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Foreword
For centuries, attacks on maritime commerce have been consistent features of war at 
sea. At the same time, a fundamental raison d’être of navies has been the protection of 
maritime trade against such attacks. From ancient times, piracy has been an issue at sea, 
and a long tradition of private men-of-war lasted into the mid-nineteenth century.
After 1690, the French navy put into practice a concept of guerre de course as an alterna-
tive to fleet battle, or guerre d’escadre, as a means of dealing with the superior power of 
Britain’s Royal Navy. In the 1870s and 1880s a group of naval thinkers in France, labeled 
the Jeune École, promoted ideas of commerce raiding with high-speed torpedo boats. 
Other naval theorists—including Alfred Thayer Mahan in the United States, Sir Julian 
Corbett in Britain, and Raoul Castex in France—concluded from their analyses of his-
tory that such commerce warfare was an indecisive method of waging war by relatively 
weak powers, an approach that was not as effective as one focusing primarily on the 
victory of one battle fleet over another. During the two world wars of the twentieth cen-
tury, submarine attacks on maritime trade were extremely effective, leading the great 
American naval thinker J. C. Wylie to define two different types of strategy: a sequential 
strategy that leads from one action to another, and a cumulative strategy, such as one 
involving attrition of merchant shipping in commerce warfare.
Some commentators have argued that in the modern globalized economy, no state 
would find any advantage in attacking a global interconnected maritime trade that has 
benefit for all. Yet, as one prescient observer of this subject noted recently, “unlikely 
threats and outdated practices rear their ugly heads when the situation favors them” 
(Douglas C. Peifer, “Maritime Commerce Warfare: The Coercive Response of the 
Weak?,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 2 [Spring 2013], pp. 83–109, quote at p. 84).
A consideration of the range of historical case studies in this volume provides an oppor-
tunity to reflect on the ways in which old and long-forgotten problems might reemerge 
to challenge future naval planners and strategists. 
john b. hattendorf, d.phil.
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History  
Chairman, Maritime History Department 
Naval War College
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Note
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily 
those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or the Naval War College.
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Introduction
In the late nineteenth century, the French Jeune École, or “new school,” of naval think-
ing promoted a commerce-raiding strategy for the weaker naval power to defeat the 
dominant naval power. France provided the vocabulary for the discussion—Jeune École 
and guerre de course (war of the chase)—and embodied the geopolitical predicament 
addressed: France had been a dominant land power, known for its large and proficient 
army and resentful of British imperial dominance and commercial preeminence. But its 
navy had rarely matched the Royal Navy in either quantity or quality, and its economy 
could not support both a preeminent army and navy. So its naval thinkers thought of an 
economical way out of its predicament. They argued that a guerre de course allowed a 
weaker maritime power, such as France, to impose disproportionate costs on the stron-
ger sea power in order to achieve its objectives. Sadly for France, the strategy did not 
work as anticipated, and British naval dominance and imperial primacy endured.
The case studies in this book reveal why this was so, and they shed light on the dynamic 
of rivalries between maritime and continental powers. This issue is an important one in 
that from the heyday of the British Empire to the present, maritime powers have set the 
global order, and continental powers have contested it. So the dynamic is still with us, 
and it is of vital national import to all countries that benefit from the present interna-
tional order of freedom of navigation, free trade, and the rule of international law.
Commerce raiding, or guerre de course, is associated with major wars, such as the U.S. 
Civil War and the two world wars. Yet in many cases, if not most often, such operations 
have been conducted with relatively little public awareness. This does not indicate inef-
fectiveness, however. As a military tactic, commerce raiding has time after time proved 
itself a most efficient way to exert pressure on an opponent. A few scholars have placed 
these events in their social, political, and naval contexts, but their studies have been 
the exception, not the rule. For this reason, this collection should fill a major gap in the 
academic literature.
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This volume will focus on how and why guerre de course strategies have been adopted 
and conducted both in nonwar and in wartime conflicts. Reexamining examples from 
the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries makes several factors apparent. 
First, while dominant sea powers have frequently conducted commerce raiding—most 
notably the American campaign against Japan in World War II—weak naval powers or 
continental powers have also attempted to cut off opponents’ international trade, as the 
American revolutionaries did in the 1770s, and as Napoleon tried to do from 1803 to 
1815, to Britain.
Second, guerre de course campaigns are often protracted, especially if the victim, par-
ticularly a continental one, opens alternate land lines of communications. In attacks on 
sea powers, however, speed is essential, as shown by Germany’s failure to defeat Great 
Britain in either world war. The more time a sea power has to create the means to pro-
tect its sea trade, the less effective the guerre de course strategy will be.
Third, changes in technology have greatly affected commerce raiding—for example, 
the transition from wood to copper-sheathed ships in the early nineteenth century, the 
change from coal to oil combustion in the early twentieth century, and the development 
of airplanes and submarines. Most recently, Somali “pirates” have used small skiffs and 
handheld GPS devices to capture enormous oil tankers, bringing low-level but highly 
affordable and dependable technology to the fore.
Commerce raiding has been a traditional mission for all major navies and has played 
a particularly important role in Western maritime history. Alfred Thayer Mahan 
highlighted the important if secondary roles of commerce raiders in the American 
Revolution, the War of 1812, and the U.S. Civil War. Sir Julian Corbett, the unofficial 
Admiralty historian, emphasized the costs of interfering with international trade, writ-
ing in 1907: “The prolonged exercise of belligerent rights” over mercantile shipping, 
“even of the most undoubted kind, produces an interference with trade that becomes 
more and more oppressive.”* Only seven years after Corbett’s book was published, Brit-
ain was at war, defending its very existence from a German campaign of unrestricted 
submarine warfare. Fortunately for London, Washington found German behavior 
threatening to the rights of neutral powers and eventually declared war on Berlin. In 
contrast, in World War II it was the U.S. Navy that carried out a thoroughly successful 
unrestricted submarine warfare campaign, this time against Japan. Postwar, however, 
the international community tended to band together whenever any country or regional 
war interfered with international trade, as best shown during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War 
of the 1980s and the current piracy threat off Somalia.
 * Sir Julian Corbett, England in the Seven Years’ War (London: Longmans, Green, 1907 [repr. 1918]), vol. 2, p. 5.
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The sixteen case studies in this book reflect the extraordinary diversity of experience 
of navies attempting to carry out, and also to eliminate, commerce raiding. Because the 
cases emphasize conflicts in which commerce raiding had major repercussions, they 
shed light on when, how, and in what manner it is most likely to be effective. The  
authors have been asked to examine the international context, the belligerents, the dis-
tribution of costs and benefits, the logistical requirements, enemy countermeasures, and 
the operational and strategic effectiveness of these campaigns. 
There is a popular—albeit often misguided—image of the commerce raider as the dash-
ing privateer, risking life and limb to bring an enemy prize back to port. The truth is 
probably much less romantic, and as noted almost all world navies have included com-
merce interdiction as one of their most basic roles. The chronologically arranged case 
studies in this volume begin with Thomas M. Truxes’s examination of the Seven Years’ 
War, when Great Britain attempted to deprive the French of provisions, supplies, and 
“warlike stores” from all sources, foreign or domestic. In response, France encouraged 
the neutral maritime powers—the Netherlands, Denmark, and Spain—both to fill the 
gap in the French supply train and to test the forbearance of Great Britain. From early in 
the conflict, there were large-scale interdictions of neutral merchantmen by British war-
ships and privateers, all of which strained Britain’s relations with its allies. In addition to 
problems concerning European neutrals aiding the French, Britain also faced large-scale 
trading with the enemy by its own subjects in North America and Ireland. The Royal 
Navy, along with British privateers based in the Bahamas and Jamaica, staged a vigorous 
but largely unsuccessful campaign to bring an end to this activity. 
In the American Revolution, as Christopher Magra persuasively argues, the colonists 
desperately needed to establish a naval force to prosecute the Revolutionary War. By 30 
June 1775 there were twenty-nine British warships stationed off the North American 
coast, between Florida and Nova Scotia. Without some attempt to develop their own sea 
power, the united colonies would have lost the war eventually. This chapter, challenging 
historians who argue that the Americans pursued only a guerre de course and privateer-
based naval strategy, shows how the Continental Congress leased and paid the expenses 
of a small number of vessels whose purpose was not strictly to engage enemy merchant 
shipping. In fact, the naval strategy Americans employed during the Revolutionary War 
involved deploying publicly controlled small vessels with the intention of eventually 
engaging larger enemy warships.
French privateering was common during this era. Silvia Marzagalli shows how French 
shipowners fitted out privateers throughout the eighteenth century and during the wars 
of 1793–1815. In this latter conflict, in which French shipping and trade were in some 
4  the newport papers
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instances virtually paralyzed, privateers were fitted out even in ports, such as Nantes or 
Bordeaux, that had hardly any tradition of such ventures. Important factors affecting 
the evolution of this activity include French willingness to authorize privateers, even 
though they competed with the navy for seamen; foreign opportunities to employ ships 
in other, more profitable trade; and the efficiency of the British navy and privateers in 
capturing French privateers. The French guerre de course was above all an opportunity 
for profits for merchants and employment for seamen; it was not a decisive element  
of warfare.
Kevin McCranie shows how during the War of 1812 the American Secretary of the 
Navy, William Jones, adopted beginning in February 1813 a new oceanic naval strategy 
that emphasized commerce raiding and de-emphasized ship-on-ship battle, in an effort 
to preserve America’s scarce warships and impose disproportionate expenses on Britain. 
Jones sought to force the Royal Navy to sustain costly deployments off the U.S. coast, 
throughout the North Atlantic, and eventually beyond, in other contested waters. The 
design, execution, and effects of Jones’s strategy show how a far weaker power could use 
a tiny navy effectively against the largest navy in the world.
The American Civil War revealed other uses for commerce raiding. Spencer Tucker 
focuses on the Confederacy’s guerre de course strategy to cause serious economic 
distress in the North so that business interests would clamor for a negotiated end to 
the war that would in turn bring Southern independence. The Confederacy, without 
modern shipbuilding facilities and with its ports under blockade, ultimately contracted 
for eighteen ships abroad. CSS Alabama, the most famous Confederate raider, sailed 
some seventy-five thousand miles and took sixty-four prizes valued at up to six million 
dollars prior to its destruction in battle with the U.S. Navy screw sloop Kearsarge off 
Cherbourg, France, on 19 June 1864. While the Southern raiders did drive up insurance 
rates substantially, their major lasting effect was to force a large number of U.S. vessels 
into permanent foreign registry. More than half of the total U.S. merchant fleet was thus 
permanently lost to the flag during the Civil War.
David H. Olivier’s examination of French and German naval theorists shows how the 
navies of France and Germany found themselves facing similar strategic situations but 
arrived at differing rationales for adopting commerce raiding strategies. The French 
expected their next war to be against the world’s most powerful navy, the Royal Navy, so 
the new French strategy relied on a traditional weapon, the cruiser, in combination with 
a new threat, the torpedo boat. Together, these warships were to attack British maritime 
trade, with the primary goal of causing panic in the British business and financial com-
munities. Instead of French military victories, it was to be the desperate pleas of British 
trade and commercial interests that would force Great Britain to sue for peace. The Ger-
man navy, by contrast, believed its main foe would be France. Germans too hit on the 
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idea of guerre de course but applied it differently. The main purpose behind a German 
war on French commerce would be to deny France overseas imports, especially weap-
ons. Although both the French and Germans advocated guerre de course, then, their 
methods and their goals differed.
These European discussions of commerce raiding had relevance to the first Sino-
Japanese War (1894–95). On the first day of the war, the Japanese navy sank the British-
owned-and-operated Kowshing, under lease to China to carry Chinese troops to the 
Korean theater. As S. C. M. Paine shows, this sinking was highly controversial at the 
time. Large sections of the British public condemned Japan for sinking a British ship, 
until British courts came down on the side of Japan. Conversely, China’s failure to con-
duct a guerre de course against Japan’s vulnerable logistical lines arguably cost it the war. 
A decade later Japan was at war again, but this time with Russia. As discussed by Bruce 
A. Elleman, during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War the Russian navy carried out 
an intense, albeit short-lived, guerre de course strategy. Operating simultaneously in the 
Red Sea and in the Pacific Ocean, Russian commerce raiders attempted to interfere with 
international trade to Japan. However, Russia’s basing in East Asia was inadequate, and 
China’s declaration of neutrality—combined with Japanese insistence that China carry 
out its full obligations as a neutral power—ensured that Russian commerce raiding 
would prove ineffective.
In the first of two case studies examining World War I, Paul G. Halpern discusses how a 
traditional guerre de course did not work well for the German navy. A certain number of 
German cruisers remained at large, auxiliary cruisers managed to put to sea throughout 
most of the war, and these surface raiders achieved some success—probably greater than 
allied naval authorities were willing to admit during the war. But that success relative 
to the volume of allied trade was comparatively small. In contrast, the German U-boats 
quickly proved their potential as a potent new weapon against allied shipping. However, 
because Germany’s decision to adopt unrestricted submarine warfare affected neutrals, 
most notably the United States, it widened the war; the entry of the United States into 
the war ultimately tipped the balance and led to Germany’s defeat. In the meantime, 
and despite Germany’s spectacular initial success, allied countermeasures gradually 
reduced losses to acceptable levels.
In examining Anglo-American relations during World War I, Ken Hagan and Mike 
McMaster focus on the American and British naval cooperation that began soon after 
the initiation of U.S. belligerency in April 1917 and lasted through November 1918.  
In this comparatively brief period the Anglo-American strategy stressed antisubmarine 
protection extended by convoys to troopships and cargo vessels making the hazardous 
transatlantic passage from the east coast of the United States to England and  
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continental Europe. They also analyze the importance of the battleships of the Grand 
Fleet to the containment of U-boats and German surface raiders. At the center of this 
birth of combined Anglo-American naval operations was Vice Adm. William S. Sims, 
the commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe. Under his leadership a complex, 
extensive, and crucially important Anglo-American naval network was constructed 
almost from scratch, with virtually no prewar planning, to counter the German  
U-boat threat.
Commerce raiding became important during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). Willard 
Frank shows how both the Republicans and Nationalists depended on military supplies 
imported by sea. Thus, the commerce war became a crucial element in the conduct and 
outcome of the conflict, in particular since the main suppliers of war materiel were 
the Germans and Italians for the Nationalists, and the Soviets and Mexicans for the 
Republicans, while British merchant firms provided most of the imports for the civilian 
needs of the Republic. A Non-Intervention Committee of European states attempted 
to contain the conflict by outlawing foreign intervention, and the 1937 British-French 
Nyon Arrangement countered Italian “piracy” by employing destroyers throughout the 
Mediterranean to sink on sight any submerged submarines. Yet the Soviets, with costs 
escalating, eventually halted major aid and effectively abandoned the Republic, doom-
ing it to defeat for lack of weapons. Increased international tension and rearmament 
combined with the failure of the Non-Intervention system allowed the Nationalists and 
their allies to evade all controls on their military imports while waging a relentless com-
merce war.
The German U-boat campaign during World War II met much the same fate as its 
World War I predecessor. As Werner Rahn explains, the Germans, after achieving early 
success in sinking the Allied shipping propping up the British economy, conducted 
from late 1941 onward an increasingly frustrating search for convoys. The U-boat did 
provide a weapon against enemy shipping up to 1942, but then the general war situation, 
especially on the Mediterranean and the Eastern fronts, forced the Naval Command 
to employ its last remaining offensive capability like a “strategic fire brigade.” This led 
to enormous attrition, which undermined the strategic concept of mass concentration 
in the Atlantic. The U-boat war failed completely in 1943, because the German boats 
had by then lost their ability to escape from enemy surveillance and increasingly deadly 
antisubmarine weapons.
In the lead-up to World War II in the Pacific, as Ken-ichi Arakawa shows, the Japanese 
government was most concerned by the prospect that embargoes by the United States, 
Great Britain, and the Netherlands would cut off crucial supplies. Merchant shipping 
was the bottleneck of Japan’s wartime economy, and the unexpectedly high shipping 
losses precluded the transport of sufficient resources from Southeast Asia, resulting 
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in the disintegration of the economy. However, if the war is viewed in its entirety, the 
picture becomes more nuanced: Japan experienced less-than-predicted shipping losses 
during the first stage of the war, and not until 1943 did they increase rapidly, owing to 
increasingly effective U.S. air and submarine attacks. After 1943, the military momen-
tum was on the Allies’ side, and the possibility of an ultimate Axis victory decreased. 
From this time onward, the shipping system transporting southern resources to Japan 
functioned less and less efficiently.
A major reason for Japan’s defeat was the U.S. Navy’s unrestricted submarine campaign. 
Joel Holwitt reveals how the Americans rapidly overcame their cultural aversion to 
unrestricted submarine warfare. At the beginning of World War II, it was up to the U.S. 
Navy to inflict maximum damage on the Japanese military and economy. Initially, the 
submarine force had to overcome timid commanders, inadequate tactics in combat, and 
serious flaws in the design of its torpedoes. Ultimately, however, the U.S. submarine 
force seized the initiative and conducted a pitiless commerce campaign that annihilated 
Japan’s merchant marine. The results of this campaign were extraordinary, ranging 
from the drying up of oil supplies and the almost complete cutoff of imports to the 
mass starvation of Japanese citizens and soldiers. After the war, Japanese government 
officials and naval historians assessed that the submarine war was the crucial factor that 
prevented any hope of a Japanese victory in the Second World War.
The Iran-Iraq Tanker War (1980–88) is one of the most recent examples of commerce 
raiding. George Walker discusses how the Tanker War eventually involved merchant 
shipping of many states and the largest wartime deployment of the U.S. and other navies 
since the Korean War. New legal developments, such as the diversion of shipping for in-
spection instead of seizure as prizes, and such technological developments as long-range 
missiles, significantly impacted the conduct of the war. Besides states’ traditional inter-
ests, this conflict involved intergovernmental organizations—ranging from NATO and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, or the Arab League, to the EU/EC—and nongovernmen-
tal organizations, including shipping associations, international maritime insurance 
interests, labor organizations, and human rights and humanitarian law organizations. 
These groups became important factors leading to the termination of the Tanker War.
The final case study examines the current piracy situation off Somalia. As Martin 
Murphy highlights, the pirates work from the territory of a single state—albeit a failed 
state—a fact that distinguishes this type of piracy from strictly private enterprise. In 
fact, in many ways it resembles a state-sponsored commerce-raiding campaign, in 
which Somali government officials and clan leaders receive lucrative kickbacks from the 
pirates even while the pirates gain protection from Somali officials. Until the interna-
tional community treats these pirate groups as commerce raiders, not pirates, and acts 
accordingly, there is little likelihood that the situation will improve.
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This volume concludes with an analysis of commerce raiding during the past two and 
a half centuries in terms of the factors of time, space, and force, as well as with respect 
to positive and negative objectives. The importance of commerce raiding lies not only 
in the destruction of enemy trade but also in the foreclosure of enemy courses of action. 
Commerce raiding operations open a potentially efficient way to impose dispropor-
tionate costs on the enemy. In a protracted war, its cumulative effects, in combination 
with those of other military operations, can be decisive. Even in situations short of war, 
however, attacks on commerce can threaten the orderly growth of global commerce.
Note
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily 
those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or the Naval War College.
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The Breakdown of Borders
Commerce Raiding during the Seven Years’ War, 1756–1763
THOMAS M.  TRUXES
War on commerce during the Seven Years’ War involved the seizure of trading ships and 
cargoes in the service of the enemy. Governments on both sides encouraged commerce 
raiding and provided for the distribution of prizes on generous terms. The most impor-
tant targets were those that contributed to the enemy’s capacity to wage war—cargoes of 
guns, gunpowder, ammunition, naval stores, shipboard provisions, and the like.
But commerce raiding extended far beyond goods associated with military operations. 
“In a War between two Nations, each enemy may lawfully take, seize, and possess him-
self of the Property of his Opponent, wherever it can be found,” wrote a British jurist in 
1758.1 The war on commerce encompassed the entirety of the enemy’s waterborne trade. 
In this heavily incentivized activity, the more valuable the cargo, the better.
There are huge gaps in our knowledge of eighteenth-century commerce raiding. Al-
though it is a topic frequently touched on in histories of the period, the accounts that do 
exist have a regional or local emphasis, and they are typically narrow in scope and heav-
ily anecdotal.2 What does seem evident is that the gains and losses of one side appear to 
have been largely offset by the gains and losses of the other.3 Even if the balance tipped 
one way or another, as it surely did, it is unlikely that either side derived a significant 
military advantage from its disruption of the enemy’s trade. In the eastern Atlantic, the 
western Atlantic, and in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, both sides exacted heavy 
tolls. But neither the British nor the French succeeded by commerce raiding in deliver-
ing a decisive blow to the enemy’s capacity to fight.
The Context for Commerce Raiding during the Seven Years’ War
The Seven Years’ War is known in the United States as the French and Indian War. It 
was fought between Great Britain and its allies (notably Prussia) and France and its 
allies (notably Austria and later Spain). As with the earlier eighteenth-century Anglo-
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in the balance of power. Even more pressing, however, were territorial concerns on the 
North American mainland that had been left unresolved at the conclusion of the War of 
the Austrian Succession, 1744–48.
The Great War for Empire, as the Seven Years’ War has been called by one of its best-
known historians, was a global conflict in which armies collided in Europe, Africa, the 
Indian subcontinent, and the Philippines, and there were naval operations with an even 
longer reach. In the North American and Caribbean theaters, Great Britain and France 
struggled for control of a vast and rich colonial empire. Fighting erupted in the back-
country of Pennsylvania in 1754, but formal hostilities did not begin until the spring of 
1756, when Great Britain declared war on France. Spain’s entry into the war in January 
1762 on the side of the French was directly associated with the war on commerce.4
The mid-eighteenth-century British Empire was a mélange of kingdoms, colonies,  
and widely dispersed territorial footholds held together by loyalty to a common mon-
arch, broad adherence to a set of legal principles, and participation in a commercial 
system that encouraged initiative and respected property. The British had been late to 
establish permanent settlements in the New World, but by the middle decades of the 
seventeenth century Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scots had found the means to tap the 
riches of the Americas in the production and marketing of tobacco, sugar, and other 
semitropical staples.
The rapid accumulation of wealth in British America depended on slave labor, a resilient 
commercial system, and the capacity of the Royal Navy to protect seaborne trade. By the 
1750s, economic expansion was being fueled as well by a rapidly expanding population 
on the American mainland. Demand for consumer goods in British America had trans-
formed manufacturing in the British Isles and contributed to the emergence of London 
as Europe’s financial capital.5
The French were a formidable opponent. The superpower of eighteenth-century western 
Europe, France had a large population and an abundance of resources.6 Like the English, 
the French had a strong economic presence in the New World, one that affected nearly 
every region in France. Sugar production in the French West Indies exceeded that of 
the British Caribbean islands, and French territorial holdings on the North American 
continent—though not well populated—dwarfed those of Great Britain.7 But not all 
was well. A large share of France’s Atlantic trade was conducted under foreign flags, 
with the result that the number of sailors available to man the warships of the French 
navy—necessary for the defense of a far-flung empire—had not kept pace with French 
commercial expansion.8
To doctrinaire mercantilists, trading nations were locked in a perpetual state of un-
declared economic war. It was widely believed that there was only so much trade to go 
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around and that colonial commerce belonged exclusively to the mother country. By this 
reasoning, the gains enjoyed by one colonial empire came at the expense of its rivals. 
In an age of runaway defense expenditures, governments jealously protected overseas 
trade, which they valued primarily as a source of revenue. The security of the state was 
thus intimately linked to the condition of colonial commerce.9 Trade disruption consti-
tuted an immediate and potentially lethal threat to the state, and the undermining of 
the trade of one’s enemies—particularly in time of war—was always justifiable.10
The British Campaign against French Wartime Trade
British warships began seizing French trading vessels in July 1755, weeks before news of 
Gen. Edward Braddock’s defeat in western Pennsylvania reached Europe and roughly 
ten months before Britain’s formal entry into the war.11 As many as three hundred ships, 
with cargoes valued at approximately thirty million livres, fell into the hands of British 
cruisers.12 To critics of the British government’s war policy, it was a blatant violation of 
the “law of nations.”13 From the perspective of the War Ministry, however, the attack 
on French commerce was defensible as a means of “crippling the enemy’s finance at the 
critical moment of mobilization,” according to one contemporary.14 The French, far be-
hind in their preparations for war, “behaved with studious restraint,” says one historian, 
and “stigmatized the proceedings of the English as simple piracy,” writes another.15
On 17 May 1756, King George II declared war against the French king, Louis XV. The 
detained French vessels and cargoes were confiscated, and all French shipping, as well 
as the shipping of any nation in the service of the French—“the same being taken” by 
British warships and privateers—“shall be condemned as good and lawful Prize,” an-
nounced the royal proclamation.16
The French returned the favor on 9 June 1756, declaring war on Great Britain and un-
leashing their own warships and privateers against the British carrying trade.17 The next 
month, a parliamentary statute granted the officers and men of British warships and 
privateers “the sole interest and property of and in all and every ship, vessel, goods and 
merchandizes, which they shall take [during] the continuance of this war with France 
(being first adjudged lawful prize in any of his Majesty’s courts of admiralty in Great 
Britain, or in his Majesty’s plantations in America).”18 By statutes and proclamations, the 
British government streamlined the operation of admiralty and vice-admiralty courts 
and established an orderly process for the distribution of prizes.19 Without such reforms, 
wrote a Boston newspaper, “Privateering may be said to be only a Harvest for Agents 
and Lawyers.”20
The Royal Navy was Britain’s principal weapon in the war on French commerce. In the 
eastern Atlantic well over half the prizes taken by the British were seized by the navy. 
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Among these were such vessels as Duke of Bourbon, taken by HMS Bristol (fifty guns) in 
September 1757. The captured French merchantman had been bound from Bordeaux to 
Saint-Domingue “loaded with Wine, Flour, Oil, Soap, Beef, Pork, and the richest of Bale 
Goods . . . supposed to be worth £12,000,” wrote the Cork Evening Post.21 British naval 
officers were relentless in their pursuit of prizes. During the first years of the war, for 
example, the captain of a British warship rowed into the harbor of Brest, where he and 
his men “boarded a French snow, cut her cables, and brought her clear off though she lay 
among the men of war.”22
Private ships of war were “always supplementary” to the warships of the king, writes a 
British naval historian.23 Even so, privateers (privately owned fighting ships licensed 
by the state to seize the property of the enemy) and “letters of marque” (commercial 
vessels licensed by the state to seize property of the enemy encountered in the normal 
course of trade) were effective weapons and represented the public face of commerce 
raiding. In American waters, privateers and “letters of marque” may have had a slight 
edge over warships of the Royal Navy in the number, if not the value, of seizures.24 How-
ever, competition for prizes between warships and privateers bred distrust on both sides, 
and naval officers freely expressed contempt for privateersmen, whom they considered 
seagoing vermin.25
In the early months of the war, there was a privateering frenzy on both sides of the 
Atlantic: “The zeal shown on this occasion produced a fleet of cruisers far exceeding 
anything attempted in previous wars,” writes the historian of Bristol privateering.26 But 
he might just as well be speaking about London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Cork, or more than 
a dozen ports in the British Isles and Channel Islands.27
It was no different in British North America, particularly in Newport, Rhode Island, 
and New York. “The declaration of War having put such spirits in persons here,” wrote a 
New York merchant, “that no Less than 12 Privateers are out and fitting with the great-
est dispatch.”28 A North American privateer that caught the public’s imagination was 
the “diminutive” Herliquin of New York: “We have had brought into this Port Taken by 
our Privateers 51 Sail of Prize,” a New Yorker told his brother in Liverpool. “But a Little 
Pilet boat Called the Herliquin has been the most Successfull of any having Made 5 good 
Voyages in 14 months.”29
British privateers typically operated alone or in pairs. However, the most effective tac-
tics required cooperation and took advantage of the French navy’s failure to provide ad-
equate convoy protection. Early in the war it was common for a French convoy to begin 
its transatlantic crossings with just a single escort, and few escorting vessels provided 
port-to-port protection. French convoys were frequently abandoned by their escorts or 
scattered by a strategy of penetration employed by awaiting enemy squadrons.30 In the 
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early stage of a transatlantic crossing, a westbound French convoy faced harassment 
by British warships and privateers based in the eastern Atlantic. Those that survived 
endured a second round of attacks as they entered the West Indian archipelago.31 The 
impact on French transatlantic shipping of such experiences was devastating.
In 1756, a Connecticut newspaper wrote, “Our Enemies the French are much strait-
ened for Provisions in their several Settlements on this Continent, as well as in their 
Islands.”32 The early phase of the war saw a heroic struggle by the French to keep the 
sea-lanes open. “I hope Heaven shall soon deliver us from this sorrowful Place,” wrote 
a Dutch ship captain from Saint-Domingue in February 1757, “in case now and then a 
Prize was not brought up, there would really not have been any Bread to eat.”33 By the 
end of 1757 British warships and privateers had swept the French carrying trade from 
the sea.34 After the autumn of 1759, British squadrons based at Port Royal, Jamaica, and 
English Harbor, Antigua, rarely encountered French warships in Caribbean waters.35 
French merchantmen were loath to put to sea, and when they did—on either side of the 
Atlantic—they faced likely capture.36
London’s Policy toward Neutral Shipping
In his declaration of war, George II warned that any vessel carrying “soldiers, arms, 
powder, ammunition, or other contraband goods” to any territory of the French king 
“shall be condemned as good and lawful prize.”37 Versailles responded in kind: “Every 
power at war is naturally attentive to prevent its enemies from carrying on a free trade 
under the protection of neutral colors,” asserted a Mémoire Instructif in the summer of 
1756: “As the Hollanders are neutral in the present war,” it threatened in thinly veiled 
language, “it is their interest to conform to the regulations of France.”38 The Dutch were 
in an impossible position. From the British they risked destruction of their commerce 
at sea; from the French they faced the possibility of invasion through borders that were 
indefensible against the armies of Louis XV.39
By Dutch tradition the seas were free, and compared to that of Great Britain and France, 
the overseas trade of the Netherlands was unencumbered. Dutch authorities encouraged 
open markets and the free flow of ships and cargoes through their thriving continental 
ports, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, as well as strategically located shipping points in 
the West Indies.40 The most important of these, the tiny island of Saint Eustatius, is just 
six miles northwest of Saint Christopher, in the Leeward Islands. For a mile along the 
crowded shore of Orange Bay, over two hundred warehouses offered an astonishing ar-
ray of goods to buyers on both sides of the conflict. Saint Eustatius and the Dutch island 
of Curaçao in the southern Caribbean Sea were busy crossroads of transnational trade, 
as well as irritants to British, French, and Spanish mercantilists.41
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Even before the formal declaration of war, a rumor circulated in London, according to a 
diplomat stationed there, that “France will allow all nations to trade freely with her colo-
nies so that more French sailors may be free to fight, and that French merchants may 
trade under neutral flags.” 42 The British had good reason to be concerned and before 
long began interdicting Dutch vessels carrying small arms, cannons, gunpowder, shot, 
and other “warlike stores” mixed with conventional cargoes.43
Officials in the Netherlands insisted that the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1674 guaranteed 
the free movement of Dutch ships and goods in time of war. By the middle decades of 
the eighteenth century, however, the 1674 treaty was seriously out of alignment with the 
realities of the Atlantic economy. The British—rattled by a string of French victories and 
faced with the reality that neutral shipping was sustaining the French war effort—as-
serted that the treaty did not apply to America and unilaterally abrogated the principle 
of “free ships, free goods” enshrined in the 1674 agreement.44
The British had no intention of allowing the unfettered trade of neutrals to threaten the 
security of Britain. “Considering how widely Commercial Interests are diffused,” wrote 
the author of The Case of the Dutch Ships Considered in 1758, “[it] is actually an Impos-
sibility for two great, and Maritime Powers, to engage in a War, but the Intercourse of 
all the rest must be liable to be disturbed.” In such a situation, he added, a neutral state 
must accept the risks implicit in neutrality: “If the Goods of Enemies may be lawfully 
seized wherever they are, then it follows, that they certainly may be seized on board the 
Ships of Neutrals.” 45
In the first two months of the Seven Years’ War, no fewer than forty-eight Dutch vessels 
were taken by the British. “England does not have much regard for Treaty rights when 
her safety is at stake,” said a Spanish diplomat.46 Britain’s assault on the neutral carrying 
trade, which continued through the war, “renders our Trade very uncertain,” wrote a 
merchant on Saint Eustatius to Bordeaux.47 From the perspective of London, the ship-
ping and entrepôt services provided by the Dutch and Danes had the potential to turn 
the war on its head. “What signifies our being masters at sea,” commented a London 
businessman, “if we shall not have liberty to stop ships from serving our enemy?” 48
Neutral Spain presented an even more difficult problem, as the ministry in London 
became increasingly obsessed with keeping Spain out of the conflict on the side of 
France. Spanish merchantmen regularly called at French Atlantic and Mediterranean 
ports, and in the Caribbean, Spanish vessels were an ordinary sight at Saint-Domingue, 
Martinique, and Guadeloupe.49 In spite of clear evidence of cooperation between the 
Spanish and French, London insisted on respect for Spanish neutrality.50 From the 
outset, however, British naval officers and privateer commanders had been taking the 
law into their own hands, seizing Spanish ships thought to be cooperating with the 
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enemy and—occasionally—entering Spanish territorial waters in pursuit of French 
merchantmen.51
British public opinion demanded that the French be deprived of the protection of 
neutral flags, even at the risk of enlarging the war.52 The solution came in the form 
of “the Rule of 1756,” the British assertion that a trade prohibited in peacetime could 
not be allowed in a time of war.53 “All the European nations exclude foreigners from 
their American colonies,” wrote Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in September 1756: “The 
question is whether England shall suffer [the Dutch and the Danes] to trade thither in 
time of war, without seizure, when the French themselves will not suffer them to trade 
thither, in time of peace, on that very account.”54 In a stroke, Great Britain set down a 
sweeping dictum that took on the force of international law.
British interdictions created a diplomatic storm that challenged the forbearance of 
powerful commercial interests in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Copenhagen, Cadiz, and 
other neutral ports.55 Pushback against the British came in the form of unsanctioned 
outbursts, each with the potential of creating an international incident. According to 
the New-York Gazette, for example, HMS Woolwich (forty-four guns) was cruising off 
Saint Eustatius late in the war when it “was fired upon from their Batteries, whereby she 
received considerable Damage, and very narrowly escaped being burnt [having been 
mistaken for] the Britannia Privateer, Capt. M’Pherson, of Philadelphia, who has inter-
cepted many of their French trading Vessels.”56 About the same time, an Irish newspaper 
reported that the master of a New York privateer cruising off Curaçao “was taken and 
carried in there by three Dutch armed vessels” and confined to a dungeon.57 There were 
many such incidents, but, in the capitals of northern Europe, cooler heads prevailed.58
The French Campaign against British Commerce
On the eve of the Seven Years’ War, a British newspaper boasted, “I believe we have 
nothing to fear for the Trade to the Northward of Dunkirk.”59 The nation paid dearly 
for such bravado. Two days after George II’s declaration of war, Versailles unleashed its 
corsairs, and five days later the French in America went on an all-out offensive.60 The 
government in London, according to one historian, was unprepared for “the spirited 
manner in which the French commenced the war, and the superiority and activity of 
their privateers.”61
The French navy’s contribution to the war on commerce was minimal. But when it did 
strike, it could do so with devastating effect. In 1757, for example, when Adm. Armand 
de Kersaint’s squadron slipped out of Brest and made for the Guinea coast of Africa 
and the West Indies, Britain’s Atlantic trade suffered the consequences.62 However, 
the French navy faced severe limits on the availability of ships, crews, and supplies 
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necessary to maintain a credible presence at sea. In 1756 it could provide just fifteen 
frigates at Brest and Rochefort for coastal protection and convoy duty.63 Ingrained 
attitudes about the proper role of fighting ships also kept the navy on the sidelines: 
“Officers generally sailed under orders which defined battle as an exception,” writes a 
British naval historian.64 In any case, by November 1759 the Royal Navy had effectively 
confined the French navy to port.65
Despite this, France was able to mount and sustain a vigorous campaign against British 
commerce. It did so with its large and well equipped fleet of privateers, some com-
parable in size and sophistication to warships.66 Among the most dangerous French 
privateers were those based at Dunkirk, Saint-Malo, and Morlaix, ports that enjoyed 
close proximity to the English Channel, the waterway through which passed not only 
the overseas trade of London but a large part of the British coastal trade as well. The 
privateers of Bayonne and Saint-Jean-de-Luz—farther away but every bit as dangerous—
compensated for their geographic disadvantage with their unrelenting pursuit of British 
merchantmen. Dunkirk and Bayonne, both exempt from the registration of sailors for 
service in the navy, were close enough to French borders to attract foreigners into their 
privateer services.67
French cruisers operated with impunity in British home waters from the beginning to 
the end of the war.68 Early in the fighting, according to one historian, “swift and well 
armed French privateers found their way into the North passage and the Irish Sea, 
and kept Liverpool blockaded for many weeks.”69 The London Evening-Post reported in 
1756 “that it is with great Difficulty the Fisherman of Margate [in East Kent] get any 
Fish, they being continually chased by French Boats.”70 When Versailles began to take 
warships out of service in 1760, the number of sailors available to the privateer fleet 
increased markedly, and so did the boldness of French raids in British waters. “An Order 
is gone,” reported the Cork Evening Post, “for two Ships of 40 Guns each, and a Frigate, 
to sail for the Coast of Ireland, there to cruize for the Protection of our Trade in those 
Parts, at present much annoy’d by some of the Enemy’s Privateers.”71
It was a similar story in the western Atlantic. Large and heavily manned French priva-
teers, operating in the waters off British North America, were a constant threat.72 Some 
of their commanders became quasi celebrities in the American press. Among the most 
feared was “Monsieur Palanqui,” the commander of an eighteen-gun privateer carrying 
205 men, who enjoyed a larger-than-life reputation established in the wars of the 1740s, 
when “he took 69 English Vessels.”73 Even more dreaded was the gallant Capt. Sou-
bier du Chateleau of Saint-Malo, “of late but too well known on our Coast,” wrote the 
Pennsylvania Gazette in 1759.74 Despite the anxiety created by the enemy’s presence off 
New York and other colonial ports, French privateering had little impact on the flow of 
military supplies into North America, the principal theater of war in the Americas.75
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Swarms of small and agile privateers dominated French commerce raiding in the Carib-
bean. Occasionally they coordinated their efforts. In March 1757, for example, an Amer-
ican ship captain who had been captured by a French privateer sloop reported seeing 
“55 French privateers between Barbuda and Guadeloupe in a chain about a Mile distant 
from each other.”76 More often they worked alone or in pairs, using the local topography 
to their advantage. Because of prevailing winds and currents in the eastern Caribbean, 
British merchantmen were forced to pass within easy striking distance of the French 
islands, especially Martinique, “whose numerous coves,” writes one historian, “sheltered 
scores of little sloops and schooners ready to dart out when the coast was clear.” At least 
2,400 British merchant ships were taken in the West Indies during the Seven Years’ War 
by French privateers, most of them based in Martinique.77
British countermeasures included convoys, search-and-destroy missions, and raids on 
enemy privateer bases—all of which put a strain on British naval resources.78 “I have just 
received information from Martinique that forty Privateers are ready to put to sea as 
soon as the Full of the Moon is over,” reported the commander of the British squadron 
at English Harbor, Antigua, in 1759. “Their Lordships may be assured, no Diligence of 
mine shall be wanting to give proper Protection and Security to the Trade,” he wrote, 
adding, “But the constant Application that is made to me for Convoys [must] take off 
some of our Cruizers.”79
There were, as well, dramatic encounters at sea, some involving staggering loss of life.80 
One that caught the attention of the public involved the British privateer Terrible (two 
hundred sailors and twenty-six guns) under the command of Capt. William Death (pro-
nounced “Deeth”). In 1757, Terrible lost seventeen men when it took Grand Alexander, a 
richly laden sugar vessel returning from Saint-Domingue. After placing forty of his men 
as a prize crew on board the French merchantman, Captain Death and Terrible encoun-
tered a large French privateer, Vengeance (360 sailors and thirty-six large cannons), of 
Saint-Malo. Both commanders were killed in the action that followed, and fewer than 
ten of the 160 sailors remaining aboard Terrible were left uninjured. In all, at least four 
hundred men were killed or wounded in the engagement.81
Perhaps the most dramatic action against French commerce raiding was a June 1758 
British incursion at Saint-Malo that destroyed a large number of French privateers 
and a valuable supply of naval stores with virtually no opposition. According to one 
account, the “quays and slips were crowded with shipping,” and as darkness fell British 
soldiers (or, quite likely, marines) “stole into the defenseless suburbs, with infantry in 
support, and began their work. Ship after ship was silently fired; stores, rope walks, 
and shipyards followed, till the night was red with holocaust.” In London, the mission 
was praised “for the protection it gave our trade by paralyzing one of the most dan-
gerous and active of the French privateer ports.”82 Nonetheless, and despite the Royal 
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Navy’s relentless campaign—and the large number of French privateers captured or 
destroyed throughout the war—“no absolute success was possible,” writes a British naval 
historian.83
The Royal Navy’s Response to North American and Irish Trade with the Enemy
With the French carrying trade swept from the sea and the shipping of neutrals under 
the relentless scrutiny of British cruisers, the French turned to their one remaining 
option: trading with the enemy.84 Ports in North America—notably Boston, Newport, 
New York, and Philadelphia—as well as several in Ireland took on important roles in 
the French supply chain, by which cargoes of foodstuffs, lumber, and basic supplies were 
exchanged in the French West Indies for sugar, coffee, and other West Indian produce at 
fire-sale prices.
This commerce, technically illegal only if there was direct contact between British and 
French subjects, took four forms. In the first, merchants in British North America and 
Ireland—and less often in Great Britain—channeled cargoes through the Dutch and 
Danish West Indies, where local intermediaries steered them into French hands. The 
business conducted at Dutch Saint Eustatius and Curaçao and the Danish island of Saint 
Croix grew to huge proportions.
A second venue for trading with the enemy was Spanish Monte Cristi, a sleepy port 
on the north coast of Hispaniola fewer than twenty miles from the border of French 
Saint-Domingue. Throughout the war, a fleet of forty-five to sixty Spanish coasters 
moved vast quantities of goods that had been off-loaded from vessels anchored in Monte 
Cristi Bay to Fort-Dauphin, Cape François, Port-au-Prince, and other ports in Saint-
Domingue. This occurred in full view of British warships patrolling off Monte Cristi. 
Their commanders were under strict orders to avoid incidents that might upset Britain’s 
delicate diplomatic relationship with neutral Spain.
A third form of trading with the enemy involved merchants in British America doing 
business under the cover of prisoner-of-war exchanges. Because of a reluctance to shoul-
der the cost of maintaining prisoners of war, colonial governors granted to ship captains 
licenses permitting the carriage of French prisoners to Saint-Domingue and elsewhere 
in exchange for captured British soldiers and sailors. To cover their costs, Americans 
were allowed to engage in limited trade. From this concession grew a massive flow of 
goods, mostly from Philadelphia, Newport, and New York, where the cartel trade be-
came a feature of wartime economic life.
In its fourth manifestation, North American vessels trading with the enemy did so 
without legal cover. In this high-risk game, merchants stood to make enormous profits, 
having cut out expensive layers of middlemen, or conversely, to lose everything.
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In response to this trade, in its various aspects, Parliament passed the Flour Act of 1757, 
a law that prohibited the carriage of foodstuffs to any port outside the British com-
mercial system. Huge fines were levied against violators, who risked forfeiture of both 
their vessels and cargoes. The statute applied solely to North American ships and had no 
impact on British or Irish vessels trading with the enemy. The arbitrary and discrimina-
tory character of the Flour Act left a bitter legacy and was to figure among the colonial 
grievances in the run-up to the American Revolution.
British privateers occasionally played a supporting role in wartime trade with the 
French. As French prizes became scarce in the Caribbean and the waters off North 
America, British naval officers began paying closer attention to American and Irish 
vessels doing business, directly or indirectly, with the French. The Flour Act made 
colonial vessels attractive prizes for naval officers, even in cases in which there had been 
no direct contact with the enemy. To counter this threat, North American merchants 
hired privateers, or sometimes deployed their own, to capture their own trading vessels 
returning from the French islands. In these collusive captures, the cooperating privateer 
commander went through the ritual of capture and placed a prize master, armed with 
appropriate legal documents, on board the seized vessel, which was then escorted to a 
safe port. To complicate matters further, court records reveal instances of British priva-
teers carrying goods to the enemy while at the same time cruising against French and 
neutral shipping. Enemy privateers also figured in this story, by honoring the passports 
carried by North American and Irish vessels trading within the French islands.
In official London, there was remarkable ambivalence on the subject of trading with 
the enemy. One need not look far to discover powerful individuals and interest groups 
that benefited from illicit wartime trade. It was, however, a very different story in the 
western Atlantic. In 1758, frustrated British naval commanders began to intervene on 
their own authority. From their perspective, treasonous North American and Irish mer-
chants were provisioning enemy privateers that menaced British shipping and tied up 
naval resources. Seizure by the Royal Navy—as well as by privateers based in the West 
Indies, particularly at Nassau, in the Bahamas—meant quick condemnation of ship and 
cargo in the vice-admiralty courts of Jamaica and other British West Indian islands. 
But to the chagrin of the captor’s officers and the men, who stood to share substantial 
amounts of prize money, many cases brought before an admiralty appeals court in Lon-
don were reversed, most often on grounds of insufficient proof of face-to-face contact 
with the enemy.85
Operational and Strategic Effectiveness of the British and French Guerre de Course
The goals of commerce raiding varied from one operational theater to another. In the 
struggle for dominance in North America and the West Indies, both Great Britain and 
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France placed a high priority on disrupting the enemy’s trade in both directions across 
the Atlantic. The interdiction of westbound commerce deprived the enemy of supplies 
necessary to sustain the fight, and the seizure of eastbound vessels laden with valuable 
colonial produce shifted sorely needed tax revenues from the coffers of one state into 
those of the other. Within the confines of the Caribbean Sea, both sides worked assidu-
ously to strangle the other’s interisland commerce and throw its plantation economy 
into disarray.
In the eastern Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Baltic Sea, the objectives and 
tactics of the belligerents differed. The loosely coordinated privateer force of the French 
sought opportunistically to disrupt British waterborne trade, in whatever way it could, 
rather than as part of an overarching grand design. Great Britain, which until late 1759 
faced the real possibility of a French invasion, used its warships and privateers to keep 
the enemy’s commercial shipping bottled up in port in order to deprive cash-starved 
France of the benefits of a commercial empire.
Nearly all of the port towns of Great Britain and Ireland felt the sting of French com-
merce raiding. But none were more than temporarily disturbed by the depredations of 
enemy privateers. The French were not so fortunate. The guerre de course profoundly af-
fected all of the French Atlantic and Mediterranean ports. At La Rochelle, for example, 
the Seven Years’ War threatened the city’s economic foundations: “For the Rochelais,” 
the war “precipitated an economic crisis, measured by captured merchantmen, kin and 
seamen killed or wounded in combat, unpaid debts, soaring costs, and the absolute 
cessation of the slave trade.” It was nearly as bad at Le Havre, Brest, L’Orient, Nantes, 
Bordeaux, Marseilles, Toulon, and elsewhere on the French Atlantic and Mediterranean 
coasts, where commercial losses cast a pall over economic life.86
In the western Atlantic, neither the British nor the French fully achieved their goals. 
The Royal Navy possessed adequate resources to halt Dutch, Danish, Spanish, North 
American, and Irish participation in the French supply chain, but it lacked the political 
support from London necessary. To the dismay of the Royal Navy, French resourceful-
ness, the cooperation of neutral states, and the opportunism of merchants in Ireland 
and North America led to a breakdown of borders that encouraged the free flow of 
goods in a highly volatile wartime environment.87 The French, for their part, were dis-
advantaged by the absence of their navy and their overreliance on a loosely coordinated 
but aggressive privateer force. French commerce raiding in the western Atlantic created 
serious disruptions for the British, but it had little impact on the war’s outcome.
There were many who benefited from the war on commerce. In fact, commerce raid-
ing acted as a countercyclical stimulant to economic activity in a region negatively 
affected by war: “The fitting out of commissioned ships involved capital investment, 
truxes  21
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch1-Truxes.indd  August 16, 2013 4:30 PM
employment of labor, and the consumption of goods produced in the shore-based 
marine industries,” and commerce raiding “generally added to the ‘stock’ of vessels 
operating from a port by virtue of the purchase, seizure, or building of ships.”88 Indi-
viduals benefited as well, some handsomely. For the officers and men of the Royal Navy, 
prize money was the greatest attraction of naval service. A lucky captain could “make 
a fortune overnight,” according to one authority on eighteenth-century navies, and “an 
admiral was almost assured of it.”89 Financial rewards could be substantial for those who 
manned the privateers, as well as for those who invested in them. There was no payday, 
however, if a voyage came up empty.90
Both sides paid a high price for commerce raiding. It led to a steep rise in transporta-
tion charges as the wages of sailors increased, maritime insurance premiums rose, and 
available cargo space contracted.91 It also bred uncertainty. An American merchant on 
the eve of the conflict wrote, “Our produce is falling owing to the apprehensions of a 
war, . . . [with] people fearing to send out their vessels.”92 But the greatest cost was the 
loss of life and limb that was a predictable result of armed engagements at sea. If the 
British and the French stumbled into war over ill-advised forays into commerce raiding, 
then all of the costs associated with the Seven Years’ War must be laid at the feet of what 
Lord Granville called “vexing your neighbors for a little muck.”93
It is impossible to discuss this topic without wondering whether mid-eighteenth-
century commerce raiding was merely a disguised and legally sanctioned form of piracy. 
Newspapers were replete with stories that described the pillaging of British, French, 
and neutral merchantmen, as well as the mistreatment of sailors.94 Dutch vessels were 
frequent targets of abuse by British privateers, but the most egregious incidents involved 
attacks against Spaniards in the Caribbean.95 Some of these, such as the “piratical” rob-
bery of a Spanish vessel carrying government dispatches by a privateer crew based in 
Barbados, created international incidents requiring intervention at the highest level. In 
that instance, the governor of the Leeward Islands reported to London “that this Execu-
tion, and the Hanging in Chains [of the bodies of the perpetrators] seem to have struck 
a general Terror amongst the Privateers; and I flatter myself, that His Catholick Majesty 
will have no further Cause for Complaint.” As for the future, however, “unless some of 
the Offenders can be prevailed upon to give Evidence for the King . . . under a Promise 
of Pardon, it will not be possible to convict them.”96
British parliamentary statutes—notably those of 1708, 1756, and 1759—attempted to 
establish rules of conduct for the interdiction of trading vessels in the service of the en-
emy.97 But it was beyond the capacity of an eighteenth-century state—except where com-
missioned naval officers were involved—to control the behavior of predator warships in 
high-stakes confrontations at sea in which lives and fortunes were on the line.
22  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch1-Truxes.indd  August 16, 2013 4:30 PM
There is no reliable account of the number and value of the prizes taken and condemned 
by the British and French during the Seven Years’ War. However, “there seems no doubt 
that the French claim to have captured a greater number of vessels than [the British] 
is justified,” writes one authority on eighteenth-century warfare. The value of their 
captures is less certain. The French, he added, did little harm to British transatlantic 
convoys, and the enemy’s relentless disruption of shipping failed to undermine Great 
Britain’s commercial credit, the weakening of which would constitute “the main strate-
gic value of commerce destruction.”98
Conclusions
During the Seven Years’ War, commerce raiding energized the Atlantic economy, 
fostered cross border exchanges, and challenged the mercantilist assumptions that gov-
erned eighteenth-century commercial policy. It also motivated policy makers in London 
and Versailles to put their houses in order following the Peace of Paris in 1763.
Under the leadership of the duc de Choiseul, in 1763 the minister of marine and colo-
nies, France initiated an ambitious program to rebuild its navy, strengthen defenses in 
the West Indies, and restructure French colonial commerce. But in both France and 
the French Caribbean, officials worked at cross-purposes, and attempts to liberalize 
the rules governing trade were offset by periods of tightened control and heavy-handed 
enforcement. French commercial policy grew increasingly out of touch with the realities 
of the Atlantic world.99
Great Britain, likewise, entered a period of adjustment. Victors in the long and costly 
war, the British initiated a series of postwar reforms intended to discipline colonial 
commerce and strengthen the revenue of the state. Within weeks of signing the Treaty 
of Paris, Parliament passed the Customs Enforcement Act of 1763, a statute that called 
for deputizing the sea officers of the Royal Navy as customs-enforcement agents.  
A legacy of widespread trading with the enemy during the Seven Years’ War, the 
Customs Enforcement Act helped to create the adversarial relationship between the 
mother country and the British colonies that culminated twelve years later in the 
American Revolution.100
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Guerre de Course and the First American  
Naval Strategy
CHRISTOPHER P.  MAGR A
In 1755, a twenty-year-old John Adams wrote a letter to a friend stating that since the 
North American colonies had “all the naval stores of the nation in our hands, it will be 
easy to obtain the mastery of the seas, and then the united force of all Europe will not be 
able to subdue us.”1 Perhaps the substance of this letter reflects nothing more than the 
chest-thumping posturing of an ambitious youth who had dreams of elevating America 
to prominence through sea power. After all, the thirteen North American colonies that 
eventually became part of the United States of America were still firmly embedded in 
the British Empire in 1755, the colonists relied on the British navy for protection, and 
any separation of the colonies from the mother country was not going to be easy. Yet 
Adams never stopped believing resource-rich Americans could attain “mastery of the 
seas.” Twenty years later, the Massachusetts delegate to the Continental Congress helped 
convince skeptical Founding Fathers that sea power was possible and even necessary to 
attain during the American Revolution. Adams was so heavily involved at the start of 
the conflict in formulating the first American naval strategy that he has been lauded as 
“the real father of the American navy.” 2
There is a general consensus among Revolutionary War historians that the colonists 
primarily pursued a maritime strategy of privateering during the Revolution.3 It is true 
that Americans did not construct a large squadron of floating fortresses, nor did they 
engage the enemy in traditional line-of-battle tactics, in which a fleet of sizable war-
ships in column delivered broadsides against an enemy fleet in the same formation. But 
Adams’s definition of a navy was never that expansive: “I don’t Mean 100 ships of the 
Line[;] . . . [instead] this Term might be applied to any naval force consisting of several 
Vessels, tho[ugh] the Number, the Weight of Metal, or the Quantity of Tonnage may be 
small.” 4 To achieve this goal, it is generally understood, the colonial government relied 
largely on the private sector. Civilian vessel owners secured letters of marque and con-









28  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch2-Magra.indd  September 11, 2013 10:32 AM
British shipping, with the intention of taking cargo-rich prizes for sale in the market-
place. Crews shared in the prize money as their reward.5
While these generalizations may be valid for the conflict as a whole, however, they do 
not apply to the early months of the Revolutionary War in 1775, when the American 
government had not yet deferred to privateers and so did not adhere to a plan of action 
strictly based on guerre de course. In these months smaller, privately owned vessels 
were indeed converted to warships. But these vessels were leased to, and their expenses 
were reimbursed by, the Continental Congress, an arrangement that made them at least 
the temporary property of the American government. Very few naval historians have 
bothered to differentiate between guerre de course involving privateers and that waged 
by government-controlled warships.6 Moreover, these vessels were not solely intended 
to engage enemy merchant shipping for commerce raiding. At the very beginning of the 
Revolutionary War at least, the naval strategy Americans developed involved deploying 
public—that is, government-leased—vessels with the broad intention of engaging the 
enemy’s commercial shipping and its warships as well. This was the very first American 
naval strategy. It was bold, and it was daring, just like Adams’s 1755 letter.
Early American Naval Strategies
Scholars have debated whether John Adams was correct to insist that the colonists 
needed some measure of sea power to prevent the American war for independence from 
being defeated.7 By 30 June 1775, there were twenty-nine British warships stationed off 
the coast of North America between Florida and Nova Scotia. These warships carried 
a total of 584 guns and 3,915 men.8 Vice Adm. Samuel Graves, with eight of these war-
ships, patrolled the New England coastline.9 In October, thirty-five British naval vessels, 
including twelve ships of the line, patrolled the coast of North America. Fifteen of these 
thirty-five, and no fewer than seven of the twelve of the line, were positioned in New 
England waters near Adams’s Massachusetts home.10 At that time the British military, 
however, pursued in general a strategy of pacification as opposed to conquest, and its 
goal was not to destroy the revolutionaries.11
The Admiralty ordered its commanders to support the army in North America by en-
gaging colonial positions on land, transporting and evacuating British troops, blockad-
ing the coastline, and cutting off American access to transatlantic military supplies. By 
these means the navy was to help the army suppress colonial dissent. Full naval force 
was, arguably, never brought to bear on the colonies, however, because of a perpetual 
fear of French invasion.12 Yet the British vessels stationed off the coast of North America 
provided major leverage over the colonists. Without some attempt to develop their own 
sea power, the United Colonies might have eventually lost their bid for independence. 
During the first three years of revolution, the American navy sent only four frigates to 
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sea, and none of these were operational at the very start of the military conflict, making 
the leasing of privately owned ships essential if a naval force was to be assembled.13
Most naval historians of the Revolutionary War equate privateering with commerce 
raiding, or cruiser warfare.14 In this strategy, small and maneuverable vessels target an 
enemy’s merchant shipping with hit-and-run tactics. The purpose of this strategy is to 
wreak economic havoc on the enemy through the loss of valuable cargoes and vessels 
and through increased maritime insurance rates. In theory, economic distress then mo-
tivates the enemy’s business interests to pressure the government to end the conflict.15 
This cumulative strategy is “a type of warfare in which the entire pattern is made up of 
a collection of lesser actions, but these lesser or individual actions are not sequentially 
interdependent[;] . . . the thing that counts is the cumulative effect.”16
Cutting seaborne supply, carried in many instances throughout the eighteenth century 
by unarmed, unescorted private contractors on which militaries relied for transoceanic 
logistical support, could also adversely impact the combat effectiveness of an adversary’s 
ground forces.17 According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, overreliance on privateers and 
guerre de course limited the size and scope of the Continental Navy, both through loss 
of manpower to the private sector and through reduced naval construction, and it left 
British ships of the line in command of the Atlantic Ocean throughout the Revolution. 
Mahan considered this strategy indecisive and inconclusive, even calling it a “second-
ary” naval operation, as it did not in his opinion eliminate the central naval threat.18
American leaders discussed naval strategies over the course of 1775, and America’s 
very first naval strategy developed out of these discussions. Instead of beginning con-
struction of a new navy, and rather than immediately moving to issuance of letters of 
marque, representatives at the Continental Congress in Philadelphia debated whether 
or not to fund a navy. On the one hand, there were those who supported the formation 
of an American navy, including Rhode Island legislators. The Rhode Island General 
Assembly was a revolutionary political body, residing in a colony exposed to seaborne 
assaults. Its members were, by and large, prominent merchants and shipowners who 
were very concerned that the Royal Navy could and would attack their property at any 
moment. On 26 August 1775 they sent instructions to their delegates at the Continental 
Congress, Samuel Ward and Stephen Hopkins, to make the first formal motion in Con-
gress for “the building and equipping of an American fleet, as soon as possible . . . at the 
Continental expenses.” In particular, Rhode Islanders wanted “a fleet of sufficient force, 
for the protection of these colonies, and for employing them in such manner and places 
as will most effectively annoy our enemies, and contribute to the common defense of 
these colonies.”19
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On the other hand, there were leaders in Congress who felt that the costs of a naval force 
outweighed the benefits, while others still fervently hoped for reconciliation with the 
mother country.20 Samuel Chase, a representative from Maryland, famously stated, “It 
is the maddest idea in the world to think of building an American fleet[;] . . . we should 
mortgage the whole continent.”21 Such concerns proved so forceful that they retarded 
American naval construction at the start of the conflict, ensuring that the colonists 
would not pursue traditional line-of-battle naval tactics in the Revolutionary War.
But even naysayers like Chase were willing to compromise, since they did want some 
measure of sea power. They simply had their own ideas as to the necessary level and the 
best way to achieve it. John Adams kept notes on key debates within the Continental 
Congress. According to his notes, Chase stressed the importance of military intelli-
gence—he wanted to know what the enemy was planning and executing, and he wanted 
this knowledge before the American leadership took any extensive action. That is why 
the delegate from Maryland proposed allocating funds for “two swift sailing vessels” for 
the purposes of “gaining Intelligence” instead of setting aside money for the construc-
tion of an American navy.22 In fact, such ships would be necessary for a navy as well.
Creating an American Navy
Christopher Gadsden, a former purser in the Royal Navy and a member of the Con-
tinental Congress from South Carolina, also supported forming an American navy. 
He is best known for opposing the building from scratch of a completely new fleet of 
large warships. The “extensiveness” of building, arming, manning, and maintaining an 
American navy concerned Gadsden. Yet Gadsden insisted it was “absolutely necessary” 
that “some Plan of Defense by Sea should be adopted.”23 Initially, he emphasized the role 
of maritime military forces in coastal defense.
Following a private meeting with Adams, then acting as the representative of Massachu-
setts, Gadsden shifted from a strategy predicated on defense to a bolder, more offensive-
minded plan of attack. The details of this meeting are unknown, but afterward—as 
Adams reported—Gadsden was “confident that We may get a Fleet of our own, at a 
cheap Rate.” Perhaps owing to his talks with Adams, Gadsden concluded that smaller 
commercial vessels could be inexpensively converted into warships and that they could 
effectively offer some measure of sea power. According to Adams, Gadsden held that 
such a “cheap” navy could “easily take their [i.e., Great Britain’s] Sloops, schooners and 
Cutters [smaller vessels], on board of whom are all their best Seamen, and with these We 
can easily take their large Ships, on board of whom are all their impressed [that is, forc-
ibly conscripted] and discontented Men.”24 Adams later stated his own belief that “two 
or three Vessels of 36 and twenty Guns, well armed and manned might attack and carry 
a 64 or a 70 or a 50 Gun Ship.”25
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Gadsden’s strategy was based on the large number of impressed colonists in the Brit-
ish crews. He maintained that such men would not put up much of a fight, especially 
against fellow colonists. Gadsden’s prior experience in the Royal Navy may have 
contributed to the development of this particular naval strategy. Gadsden would have 
known directly or indirectly that when an enemy vessel and crew were captured, the 
size of the prize crew assigned to it and the disposition of prisoners were precisely cal-
culated to minimize the chances that prisoners would attempt to retake the prize. These 
ratios may have been on Gadsden’s mind as he weighed the odds that a small vessel of 
Americans could capture a larger vessel that was manned, at least in part, by impressed 
American seamen.
Some British naval officers during the Revolutionary War echoed Gadsden’s insights. 
For example, on 20 November 1775 Vice Admiral Graves informed the Admiralty 
Board that he had authorized only with great reluctance the impressment of colonial 
seamen, as “they will seize every Opportunity of making their Escape, or of assisting 
their Countrymen in Rebellion.”26
Adams later transmitted the plans that he and Gadsden had worked out to Elbridge Ger-
ry, a fish merchant from Marblehead, Massachusetts, who was a member of the Massa-
chusetts Provincial Congress, which organized and administered much of the military 
resistance in and around Boston throughout 1775. Gerry almost certainly informed 
the members of the Provincial Congress of Adams’s correspondence, as this body was 
at that very moment debating whether or not Massachusetts should use public funds to 
arm its own vessels for war. On 20 June 1775, the Provincial Congress resolved
that a number of armed Vessels, not less than six, to mount from eight to fourteen carriage guns, 
and a proportionable number of swivels [swivel guns], &c. &c. be with all possible dispatch pro-
vided, fixed, and properly manned, to cruise as the Committee of Safety, or any other person or 
persons who shall be appointed by this Congress for that purpose, shall from time to time order and 
direct, for the protection of our trade and sea-coasts against the depredations and piracies of our 
enemies, and for their annoyance, capture, or destruction.
The actual military conversion of commercial vessels was “ordered to subside for the 
present,” but this program did get under way in Massachusetts later in August.27 It is 
likely that the pecuniary-minded members of the Provincial Congress wanted to wait 
to see whether the Continental Congress would formally approve the Rhode Island 
proposal. After all, if the Continental Congress had agreed to create a national navy at 
public expense, that would have saved the Massachusetts Provincial Congress from pay-
ing for its own.
The first American naval strategy, then, was worked out among delegates to the Con-
tinental Congress in June and July 1775. This strategy was communicated to Massa-
chusetts, then under siege by the British forces. The plan at this time involved arming 
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and manning smaller commercial vessels that could be fitted out quickly and at low 
cost. The goal was to capture successively larger enemy warships, free their impressed 
sailors, and thereby disrupt enemy supply lines. Since it focused on freeing colonists 
held against their will, such a strategy was not simply commerce raiding. The Ameri-
can strategy, to be sure, involved hit-and-run tactics against enemy merchant vessels 
carrying military supplies and trade goods. But like commerce raiding, this American 
strategy was intended to weaken British sea power. To accomplish this task, the Conti-
nental Congress turned to armed schooners.
The Colonial Use of Armed Schooners
As a result of these early maritime debates, the Continental Congress deployed armed 
schooners against the British over the course of 1775. These armed schooners have er-
roneously been called privateers. But Congress did not officially authorize privateering 
until the very end of 1775. Additionally, while privateers always remained under the 
command of captains who worked for civilian merchants, the American government 
established lease agreements with other merchants for use of their vessels. The govern-
ment thereby assumed a significant degree of control over those vessels. A number of 
fishing vessels, for example, were leased directly to the Continental Congress, making 
them the temporary property of the United Colonies.
On 18 July 1775, the Continental Congress officially sanctioned the conversion of 
commercial shipping into armed vessels. America’s national leaders resolved “that each 
colony, at their own expense, make such provision by armed vessels or otherwise, as 
their respective assemblies, conventions, or committees of safety shall judge expedient 
and suitable to their circumstances and situation for the protection of their harbors and 
navigation on their sea coasts, against all unlawful invasions, attacks, and depredations, 
from cutters and ships of war.”28 Orders were sent to the Massachusetts Provincial Con-
gress, and this body assigned John Glover the task of finding vessels to arm.29
In August 1775, Glover succeeded in assembling five of the six armed vessels the Pro-
vincial Congress had authorized in June. The Committee of Safety, which was affiliated 
with the Provincial Congress, furthermore ordered “that Colonel John Glover” use his 
authority in Marblehead “for the prevention of Intelligence” leakage to the British patrol 
vessels in the harbor.30 The leased vessels were all fishing schooners, they all belonged to 
fish merchants in Marblehead, and they were all converted into warships in the harbor 
of the nearby town of Beverly. The five schooners were Hannah, Franklin, Hancock, Lee, 
and Warren.31
Hannah, of “78 tons” burden and ten years old, was the property of Glover himself, 
leased to the Continental Congress on 24 August.32 Glover had purchased it in 1769. In 
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typical fashion, Hannah and its crew had transported fish and lumber to Barbados in 
the winter months between 1770 and June 1775.33 The ship returned from these voy-
ages bearing muscovado sugar and West Indian rum in its hold.34 Glover now leased the 
fishing vessel to “the United Colonies of America,” or, in other words, the Continental 
Congress. It is important to reiterate that the Marblehead fish merchant did not lease 
the schooner to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, nor did he lease it directly 
to General George Washington. Such a lease underscores Hannah’s role as the first 
“American,” as opposed to state, naval vessel.35
Silas Deane, a Connecticut representative at the Continental Congress, one of the early 
members of its Marine Committee, and a man remembered for having referred to 
the creation of an American fleet as “a Favorite object of mine,” believed that getting 
colonial vessels “into Continental pay” (i.e., leased) was one of the first steps toward 
the realization of this “Favorite object.”36 What is more, in his orders General Washing-
ton explicitly reminded Nicholson Broughton, Hannah’s captain, that it was Congress 
that had paid his salary and that as “a Captain in the Army of the United Colonies of 
North America,” Broughton personally fell under the commander in chief ’s authority. 
Moreover, as “the schooner Hannah” had been “fitted out & equipped with Arms, Am-
munition and Provisions at the Continental Expense,” Broughton was doubly beholden 
to Washington.37
On 2 September 1775 Washington’s first set of fighting instructions for Broughton were 
issued, and they parted in significant details from a purely guerre de course strategy. 
These orders were arguably the first naval instructions in American history. Washing-
ton did not simply and solely instruct Broughton to target the enemy’s shipping and 
supplies, with the ultimate goal of putting economic pressure on Great Britain. Cer-
tainly, Broughton was told to seize “arms, ammunition or provisions” bound to or from 
the British forces at Boston. He was “to avoid any engagement with any armed vessel of 
the enemy,” and Washington clearly stated that “the design of this enterprise” was “to 
intercept the supplies of the enemy.” However, Hannah was clearly meant to weaken 
Britain’s fighting capacity as well, since it was also ordered to seize enemy “soldiers.” In 
this regard, Washington gave Broughton specific instructions on the care of “prisoners 
you may take.” This was not an indirect form of warfare. Moreover, Broughton was to 
“be very particular and diligent in your search after all letters and other papers tending 
to discover the designs of the enemy, or of any other kind, and to forward all such to me 
as soon as possible.” Washington clearly envisioned Hannah as an intelligence-gathering 
tool, not simply a blunt economic weapon.38
On 4 October 1775, Washington assigned Stephen Moylan, the Muster Master General, 
to assist Glover in arming the leased vessels for war. Both men were to report either 
to Col. Joseph Reed, Washington’s military secretary, or to the commander in chief 
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directly.39 The two reported on 9 October 1775 that the terms of the contracts they had 
negotiated with vessel-owning merchants included a requirement that the merchants 
“shall put their vessels in the same good order & Condition which they would be obliged 
to do, were they hired to take in a Cargo for the West Indies or elsewhere.” For their 
part, Glover and Moylan agreed “that what extra expense may accrue from the nature 
of their present employment must be a public Charge.” The vessel owners wanted extra 
sails, over and above the “three sails, Mainsail, foresail, & jib . . . sufficient for the Voy-
ages they usually Make,” to be made “a public Charge.” 40
In light of these instructions, Washington’s strategic objectives for the armed schooners 
can best be summarized as cutting military supply lines, gathering military intelligence, 
and reducing the enemy’s fighting capacity. Only the first objective is fully consistent 
with guerre de course. The terms of the ship contracts confirm that all conversion 
expenses were paid with public funds, which distinguished them from simple privateers.
Operating Methods of the Armed Schooners
The armed schooners funded by the Continental Congress operated in a manner that 
was not strictly privateering. William Falconer, the author of a maritime dictionary in 
1769, defined a privateer as a privately owned vessel, fitted out and armed in wartime 
“to cruise against and among the enemy, taking, sinking or burning their shipping” in 
exchange for shares of any captured prizes.41 Robert Gardiner focused more on potential 
profits, defining privateers as “free-enterprise warships, armed, crewed and paid for by 
merchants who gambled on the dividend of a valuable capture.” 42
To be sure, there is ample evidence that contemporaries regarded the fleet of armed 
schooners fitted out at Beverly as a collection of privateers. For example, “Manly, A Fa-
vorite New Song in the American Fleet,” composed in Salem, Massachusetts, in March 
1776, referred to the captain of the armed schooner Lee, John Manley, as a “Privateer.” 43 
Out of exasperation, Washington once even went so far as to refer to the men on the 
schooners as “our rascally privateersmen” in a letter to his secretary Col. Joseph Reed.44 
Such evidence, combined with the facts that the fishing schooners remained privately 
owned and the crews at least earned some prize shares, has led several naval historians to 
consider the vessels armed at Beverly to be privateers. Gardiner, for example, describes the 
“handful of Marblehead fishing schooners, armed with four or six tiny 4 pdrs and 2 pdrs,” 
not as representing “the beginnings of a national navy” but as being privateers “conceived 
with a specific raiding purpose in mind.” 45 Following this line of reasoning, the refitted 
ships would have been profit-driven business ventures and little more.
Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to argue that the fishing schooners armed for 
war in late 1775 were not privateers. First and foremost, most of the prize money from 
magra  35
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch2-Magra.indd  September 11, 2013 10:32 AM
the sale of prizes they took went not to the vessel owners, as would normally have been 
done with privateers, but to the American government to recoup outfitting costs. On 
25 November 1775, the Continental Congress established formal rules regarding prize 
shares for privateers, colony (state) naval vessels, and Continental Navy vessels. The 
owners of privateers were to get all prize money associated with their captures, military 
or commercial. For colony/state vessels, the government entity funding the ship was to 
get two-thirds of the prize money and the crew the remainder. This same distribution 
applied to Continental Navy vessels, with the Continental Congress getting two-thirds 
of the prize shares. If, on the other hand, “the Capture be a Vessel of War,” then whether 
operating under a colony, a state, or the Congress, the captors received one-half.46
Second, in a sharp break with tradition, the crews of the armed schooners were given 
wages in addition to prize shares, and these wages were paid directly by the Continental 
Congress. The standard practice for privateers in the late eighteenth century, by con-
trast, was to give crews food but not wages.47 The commander in chief of the American 
forces specifically referred to those same vessels, in a letter to the Continental Congress 
at the end of 1775, as “the Continental armed vessels.” 48
All of this evidence indicates that the small collection of fishing vessels armed at Bev-
erly, Massachusetts, were not just “rascally privateersmen.” 49 In fact, they represented 
the first American naval warships. Considering the times, this fact should not be overly 
surprising. There was an established naval tradition in the early-modern Atlantic world 
of arming fishing vessels for war.50 Moreover, during the Revolution most of the vessels 
engaged in combat at sea with the British were small in size.51 Although small, they 
represented the origins of what would one day become the world’s largest and most 
powerful navy.
Conclusions
It is true that during the Revolutionary War Americans unleashed the private sector and 
the profit motive on their enemy’s commercial shipping and military transports. The 
Continental Congress printed and issued over two thousand letters of marque licensing 
entrepreneurial American shipowners to engage enemy-flagged vessels between 25 No-
vember 1775, when Congress first authorized the practice of privateering, and the peace 
that ended the war in 1783. On 7 September 1776, Beverly merchants made public the 
following handbill: “Now fitting for a Privateer, In the harbor of Beverly, the Brigantine 
Washington. . . . Any Seaman or Landsman that has an inclination to make their For-
tunes in a few months may have an opportunity by applying to John Dyson.” 52 Boston 
merchants printed similar advertisements in the local newspaper as late as 13 November 
1780, under the title “An Invitation to all brave Seamen and Marines, who have an incli-
nation to serve their country and make their Fortunes.” The Boston merchants shrewdly 
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added that those who signed on for a cruise with the privateer would receive “that excel-
lent Liquor called Grog, which is allowed by all true seamen to be the Liquor of Life.”53
In exchange for these letters of marque, shipowners could sell legally appropriated 
prizes, including vessels and nonmilitary cargoes. Prize courts adjudicated whether the 
vessel had been an enemy vessel and whether or not the cargo was contraband. During 
the course of the war, American privateers captured and sold over six hundred prizes.54 
Nearly all of these prizes were British merchant vessels either carrying trade goods 
across the Atlantic for sale in overseas marketplaces or contracted to transport military 
stores across the ocean for the army and navy. These statistics are in keeping with the 
traditional naval history of the American Revolution, which focuses on the widespread 
use of privateers.
However, it is important to emphasize that privateering did not play a large role in the 
initial American naval strategy. War broke out on 19 April 1775, but Congress did not 
authorize privateering until the end of the year. As a result, the vast bulk of the letters 
of marque Congress sold during the war were issued after the first year of the conflict. 
With regard to the American turn to the use of a guerre de course strategy, Mahan 
would later write, “The colonists could make no head against the fleets of Great Britain, 
and were consequently forced to abandon the sea to them, resorting only to a cruising 
warfare, mainly by privateers.”55 But the widely held belief that Americans relied only on 
privateering throughout the entire Revolutionary War is inaccurate. Americans did not 
initially intend to wage a large-scale privateering war against the British. In fact, at the 
start of the Revolutionary War publicly funded, government-controlled warships were 
used. Therefore, the naval strategy that the Americans initially adopted was not strictly 
one of guerre de course. In truth, the first American naval strategy was to support 
smaller, cheaper oceangoing vessels to target the enemy’s commercial vessels, military 
supplies, soldiers, sailors, and warships.
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French Privateering during the French Wars, 
1793–1815
SILVIA MARZ AGALLI
In Old Regime France, war was a recurrent experience. Between 1689 and 1815 France 
was at peace no more than one year out of two. As a major continental power the French 
crown invested heavily in its army, but the navy too played an important role in the 
strategy for warfare, especially after France became a colonial power in the seventeenth 
century and fought to defend its overseas territories and economic interests. The French 
navy was in charge of securing merchant shipping, destroying the enemy’s navy, and 
eventually organizing raids and the occupation of enemy territories. These tasks, 
however, were only one aspect of war at sea. The capture of the enemy’s merchant ships 
represented the other relevant feature.1 But if the navy took part in the capture of the 
enemy’s private merchant ships, this was not its top priority.2 These activities were 
mostly the preserve of privateers, who were granted letters of marque authorizing them 
to raid enemy property at sea.
Significant efforts were made in Europe beginning in the late seventeenth century to 
reduce plundering and violence by soldiers on civil populations;3 however, the legiti-
macy of the maritime equivalent—the capture of private property at sea—was not seri-
ously questioned before the early 1790s. By declaring private property a natural right 
(article 2), however, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789 
implicitly opposed any kind of predatory activity, including at sea. Moreover, article 
12 contested the use of public force for the benefit of private interest, a principle that 
could be applied against privateering. In 1792, French revolutionaries intensively de-
bated the legitimacy and the utility of privateering, but once the war against maritime 
powers broke out in 1793 France once again authorized shipowners to fit out vessels 
and raid enemy shipping. Not until the Paris international convention in 1856 did 
France officially agree to ban privateering.4
The French Wars (1793–1815), the last conflict pitting France against Great Britain in 
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concrete experience of French privateering before its abolition in 1856.5 This chapter 
seeks to understand privateering both as an element within a long tradition and as the 
product of specific circumstances created by the French Revolution and Napoleon. Only 
ships that were fitted out by private individuals to raid enemy merchant ships will be 
considered, thus excluding the captures made by the French navy and by merchant ships 
fitted out “en guerre et marchandises” (for war and trade).6 In particular, it will show 
that from the delivery of the letter of marque granting the right to outfit a privateer to 
the final court procedure establishing whether the prize was valid or not, government 
authorities after 1793 controlled all phases of privateering. They also occasionally either 
encouraged or restricted it, according to the prevailing national interests. In addition, 
it will discuss the practical organization of a campaign, as well as the consequences of 
privateering both in France and abroad.
French Privateering: A Multifaceted Activity
The first historians of privateering celebrated the brave actions of certain outstanding 
privateers.7 Later research has quantified the relevance of this activity for French ports;8 
other work has stressed its effects on international relations.9 More recently, attention 
has been paid to its broader economic implications.10 Privateering did not concern the 
French government only as an element of warfare; for captains, sailors, and shipown-
ers and their families, it represented an essential alternative to peacetime shipping and 
trade. The activity was a source of potential profit in times of war, not only for those 
who invested in it but for all the privateers’ crew members. Prizes contributed to pro-
visioning local markets where their cargoes were sold, and prize ships themselves fed a 
lively secondhand market.
Ultimately these various economic interests influenced the extent of privateering.11 The 
calculation of costs and expectations of benefits determined the willingness of shipowners 
to fit out privateers, although occasionally the French government intervened by subsidiz-
ing shipowners—for instance, providing naval munitions or other forms of assistance to 
lower their costs.12 The absence of decent alternatives to earn livings at sea made fisher-
men and sailors, and more generally unemployed young men, particularly willing to 
participate, despite the high risk of being captured and taken to England as a prisoner.13
The impact of French privateering during the French Wars went beyond the economic 
interests of shareholders and crews. At times, the numbers of privateers and their degree 
of success affected international shipping and trade and influenced merchants’ strate-
gies, among both belligerents and neutrals. Their activities provoked public responses 
outside France. The effectiveness of the British measures adopted to control trade 
routes and to protect shipping against raiding affected in turn the success of French 
privateering. Raiding at sea did not concern belligerents only; privateering generated 
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international tensions with neutral powers, and the number of prizes depended also on 
the capacity of neutral countries to enforce their rights and defend their interests.
Although privateering was essentially the result of private initiative, the French govern-
ment had a close interest in supporting it. This was the case not only because capturing 
ships and goods at sea was considered an important naval tactic, adversely affecting the 
enemy’s trade and interests while weakening the manning of its navy, but also because 
the government was concerned to avoid indiscriminate plundering of foreign property. 
Finally, in cases of seizure, the state received a portion of the prizes. For all these rea-
sons, the French government closely regulated privateering.
The Short 1793 Privateering Experience
Although revolutionary France was involved in war from 1792, privateering resumed 
only after the declaration on 1 February 1793 of war against Great Britain and the 
Netherlands, followed a few days later by the declaration of war against Spain. At first, 
privateers could raid enemy merchant ships only, but in May 1793 France declared 
that goods belonging to enemy subjects on neutral ships could be seized as well—a 
factor that considerably extended the potential profitability of privateering, given the 
importance of neutral shipping in wartime. In making this decision, France adopted a 
much-contested 1756 British measure. Whereas prior to 1756 it was commonly admit-
ted that the flag protected the cargo—implying that enemy goods, with the exception of 
contraband of war, could be safely shipped by neutrals—at the beginning of the Seven 
Years’ War the British navy and British privateers started to capture and condemn 
enemy goods on neutral vessels.
Once war was declared in 1793, the French Convention encouraged its citizens to fit out 
privateers, and it offered some incentives; for instance, it temporarily gave up its own 
right to a share in the prize money.14 Given the disruption of the French navy in the early 
1790s, due to the emigration of many of its aristocratic officers, privateering seemed 
potentially the most effective means to affect enemy shipping and trade.15
France enjoyed a long tradition of privateering. Many sailors had served on French 
privateers during the American war of independence and had acquired solid experience. 
Although the golden age of French privateering had occurred under Louis XIV and the 
glorious times of Jean Bart, eighteenth-century conflicts maintained both the memory 
and the practice of privateering across generations.16 As the war began, the Convention 
could therefore easily tap existing representations of brave privateers: “Merchant navy! 
Under the reign of despotism . . . you gave birth to Jean Bart, Duquesne and Duguay-
Trouin; what will you not be able to do under the realm of Equality!”17
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French shipowners were very responsive, in particular because prizes were welcome 
in a time of severe food shortages. Over five months Dunkirk fitted out forty-nine 
privateers, Marseille twenty-seven, Saint-Malo twenty-three, Bayonne fifteen, Boulogne 
thirteen, Bordeaux twelve, and Nantes ten; many other metropolitan ports sent out a 
few additional privateers.18 Furthermore, privateers under French colors were fitted out 
in the French West Indies, as well as in neutral ports, both in Europe and in the United 
States. This factor occasionally provoked diplomatic tensions, as in the case of French 
plenipotentiary minister Edmond-Charles Genêt at Charleston, South Carolina, who 
was a bit too eager in his support of privateers.19
On 22 June 1793, a governmental decision to stop all privateering rapidly chilled the 
sudden French enthusiasm for commerce raiding. This decision was taken because 
the French navy badly needed experienced seamen; both activities tapped the same 
workforce of trained sailors, and the navy’s needs were even more dramatic than before, 
because civil war in France had made it impossible to recruit sailors in some parts of the 
country.20 This government embargo on privateering lasted until 15 August 1795.
French Privateering against Neutral Ships
French privateering revived again under the Directory (1795–99), with 1797 and 1798 
representing the peak years. In January 1798 (on 19 Nivôse, Year VI, in the revolution-
ary calendar), France adopted legislation affecting neutral trade that increased oppor-
tunities to take prizes. Besides enemy ships, French privateers were now authorized to 
raid neutral ships carrying enemy goods. The novelty was that not only the cargo but 
the neutral ship itself was now a legally valid prize.21 An essential factor determining 
the willingness of investors to fit out privateers was the extent to which ships and goods 
could legally be seized. Whenever legislation extended the boundaries of potential prey, 
the number of privateers increased.
This legislation had profound consequences on neutral shipping. Between July 1796 and 
June 1797 French privateers captured 316 American vessels, mostly in the West Indies.22 
This situation worsened considerably in 1798, and the Quasi-War against the United 
States represented a golden opportunity for French privateers to raid the booming 
American shipping industry.23 The reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries after the Mortefontaine Treaty in 1800 did not stop predations on neutral 
ships, and French courts condemned American vessels as good prizes throughout the 
French Wars. Ulane Bonnel lists 1,434 American prizes from 1797 to 1813, but this 
number is almost certainly an underestimate.24 Other neutral merchant ships expe-
rienced a similar fate. The list of cases judged by the Prize Council in Paris contains 
an impressive variety of flags, some of them of entities—like the independent small 
states of Papenburg, Kniphausen, and Oldenburg—that had never possessed important 
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merchant fleets before the conflict, a fact that reflected the massive increase of neutral 
shipping in time of war.25
Judgment of the Prizes
The French government, besides regulating privateering by issuing letters of marque, 
judged the legitimacy of prizes taken. Since the end of the seventeenth century and as 
recently as the war of American independence, this judgment had been made by the 
Admiralty or by an extraordinary commission called the Conseil des Prises, or Prize 
Council, established at the beginning of each conflict. The Revolution suppressed the 
Admiralty, and the last Conseil des Prises, created in 1778, had been dissolved in 1788. 
In 1793 and again in 1795, after some fluctuation during the Terror, authority to judge 
maritime prizes was conferred on the Tribunals of Commerce, which existed in all ma-
jor French cities.26 These courts were composed of local merchants and shipowners, who 
were likely to possess shares in privateers. When a prize arrived in a foreign port, the 
decision as to its legitimacy was taken by the French consul or, between 1796 and 1800, 
by the consulate chancery. In both cases, many abuses were reported. Departmental 
courts in France handled appeals.
A series of peace treaties in Europe and with the United States followed Bonaparte’s 
coup d’état in November 1799. The immediate result was a decline in the number of 
potential prizes. Napoleon also introduced a major change in jurisdiction: by a decree of 
27 March 1800 the decision on the legitimacy of neutral prizes was given to a Conseil de 
Prises in Paris, whereas local commissions were in charge only of enemy ships, when the 
prize was not contested by the captured captain. Tribunals of Commerce oversaw locally 
the accounts of privateers’ campaigns and the distribution of profits and losses accord-
ing to the law. They also ruled on conflicts between managing owners and crews.27
Managing Privateering
Privateers were fitted out by managing owners, who handled all the organizational, 
administrative, and financial issues. First, they acquired the ships, which could be newly 
built French vessels, former prizes, or secondhand French or foreign ships; after 1803, 
privateers had to be French-built by law, and the use of foreign-built ships required spe-
cial permission. Patrick Crowhurst has clearly shown the wide variety of types and sizes 
of privateers, by exploiting the records of hundreds of French privateers captured by the 
British and condemned by the High Court of Admiralty. Whereas in the eastern half of 
the English Channel, privateers were mostly below twenty tons, on the high seas they 
were generally over eighty tons and could be as big as five or six hundred tons.28 The 
average was less than a hundred tons, however, which was the case for the 327 privateers 
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fitted out in Saint-Malo.29 The choice of vessel depended on the kind of campaign and 
the intended targets.
After acquiring ships, managing owners equipped them with cannons, small arms, 
and all the victuals that were required for their cruises. They completed the necessary 
administrative steps to obtain letters of marque, which authorized the captains to raid 
for six months; eventually letters were issued for up to twenty-four months. Managing 
owners also hired captains and crews, which consisted mostly of men aged between 
eighteen and twenty-eight—conscripted seamen, novices, foreign sailors, and untrained 
volunteers. An extremely high crew ratio of one man per ton, comparable only to vessels 
bound for Newfoundland’s on-shore fisheries, was common on privateers.
Many neutral seamen carried into French ports as part of prize crews or arriving there 
at the end of merchant voyages were tempted by potentially high profits to embark on 
French privateers. Numerous American sailors, for instance, served on French priva-
teers during the Quasi-War and often ended up raiding American ships.30 As a result, 
most “French privateers were manned by a polyglot crew drawn from throughout the 
French coastal ports as well as Northern Europe, the Mediterranean and even North 
America.”31 Crew members might receive a fixed salary. They were also granted a part 
of the net profit of the cruise, but this system could oblige them to help cover losses as 
well. Crew members who became disabled during a cruise were entitled to half pay for 
the rest of their lives, as were seamen in the navy.32 The French government received 
5 percent of the proceeds of the privateers’ campaigns for this purpose.
Fitting out privateers was normally financed by shares, as in other risky maritime 
activities, such as insurance or the slave trade. Shareholders were liable only for the 
amounts of their shares, whereas the responsibility of the managing owner was unlim-
ited. The value of the shares was generally between a thousand and five thousand francs 
(F 5 = U.S.$1 at that time), but it was eventually possible to acquire a half or a quarter 
share, so that even small merchants and people who did not belong to the commercial 
world could invest in privateering. Shares were eventually sold outside the city in which 
a privateer was fitted out, notably in Paris.
The managing owner generally acquired a controlling percentage of the shares. Daniel 
Lacombe, for instance, owned half the shares of Venus, fitted out in Bordeaux in 1803.33 
The master was often a shareholder, a factor that likely increased his zeal: Captain 
Laveille owned fifty thousand francs in Psyché, which he commanded, just as much as 
did “Balguerie junior,” a merchant of Bordeaux, whereas Louis Chaurand, the managing 
owner in Nantes, where the ship was actually fitted out, held only five thousand francs 
on this privateer.34 Some managing owners fitted out only one privateer or two in their 
entire careers, while others did so systematically. The Bastarrèche brothers of Bayonne, 
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for instance, fitted out twenty privateers from 1793 to 1813, and Jacques Conte of Bor-
deaux fitted out thirty-two privateering campaigns from 1796 to 1815, representing 15 
percent of all the privateering based in Bordeaux.35
The managing owner kept accounts of expenses and receipts, which were validated by 
the Tribunal of Commerce and produced to shareholders. Receipts included both sales of 
prizes and ransoms obtained for captains of boarded ships. It was legal, and sometimes 
considered convenient by the captains of both the privateer and the boarded ship, to 
conclude a mutual agreement by which the prize continued its voyage and paid a fixed 
sum upon arrival. Hostages would be taken on board the privateer in the meantime, and 
the legitimacy of the prize and the ransom would be later judged by the court.36
After deducting the costs of fitting out the privateer and other expenses—such as 
repairs, legal costs, other operating outlays, the part due to the French government, and 
the commission for the managing owner (generally 2 percent)—the profits were shared 
between shareholders and the crew, who received (as groups) two-thirds and one-third, 
respectively. Whereas shareholder profit was divided proportionally to the number of 
shares owned, crew profits were allocated among crew members according to a prede-
termined scale. For example, the captain might receive twelve parts, a sublieutenant 
four, regular seamen one and a half, a cabin boy one, etc.37
The cost of fitting out a privateer varied considerably, according to the size of the ship 
and the crew. Both depended on the areas in which they meant to operate and the kinds 
of ships they intended to capture. French privateers raided in the West Indies, in Euro-
pean waters, in the Mediterranean, and in the Indian Ocean.38 While some campaigns 
at sea lasted a number of months, in other instances privateers made campaigns of only 
two or three days before sailing back to their home ports.
Was Privateering Profitable?
The impact of privateering was multifaceted. Economically, the activity affected the 
home ports and home countries of privateers, as well as enemy and neutral shipping and 
trade interests. Socially, it offered opportunities for rapid upward mobility.39 Strategi-
cally, it forced the enemy to adopt measures to counter the threat to its merchant ships. 
Diplomatically, it could profoundly affect international relations.
To assess the economic impact of privateering in this period it would be necessary to 
know, among other things, the total number of French privateers fitted out throughout 
the French Wars, the number of ships they took, and the profitability of their cruises. 
Unfortunately, the relevant data are scattered and unsatisfactory.40 Patrick Villiers has 
computed that 1,542 letters of marque were issued in France from 1803 to 1814, but as 
he does not discuss sources, it is unclear whether privateers fitted out outside French 
48  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch3-Marzagalli.indd  August 30, 2013 1:19 PM
metropolitan ports are included in this total. According to Villiers, French ships took 
5,600 prizes from 1793 to 1802 and 5,500 during the Napoleonic Wars, but it is again 
unclear whether prizes carried and judged in colonial and foreign ports are included 
in these figures.41 Villiers also does not take into account prizes that were recaptured at 
sea, a phenomenon that became more frequent over time and obviously heavily influ-
enced the profitability of privateering.42 According to a Parisian merchant-house report 
from 1807, three prize ships out of four were freed before reaching the ports to which 
privateers intended them to sail.43 Contemporaries also believed that some of the prize 
seizures were faked, organized jointly by French and British merchants to circumvent 
the prohibition on importation of British goods into France.
Available data show that the geography of ports fitting out privateers during the French 
Wars changed from earlier wars. Privateering was no longer confined to ports with 
strong traditions of privateering. Certainly, these ports were still active, although 
Boulogne supplanted Dunkirk in the Napoleonic Wars.44 But cities like Bordeaux, which 
had fitted out few privateers in the past conflicts, organized 209 campaigns during 
the French Wars;45 Cherbourg, which also had no strong tradition, fitted out a total of 
eighty-seven privateers.46 The latter benefited from the tight British blockade of ma-
jor ports in the Channel, whereas in ports like Bordeaux merchants had been used to 
investing in the colonial and slave trades, which they could no longer pursue, and were 
looking for profitable alternatives to replace them. Merchants in French colonies were 
extremely active as well. On Mauritius (a French colony until 1810) local merchants fit-
ted out a total of 122 privateers;47 Guadeloupe’s privateers infested the West Indies, with 
114 privateers fitted out in 1797–98 alone. This island had replaced Martinique as the 
core of colonial privateering after Martinique fell into British hands in 1794.48
Assessing the profitability of French privateering is an extremely difficult task. It is 
moreover doubtful whether an overall national average would be significant, as vari-
ability was extremely high. Shareholders generally invested in different privateers 
to reduce risk, but the results were unpredictable. They ranged from the capture of 
privateers immediately after departure to successful six-month cruises producing a 
number of extremely valuable prizes. Many expeditions produced losses, and others 
ended with hardly any profit despite taking some prizes, but shareholders occasionally 
had extremely high returns: Bordeaux shipowner Daniel Lacombe lost 81 percent on 
Gascon, which was fitted out in Lorient and captured during its first cruise in 1809, 
but he received a 759.5 percent return on Rôdeur, which was fitted out at Passages  
in 1808.49
Privateering could be an important factor in social mobility. The former slaver captain 
Robert Surcouf of Saint-Malo made a fortune as a privateer in the Indian Ocean in the 
1790s. His privateering campaign in 1800 on board Confiance, with a 130-man crew, led 
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to the capture of nine British ships, including the 1,200-ton East Indiaman Kent, with 
440 men.50 Captain Delattre in Dunkirk took sixty-five prizes between 1793 and 1805, 
which produced seven million francs.51 Jacques Conte in Bordeaux earned approximate-
ly 1.2 million francs in commissions on the privateers he fitted out, and this amount 
does not include his profit as a shareholder.52 But these were exceptional exploits, and 
many privateers were captured by the British before taking any prizes at all. According 
to Patrick Villiers, this happened to about half of the privateers, with an average of seven 
of ten Bordeaux privateers taken.53 Under these circumstances, people either invested in 
or joined privateers as crew members because fabulous profits could change their lives, 
if they were among the lucky ones.
British Countermeasures against French Privateering
As time passed, it became increasingly difficult for French privateers to avoid being 
taken by the British navy. The main factor affecting profitability, however, was less the 
overall effectiveness of the enemy’s counterstrategies than the ability of privateers to 
take one or more valuable prizes before being captured. For this reason, it was in Brit-
ain’s long-term interest to retain all captured privateers as prisoners, so that they could 
neither transmit their knowledge to a new generation of privateers nor embark anew 
themselves.
If privateering was a lottery in terms of profits for shareholders and crew, counterstrate-
gies had a major impact on the fate of thousands of sailors. From 1793 to 1800 the Brit-
ish took 743 French privateers and over 26,500 seamen; 130 privateers and 7,094 men 
were taken in 1797 alone.54 The British captured more than forty thousand seamen from 
French ships (see the figure). The common sailors were kept for many years in prisons, 
or moored ships used as prisons, where health conditions were extremely poor. Of-




















































Seamen Captured on French Privateers, 1793–1813
Source: data provided from Crowhurst, French War on Trade, app., pp. 207–209.
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from humanitarian consideration for the fates of these prisoners and the distress of 
their families, the temporary loss of thousands of seamen affected the French navy. This 
strategy had a cost for Britain too—the estimated expense of holding French prisoners 
between 1803 and 1815 was six million pounds.56
Although the effectiveness of British defense at sea increased over time, the rapid rise in 
the number of French prisoners in Britain roughly reflects the growth trends of French 
privateering itself, which prospered in the late 1790s and subsequently declined. It is 
difficult to ascertain, however, whether this decline depended on the decreasing profits 
of the activity—as some contemporary sources suggest—or on the existence of lucrative 
alternatives for investors, notably through recourse to neutral trade before 1807, and the 
revival of maritime trade under the system of licenses after 1810.57
Whatever the reasons, French privateering did not significantly affect British trade over 
the long run. Thousands of British ships were taken as prizes, but predation amounted 
to only 2 to 2.5 percent at most, a figure that on the average doubled the normal losses at 
sea to other factors.58 From 1796 to 1814 British imports doubled, exports grew by half, 
and reexports increased threefold.59 Nevertheless, locally and temporarily, privateers 
could affect costs: Lloyd’s insurance rates for shipping to the Lesser Antilles increased 
by from 10 percent to 33 percent from 1794 to 1797 because of the effectiveness of priva-
teers from Guadeloupe.60
To protect its shipping, Britain adopted a set of countermeasures. On the defensive side, 
the traditional wartime policy of convoying was reestablished in 1793, became com-
pulsory for most British trade in 1798, and was resumed in 1803 after the termination 
of the Peace of Amiens. West Indian as well as Baltic convoys could be as large as eight 
hundred or a thousand ships, many of which did not sail under the British flag. Other 
effective means of protecting British ships were patrolling the Atlantic coasts and block-
ading French ports, notably Brest, thus preventing French privateers (and the French 
navy) from getting out and prizes from being sent into port.61
British patrols were indeed effective, and it became increasingly difficult over time to 
cross the Atlantic without running into British privateers or frigates. Benjamin Morgan, 
a 291-ton merchant ship fitted out in Bordeaux under American colors, left France on 5 
August 1803. The ship was captured the next day by the British frigate Diamond. On its 
way as a prize to Plymouth, however, it was freed by the French privateer Adventure, and 
its captain proceeded to Philadelphia, arriving on 30 September. Before its safe arrival, 
however, the ship was visited by three different British privateers and was eventually 
stopped by the French privateer Alert, which discharged two American sailors whom it 
had on board.62
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Defensive and offensive policies to counter French privateering did incur costs to the 
British government. Importantly, N. A. M. Rodger calls these added costs “the principal 
achievement of the French war on trade.”63 Still, while these costs possibly contributed 
to the difficulties occasionally experienced by the British economy during the French 
Wars, they did not result in its collapse.64
Meanwhile, French privateers negatively affected neutral shipping as well, eventually 
more than British shipping. Only 27 percent of prizes taken into Guadeloupe in 1799–
1801 were British; in fact, 58 percent sailed under the U.S. flag.65 Neutral ships were 
often visited by belligerents at sea and were occasionally plundered;66 if captured, ships 
(with their cargoes) were eventually ransomed or taken as prizes. However strong the 
levy on neutral shipping was, however, it did not prevent neutral powers from gaining 
enormously from wartime profiteering.67 Even during the Quasi-War, when the French 
massively attacked American shipping, privateering did not even slow the spectacular 
growth rate of American trade.68
Neutral ships could protect themselves against privateering by, for instance, joining a 
British convoy, which liberally protected them.69 While this might defend them from 
attacks during one voyage, however, it made them subject thereafter to French seizure. 
Another common means of protection consisted in double papers or forged papers 
and in false itineraries. Whereas direct trade between two enemy ports on a neutral 
ship made it vulnerable to privateering, even a short call in a neutral port increased the 
chances of a neutral ship boarded at sea being allowed to continue its voyage unharmed.
The existence of countermeasures and the absence of significant impact on global trade 
aggregates should not imply that privateering had no effect at all on shipowners, mer-
chants, and seamen. French privateering was of major concern to British shipowners. 
Moreover, privateering was a constant source of diplomatic tension, in particular with 
the United States. The countermeasures adopted by British merchants and their massive 
recourse to neutral shipping ultimately led Napoleon to adopt strict measures to halt 
neutral trade.70
Conclusions
This brief analysis of French privateering during the French Wars has shown the com-
plex nature of the phenomenon and the wide variety of approaches adopted by  
belligerent and neutral countries to halt it. Although France’s privateers ultimately 
proved ineffective in depriving the Royal Navy of seamen, causing major financial 
losses, or undermining the British national economy, French privateering was far from a 
marginal activity.
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During this two-decade period, French legal predation at sea affected individuals, cities, 
national economies, and international relations. Hundreds of shareholders invested 
in privateering, and thousands of sailors and their families depended on it for their 
livelihoods. For all the crews of neutral and belligerent merchant ships, as well as for 
the crews of privateers, these years of conflict were marked by the enormous risk on 
every voyage of being stopped, searched, and perhaps captured or, if lucky, ransomed. 
For almost a quarter of a century, therefore, privateering represented a major aspect of 
maritime life.
Although public criticism regarding the legitimacy and the utility of privateering arose 
as early as 1792, there is no evidence that privateering was seriously challenged or 
contested throughout the French Wars. The fact that French shipowners applied (unsuc-
cessfully) for letters of marque even after 1815 seems to prove that the eventual abolition 
of privateering in 1856 came about as a result of political and juridical discourse rather 
than from economic factors. In fact, investors who backed privateering ships widely 
considered predation at sea a thoroughly acceptable way to make potentially enor-
mous profits.
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Waging Protracted Naval War
U.S. Navy Commerce Raiding during the War of 1812
KEVIN D.  MC CR ANIE
During the first six months of the War of 1812, the thirty-eight-gun British frigates 
Guerriere, Macedonian, and Java struck their colors to frigates of the U.S. Navy. Over 
the remainder of the war, however, the Americans failed to duplicate such results.1 A 
partial explanation stems from the Royal Navy’s ability to adapt. Leading the world’s 
largest navy, the Admiralty had significant flexibility that allowed it to dispatch re-
inforcements to the North American Station. The one ship of the line and five frigates 
present in June 1812 became by the middle of the next year ten ships of the line and 
sixteen frigates, as well as one modified ship of the line known as a “razee.” By late 1814, 
the strength on the station had increased to twelve ships of the line, two razees, and 
twenty-nine frigates.2 Additional roving squadrons patrolled critical sea lines of com-
munication. Convoys received stronger escorts, and in July 1813 the Admiralty directed 
its frigate captains to avoid single combat with the largest American frigates, such as 
Constitution.3
Though British material strength, as well as choices about deployments and rules of 
engagement, minimized Royal Navy losses, a leadership change on the American side 
also contributed. The appointment in the United States of William Jones as Secretary of 
the Navy in January 1813 led to the development of a new oceanic naval strategy. Jones 
realized that the United States entirely lacked ships of the line, the battleships of the day, 
for fleet-on-fleet engagements with the British. Smaller warships were also scarce com-
modities, so ship-on-ship battles or squadron-sized encounters were also discouraged, 
in an effort to preserve America’s scarce warships while imposing significant costs on 
the British navy and protracting the naval war.4
By stressing single-ship cruises targeting British commerce rather than attempt-
ing to meet the Royal Navy in battle, Secretary Jones sought to husband the strength 
of the U.S. Navy, even while forcing the British navy to sustain costly deployments 
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geographically expansive contested zone that proved impossible for the British to reduce 
as long as the Americans had operational warships. The design, execution, and effects of 
Jones’s strategy, as well as its long-term results, illustrated the U.S. Navy’s opportunities 
and challenges at war with the largest navy in the world.
The American Decision to Adopt Commerce Raiding
Strategic direction for the U.S. Navy emanated from the office of the Secretary of the 
Navy. Benjamin Stoddert, appointed to this position in 1798, set the precedent of strong 
leadership. One author has asserted, “Power rested entirely with the Secretary, not only 
in the technical field of naval construction and equipment but also in the strategic and 
tactical control of naval operations.”5 Soon after the beginning of the War of 1812, Sec-
retary of the Navy Paul Hamilton, who emphasized squadron, as opposed to single-ship, 
operations, for “the precious effects which victory will procure,” was accused of incom-
petence.6 Such charges led to his resignation during the last days of 1812.7 William Jones 
was selected as Hamilton’s replacement. The new secretary took office during the first 
days of 1813, and he quickly became known for supporting an oceanic naval strategy 
that focused on commerce raiding with the object of protracting the war and incurring 
significant protection costs on the Royal Navy.
President James Madison had selected Jones because his “pursuits and studies have been 
intimately connected with the objects of the department.”8 Jones had taken up arms 
against Britain during the American Revolution. Afterward, he commanded merchant 
ships, became a businessman, and served a term in Congress. In 1801, President Thomas 
Jefferson offered to appoint him Secretary of the Navy, but Jones declined.9 This led 
one of his friends in early 1813 to comment, “I could scarcely believe that you would 
have been drawn into Public life—knowing how little ambitions [sic] you are in that 
pursuit.”10 When accepting Madison’s offer in January 1813, Jones wrote to the president 
“that your own and the public confidence far transcends my merit, . . . but the sacred 
cause in which we are engaged and my confidence indeed attachment to the adminis-
tration of our Government demands the Sacrifice of every personal consideration.”11 
However, Jones noted elsewhere, “the moment peace returns, . . . I shall return to private 
life and to business.”12
President Madison, his cabinet, and various members and committees of Congress cer-
tainly provided guidance as to what they wished the navy to accomplish, but it was Jones 
who gave those ideas operational form. The extant correspondence between Jones and 
Madison is dominated by the situation on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, border-
ing the United States and British Canada.13 These waters—virtual inland seas, isolated 
by the rapids on the St. Lawrence River from access by ocean vessels—were the scene 
of urgent efforts by both sides to build up naval forces. The border between the United 
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States and British Canada proved the central theater of the war, but Jones saw nonethe-
less the advantages of protracted oceanic operations. This led Jones to school Madison 
about what might be accomplished by oceanic operations and how. Jones, for example, 
explained: “The difference between the Lake and the sea service is that in the former we 
are compelled to fight them at least man to man and gun to gun while on the ocean five 
British frigates cannot counteract the depredations of one Sloop of War.”14
Jones developed a new concept of oceanic operations, which he dispatched to five prin-
cipal naval officers on 22 February 1813. It predicted that British naval strength on the 
North American Station would increase during 1813, making it too risky for American 
warships to operate near the U.S. coast: “Our great inferiority in naval strength, does 
not permit us to meet them on this ground without hazarding the precious Germ of our 
national glory.” Such a statement served as a warning to American naval officers that 
battles with the Royal Navy would be discouraged; the dozen operational warships of 
the U.S. Navy could not defeat a significant portion of the approximately five hundred 
operational warships of the Royal Navy. Moreover, Jones did not wish to risk the moral 
advantage obtained from America’s 1812 victories over Guerriere, Macedonian, and 
Java, as well as the sloops Frolic and Alert.
Rather than fighting British warships, Jones decided to target maritime commerce: “If 
any thing can draw the attention of the enemy, from the annoyance of our coast for 
the protection of his own, rich & exposed Commercial fleets, it will be a course of this 
nature, & if this effect can be produced, the two fold object, of increasing the pressure 
upon the enemy & relieving ourselves, will be attained.”15
To accomplish these objectives, Jones stressed single-ship cruises targeting British com-
merce while avoiding battle with the Royal Navy. Jones hoped to multiply the strategic 
effects if the British designed their 1813 operations to counter a continuation of the 
squadron-sized cruises that had dominated American operations during the first half-
year of the war. By defining maritime commerce as Britain’s critical vulnerability, Jones 
planned to use British commerce as bait, forcing the Royal Navy to react in ways both 
costly and disruptive. In this way, the secretary hoped to husband the strength of the 
U.S. Navy and disperse that of the Royal Navy.
The Design of British and American Operations
Jones could not have hoped for a more compliant adversary. During the same month 
he took over as head of the Department of the Navy of the United States, the First Lord 
of the British Admiralty declared, “It is evident that the Enemy’s frigates do not wish to 
proceed to Sea singly, & we must be prepared accordingly.”16 The British were anticipat-
ing squadron-sized American operations similar to those conducted during 1812, and 
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these had to be countered more effectively than in the past. In the words of an Admi-
ralty assessment of December 1812, “The War has now continued some months without 
any advantage on our parts.” The British government demanded from Adm. Sir John 
Borlase Warren, the commander in chief of the American and West Indian Stations, 
“more active measures and . . . more successful exertions” against the U.S. Navy. Though 
the Admiralty was “aware of the great uncertainty of all Naval Operations and of the 
difficulty of preventing the occasional excursions of an enterprizing Enemy,” it ex-
pected in the aftermath of America’s 1812 naval victories that Warren would restore “the 
honor of His Majesty’s Arms and the preeminence of the Naval Power of the Country.”17
British naval leaders in London thus saw a need to engage squadron-sized units of the 
American navy, while Jones planned for single-ship cruises that avoided battles and 
targeted maritime trade. However, the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy needed 
his senior leadership to buy into his new strategy. Jones ended a 22 February letter to 
his principal officers with the following invitation: “Your own ideas of a cruise with 
this general view will be acceptable to me.” This was the beginning of an extensive 
correspondence with the navy’s uniformed leadership. Jones endeavored to work the 
ideas of senior officers into plans that would support his strategy. For example, Com-
modore John Rodgers proposed a cruise by his heavy frigate President to the Azores and 
Madeira, since this area served as a rendezvous for scattered British East and West India 
convoys.18 President would then sail north and operate against commercial shipping 
around Britain and Ireland before provisioning at a port in Denmark. Subsequently, 
Rodgers suggested a much farther-ranging cruise, to the East Indies. Jones determined 
that the first part of the plan would fit his strategy but judged that a cruise into the 
Indian Ocean was too risky. In the end, he refused to allow Rodgers to sail past the Cape 
of Good Hope, or at the farthest Mauritius.19
Meanwhile, Commodore Stephen Decatur of the heavy frigate United States suggested 
that he sweep up a small British squadron reportedly off the South Carolina coast and 
then cruise on the route used by British merchant vessels returning to England from the 
East and West Indies.20 Jones, however, had intelligence that the Royal Navy squadron 
off South Carolina had dispersed; instead, therefore, he suggested that Decatur oper-
ate solely against British commerce in the West Indies. In contrast to this diplomatic 
response to a senior officer, Jones had no qualms about ordering the recently promoted 
Capt. Jacob Jones of the frigate Macedonian also to operate in the West Indies and to 
“compare your ideas [with Decatur’s] so as to cruise separately & spread over as great a 
space as possible.” 21
In another instance, Capt. John Smith of the frigate Congress received seven possible 
cruising options from Jones, who explained, “On the eve of Your departure inform me 
of the route you contemplate.” 22 Smith chose a station along the equator to intercept the 
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East Indian and South American commerce.23 As these officers “chose” their cruising 
grounds, Jones provided more specific orders to his remaining, more junior command-
ers so as to avoid leaving important regions uncovered. Jones ordered the brig Argus to 
operate around the British Isles, and the commander of the frigate Chesapeake received 
instructions to intercept commerce destined for Canada.24
Orders to American naval officers emphasized single-ship cruises that, although sacri-
ficing concentration of force, would compel the British to disperse their warships more 
widely. As Jones explained, “I have never doubted the effect upon the enemy, would be 
in proportion to the space covered on the ocean by our cruisers, in those tracks most 
frequented by his immensely rich, & wide spread commerce.” 25 Cruises by American 
warships into areas the British considered safe from attack could be particularly useful 
in spurring Britain to costly overreactions.
Commerce raiding by single ships thus promised to increase Britain’s wartime expendi-
tures and disrupt other operations, possibly requiring the withdrawal of ships from the 
U.S. coast. Jones ordered the commanding officer of Argus to destroy trade around the 
British Isles since this “would carry the war home to their direct feelings and interests, 
and produce an astonishing sensation.” 26 For similar reasons he supported operations 
deep in Canadian waters by the frigate Chesapeake: “The enemy will not, in all prob-
ability, anticipate our taking this ground [the Gulf of St. Lawrence] with our Public 
Ships of war.” 27
The targeting of merchant vessels in nearly every corner of the Atlantic had the po-
tential to stretch British naval deployments, but the Royal Navy’s strength gave it a 
considerable degree of elasticity with which to face unanticipated threats. Jones needed 
additional methods to “in some degree compensate for the great inequality compared 
with that of the Enemy.” 28 One answer was to destroy captured vessels. For financial 
reasons, naval captains preferred to send captures into friendly ports so that they could 
be sold as prizes of war, entitling the officers and men of the warship to all or part of 
the proceeds.29 Jones’s orders explained the drawbacks of this conventional approach: “A 
Single Cruiser, if ever so successful, can man but a few prizes, and every prize is a seri-
ous diminution of her force.” By contrast, “a Single Cruiser, destroying every captured 
Vessel, has . . . the power perhaps, of twenty acting upon pecuniary views alone.”30 
Accordingly, “as there is no way of annoying our enemy so effectually as through his 
Commerce,” Jones wrote to one frigate captain, “let devastation be the standing order of 
your cruize.” 31
The hard fact that the British fleet outnumbered the U.S. Navy by a margin of nearly 
fifty to one in 1813 made Jones’s strategy a risky one, but it was a calculated risk. In the 
face of such daunting odds, one obvious alternative was to keep the American warships 
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in port and thereby at least tie down the British squadrons that would be needed to 
guard against a breakout. Yet Jones immediately dismissed such a “fleet in being” 
strategy: “nothing could more effectually promote his [British] views, than an opportu-
nity of blockading in port our naval force, which one tenth part of the force necessary 
to watch their motions on the ocean would accomplish.” 32 American warships in port, 
moreover, would be vulnerable to British amphibious operations, as would indeed be 
demonstrated later in the war. A British operation in Maine involving ground and naval 
forces during the summer of 1814 resulted in the burning of Adams, a flush-decked cor-
vette mounting twenty-seven guns, and the British raid on Washington witnessed the 
destruction of an American frigate and a ship-sloop. Though the odds against America’s 
warships at sea appeared long, the odds in port were arguably worse.
The Execution of American Strategy
As it was, Jones’s single-ship raiding policy soon bore fruit. Two examples occurred 
during the cruises of President and Congress during the summer of 1813. The two war-
ships sailed together from Boston, but they soon split up; President operated as far north 
as the Arctic, and Congress patrolled along the equator. The frigates’ departure from 
Boston in company confirmed the British assessment that the U.S. Navy would conduct 
squadron-sized operations, and the Royal Navy reacted accordingly, dispatching forces 
in pursuit that were larger and costlier than would have been necessary to guard against 
single-ship commerce raids. Even when it became obvious that the two American 
warships were operating singly, the British still had to find them, and they disrupted 
operations from the equator to the Arctic.33 Of Commodore Rodgers, who commanded 
President, a British newspaper mused sardonically “how flattering it must be to him to 
learn, that not single ships but squadrons were dispatched after him, and one specifi-
cally under the command of an Admiral.”34 Rodgers had every right to assert later that 
he had caused disruptions to the Royal Navy equivalent to “more than a dozen times the 
force of a single Frigate.” 35
Broader policy imperatives also drove Jones to accept the risk of oceanic operations so 
as to obtain moral victories against the stronger power. Overall, the first year of the War 
of 1812 did not go as well as planned for the United States, but operations at sea resulted 
in several tactical victories and helped sustain flagging popular support for the conflict. 
In October 1814 Jones noted that “an increase in force on the Ocean is strongly urged 
by public writers and by the Legislature.” 36 The capture of the British sloop Epervier in 
early 1814 was precisely the sort of achievement Jones thought the country needed: “I 
like these little events they keep alive the national feeling and produce an effect infi-
nitely beyond their intrinsic importance.”37
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Even so, Jones endeavored to limit the risks to his warships. Writing to one commander 
in January 1814, he stressed the need to avoid “all unnecessary contact with the Cruis-
ers of the enemy, even with an equal, unless under circumstances that may ensure your 
triumph without defeating the main object of your Cruise, or jeopardize the safety of 
the vessel under your Command.” 38 Much as a victory over an enemy warship might 
boost morale, Jones realized that even a successful engagement would almost certainly 
require the U.S. warship to come into port for repairs. That eventuality would signifi-
cantly diminish the American presence at sea and thus undercut the larger strategic goal 
of forcing the British to disperse their effort in the face of widespread commerce raiding 
operations.
Battles between warships, moreover, were inherently risky; the British might win. Jones 
cited “the success of the Argus [which] . . . in the course of but a few days [of operations 
against merchant ships in the narrow waters between England and Ireland], was aston-
ishingly great; and had the gallant spirit of Captain [William H.] Allen, but submitted 
to the restraint of his excellent judgment, he would have rendered more essential service 
to his country, perhaps, than any single vessel ever did.” 39 Instead, Allen had chanced 
an engagement with a British brig and lost. In another case, Jones wrote of Capt. James 
Lawrence’s decision to bring the frigate Chesapeake to action with the British frigate 
Shannon:
Whilst the gallant spirit and high minded character of our Naval Officers justly excites the national 
admiration, their zealous devotion to the cause and honour of their country must be tempered by 
judgment and sound policy. The glory we have acquired is too precious to commit to the wiles of an 
insidious foe. The just and honorable contest in which we are engaged must be directed to the most 
effectual annoyance of the enemy, not to Naval Chivalry in which the numbers and force of the 
respective combatants are unequal by example.40
Yet Jones knew some warships would not return. Describing the capture in early 1814 of 
the American Frolic, a ship-sloop mounting twenty-two guns, he wrote that “the loss . . . 
which though much to be regretted is among the casualties of War.” 41
The U.S. Navy was quite small, and ship losses could not readily be made good. There 
had been no naval vessels under construction at the outbreak of hostilities;42 many of 
the additional vessels built or purchased under wartime programs became operational 
only after their conclusion. To mitigate attrition, Jones slowed the operational tempo of 
American warships. During the first six months of the war (before Jones’s appointment), 
eleven frigates sailed on extended cruises, but during the remainder of the conflict 
American frigates embarked on only ten cruises.
Husbanding of resources in the face of the Royal Navy’s dominance and the absence 
of reinforcements for the U.S. Navy only postponed the nearly inevitable capture or 
destruction of American warships in chance encounters with superior enemy forces, 
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blockades of ports, and amphibious raids into those ports. The British failed to capture 
a frigate during all of 1812, but increases in British strength and effective Royal Navy re-
sponses to American initiatives made oceanic operations by the U.S. Navy increasingly 
risky as the war progressed. Beginning in 1813, the British turned back or captured half 
the U.S. frigates that proceeded to sea.43 Overall, Jones’s time as Secretary of the Navy 
witnessed the loss of two frigates and five smaller oceangoing warships. In addition, the 
brig Enterprize returned to port without most of its guns, because its crew had heaved 
them overboard in a desperate bid to escape a pursuing British frigate. Now disarmed, 
it was withdrawn from oceanic service for the remainder of the war. Moreover, five 
additional warships could not sail because of the British blockade, and a sixth had been 
laid up and the crew sent for service on the lakes on the Canadian border by the end 
of 1814. That left the American oceangoing navy with only four operational warships. 
Additional vessels procured under wartime programs would not be available for months 
to come.44
Jones, then, could not protract the war indefinitely. In the face of Britain’s overwhelm-
ing superiority in oceangoing warships, at best he could extend the oceanic struggle for 
a finite period. Time was not on his side; numbers began to tell, and the British Navy 
slowly whittled down the U.S. Navy.
Another problem Jones faced was funding. The government’s income paid only for a 
small percentage of its expenditures during the War of 1812. This forced the Treasury 
Department to raise money through loans and treasury notes, and the results did 
not meet expectations.45 In October 1814 Jones lamented, “With respect to money the 
Department is truly in the most untoward situation. . . . I am destitute of money in all 
quarters. Seamen remain unpaid and the recruiting Service is at a stand. I have none 
for the most urgent contingent purposes.” 46 Oceanic operations were extremely costly. 
Without steady funding, Jones’s ability to conduct these endeavors became ever more 
limited as the war progressed, particularly as 1814 drew to a close.
The Limits of Effectiveness
Faced with this bleak picture, Jones decided to resign as Secretary of the Navy. He 
had warned President Madison of his decision in late April 1814, offering to make the 
resignation immediate. His stated reason stemmed from the financial embarrassment 
resulting from personal debt incurred in a failed commercial venture prior to his ap-
pointment. Given the state of the U.S. Navy, an alternative argument could be made 
that Jones felt the naval war had run its course. The financial weakness of the United 
States, coupled with the attrition of the navy and the potential for further losses because 
of British power, led Jones to liken his position to “standing upon Gun Powder with a 
slow match near it.” 47 Getting out in 1814 would keep his reputation intact. One thing 
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is certain—Madison did not want Jones to resign. The president wrote of “the gratifica-
tion I have experienced in the entire fulfillment of my expectations, large as they were, 
from your talents & exertions.” Eventually, the president and his Secretary of the Navy 
reached a compromise that Jones would serve until 1 December 1814.48
In his last days as secretary, Jones crafted a final set of cruising orders. These were 
only partially implemented, because of funding problems, the strength of British naval 
deployments, and the looming termination of the war. The overarching target remained 
British commerce, with the ultimate object of imposing costs on Britain and its navy. 
As such, Constitution and Congress received traditional instructions to operate sin-
gly.49 Jones directed the new large frigate Guerriere, captured in 1812, to sail from the 
Delaware River in company with a schooner that could carry extra supplies and serve as 
a scout.50 Plans also called for President to sail from New York for Asia, in company with 
the sloops of war Hornet and Peacock, as well as store ships, so they could operate for a 
much longer period than in any previous cruise.51
The most innovative feature of these orders involved the sailing of small squadrons to 
the West Indies and the Mediterranean. Each would consist of five vessels resembling 
privateers.52 Such commerce raiders were generally procured, fitted, and manned by 
private citizens as a type of business venture seeking financial gain. To be financially 
successful, privateers needed to get their captures into friendly ports, but this was prov-
ing ever more difficult, given the strength and deployments of the Royal Navy. Jones 
realized that the destruction of prizes would allow the five-vessel, privateer-like naval 
squadrons to continue their missions for longer periods and with greater effect than 
traditional privateers.
Notwithstanding Jones’s innovativeness, it was clear that his oceanic strategy had ap-
proached the limits of its effectiveness. Meanwhile, Congress was not fully manned; 
Guerriere’s departure from the Delaware would be difficult, perhaps impossible, because 
of a combination of geography and British blockade; and funding problems slowed the 
creation of the West Indies and Mediterranean privateer-like squadrons, neither of 
which sailed before the ratification of the peace treaty.
At sea, additional constraints compounded American difficulties. There were only so 
many bodies of water where commerce raiding could be successfully carried out. Every 
time U.S. warships did damage in a region, British responses made it more difficult for 
the Americans to obtain similar effects again. This increasingly limited Jones’s options 
and forced him to exploit new areas, but those regions that remained by late 1814 could 
be reached only by long and often dangerous passages.
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Assessing the Effectiveness of American Commerce Raiding
It would be all too easy to label Jones’s strategy a failure. American warships destroyed 
few vessels in comparison to the immense size of the British merchant fleet. But consid-
ered together with privateers, over which Jones had little or no control, they had a much 
greater quantifiable impact. One author estimates that American warships captured 165 
merchant vessels, compared to 1,344 by American privateers.53 These numbers should 
be viewed as implying a ratio rather than as precise in themselves; Faye Kert has argued 
that it is impossible to determine the exact number of British merchant vessels captured 
and destroyed by the Americans.54
In fact, Jones looked beyond the raw numbers of British merchant vessels captured and 
understood what historian Jan Glete has concluded: “Even a small American fleet . . . 
was able to enforce high protection costs on Britain.”55 In a letter to Commodore Rod-
gers concerning the latter’s 1813 summer cruise, Jones explained, “The effects of your 
Cruize however is not the less felt by the enemy either in his Commercial or Military 
Marine, for while you have harassed and enhanced the dangers of the one, you provoked 
the pursuit & abstracted the attention of the other to an extent perhaps equal to the 
disproportion of our relative forces.”56 As long as the U.S. Navy survived and followed 
the strategy laid out by Jones, the Royal Navy had to react, expend precious resources, 
maintain or increase its deployments, and refine a convoy system that was costly to both 
merchants and the navy.
The American strategy caused the British considerable irritation. In early 1813, the 
Secretary of the Admiralty asserted to Admiral Warren, the commander in chief of the 
American and West Indies Stations, that “their Lordships have, not without inconve-
nience to other Services, placed under your command a force much greater in propor-
tion than the National Navy of the Enemy opposed to you would seem to warrant.”57 
That said, the Admiralty continued to reinforce Warren’s command, with the object 
of minimizing or destroying the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy.58 The First Lord of the 
Admiralty warned Warren in June 1813 that “any more naval disasters, more especially 
if they could fairly be ascribed to want of due precaution, would make a strong impres-
sion on the public mind in this Country.”59 Warren, for his part, lamented that single 
American warships at sea “are such small & Difficult Objects to hit—that our chances 
are few indeed & the good Fortune of these Rascally privateer Frigates makes me almost 
Despair of ever seeing them.” 60
The British apparent inability to destroy the U.S. Navy led to criticism of Warren’s con-
duct. A letter to the editor in the influential Naval Chronicle argued that Warren “sailed 
from England with the confidence of the nation—that he will possess it on his return, I 
greatly doubt. . . . I fear they [the Americans] have shewn, that the British lion is sound 
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asleep. . . . It is too certain that little has been done, certainly nothing great or worthy of 
this powerful fleet.” The writer, however, believed the naval failures went beyond War-
ren to include “the apathy and supineness of the B[oard] of A[dmiralty]”—he indicted 
the Admiralty as “novices.” 61
Yet the Admiralty had an unenviable task of balancing deployments. Until early 1814 
Britain faced Napoleonic France. This war had continued, with one short respite, since 
1793. The French navy was much larger than the American and included numerous 
ships of the line, of which the Americans had none operational before the termination 
of the War of 1812. Moreover, the geographic distinctiveness between the American 
and French theaters of operations added to the difficulty. The War of 1812 forced the 
Admiralty to alter its worldwide naval deployments. Forces in North American waters 
multiplied from twenty-three warships in mid-1812 to 120 in late 1814. The number of 
ships of the line increased, as noted above, from one to twelve, along with two razees, 
and frigate strength increased from five to twenty-nine.
The Leeward Islands, Jamaica, and South American Stations continued to demand 
large squadrons, including some of Britain’s best warships. Small squadrons routinely 
patrolled the busy sea-lanes around the Azores, Madeira, and the Canaries searching for 
American commerce raiders and protecting British convoys. Around the British Isles, 
the threat of American naval operations forced the Admiralty to maintain significant 
deployments even after the defeat of Napoleon. However, deployments shifted from the 
English Channel to its southern approaches, the coast of Ireland, and from Scotland to 
the north, so as better to cover the arrival of convoys.62
Convoys themselves received stronger escorts. In 1812, convoys from the West Indies to 
England routinely sailed under the escort of single frigates. These single warships often 
became squadrons later in the War of 1812. For example, the escorts protecting West 
India convoys generally grew to include a line-of-battle ship, a frigate, and at least two 
sloops. In May 1814 the Secretary of the Admiralty explained, “Each convoy therefore 
equaled in force the whole American navy; the consequence of which was, that not a 
single merchant-ship had been taken which sailed under convoy, and that no convoy 
had been at all disturbed, except by weather.” 63
British naval deployments thus minimized commercial losses but meant that the Royal 
Navy had to maintain a large fleet, including many ships of the line and large frigates, 
even after the termination of hostilities with Napoleonic France in 1814. Had the British 
been able to destroy the U.S. Navy or force the United States to rely solely on priva-
teers—which were smaller in size than warships and less apt to fight when brought to 
bay—the Royal Navy could likely have economized more, decommissioning a greater 
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number of ships of the line and frigates, which were both manpower intensive and costly 
to operate.
Instead, the possibility of facing the powerful frigates and sloops of the U.S. Navy 
continued to require an expensive commitment for Britain. This can be seen in the 
operational strength of the British fleet. During 1812 and 1813, the Royal Navy deployed 
slightly over five hundred warships. The fall of Napoleon in the spring of 1814 should 
have resulted in a major drawdown. Though operational strength did decline, Royal 
Navy deployments in late 1814 still totaled approximately 350 warships, of which thirty-
three were ships of the line or razees and eighty-three were frigates. To be sure, the 
British maintained squadrons in places that had little to do with the War of 1812, like 
the Mediterranean and the East Indies, but operations relating to the conflict with the 
United States still accounted for more than half of Britain’s warships in late 1814.64
Conclusions
Beginning in January 1813, Secretary of the Navy William Jones crafted the U.S. Navy’s 
oceanic strategy to include a greater emphasis on commerce raiding. Moreover, Jones 
was the operational planner who designed the cruising orders for the navy, thus creating 
the tangible element of the strategy at sea.65 According to all available evidence, Presi-
dent Madison largely left oceanic strategy and the conduct of operations in the hands of 
Jones, who had the great advantage of understanding the intricacies and vulnerabilities 
of the global maritime commercial system. Jones was therefore the driving force in pro-
tracting an oceanic naval war that provided reasonable dividends to the United States 
at a considerable cost to the British navy. This was quite an achievement in the face of 
overwhelming British maritime power.
Jones’s commerce raiding strategy inflicted significant costs on the Royal Navy by 
creating a festering irritation that could not be eliminated before hostilities concluded. 
To sustain this irregular naval war, Jones explained, “The species of force called for is 
undoubtedly well calculated to annoy the enemy and in order to meet the wishes which 
have been expressed on the subject by the President and in accordance with my ardent 
desire to employ every possible means of annoyance against the enemy.” 66
Aiming for mere annoyance allowed Jones to create a strategy that could prolong the 
war and make it increasingly expensive for the British. As long as the war at sea against 
the Americans wore on, the Royal Navy had to remain on a war footing, and British 
merchants had to adhere to convoy regulations rather than return to more efficient and 
less costly peacetime practices. Peace was greatly desired among the British political 
public, which had endured more than two decades of war with revolutionary and then 
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Napoleonic France. This put greater diplomatic leverage in American hands than would 
have been the case with another, lesser, naval strategy.
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CSS Alabama and Confederate Commerce 
Raiders during the U.S. Civil War
SPENCER C.  TUCKER
On 8 February 1861, seven southern states established at Montgomery, Alabama, the 
Confederate States of America. The American Civil War began on 12 April, when shore 
batteries at Charleston, South Carolina, opened fire on Union-held Fort Sumter at the 
entrance to the harbor. At great disadvantage vis-à-vis the North in both population 
and industrial strength, the South necessarily made the army its military priority. The 
Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, left the naval war largely to his able Secretary of 
the Navy, Stephen R. Mallory.
Mallory hoped to secure a few technologically advanced ironclads, break the Union 
blockade, and attack Northern ports and shipping. He also planned to send out com-
merce raiders to destroy Union merchant shipping on the high seas. These would not 
be privateers but regular commissioned naval vessels, operating under established  
international law. As the war progressed, Mallory shifted to a more defensively  
oriented approach and increasingly experimented with new methods of warfare, 
including mines and the submarine, but commerce raiding remained a consistent 
strategy.
Mallory hoped that a campaign of guerre de course would cause serious economic 
distress in the North, divert U.S. naval assets from the blockade, and pressure Northern 
businessmen to demand a negotiated end to the war that would grant Southern inde-
pendence. In the event, while the Confederate campaign against Union commerce did 
drive up insurance rates and force the North to shift naval assets in an attempt to hunt 
down the raiders, its principal lasting effect was to initiate the flight of U.S.-flagged 
merchant ships to foreign registries.
Creating a Confederate Fleet
At the onset of the war, Secretary Mallory had very few ships. Like the Union navy sec-
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had almost no resources available, whether of ships to purchase or facilities for their 
conversion, let alone for new construction. Only the Tredegar Iron Works (J. R. Ander-
son & Co.) of Richmond, Virginia, could manufacture entire steam-propulsion systems. 
Thus the Confederacy never built any cruisers in its ports during the war, although it 
did manage to construct a great many wooden gunboats and a number of ironclads.
In the months before fighting broke out, Mallory dispatched agents to purchase sup-
plies in the North and in Canada. He also ordered naval representatives to Europe both 
to purchase ships for conversion to cruisers and to contract for the construction of 
purpose-built warships. By far the most able of these individuals was James D. Bulloch, 
a former U.S. Navy lieutenant who had resigned from the service in 1853. Bulloch ar-
rived in Liverpool in June 1861 and by August had placed contracts with British yards 
for the ships that would become the Confederate cruisers Alabama and Florida. He and 
other Confederate agents eventually contracted for eighteen vessels, the best of which 
were those secured in Britain: Alabama, Florida, Shenandoah, Chickamauga, Georgia, 
Rappahannock, and Tallahassee. The other eleven ships became blockade-runners, were 
sequestered by the British or French governments, or were not completed prior to the 
end of the war.
With so few ships available at the beginning of the war, the Confederacy first turned 
to private vessels. On 15 April 1861, following the shelling of Fort Sumter, President 
Abraham Lincoln declared the existence of an “insurrection” and called for seventy-five 
thousand Union volunteers. Jefferson Davis responded two days later with a call for 
letters of marque and reprisal to carry out privateering operations against American 
merchant shipping. Privateering involved the capture of civilian property by private 
individuals and thus could not involve destruction of enemy vessels. The Confederate 
Congress passed, and Davis signed into law on 6 May, a bill recognizing a state of war 
with the Union and establishing regulations for “letters of marque, prizes, and prize 
goods” similar to those issued by the United States in the War of 1812.1
Mallory had little confidence in privateers, but even modest success in this quarter 
would force up insurance rates in the North and adversely affect its business sector. 
Also, even a few privateers could force Welles to shift warships away from the blockade 
to hunt for them. Davis and other Southern leaders claimed the practice was legal, in 
that the United States had failed to ratify the 1856 Declaration of Paris, the signatories 
of which foreswore privateering. In retaliation for the Southern declaration, however, 
Lincoln proclaimed a naval blockade of the Confederacy and warned that any captured 
privateers would be treated as pirates.2 Lincoln also offered to bind the United States to 
adhere unconditionally to the 1856 Declaration of Paris, but the British secretary of state 
for foreign affairs, Lord John Russell, pointed out that any European powers signing 
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such a convention with the United States would be bound to treat all Confederate priva-
teers as pirates, which they were unwilling to do.3
Meanwhile, on 14 May 1861, the British government issued a proclamation recogniz-
ing the Confederate States as a belligerent power, thereupon rejecting the Lincoln 
administration’s contention that Confederate privateers were pirates. At the same time, 
however, on 1 June the British forbade armed ships of either the Union or the Confed-
eracy to bring prizes into British home or colonial ports; France and the other major 
European maritime powers promptly followed suit. These decisions were a serious blow 
to the Confederacy. To be legal, all captured vessels had to be taken into port and there 
adjudicated by prize courts as legal captures. Without access to prize courts, privateers 
could be treated as little more than pirates. Not only did a declaration of neutrality 
prohibit the entry of prize vessels into ports, but it prohibited that nation’s citizens from 
fitting out privateers under the flag of either belligerent. Yet international law held that 
state warships could legally destroy captured vessels, so the Confederate vessels were not 
prohibited from sinking Union ships.
Lincoln’s threat did not deter applications for letters of marque in the South. On 10 May, 
the day the Confederate regulations were published, the Confederacy granted its first 
commission to the thirty-ton schooner Triton of Brunswick, Georgia, armed with a sin-
gle six-pounder. In all, the Confederacy issued letters of marque for fifty-two privateers, 
most of which operated out of Charleston and New Orleans.4 The few privateers that got 
to sea in May found easy pickings. The first success came on 16 May, when Calhoun of 
New Orleans captured the American merchant bark Ocean Eagle of Rockland, Maine, 
off the Mississippi River mouth. Calhoun and two other New Orleans privateers took 
nine other Union ships before the arrival at the end of May of the U.S. Navy screw sloop 
Brooklyn to patrol the area.
Typical of Atlantic coast privateers was the fast schooner Savannah, a fifty-three-ton 
vessel with a crew of twenty men and armed with a single gun. Savannah sailed from 
Charleston on 2 June and soon captured and sent into port the brig Joseph of Phila-
delphia. At dusk that same day Savannah spotted a sail and ran toward it, but the ship 
turned out to be the U.S. Navy brig Perry, armed with six thirty-two-pounders. Having 
lost part of its upper works in a storm the night before, Savannah could not outrun its 
opponent. The outclassed Savannah surrendered after a twenty-minute fight.
Sailed to New York, Savannah was there condemned and sold. Branded as “pirates” by 
the Northern press and Federal government, the crew was put on trial and threatened 
with the death penalty. President Davis promptly warned that if the men were execut-
ed, he would hang captured Union officers on a one-for-one basis. Washington backed 
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down. In February 1862 it decided that privateersmen would be classified as prisoners 
of war.5
Union warships soon swept up most of the remaining privateers. Also, as the Union 
blockade became more effective, it became more difficult to send prizes to the South, 
and increasing numbers of the latter were recaptured. Many privateer vessels were 
subsequently converted into blockade-runners, a course that ran counter to Confederate 
naval strategy.
Maximizing Commerce Raiding
Secretary of the Navy Mallory sought to get Confederate commerce raiders to sea. Given 
the Confederacy’s lack of facilities, Great Britain, the world’s most advanced and largest 
shipbuilder, was the logical source from which to buy the ships, especially as its leader-
ship was sympathetic to the South. Mallory urged Bulloch in England “to get cruising 
ships . . . afloat with the quickest possible dispatch.” 6
Mallory had decided views on the type of ships required. In his words, such ships 
should be
enabled to keep the sea, and to make extended cruises, propellers fast [fixed firmly] under both 
steam and canvas suggest themselves to us with special favor. Large ships are unnecessary for this 
service; our policy demands that they shall be no larger than may be sufficient to combine the 
requisite speed and power, a battery of one or two heavy pivot guns and two or more broadside 
guns, being sufficient against commerce. By getting small ships we can afford a greater number, an 
important consideration. The character of our coasts and harbors indicate attention to the draft of 
water of our vessels. Speed in propeller and the protection of her machinery can not be obtained 
upon a very light draft, but they should draw as little water as may be compatible with their ef-
ficiency otherwise.7
Pending foreign construction, Mallory sought to outfit some ships at home. On 17 April 
1861 he met with Cdr. Raphael Semmes, a staunch advocate of commerce raiding with 
a strong hatred of the North. A former career U.S. Navy officer, Semmes had distin-
guished himself during the Mexican-American War. Interestingly, in a book about his 
war experiences, Service Afloat and Ashore during the Mexican War (1852), Semmes had 
argued that if Mexico had fitted out privateers against American shipping during that 
war, Washington should have treated them as pirates.8
Following their discussions, Mallory gave Semmes command of the former steamer 
packet Habana at New Orleans. Launched in 1857, this 437-ton vessel had been em-
ployed on the route between New Orleans and Havana. Renamed Sumter and commis-
sioned on 3 June, it was the first Confederate Navy commerce raider. The ship had a 
retractable funnel and a screw propeller; there would be no outward means to identify it 
as a steamer. Its armament consisted of one nine-inch Dahlgren gun and four thirty-
two-pounders.9 Sumter escaped to sea from the mouth of the Mississippi on 30 June, 
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outrunning Brooklyn, which was caught off station.10 On 3 July Sumter took its first 
prize, the merchant bark Golden Rocket.11
Semmes, like other Confederate raider captains, found himself handicapped by the 
neutrality of the major powers. Semmes tried to talk Spanish officials in Cuba into 
adjudicating five of his prizes there, but they refused, and these ships were eventually 
returned to their owners. As a result, Confederate captains routinely burned the North-
ern merchant ships they captured. Occasionally a ship would also be let go “on bond,” 
because of a large number of passengers or because its cargo belonged to a neutral na-
tion. Bonding meant that a captain signed a paper guaranteeing to pay a set sum to the 
Confederate government at the end of the war, the amount to be decided by condemna-
tion procedures.
Semmes also discovered that neutrality laws limited the time that cruisers might spend 
in port and the repairs that might be made there. Large numbers of captured seamen 
and passengers were both a problem and a danger to a commerce raider. Those captured 
were routinely sent ashore in their own boats or, if no land was in sight, transferred to 
neutral ships or to Union merchant ships carrying cargoes belonging to neutral nations.
Semmes cruised the Caribbean and the South American coast to Brazil and back to the 
West Indies before crossing the Atlantic. With his ship now in poor repair, he put in 
to Cádiz, but Spanish authorities there would not permit an overhaul of its engine and 
ordered him to depart. Semmes then proceeded to Gibraltar, but U.S. Navy warships, in-
cluding the screw sloop Kearsarge, soon arrived. Since the repairs his ship needed could 
not be effected at Gibraltar either, in April 1862 Semmes, having received authorization 
to do so, laid up the ship. In December it was sold to a British firm and put back into 
commercial service as Gibraltar.12
Though Sumter had proved both too small and too slow to be an effective commerce 
raider, Semmes had taken seventeen prizes in just six months, at a cost to the Confeder-
ate government of only twenty-eight thousand dollars. This figure was less than that of 
the least valuable of its prizes. Advanced to captain, Semmes was at Nassau in June 1863, 
hoping to catch passage on a blockade-runner to the South, when orders arrived from 
Mallory sending him back to England to take command of a ship nearing completion at 
Liverpool.13
Bulloch, meanwhile, had managed to skirt the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819, which 
prohibited British subjects from equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming any vessel 
intended for service by foreign belligerent navies. Liverpool lawyer F. S. Hull advised 
him that construction of such a ship was not illegal in itself, whatever the intent, and 
that the offense lay only in the equipping. Bulloch thus saw to it that none of his cruisers 
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went to sea with ordnance, small arms, or military stores. He shipped these in other ves-
sels, and the cruisers were then outfitted in international waters.14
The first British-built Confederate raider was Florida. Commissioned in August 1862 
by Lt. John N. Maffitt, it made two spectacular passages through the blockade of Mobile 
Bay and captured thirty-three Union merchant ships, causing an estimated $4,051,000 
in damages. Expenses of the raider’s construction and cruises probably totaled only 
$400,000, so this was a tenfold return on investment. Florida was captured at Bahia, 
Brazil, on 7 October 1864 by the Union screw sloop Wachusett in defiance of interna-
tional law and sailed to the United States.15
Alabama was the second English-built Confederate commerce raider and by far the 
most successful. On 1 August 1861 Bulloch contracted for the ship with the Birkenhead 
Ironworks, owned by the firm of John Laird and Sons. Identified on the ways as Hull 
No. 290, it was launched on 15 May as Enrica. Bulloch expected to command it himself, 
but Mallory decided that command would go to Semmes, now without a ship, while 
Bulloch continued his important contract and logistics work.16
Any trained observer could see that Hull No. 290 was designed for easy conversion into 
an armed cruiser; the American consul at Liverpool hired a private detective and soon 
learned more about the vessel. The U.S. minister to Britain, Charles Francis Adams, 
complained to London and furnished evidence as to Enrica’s true nature. Adams also 
arranged that the U.S. Navy screw sloop Tuscarora, then at Southampton, be ordered to 
intercept Enrica should it put to sea.
Warned on 26 July that the British government was about to impound his ship, then 
undergoing sea trials, Bulloch immediately informed the Lairds that he wanted to carry 
out an additional trial and brought on board a British master, Mathew J. Butcher, and a 
skeleton crew. On the morning of 29 July, Bulloch and invited guests set out in Enrica, 
with a steam tug as tender. After lunch, Bulloch informed his guests that the ship would 
stay at sea that night and took them back with him to Liverpool in the tug. Early the 
next morning Bulloch returned in the tug with additional crewmen. Learning that Tus-
carora was at sea searching for Enrica toward Queenstown on the southern Irish coast, 
Bulloch ordered Butcher to head north around Ireland, thence to Terceira Island in the 
Azores.17
Returning to Liverpool, Bulloch sent out another ship, Agrippina, with stores, ordnance, 
ammunition, and 250 tons of coal. On 13 August he and Semmes, who had only just 
arrived, departed Liverpool aboard Bahama. Meanwhile, Enrica arrived at Porto Praia 
da Vitória, on Terceira, on 9 August, followed by Agrippina on 18 August, and Bahama 
on 20 August. Semmes ordered the latter two ships to Angra Bay to fit out Enrica.18 On 
24 August, in international waters, Semmes commissioned his ship Alabama. He also 
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persuaded some eighty seamen from the other two ships to sign on, promising them 
double standard wages in gold, along with prize money for ships destroyed. Bulloch, 
meanwhile, returned to Liverpool in Bahama.19
Alabama was a sleek, three-masted, barkentine-rigged wooden ship, described by 
Semmes as “a very perfect ship of her class.”20 Some 230 feet long and nine hundred tons 
burden, it had a single screw propeller powered by two three-hundred-horsepower en-
gines and four boilers, with a retractable funnel. The propeller could be detached from 
the shaft and lifted into a special well to enable higher speed under sail alone.
Alabama was capable of thirteen knots under steam and sail, ten knots under sail alone. 
It mounted eight guns: two pivot-mounted guns—a rifled seven-inch (110-pounder) 
Blakely on the forecastle and a smoothbore sixty-eight-pounder abaft the main mast—as 
well as six heavy thirty-two-pounders in broadside. The average crew numbered twenty-
four officers and 120 men. Designed to keep the sea for long periods, Alabama boasted a 
fully equipped machine shop so that the members of the crew might make all ordinary 
repairs themselves. It carried sufficient coal for eighteen days’ continuous steaming. 
Semmes used the coal sparingly and made most captures under sail alone. The entire 
cost of the ship, including outfitting, came to $250,000.21
Semmes’s first three lieutenants had served with him on Sumter. The first lieutenant, 
John McIntosh Kell, and the fourth lieutenant, Arthur F. Sinclair, both later wrote books 
about their experiences. While his officers proved capable, however, Semmes had prob-
lems with his crew. The vast majority of its members were British seamen, many of them 
castoffs from Liverpool. Difficulties were especially pronounced in port when alcohol 
was available. Partly for this reason, Semmes rarely allowed his men ashore, which in 
turn created morale problems. The large number of non-American crew members also 
made it more difficult to enforce discipline. The same problems affected other raiders, 
including Florida, whose Spanish and Italian seamen did not get on well together and 
also had difficulty understanding orders delivered in English.22
Alabama took its first prizes, all whalers, in the vicinity of the Azores. The first, on 
5 September, was Ocmulgee of Massachusetts. As was his practice, Semmes had ap-
proached it under a false U.S. flag; Semmes also regularly presented his ship as a British 
or Dutch vessel—even as a U.S. Navy warship.23 During two weeks, Semmes decimated 
the Union whaling fleet in the Azores. After weathering a major storm, Alabama pro-
ceeded west, arriving off Newfoundland and New England. That October Semmes took 
eleven vessels, destroying eight and releasing three on bond. Nature intruded, however, 
in the form of a hurricane, which on 16 October split sails and snapped the main yard, 
but Alabama proved its ability to withstand heavy weather.24
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More than a dozen Union warships now searched for Alabama and the other raiders, 
but they were always a little late or in the wrong location. Semmes next proceeded to 
Fort-de-France, Martinique, to receive coal from Agrippina. The tender was already in 
port when Alabama arrived on 18 November. Semmes ordered Agrippina to Blanquilla 
Island off Venezuela, and the tender was hardly clear of the port when the U.S. Navy 
screw frigate San Jacinto arrived and took up a position off the harbor. Although it 
had a much more powerful armament than Alabama, the Union warship could make 
only seven knots, and that same night Semmes took advantage of a squall to escape to 
Blanquilla.25
Alabama Sails to Galveston
Semmes soon learned from newspapers of the U.S. capture of Galveston and that a 
Union expeditionary force was expected to invade Texas in January 1863. Aware that 
Galveston Harbor was shallow and that all Union transports would thus have to anchor 
offshore, Semmes developed a daring plan to sail there and attack the transports. He 
hoped also to take, en route to Galveston, a steamer from Panama carrying gold trans-
shipped from California.
On 29 November 1862, Alabama made the passage between San Domingo and Puerto 
Rico, the usual route for mail steamers. Semmes took several prizes, among them the 
large bark-rigged steamer Ariel of the Aspinwall Line. Although outward bound and 
hence not carrying gold, it was Semmes’s most important prize. The steamer had more 
than seven hundred people on board, including some five hundred passengers and 140 
U.S. Marines on their way to Pacific Squadron assignments. Semmes disarmed and 
paroled the Marines, but the large number of prisoners forced him to let Ariel proceed 
under bond.26
On 23 December, Alabama met Agrippina at the Arcas Islands off Yucatan and spent a 
week there taking on supplies and coal and preparing for the Galveston raid. Semmes 
planned to arrive there during daylight, reconnoiter, and then return for a night attack. 
He expected to use Alabama’s superior speed to fight or run, as he chose. Alabama 
arrived off Galveston late in the afternoon of 11 January 1863 but found there, instead 
of a fleet of Federal transports, only five Union warships lobbing shells into Galves-
ton. Semmes correctly concluded that the Confederates had retaken the port; indeed, 
Galveston had fallen eleven days before, and the Union troops had been diverted to 
New Orleans.
Lookouts on the Union warships soon spotted Alabama. The Union squadron com-
mander, Commodore Henry H. Bell, flew his flag in Brooklyn, but since that ship’s 
engine was not functioning, Bell dispatched Lt. Cdr. Homer C. Blake in Hatteras to 
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investigate. A former Delaware River excursion side-wheeler, Hatteras mounted only 
four thirty-two-pounders and a 3.67-inch rifle.
Alabama moved slowly along the coast, drawing the Union ship away from the rest of 
the squadron. As soon as it was dark and the two ships were about twenty miles from 
the other Federal ships, Alabama came about and turned toward Hatteras under steam. 
When Alabama came within hailing distance, Blake demanded its identity, only to be 
told that it was an English vessel. Reassured, Blake demanded and received permission 
to inspect the ship’s registry. After Hatteras had lowered a boat, Lieutenant Kell called 
out, “This is the Confederate States steamer Alabama . . . , fire.” 27
Alabama’s broadside ripped into Hatteras from very close range. Knowing his ship’s 
weakness, Blake tried to ram, but the faster Alabama avoided the attempt. His ship on 
fire and sinking, Blake surrendered after thirteen minutes. Two of his crewmen were 
dead and five wounded. Hit only five times, Alabama had two men wounded. Semmes 
took the Union crew on board and then sailed for Port Royal, Jamaica, where he paroled 
his prisoners.28
In late January 1863, Alabama sailed from Jamaica east through the West Indies to 
Brazil, arriving on 10 April at Fernando de Noronha, where Semmes coaled from a 
prize. This was fortunate, because Agrippina had been delayed. Semmes then made for 
Bahia, taking several more prizes en route. There, in mid-May, Georgia came in; Florida 
was only a hundred miles north. The only Union warship then in the South Atlantic was 
the screw sloop Mohican. Acting Rear Adm. Charles Wilkes, commander of the West 
Indian Squadron, created specifically to track down Alabama and Florida, had been 
detained in the West Indies with his flagship, the powerful and fast steamer Vanderbilt. 
Had Vanderbilt been actively searching with Mohican, the career of Alabama might 
have been ended then and there, but Wilkes was more interested in capturing blockade-
runners for prize money than in hunting Alabama; Welles later relieved him of com-
mand for misusing Vanderbilt.29
On 21 May 1863 Alabama sailed from Bahia and cruised off Brazil. Agrippina did not 
arrive at Bahia until 1 June, only to discover the U.S. warships Mohican and Onward 
there. Capt. Alexander McQueen of Agrippina, fearful that his ship and its contents 
might be seized by the Union vessels when he left port, sold the coal and took on cargo 
for Britain. The tender never again encountered Alabama.30
Between Bahia and Rio, Alabama took eight prizes. Of these, five were burned, and two 
were bonded. The remaining prize, the five-hundred-ton, fast, bark-rigged clipper Con-
rad, was given two twelve-pounders from another prize. Semmes commissioned it as 
the auxiliary cruiser Tuscaloosa, under Lt. John Low. Semmes ordered Low to proceed 
on his own and rendezvous at Cape Town. Low subsequently took two prizes. After 
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Tuscaloosa arrived at Cape Town, however, British authorities seized it as an uncon-
demned prize, eventually turning it over to the American consul.31
Semmes, meanwhile, sailed to the Cape of Good Hope to intercept ships homeward 
bound from the East Indies, but in two months off South Africa he took only one prize. 
Indeed, of its eventual total of sixty-four prizes, Alabama took fifty-two of them in its 
first ten months at sea. This shift can be attributed to the transfer of American mer-
chant ships to foreign registry, the reliance of American merchants on foreign  
ships to transport their goods, and the use by merchant skippers of less-frequented  
trading routes.
Alabama Disrupts U.S. Trade in Asia
On 24 September 1863, aware that Vanderbilt was searching for him, Semmes departed 
Cape Town for the Far East. He took his ship south of Mauritius. Engine problems, 
meanwhile, forced Vanderbilt to return home.32 Semmes’s goal was to cripple the Ameri-
can trade with Asia. During the first half of November, he took four merchantmen. But 
American ship captains had been warned, and on 21 December, when Alabama put in 
at Singapore, Semmes found twenty-two American merchant ships safely in that harbor. 
Other U.S. ships had taken refuge at Bangkok, Canton, Shanghai, and Manila. Semmes 
was also having problems with his crew, and at almost every port, men deserted; fortu-
nately, others usually signed on to replace them.
Alabama was now in need of major overhaul. Its copper plating was coming loose from 
the wooden hull, and its boilers were so corroded that carrying full steam pressure was 
dangerous. Learning that the Union screw sloop Wyoming was patrolling the Sunda 
Strait, between Sumatra and Java, Semmes resolved to do battle with this ship, which 
was not as heavily armed as his own. The two did not meet, however, because Wyoming 
had steamed to Batavia for repairs to its boilers.33
Semmes sailed through the Strait of Malacca and took two more U.S. merchant ships 
before entering the Indian Ocean and briefly calling at Anjengo (now Anchuthengu), on 
the southwestern Indian coast. He then proceeded west to the Comoro Islands for provi-
sions. The ship departed there on 12 February 1864, retracing its course back to Cape 
Town, where it arrived on 20 March. On the return trip Semmes took only one prize, 
and at Cape Town he learned of the seizure of Tuscaloosa.
On 25 March 1864, Alabama departed for Europe and hoped-for repairs. On 11 June it 
dropped anchor at Cherbourg. Semmes requested permission from the French authori-
ties there to place his ship in dry dock. They refused, pointing out, as Semmes was well 
aware, that these facilities were reserved for the French navy and that only Emperor 
Napoleon III could grant such permission. They suggested that Semmes move his ship 
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to Le Havre or another port with private dockyard facilities, but Semmes declined, 
expressing confidence that the emperor would approve his request.
Events now moved swiftly. On 12 June, the American minister to Paris, William Day-
ton, telegraphed news of Alabama’s arrival to the Dutch port of Flushing, where Capt. 
John A. Winslow’s screw steam sloop Kearsarge was riding at anchor, keeping watch 
on CSS Georgia and Rappahannock at Calais. Kearsarge was in excellent condition, 
only two months out of a Dutch dockyard. Having spent a year looking for Alabama, 
Winslow was quickly under way. He arrived off Cherbourg on 14 June and positioned 
his ship off the breakwater, without anchoring. International law required that if Kear-
sarge anchored in the harbor, Alabama would receive a twenty-four-hour head start on 
departure.
Semmes might have attempted escape. Cherbourg had two channels, and Kearsarge 
could not easily cover both, especially at night. But Alabama was in poor condition and 
could not be kept at sea for much longer. Semmes also might have decided to lay up his 
ship, as he had Sumter. But he elected to fight. To Semmes it was an affair of honor and 
defense of the flag. Delay would only bring more Union warships. Indeed, Winslow had 
already telegraphed for reinforcements.
The battle between Alabama and Kearsarge took place on 19 June, in international 
waters off the French coast; it was one of the most spectacular naval engagements of 
the war. Notwithstanding Semmes’s later claim that Kearsarge had the advantage in 
size, weight of ordnance, number of guns, and crew, the two ships were in fact closely 
matched, except that at eleven knots maximum speed, Kearsarge was slightly faster. It 
had four thirty-two-pounder broadside guns, a 4.2-inch rifled gun, a twelve-pounder 
howitzer, and most importantly, two eleven-inch, pivot-mounted Dahlgren smooth-
bores, throwing 135-pound shells. Alabama would have the edge at long range with its 
Blakely rifled gun, but advantage would go to Kearsarge in medium-to-short-range fire. 
Both ships could fight only five guns on a side, but Kearsarge threw a heavier weight of 
metal—364 pounds to 274 for Alabama.
Semmes expected to use his starboard guns in broadside and shifted a thirty-two-
pounder from port to strengthen that side. The movement of weight caused the ship to 
list about two feet to starboard, but this exposed less of that side to enemy fire. When 
the two ships were about a mile and a quarter apart, Winslow reversed course and 
headed for Alabama. He too planned to use his starboard battery, so the two ships met 
going in opposite directions. The battle began at 10:57 am some six or seven miles off-
shore and lasted only slightly more than an hour.
The two ships closed. When they were about a mile distant, Alabama sheered, turned 
broadside, and opened fire. The shot went high, probably because the gunners were 
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overcompensating for their ship’s starboard list. The two ships now circled each other, 
starboard to starboard. Because Kearsarge was faster and Winslow sought to narrow the 
range, the circles grew progressively smaller, from a half to a quarter mile in diameter, 
with each ship firing its starboard battery only, the current gradually carrying both 
ships westward.
Kearsarge had lengths of chain strung over its vital midships section to protect the 
engines, boilers, and magazines. An outward sheathing of one-inch wood painted the 
same color as the rest of the hull concealed this from observation, but the French had 
informed Semmes of it. Alabama had chain in its lockers that might have been used 
for the same purpose. Semmes later claimed Kearsarge had had an unfair advantage 
as a “concealed ironclad.” In his after-action report to Commodore Samuel Barron, he 
wrote, “The enemy was heavier than myself in ship, battery, and crew, and I did not 
know until the action was over that she was also ironclad.” Semmes convinced himself 
that he had been tricked into battle and that the chain was the only reason Alabama lost. 
But in fact, whether Semmes knew of the chain or not, Winslow had done nothing un-
toward. Bulloch himself later observed, “It has never been considered an unworthy ruse 
for a commander . . . to disguise his strength and to entice a weaker opponent within 
his reach.” 34 Lieutenant Sinclair later criticized Semmes for this very failure, noting that 
Semmes “knew all about it and could have adopted the same scheme. It was not his elec-
tion to do so.” 35
As the range narrowed, both sides substituted explosive shell for solid shot. Semmes 
hoped to close and attempt to board, but Winslow kept to the most effective range for 
his own guns, able to do so because his ship was both faster and more maneuverable 
than his opponent’s. Repeated hits from Kearsarge’s two Dahlgrens tore large holes in 
Alabama’s hull. With Alabama taking on water, an eleven-inch shell struck at the water-
line and exploded in the engine room, extinguishing the boiler fires. Water now entered 
the hull at a rate beyond the ability of the pumps to remove it.
At the beginning of the eighth circle, with the two ships about four hundred yards apart, 
Semmes turned Alabama out of the circle, ordering Kell to set all sail in hopes of mak-
ing the French shore. Semmes also opened fire with his port battery. But Alabama was 
now taking on too much water and was completely at the mercy of Kearsarge, whose fire 
was ever more accurate.
Kell, returning from a check on conditions, reported that Alabama could not last ten 
more minutes, whereupon Semmes ordered him to cease firing, shorten sail, and haul 
down the colors. Semmes then sent a dinghy to Kearsarge to notify Winslow that he was 
ready to surrender. Semmes and Sinclair both later claimed that Kearsarge continued 
to fire after the colors were struck and a white flag displayed. Winslow asserted that he 
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had ordered fire halted when Alabama’s colors came down and a white flag appeared 
at its stern but that shortly afterward the Confederate ship had fired two port guns; 
he had then moved his ship into position to rake his antagonist but, seeing the white 
flag still flying, again held fire. In any case, Semmes ordered all hands to try to save 
themselves, but only two boats could be used, and most of the crew simply leapt into the 
sea. Semmes gave his papers to a sailor who was a good swimmer, hurled his sword into 
the water, and then jumped in himself.36 Alabama suddenly assumed a perpendicular 
position, bow upward, as its guns and stores shifted aft and then disappeared. Aboard 
Kearsarge there was no elation, only silence.37
Surprisingly, during the battle Alabama got off twice as many shots as its opponent, 370 
rounds to 173, but Kearsarge sustained only thirteen hull hits and sixteen in the masts 
and rigging. Only one shot from Alabama caused personnel casualties—a Blakely shell 
explosion on the quarterdeck wounded three men at the aft pivot gun, one mortally.38 
By contrast, a high percentage of the Union shots struck. Semmes later said that one 
Union shot alone killed or wounded eighteen men at the after pivot gun. In all, Alabama 
suffered forty-one casualties: nine dead and twenty wounded in action and twelve men 
drowned.39
Winslow was slow to order his men to pick up survivors, partly because most of his own 
boats had been badly damaged in the exchange of fire. As a result, many of those in the 
water were taken aboard other ships, especially the English yacht Deerhound, which res-
cued and transported to Southampton forty-two members of the raider’s crew, including 
Semmes and Kell. The British government rejected a demand from Adams to turn them 
over to American authorities. Kearsarge took aboard six officers and sixty-four men, 
including twenty wounded. Winslow paroled them at Cherbourg. Unfairly, Semmes 
blamed Winslow for not doing enough to save those in the water, writing, “Ten of my 
men were permitted to drown.” 40
Semmes was lionized in Britain. After a brief trip to the Continent, he made his way to 
Havana, then to northern Mexico and overland to Richmond. Promoted to rear admiral 
in February 1865—and thus second in seniority in the Confederate service only to 
Franklin Buchanan—Semmes briefly commanded the James River Squadron. Forced to 
destroy his ships on the night of 2 April 1865 when Confederate forces abandoned Rich-
mond, Semmes formed the men into a naval brigade under his command as a brigadier 
general, thus becoming the only Confederate to hold flag rank in both the navy and 
army. Later that month he surrendered his unit in North Carolina with Confederate 
forces under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.41
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Conclusions
The defeat of Alabama signaled the beginning of the end for Confederate commerce 
raiders. Since its commissioning, Alabama had sailed seventy-five thousand miles, 
taken sixty-four prizes, and sent to the bottom a Union warship worth $160,000. In 
Sumter and Alabama, Semmes had taken eighty-one Union merchantmen. He later esti-
mated that he had burned $4,613,914 worth of Union shipping and cargoes and bonded 
others worth $562,250. Another estimate places the total Union loss at nearly six million 
dollars. Two dozen Union warships had been searching for Alabama, another hefty 
expense. Beyond this, the raider’s exploits had been a considerable boost to Southern 
morale.42
Following Alabama’s loss, Mallory continued to press the war against Union shipping, 
and he instructed Bulloch to locate a vessel that might be easily converted to operate in 
the Pacific against American whalers. (It had to be a conversion, because tightened Eng-
lish neutrality laws now precluded building such a vessel in that country.) In September 
1864 Bulloch purchased Sea King. The world’s first composite auxiliary-screw steam-
ship, it became CSS Shenandoah and devastated the U.S. whaling fleet in the Bering 
Sea. But the war was already over. Finally convinced of the end of the conflict, Lt. Cdr. 
James Waddell struck Shenandoah’s guns below and sailed seventeen thousand miles 
to Liverpool, arriving there on 6 November 1865, the only Confederate warship to sail 
around the world. It had taken thirty-eight Union vessels, of which Waddell had burned 
thirty-two. Damage to Union shipping was estimated at some $1.36 million.43
During the Civil War, Confederate commerce raiders took a total of 257 U.S. merchant 
ships, or only about 5 percent of the total. They hardly disrupted American trade, then, 
but the cruisers ultimately deployed by the U.S. Navy to hunt down the raiders cost the 
government some $3,325,000. In fourteen months from January 1863, a total of seventy-
seven Union warships and twenty-three chartered vessels were employed in this security 
effort. The raiders also drove up insurance rates substantially, but a bigger impact was 
forcing a large number of U.S. vessels into foreign registries. During the Civil War, more 
than half of the total U.S. merchant fleet was permanently lost to the flag. The cruis-
ers may have burned or sunk 110,000 tons of shipping, therefore, but some 800,000 
additional tons were sold to foreign owners—seven hundred ships to British interests 
alone—and these included some of the best vessels. Legal impediments prevented much 
of this tonnage from later returning to U.S. ownership.44
After the war, the matter of the British government having allowed the fitting-out of a 
number of Confederate cruisers became a major thorn in Anglo-American relations. 
U.S. government officials believed, rightly or wrongly, that London’s early proclama-
tion of neutrality and then persistent disregard of that neutrality in the early part of the 
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war had heartened the South and prolonged the conflict. There were those in the U.S. 
government who proposed taking Britain’s Western Hemisphere possessions, including 
Canada, as compensation.
In 1871, when the continental balance of power decisively changed with Prussia’s defeat 
of France, British statesmen concluded that it might be wise to reach some accommoda-
tion with the United States against the possibility of a German drive for world hege-
mony. An international tribunal met in Geneva beginning that December to discuss 
what became known as the “Alabama claims.” In September 1872 this tribunal awarded 
the U.S. government $15,500,500 in damages. This settlement came to be regarded as an 
important step in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and a victory for the 
international rule of law.45
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Two Sides of the Same Coin
German and French Maritime Strategies in the Late 
Nineteenth Century
DAVID H.  OLIVIER
For the last thirty years of the nineteenth century, both France and the newly formed 
German Empire faced similar dilemmas in a potential war—both were likely to fight 
against superior naval powers. As history had shown, the weaker fleet could rarely wrest 
control of the sea from its opponent. Thus, the traditional strategy of the weaker power 
at sea had been to conduct guerre de course, hoping to cause enough damage to the foe 
by attacking its commerce to impair its war effort. However, a number of circumstances 
had changed by 1871, leaving navies uncertain whether commerce raiding could be 
conducted at all, let alone with any degree of effectiveness. Changes in maritime law 
threatened to eliminate a state’s ability to hamper the flow of maritime commerce to its 
rivals. The technological fruits of the Industrial Revolution created uncertainty in naval 
planning and construction policies. Finally, the most recent major wars featuring some 
form of commerce raiding—the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War—
indicated that modern guerre de course would have to be very different from what it had 
been in the Age of Sail.
The responses by the French and German navies to these circumstances were quite 
different, even if German commentators occasionally borrowed the language of their 
French counterparts. French naval theorists created an entirely new philosophy of war 
at sea, the Jeune École (the Young School), designed to maximize the threat posed by 
new naval technology to the economic well-being of the enemy. This philosophy was 
part and parcel of a greater dispute in the navy over construction policies, promotions, 
and even political philosophies, and it is arguable that at times the conflict between 
supporters and opponents was even detrimental to the navy’s functioning. The Jeune 
École sought to create economic chaos in its projected enemy, Great Britain. Financial 
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pressure the government for peace. It was not the sinking of ships or the destruction of 
cargo that was the hoped-for end result but the ensuing panic.
In contrast, commerce raiding never assumed any level of importance in German naval 
strategy. Instead, it was almost taken for granted, a duty to be expected of ships stationed 
overseas, which would otherwise have no means of contributing to the war’s real focus, 
which was in European waters. Unlike the French, the Germans never developed a co-
herent philosophy to support commerce raiding. Greater concern lay in commerce protec-
tion and coastal defense, and the navy was expected to support the army’s drive against 
a continental foe. The goal of German commerce raiding was far simpler in nature—to 
deny the enemy access to overseas raw materials and finished goods. The more ships 
sunk, the less the enemy had with which to prosecute the war. This was an end that served 
the needs of the army, by weakening the enemy’s ability to continue to fight.
Historical Background
Before 1856, war at sea was often as much a conflict between belligerents and neutrals as 
it was between the belligerents themselves. Maritime commerce in wartime was affected 
by the relative strength of the belligerents and the neutrals. In a war in which there were 
no significant neutrals, such as the Seven Years’ War, the most powerful naval state (in 
that case, Great Britain) was free to do essentially what it pleased to prevent the flow of 
goods to and from, say, France. However, in a war like that of American independence, 
involving one or more powerful neutrals, the scope of action was severely limited by the 
threat of a league of armed neutral states.1
In 1856 the major powers agreed to abide by the terms of the Declaration of Paris, which 
made significant amendments to the law of war at sea. The changes affected blockade, 
neutral ships and neutral goods, and the practice of privateering—the issuing of licenses 
to private vessels to make war on enemy commerce. All of these new rules would have a 
major impact on the conduct of war at sea. Neutral vessels carrying enemy goods were now 
exempt from capture, and enemy ships carrying neutral goods were also exempt. This meant 
that far more stringent search procedures would have to be followed by boarding parties.
The change that produced the greatest criticisms—and that prompted the United States, 
Spain, and Mexico to refuse to ratify the declaration—was the complete abolition of 
privateering. The ability to charter vessels from a country’s merchant marine to serve 
as commerce raiders was viewed as of paramount importance for such countries as 
the United States, which in the 1850s possessed a comparatively large merchant fleet 
but a very small navy. In the Americans’ view, the abolition of privateering merely 
reinforced the maritime dominance of countries with large standing navies, such as 
Great Britain.2
olivier  91
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch6-Olivier.indd  September 11, 2013 11:12 AM
It was not fully realized, however, in the United States or among other naval powers that 
the Declaration of Paris did not completely eliminate war against maritime commerce. 
What it required was that such a war be carried out solely by a country’s navy instead of 
by private interests operating under license. The biggest impact of these new rules would 
be the elimination of the profit motive for attacking enemy trade. Without this mo-
tive, the need to keep confiscated cargoes became less important than merely denying 
them to the enemy, destroying what could not be taken. However, only actual wartime 
conditions would show how these changes in maritime law would affect the conduct of a 
guerre de course.
In addition, though the innovations of the Industrial Revolution had a significant 
impact on war at sea in the nineteenth century, that impact was uneven and took time 
to translate into effective, permanent change. As a result, many advances could only be 
applied partially, and for most of the second half of the century warships and merchant 
vessels were a mix of traditional wooden construction and sail power, on the one hand, 
and modern iron or steel construction and steam power, on the other. In fact, the major-
ity of merchant vessels, even as late as the beginning of the twentieth century, remained 
sail powered, at the mercy of the winds and tides.3 A becalmed merchant vessel could go 
nowhere. Meanwhile, a commerce raider equipped with both sails and a steam engine 
could use its sails for long-range cruising, then switch to steam propulsion to overtake 
becalmed or slower-moving sail-powered merchantmen. This provided a considerable 
advantage to the raider.
The other significant technological advance in the nineteenth century that had an effect 
on commerce raiding was the self-propelled torpedo. The torpedo was first developed 
in 1868 but took nearly a decade to become a useful and reliable weapon.4 The torpedo 
provided two advantages to the attacker. First, it could be used at a greater range than 
gunnery, thus avoiding the possibility of return fire or ramming by the merchant vessel. 
Second, being a compact weapon, it could be carried and used by a much smaller ship. 
This opened the possibility of conducting a war on enemy commerce using an inex-
pensive fleet of small vessels. Taken together, these two innovations—steam power and 
torpedoes—gave commerce raiders greater range and mobility, as well as a punch that 
made them a threat to both merchant vessels and pursuing warships.
The first two wars to be fought under the new laws of war at sea were the American 
Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). The use of commerce raiding in the 
Franco-Prussian War was far more limited in scope than in the Civil War. But France 
imposed a limited blockade of the coasts of the Germanic states in the opening months 
of the war, hindered only by its inability to capture neutral British merchant vessels 
conducting trade into and out of these ports. The reverses on land suffered by the French 
armies made the blockade more and more superfluous; in addition, the blockading ships 
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were hampered by increasingly bad weather and the need for regular supplies of coal.5 
What caught the attention of French navalists was the exploits of a single Prussian raider, 
SMS Augusta, in January 1871. In its brief career, Augusta captured a total of three French 
merchant vessels—hardly comparable to the two hundred–plus Germanic ships taken by 
the French—before being forced to seek refuge in a neutral Spanish port.6 But the panic 
caused along the French Atlantic coast made a great impression on French observers.
To the Germans, there were entirely different lessons to be learned from the Franco-
Prussian War. When Prussian armies had triumphed at the battle of Sedan at the 
beginning of September 1870, it had been expected that France would soon sue for 
peace. Instead, a new French government called for continued resistance and raised new 
armies to replace those lost in the opening campaign. These armies required weapons, 
and many of those arms were purchased from manufacturers in Great Britain and the 
United States. An effective guerre de course might have hampered the French efforts 
to prolong the war, but the North German Confederation navy was unable to stem the 
flow of foreign weapons. It speaks of the attitude toward the navy’s contribution to 
victory that the celebratory postwar parade in Berlin featured a grand total of twenty-
two officers and men from that service. In the eyes of many German observers, a prime 
opportunity had been lost.7
The lessons learned from the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War helped 
shape the way French and German naval thinkers saw their navies contributing to 
future wars. Successes and failures alike were magnified in significance, depending 
on the kinds of arguments being made. To many French observers, the economic and 
psychological elements seemed paramount; to the Germans, however, the physical effect 
itself was the most important. These divergent views influenced French and German 
thinking about future wars.
France and the Origins of the Jeune École
The French navy had a long tradition of guerre de course in its nation’s many wars with 
Great Britain. France seemed unable to defeat the British in naval battles, but it enjoyed 
much more success when individual ships, either warships or independent privateers, 
preyed on British merchant vessels. There were sound commercial reasons for the 
French to remain focused on British trade: vessels could be seized and cargoes deemed 
prize goods and resold, and money taken out of British pockets went directly to those of 
the French.
In theory, the Declaration of Paris and the end of privateering should also have ended 
all attacks on maritime trade. The key to traditional guerre de course had always been 
its profitability; outlawing privateering removed the financial incentive for private 
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individuals and corporations. Furthermore, forcing governments to assume the respon-
sibility for naval warfare required any efforts at attacking enemy trade to be funded out 
of the government’s own purse. Finally, technology appeared to give the merchant ship 
the means to elude any attempts at commerce raiding, because steam power allowed 
ships to sail in any direction at any time.
However, such was not the case. In particular, naval strategists in France still believed 
that it remained essential to attack British shipping in the event of a war. An early pro-
ponent was Capt. Richild Grivel. In 1869 Grivel wrote that it was a waste of time and re-
sources for France to continue to build a large navy of battleships for use against Britain; 
it would be easily countered by Britain’s superiority in factories and resources.8 France 
could produce a navy large enough to dominate smaller opponents, such as Italy or the 
North German Confederation, but to build a battle fleet for war against Britain was folly.
Instead, as shown by historical example, France should continue to pressure Britain’s 
merchant fleet. First, the vessels needed by France to engage in such a war were much 
less expensive to build and maintain than a large battle fleet. Second, this type of war 
went to the very heart of Britain’s success in previous wars—its financial resources. At-
tacks on British commerce would surely drive up the rates of insurance for British mer-
chant vessels. In turn, this would force the owners to charge more for carrying cargo, 
eventually so much that no one would be able to afford to ship their goods in British 
merchant ships. Grivel believed such an effect could be achieved in perhaps two or three 
years of continuous commerce raiding. Considering the average length of Anglo-French 
wars, this seemed to him a not unreasonable estimate.9
Grivel’s theories were neither highly regarded nor eagerly subscribed to at the time. 
This was due to political considerations as much as anything else; within two years, 
France had been defeated by the newly formed German Empire, had lost two valuable 
provinces, and had overthrown the Second Empire and returned to a republican form of 
government. The navy, having played a minimal role during the war, was of secondary 
importance to the army, and spending on naval arms was reduced accordingly.
Grivel’s theories may not have produced immediate results, but they clearly left their 
mark on another naval officer, Adm. Hyacinthe-Laurent-Théophile Aube. Since Aube 
had spent much of his career on overseas duty, geopolitical considerations, especially 
the growing colonial rivalries between France and Britain, dominated his view of the 
position of the French navy. It was also influenced by his growing conviction that unless 
France was willing and able to create a battle fleet at least equal to Britain’s, it could 
never win a fleet-on-fleet encounter. Consequently, Aube was interested in creating a 
navy that at home would protect France from British invasion and blockade and over-
seas would safeguard France’s colonies and trade while harassing Britain’s. This kind of 
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navy did not require large, expensive battleships; instead, a fleet of less expensive cruis-
ers, gunboats, and torpedo boats would suffice.10
The torpedo boat was a new weapon of naval warfare, one that changed how the guerre 
de course would be conducted. It would perform three vital tasks: it would reduce the 
effectiveness of a British blockade of French ports, and it would attack British com-
merce in vital narrow waters, such as the English Channel or the straits between Tunisia 
and Malta. Torpedoes would also powerfully deter British warships from cruising too 
close to French ports. By coordinating attacks from several ports at once by means of 
telegraphic communication, Aube argued, the French would be able to lift any British 
blockade, from one port or several, long enough to allow raiders large and small to sally 
forth to wreak havoc all around the world.11 Thus, his concern over a British blockade 
was focused on the inability to send out commerce raiders, rather than over the eco-
nomic effects of the severance of France’s maritime trade.
The French journalist Gabriel Charmes believed that the torpedo boat could play an 
even greater role in commerce raiding than Aube believed. Charmes argued that fast 
cruisers and torpedo boats could break any British blockade. Once out to sea, they were 
to pursue a ruthless war on enemy commerce, while avoiding contact with superior 
British naval forces—as Charmes put it, “to fall on the weak without pity and to flee the 
strong at full speed without false shame.” 12
However, small torpedo boats would pose no significant threat to merchant vessels if 
they observed the traditional rules governing commerce raiding. Therefore, Aube and 
Charmes advocated a radical departure from the normal stop-and-search procedures, 
in part to avoid the weakness of the tiny torpedo boat against a much larger merchant 
vessel, and in part because they viewed warfare as something other than a gentlemanly 
sport. As Aube wrote in an article in 1885,
war is the negation of law. It . . . is the recourse to force—the ruler of the world—of an entire people 
in the incessant and universal struggle for existence. Everything is therefore not only permissible 
but legitimate against the enemy.
. . . Tomorrow, war breaks out; an autonomous torpedo boat—two officers, a dozen men—meets 
one of these liners carrying a cargo richer than that of the richest galleons of Spain and a crew and 
passengers of many hundreds; will the torpedo boat signify to the captain of the liner that it is there, 
that it is watching him, that it could sink him, and that consequently it makes him prisoner—him, 
his crew, his passengers—in a word that he has platonically been made a prize and should proceed to 
the nearest French port? To this declaration . . . the captain of the liner would respond with a well-
aimed shell that would send to the bottom the torpedo boat, its crew, and its chivalrous captain, and 
tranquilly he would continue on his momentarily interrupted voyage. Therefore the torpedo boat 
will follow from afar, invisible, the liner it has met; and, once night has fallen, perfectly silently and 
tranquilly it will send into the abyss liner, cargo, crew, passengers; and, his soul not only at rest but 
fully satisfied, the captain of the torpedo boat will continue his cruise.13
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The French assault on British shipping was not designed merely to whittle down the 
British merchant marine but instead formed part of a campaign to cause tremendous 
harm to the British economy. Aube argued that sufficient economic unrest in Britain, 
such as would be caused by disrupting its trade with India and other colonies, would 
provoke social discontent. Charmes insisted that because public wealth was based on the 
success of private enterprise, no distinction should be made between public and private 
property when attacking British commerce. Here was the real goal of this new school of 
naval thought, the Jeune École.14
The British shipping industry had prospered in the nineteenth century, and in the last 
quarter of that century world trade increased dramatically. British firms owned more 
merchant vessels than the rest of the world combined. As a result of this predominance, 
Britain also led the world in other economic elements connected to world maritime 
trade: international banking, finance, and insurance. These financial elements appeared 
to rest on each other’s stability and security.
Germany and Cruiser Warfare
While the Imperial German Navy (IGN) was a new creation, coming into existence in 
1871, it had historical foundations in its predecessors, the Prussian and—from 1867—
the North German Confederation navies. This meant that the IGN had ships already 
stationed around the world and also that it had limited experience in commerce warfare.
Unlike that of France, German naval policy until 1888 was under the control of army of-
ficers. Thus, the first priority of the navy was coastal defense, its second was the protec-
tion of overseas German commerce, and its third was political and diplomatic support 
for German foreign policy.15 No serious thought was given during the navy’s early years 
to any coherent theory of commerce raiding—the protection of German commerce was 
always considered more important.
The limited experience of German commerce raiders in the Wars of Unification, 
coupled with the example of the Confederacy, served as the template for any German 
thoughts on guerre de course. In 1864, during the Danish War, a lone Prussian corvette 
took a few Danish prizes in the Far East, operating strictly under prize code. The same 
was true during the Franco-Prussian War, with the modest success achieved by Augusta. 
This was meager experience on which to base any sort of naval policy.16
Nevertheless, the IGN essentially fell by default into a strategy of commerce raiding in 
the event of war. This situation arose because the navy kept a number of warships on 
station overseas in the defense of German interests. This was a deliberate naval strat-
egy in the 1870s—to be able to apply timely pressure where needed.17 The vessels built 
for overseas service were ideally suited for conducting commerce raiding at the time: 
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reasonably fast, with sufficient armament, and equipped with dual propulsion systems 
of both sails and a steam engine.
The biggest drawback to any concerted attempt by the IGN to implement commerce 
raiding in a war was the lack of overseas naval bases. This was a point made clear by a 
number of German naval officers, especially those serving overseas. Regular correspon-
dence went from the captains of these warships back to their superiors in Berlin describ-
ing the virtues of particular ports and what good bases they would make for German 
warships.18 The response was always the same, at least until 1884: Germany had neither 
interest in nor the need for overseas bases, or colonies of any kind. As a result, the IGN 
had a number of warships scattered around the globe without any stations of its own to 
support them.
This was a key point, one that would be a fatal weakness in wartime. There were two 
reasons why overseas bases were important for the effective conduct of worldwide 
commerce raiding. First, steam-powered vessels had limitations that their sail-powered 
counterparts did not. Steam engines required regular replenishment of coal, and boil-
ers needed fresh water; even using sails for cruising and engines only for overhauling 
becalmed merchantmen, the cruisers would eventually use up these essential materials. 
This meant that a raider needed to put into port on a regular basis.
The second reason underscored the first. Thanks to events during the American Civil 
War, the laws of war regarding the use of neutral ports by belligerents had been signifi-
cantly tightened. The Confederate raiders had benefited from liberal use of neutral ports 
for supplies and rest. Now belligerents were allowed to use a neutral port only once 
every three months. German commerce raiders, without ports of their own, would not 
be able to survive for long without access to the supplies needed.19 This had been driven 
home to the Germans during the Franco-Prussian War, when one of their small war-
ships in the Caribbean received no help from the pro-French Spanish, much less from 
the Americans, after the land war turned in favor of Prussia.20
The idea of using guerre de course in a potential war was not ignored, but it was not part 
of significant discussions within the navy’s command until a new head of the Admi-
ralty was appointed in 1883. Leo von Caprivi was another army general parachuted into 
command of the navy, and his first priority was always the navy’s contributions to the 
army in the event of a war in Europe. Nevertheless, he soon became aware of the effects 
of war on world trade. In October 1883 a predecessor, Eduard Jachmann, submitted a 
memorandum to Caprivi that called for German warships overseas to form into small 
squadrons to attack enemy-held bases and enemy commerce.21
A more significant opportunity came early in 1884, when Caprivi called an Admiralty 
Council, an advisory board that had met only once under his predecessor. One of the 
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questions posed to the council concerned the feasibility of cruiser warfare for the IGN. 
The council believed that commerce raiding had a role to play, especially in denying 
the flow of overseas supplies to the enemy. The council’s belief was based on events in 
the Franco-Prussian War, when French resistance had been strengthened by the flow of 
arms purchased in Britain and the United States. This conclusion was stated explicitly in 
the council’s final report:
A striking proof for [the possible contribution of cruiser warfare] is provided by our last war, in 
which the need of France soared within months. The amounts of deliveries of weapons, etc.[,] for 
the newly created armies, were enormous. For example, a single steamer, one of many, had brought 
in not fewer than 140 cannons and thirty thousand rifles, worth around five million marks, from 
New York to Bordeaux. Without these colossal overseas supplies the continuation of the war would 
have been impossible and in this case one can rightly state that an emphatic and successfully 
conducted cruiser war, while it might not have directly brought about the decision, it would have 
considerably expedited it.22
Caprivi appreciated the efforts of the council, but he did not necessarily share its conclu-
sions. He felt that cruisers would be required that were designed more specifically for 
the task, and believed that steam-powered merchant ships made commerce warfare less 
effective, as the cruisers would be outrun by their prey. He also emphasized more imme-
diate needs in his construction policies, such as torpedo boats for coastal defense. More 
resources allocated to cruisers meant fewer resources for coastal defense. Ironically, 
political support for Caprivi’s budget proposals came in some small measure because 
politicians believed, just as the Jeune École argued, that the torpedo boat was the low-
cost replacement for expensive and obsolete battleships.23
If Caprivi was unwilling officially to endorse commerce raiding as a specific strategy for 
the IGN, however, he did not dismiss it outright. Moreover, the continuing dispatch of 
German cruisers on overseas duties set conditions whereby a significant portion of the 
navy would be thousands of miles away from Germany in the event of hostilities. What 
purpose would those ships serve in war? This question linked ongoing German and 
French debates on guerre de course, in particular after the development of torpedo boats.
The Impact of the Jeune École
France had certainly used guerre de course against Britain, and while it had been 
profitable for the French, it had never won them any wars. What was so different about 
the theories of the Jeune École that would bring success? First, the new technologies 
provided hope that British blockades would be less effective than during the sailing-
ship era. British frigates had been able to remain on close station on a regular basis 
in previous wars, providing warning of any attempt by the French to leave port. The 
switch from wind power to steam allowed British ships to keep station outside French 
ports regardless of the weather, but this was counterbalanced by the increasing need to 
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coal vessels. Coaling at sea was a difficult and dangerous business; it made more sense 
to have ships return to nearby ports for refueling. This meant many more ships were 
required to impose an effective blockade, as at any given time some would be on station, 
some heading back for coaling, some in harbor coaling, and some returning to station. 
The French themselves had learned the difficulties of imposing a blockade with steam-
powered warships during the Franco-Prussian War.24 Without overwhelming superior 
numbers at every port, the British could not blockade the French successfully.
Second, France held a key geostrategic position. Its Channel ports threatened British 
trade in the English Channel and the North Sea, its Atlantic ports threatened global 
trade routes, and its Mediterranean ports threatened British supply routes to Egypt and 
India. Raiders could cause serious harm to the British at any point.
Third, this would be a guerre de course unlike any previous in history. Until 1856, 
commerce raiding had been conducted as warfare for profit. Ships had been seized 
and brought to friendly ports, where prize courts had ruled on whether they and their 
cargoes were fair spoils of war. The crews, financial backers, and governments all made 
money, from the sale either of licenses to become privateers or of confiscated goods. 
After the Declaration of Paris outlawed privateering, only governments could engage in 
naval warfare. This reduced profits, as did the increasing difficulty in bringing captured 
merchant vessels into port to be judged as fair prizes. An enemy blockade changed this, 
as seen in the American Civil War (during which Confederate raiders, prevented by 
the blockade from bringing prizes into port at all, burned them, after removing crew, 
passengers, and any cargo they needed themselves). The size of modern cargo ships was 
another issue; it was more and more difficult to sort out cargoes that could be seized 
legitimately from those not susceptible to capture.
One method that had been tried during the American Civil War by Confederate com-
merce raiders was to capture a ship, evacuate the crew, and then set fire to and sink the 
merchant vessel. This reduced the number of ships in the Union’s merchant fleet, but 
it posed two problems. One, wooden merchant ships would burn and sink readily, but 
modern steel-hulled steamers would be tougher to destroy. Two, there was the issue of 
the captives. If a raider was at sea for an extended period or had a productive spell of ac-
tion, it could become quickly overrun with captives, posing security and health risks.
The Jeune École’s solution was both simple and drastic. French torpedo boats would 
simply sink their prey, without warning. This eliminated all the problems attendant on 
commerce raiding under the restrictions of international law. Furthermore, it would 
create difficulties for the British: loss of vessels, loss of cargoes, loss of experienced 
crews, and an implied threat to shipowners, shippers, and merchant sailors.
olivier  99
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch6-Olivier.indd  September 11, 2013 11:12 AM
However, it was likely that world opinion would be aghast at the French tactics. Such 
complete disregard for international law would affect trade in general. Traditionally, 
goods had been classified as contraband (goods to be used in war) and noncontraband. 
While there had been disputes over certain items that could be used for either war-related 
or peaceful purposes, others, such as foodstuffs, had been exempt from the definition of 
contraband. The Declaration of Paris had failed to clear up ambiguities in this defini-
tion, in expectation that the very practice of commerce raiding would slowly disappear. 
Instead, the Jeune École chose to disregard the question of contraband and noncontra-
band altogether. By sinking any ship, the French threatened any and all goods coming 
to Britain, regardless of whether they were raw materials or manufactured goods, were 
intended for military or civilian use, or were food supplies of any kind. This was the 
method to be used by France in the event of war with Great Britain.
Aube became minister of marine in 1886, igniting two decades of infighting between 
factions supporting the Jeune École and those who refused to adopt its precepts. The 
war at sea was to be directed against British shipping, with the direct goal of creating 
chaos in the financial heart of Britain. The advantages appeared to the Jeune École to be 
fairly straightforward. The biggest economic advantage lay in the financial savings such 
a navy would provide for the French government. For the price of a large battleship, 
scores of torpedo boats—and even gunboats using the same basic hull design—could be 
produced. Furthermore, this would please many junior officers, who had been stifled in 
their career ambitions because there were too few command positions in the navy. Fi-
nally, the Jeune École promised victory over Britain using methods that harkened back 
to French naval tradition—the guerre de course.
However, there were a number of problems in the Jeune École’s strategy. The first was its 
overestimation of the ability of the torpedo boat to bear up under ocean conditions. An 
attempt to send a squadron of torpedo boats from Atlantic ports to Toulon in February 
1886 revealed the pitfalls of deploying small vessels in rough waters. The crews were un-
able to eat or sleep regularly and fell victim to seasickness. Had they been on a raiding 
cruise, it is doubtful they could have performed effectively.25
The second was the dismissiveness toward international law shown by Aube, Charmes, 
and their supporters. They came under harsh criticism from Adm. Siméon Bourgois, 
a leading French expert on torpedoes and also a student of international law. Bourgois 
believed that indiscriminate attacks on merchant ships destined for Britain would cause 
legal problems. The opinion of neutral nations would be crucial for France, and the 
Jeune École’s strategy would only serve to upset them. This could lead neutrals eventu-
ally to become enemies, whereas France’s history of war with Britain showed that France 
fared best when Britain had no Continental allies. Furthermore, Bourgois argued that 
such callous disregard of human life was morally unacceptable: “The admission that 
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commercial warfare conducted by torpedo boats could lead to such excesses is the most 
forceful of possible condemnations of this use of the new weapon.” 26
The effects of the Jeune École were felt both within the French navy and in navies 
around the world, as factions in favor of and opposed to its doctrines, strategy, moral-
ity, and construction policies sprang up. In France, the revolving-door nature of cabinet 
politics meant constant swerves back and forth in strategy and construction policies 
as pro– and anti–Jeune École ministers of marine came and went. One minister would 
favor renewed battleship construction; the next would halt that program and instead 
place orders for torpedo boats and gunboats. The dispute captured public attention and 
was fought out as much in popular journals as in cabinet rooms and naval offices.
The Importance of National Honor in Germany
German naval thought turned toward the contribution of far-flung cruisers in the event 
of a European war. Part of the answer to this quandary came in an imperial order issued 
in March 1885 by Kaiser Wilhelm I, “Concerning the Duties of the Commanders of 
Overseas Ships.” This order made it clear that however ship captains were to act in the 
event of war, their first priority was to serve “the honor of the flag”: “In this context, the 
commander will have to observe above all that, from now on, it is his first duty to inflict 
as much damage as possible on the enemy. Whether it is better for this purpose for 
him to turn against enemy warships or to seek through cruiser warfare to damage the 
enemy’s sea-commerce or coastal places of enemy territory is a decision for him alone.” 27
By using the concept of honor, vitally important to a German officer—and especially 
one aware of the navy’s poor showing in its last war—this order ensured that captains 
overseas at the outbreak of war would seize opportunities for individual action in com-
merce raiding if no suitable enemy warships presented themselves. Since these German 
ships would not likely survive long without bases to fall back on, they were to inflict as 
much damage as possible on the enemy before the inevitable outcome.28
Some did not see any prospect of success for the IGN in commerce raiding. German 
commerce raiding was closer than what the Jeune École envisioned to that intended by 
international law: stop, search, and seize. Retired admiral Carl Ferdinand Batsch be-
lieved that commerce raiding would not succeed, because it had become a more compli-
cated venture than ever before. Furthermore, like Caprivi, he believed that technology 
had changed the nature of the game. In his opinion, upon the outbreak of war sailing 
merchant ships would all tie up safely in harbor, leaving the carriage of commerce to the 
steam-powered merchant ships capable of outrunning their pursuers.29
An even more telling series of observations came from Capt. Alfred Stenzel, one of the 
first teachers at the Marine-Akademie, a school for German naval officers opened in 
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1872. Stenzel was the first true German naval theorist, and his ideas shaped the think-
ing of students who took his courses. Stenzel had been the instigator of the calling of an 
Admiralty Council in late 1883 and had served on the council when it debated the ques-
tion of commerce raiding.30 Stenzel’s lectures at the Marine-Akademie were published 
posthumously.31 In them he did not differentiate between state or private property in 
his advocacy of commerce raiding. In this he broke with sections of international law 
that made a clear distinction between the two; it also meant he disagreed with his own 
government’s declaration at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War in which the 
Prussian king had stated, “I make war on French soldiers and not on French citizens.”32
Stenzel contended that Kleinekrieg—meaning “little war,” or guerre de course—had 
three aims. The first was to stop the flow of arms to the enemy. In language similar 
to that used in the Admiralty Council’s final report, Stenzel’s lectures reminded his 
students of how in 1870–71 the North German Confederation navy had been helpless to 
prevent American and British arms from reinforcing France. The second purpose was to 
attack enemy shipping as a source of wealth to the enemy. Unlike the Jeune École’s all-
out economic warfare, however, Kleinekrieg was designed to deny the enemy the means 
to purchase arms or raw materials on the open markets. The third goal was to destroy 
ships and cargoes as a way to hurt the enemy through property damage.33
Stenzel also made it clear that in order to be successful German commerce raiders 
needed safe ports from which to operate. This could be seen as yet another call for Ger-
many to acquire its own chain of bases around the world. Stenzel argued that such bases 
would support German cruisers operating alone or in squadrons, provide ports into 
which prizes could be brought, and act as places of refuge for merchant vessels. Clearly, 
thinking of the potential for prizes as he did, Stenzel did not envision a ruthless, Jeune 
École–style strategy. Rather Stenzel saw commerce raiding as “an important, perhaps 
the most important branch of the offensive for a small fleet in a war with a superior.”34
Commerce raiding remained in the minds of many Germans the one useful function 
that could be performed by its ships and crews spread around the globe. While it was 
never officially adopted as a viable strategy by the navy, practically everything the navy 
said and did—construction policy, general orders, stationing of ships and squadrons—
implied that commerce raiding was exactly the role to be played. This apparent contra-
diction even appeared in official planning. In 1889, war plans were created in the event 
of hostilities with France and Russia. In the first paragraph of the section on cruisers is 
the statement “Cruiser warfare is not of decisive influence upon warfare.” Yet the very 
next paragraph ends with “Successful cruiser warfare is therefore particularly suitable, 
lending lustre to a young navy.”35
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Evidently there was no less confusion surrounding the role of the guerre de course in the 
IGN than there was in the French. It was a type of warfare to be pursued, but to what 
end and how were much less clear. Such questions would continue to plague naval theo-
rists well into the next century.
Conclusions
The Jeune École was a more fully realized theory than anything on that line coming 
out of Germany at the same time. The driving force behind the Jeune École was the new 
technology of naval warfare, especially the automatic torpedo. The torpedo was seen as 
a cure-all—cheap, easy to deploy, and likely to produce enormous results, out of propor-
tion to its expenses. It was also a weapon that worked equally well against both enemy 
warships and merchant vessels. France’s geographical position astride Britain’s main com-
merce routes meant ready accessibility to these routes by swarms of small, swift vessels.
The Jeune École appeared to solve several of France’s naval problems at the same time: it 
provided a credible threat for far less money than Napoleon III’s ironclads of the 1850s 
and 1860s, it promised victory over Britain, and it provided many commands for junior 
officers stuck in lengthy waits for commands in a small navy of a few large ships. The 
notion of creating panic in Britain’s financial sector, and possibly even in the general 
public itself, worried about unemployment or the next food shipment, spoke of a war 
that could be won with minimal exertion and loss of life.
The drawbacks to the Jeune École were first and foremost its reliance on new technol-
ogy. Charmes’s hopes for oceangoing torpedo boats, in particular, proved to be ill 
founded. Too much of the technology needed by the Jeune École was either too new, 
insufficiently tested, or simply incapable of what was desired. The other significant 
drawback to the theory was its callous disregard of the laws of war at sea, especially in 
terms of morality. The concept of sinking enemy merchant vessels without any warning 
went against all previous practice, and in the late nineteenth century such immorality 
was unacceptable. Furthermore, the Jeune École failed to take into account neutral reac-
tion. France could not afford to have Continental foes at the same time as it was fighting 
Britain, and this policy of sinking any vessel carrying on trade with Britain might push 
some nations into war.
Finally, the very theory itself became part of the greater chaos of French politics of the 
period. Cabinets changed very quickly, and successive naval ministers seemed to be 
pro– or anti–Jeune École based on their spending priorities—battleships or torpedo 
boats, whales or minnows. The last fifteen years of the century saw far less cohesion 
within the navy than was needed for an effective buildup to face a potential war. This 
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was especially apparent in 1898, when the possibility of war with Britain increased and 
France was forced to give way because it was not ready for a major war.
German ideas on commerce raiding wrapped in the rubric of “national honor” would 
have been equally difficult to implement in the event of war with France. The Imperial 
German Navy was prepared to fight a more traditional war on commerce than were 
the French, observing prize rules whenever possible and focusing on material losses 
rather than economic or psychological pressure. In German warships stationed overseas 
on political and diplomatic duties, the nucleus of a far-flung guerre de course already 
existed. Since these vessels were equipped for long-range cruising, they were technologi-
cally appropriate for the mission.
Like the Jeune École, the German way of commerce raiding had flaws. As maritime 
technology changed, ships stationed overseas were less and less capable of conducting 
a guerre de course strategy. Already by 1890 navies had begun to realize that dual-
propulsion sail and steam warships were no longer practical and had begun to phase 
them out. Dual-propulsion vessels were less and less likely to catch up to the superior 
merchant ships being brought into service.
More importantly, the switch to all-steam propulsion revealed the weakness in Ger-
many’s world geostrategic position. Without overseas bases to support operations, its 
cruisers would run out of essential supplies—coal and water—within a matter of weeks. 
As the laws of neutrality also tightened, warfare in the style of the Union versus the 
Confederacy—relying on the kindness of sympathetic neutrals—became less and less 
possible. In the end, German captains were left to fall honorably on their swords, inflict-
ing as much damage on the enemy as possible before being sunk, interning themselves 
in a neutral port, or making a frantic dash for home waters.
As a result, neither the French nor the German method of commerce raiding appeared 
to hold out much chance for success. However, the boldness and daring of the Jeune 
École captured the attention of naval theorists and interested publics outside France. 
Some sought to emulate French thinking; others sought ways to counter it. Even mem-
bers of the IGN, while preparing to fight a different kind of guerre de course, used the 
language of the Jeune École to make their points. These ongoing debates had a particu-
larly important impact on future wars, not just in Europe, as the various naval theorists 
naturally assumed, but also in Asia.
Notes
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this 
publication are those of the author and are not 
necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. 
Navy Department, or the Naval War College.
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Missed Opportunities in the First  
Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895
S. C.  M.  PAINE
The Sino-Japanese War overturned the East Asian balance of power, transforming Japan 
into the dominant regional power for a century to come. Japan initially mobilized well 
over a hundred thousand troops.1 But in the first phase of the war, naval force played 
the key role. If Japan could not secure command of the sea, it could not safely transport 
its troops to the mainland. By contrast, if China could not command the sea or at least 
deny Japan access to the Korean and Manchuria littoral, it would have to depend on its 
antiquated and fragmented land forces to fight the Japanese on shore.
Japan’s military strategy required rapid seizure of control of the sea so that its navy 
could transport soldiers at will to the mainland. Once it landed troops in Korea, it 
planned to expel China. After the occupation of Korea, Japan would take the Chinese 
naval base at Weihaiwei on the southern shore of the broad Gulf of Bo Hai, providing 
naval access to Beijing. It would follow with an invasion of the metropolitan province of 
Zhili. If this strategy proved unfeasible, Japan would simply push all Chinese troops out 
of Korea. However, if disaster struck and China, not Japan, took command of the seas, 
Japan would focus on its own coastal defenses to prevent a Chinese invasion.2
Commerce raiding occurred exactly once during the First Sino-Japanese War, when 
the Imperial Japanese Navy sank the British-owned steamship Kowshing (高陞), killing 
many of the 1,100 Chinese troops on board and making headlines around the globe. 
Given the fine navies possessed by both belligerents, the stakes at risk, and the reliance 
by both on seaborne trade, the absence of commerce raiding is surprising. Had China 
followed Japan’s lead and targeted logistical lines and particularly troop transports, it 
might have won the war or, at the very least, managed to negotiate more favorable terms 
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Japan’s Strengths
Japanese leaders leveraged their country’s Westernized institutions, powerful nation-
alism, and extraordinary leadership to defeat China. These institutions included a 
Westernized financial sector that allowed Japan to raise funds internally and exter-
nally.3 Japan also had a six-division national army, based on universal male conscrip-
tion and organized on the Prussian model, complete with a general staff. The artillery 
and soldiers’ kit were all standardized. Men served for three years in the regular army, 
followed by four years in the reserves. They were uniformly armed with the Japanese-
made single-shot Murata breechloader rifle, while elite units had the new five-round, 
clip-fed model. During wartime, commanders were given precise objectives but with the 
freedom to decide how to reach them.4 In 1892, the army conducted comprehensive war 
games that left a French observer with “the best impression.”5
Compared to China, by 1894, Japan had an extensive industrial base to support its 
military. In 1890 Japan had over 1,700 miles of railways, which grew to 2,100 miles by 
1895; China had just 175 miles.6 By 1880 the Japanese government had opened three 
shipyards, ten mines, and five munitions factories. Two private shipyards opened in 
the 1880s. In 1892 Japan manufactured its first locomotive.7 By 1880 telegraph lines 
linked virtually all major cities.8 In contrast, at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, 
China’s Self-Strengthening Movement of the preceding thirty years had managed to 
produce only one arsenal, one shipyard, thirteen mines, and six munitions factories.9 
Whereas the Japanese government had all military production and the country’s entire 
infrastructure at its disposal, in China provincial governors were personally respon-
sible for the defense of their provinces and did not necessarily cooperate with other 
provinces.
Part of the institutional reforms in Japan concerned public education, which was com-
pulsory. By the early 1890s, there was a large literate public eager to read about the latest 
battle reports. Once Japanese armies started winning in the field, they received strong 
public support. In Japan, with higher literacy rates than China, press coverage flour-
ished, with feature stories on common-man heroes and color prints depicting battles. 
Newspaper readership became national for the first time in Japanese history, and the 
press coverage was highly jingoistic. In China, a mass press did not develop until after 
the war, and the public displayed no meaningful support for the Qing armies.
The Japanese creators of these institutions were members of a brilliant generation of 
leaders who had traveled the world in search of best practices to emulate at home. None 
of China’s top leaders had left the country, let alone conducted extended tours abroad. 
In addition, Japan’s primary civil and military leaders all knew each other. Their genera-
tion had overthrown the Tokugawa shogunate and worked together to modernize Japan 
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by introducing a complete array of Westernized institutions. The Meiji generation is 
known for the ability to match national capabilities to the goal of transforming Japan 
into a great power capable of defending its national security.10
The Japanese pitted their strengths—their Westernized civil and military institutions, 
their intense nationalism, and their brilliant leadership—against China’s weaknesses. 
These included Manchu minority rule, China’s fractured traditional institutional struc-
ture, and the compromised telegraphic communications of the man in charge of the 
Chinese forces, Li Hongzhang. All of these weaknesses combined to produce a best-case 
military scenario for Japan.
China’s Weaknesses
China had bitterly resisted Westernizing its institutions. Its military remained capable 
of putting down internal unrest and defeating technologically inferior nomad invaders 
on the empire’s inland borders but was no match for Westernized forces, as its defeats 
in the Opium Wars (1839–42 and 1856–60) and the Sino-French War (1884–85) had 
shown. In 1892, when a reporter remarked in surprise at seeing Chinese soldiers “actu-
ally armed with bows and arrows and firearms of the most antique pattern,” the inspec-
tor general of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs since 1861, Sir Robert Hart, 
replied, “Most people are surprised, for incredible as it may appear, while possessing as 
she does some of the finest types of modern warships, the Chinese army is still in many 
respects absolutely what it was three hundred years ago—merely an armed undisci-
plined horde. There seems as yet no signs of her waking up from this lethargy.”11
The Chinese army consisted of “banner” forces, segregated under Muslim, Manchu, 
Mongol, and Han Chinese banners; the Green Standard Army; “braves,” or hired merce-
naries; and the foreign-drilled army. The Qing dynasty had ethnically segregated its 
original military forces, the banners, in order to preserve its leadership in an empire of 
which Manchus constituted perhaps 2 percent of the population.12 The banners re-
mained the praetorian guard of the dynasty.13
Han Chinese mainly served in the Green Standard Army, as well as in the various 
provincial armies. By the late Qing period, the Green Standard Army, originally the 
Ming dynasty army, had been broken down throughout the empire into small, relatively 
independent units used for constabulary, not combat, duty. Contrary to the name of the 
Green Standard Army, it was actually trained less for war than for civilian police duties.
The braves, or hired mercenaries, were organized by province to serve collectively as a 
national guard to be sent to hot spots in the empire. Their units were descendants of the 
Ever-Victorious Army, which had been trained by foreigners to help put down the mid-
nineteenth-century Taiping Rebellion, but most of the foreign advisers had long since 
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departed. The foreign-drilled army simply consisted of those braves who had received 
some Europeanized military training. It formed a microscopic percentage of the total 
Chinese force.
Of the Chinese armed forces, the Green Standard troops were the most numerous, fol-
lowed by bannermen. Braves and trained recruits together represented perhaps 10 per-
cent of the total. But this is just a guess, since the Chinese government did not maintain 
accurate records. The Chinese army lacked an organized engineer corps, a commissari-
at, transport services, and a medical division.14 Even within (let alone among) provinces, 
guns and ammunition were not standardized, greatly impeding wartime logistics.15 The 
Chinese army, and even its comparatively state-of-the-art navy, was also fractured by 
command, organization, province, race, and training. The Qing deliberately prevented 
unified command, out of not stupidity but a rational fear that a unified Han army would 
make short work of Manchu minority rule—fears that would be borne out in the 1911 
Revolution, when the recently Westernized Han military toppled the dynasty.
When war broke out in 1894, local inhabitants in Manchuria, far from supporting their 
troops, lived in dread of their arrival, since Chinese armies acquired their provisions at 
gunpoint from civilians.16 In the nineteenth century a succession of huge peasant rebel-
lions, ethnic secession movements, and defeats in foreign wars had cost the Qing their 
reputation as great leaders. Loyalties were not to the dynasty, much less to the state, but 
to native place in a society where nationalism had yet to develop. Unlike the members of 
the Japanese ruling house, the Manchus could not count on the loyalty of their subjects.
To make matters worse, China failed to maintain secrecy. China’s key strategist, the 
seventy-one-year-old viceroy Li Hongzhang, the governor of the key province of Zhili 
(containing Beijing), did much of his communication by telegraph, which the Japanese 
apparently tapped. The Japanese, who excelled at cryptography, had broken the Chinese 
code by June 1894, before the outbreak of hostilities. They made a point of reading Li’s 
messages, with the result that he inadvertently alerted Japan of his evolving plans.17
The Manchu division of power by province exacerbated all of these problems. Troops, 
arsenals, and munitions were the property of their provinces of origin and could not be 
counted on to support other provinces in the event of hostilities. According to a contem-
porary German press account, each of the provincial armies was the personal creation 
of that province’s governor. “It is naturally in the interest of each [provincial] Viceroy 
to retain the fruit of his exertions for himself; in no case is he inclined to come to the 
assistance of a neighbour who is worse provided, and incur the danger of denuding his 
own province, for whose safety he is responsible with his head.” The same system of in-
dividual responsibility applied down through the military ranks. It squelched initiative 
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and promoted defensive rather than preemptive action. “By this system, common action 
is virtually excluded.”18
For instance, during the Sino-French War, Li Hongzhang, who controlled the Beiyang 
Squadron, which had the most modern elements of the Chinese navy, had declined 
to heed a call for help from the south. The Beiyang Squadron had remained in North 
China. Ten years later, during the First Sino-Japanese War, the southern fleet would pay 
him back by ignoring his calls for help.19 The failure to coordinate (on any level) greatly 
facilitated the victories of China’s enemies.
The Japanese Navy’s Decision to Sink Kowshing
As war loomed between China and Japan over which country would dominate the 
Korean Peninsula, China desperately sought third-party intervention, while Japan 
applied agile public relations and deft diplomacy to discourage the participation of ad-
ditional belligerents. As Japan’s government wished to demonstrate to the industrialized 
world that the country had become a modern power, the battle for world public opinion 
became a key theater. The Japanese courted the American and European press and, ac-
cording to a contemporary report, sought to “capture the European press” by demon-
strating that they were “engaged in a crusade against darkness and barbarism, and were 
spreading light with which they had themselves been illumined by Christendom.”20
Japan took care to notify Britain days before the outbreak of hostilities that Shanghai lay 
outside the sphere of hostilities, since commerce raiding had the potential to widen the 
war by affecting neutral trade.21 Excluding Shanghai was a costly decision, since it was 
the location of the main Chinese arsenal, and ships transported its munitions unmolest-
ed for the duration of the war.22 But Shanghai was also a key center of British commerce, 
which the Japanese did not want to disrupt, for fear that Britain would certainly retali-
ate. Although in terms of capital ships the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Chinese navy 
ranked, respectively, third and fourth globally, the Royal Navy ranked number one, as 
ever, and by a wide margin.23 So cutting off Chinese arms deliveries through commerce 
raiding was a nonstarter for Japan. The same was true, for the same reason, of Chinese 
commerce raiding against Japan’s even more important imports.
But a gray area remained, that of targeting merchantmen carrying troops to the theater, 
a strategy Japan initially pursued. The Korean and Chinese road systems were both de-
plorable, making the deployment of troops by sea far more efficient than by land. There 
could be no war if Japan could not ferry its troops to Korea. China, although connected 
to the theater by land, was actually in a similar position. It possessed only one short 
railway line from Tianjin to the coast and then north to Shanhaiguan, where the Great 
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Wall meets the sea. The line was good as far as it went, but it ended a long way from the 
Korean border. China had no railway lines beyond the Great Wall.24
On 20 July 1894, nearly two weeks before the formal declarations of war, the Chinese 
began massing troops in Korea in preparation for a possible pincer movement on 
Seoul. They deployed troops two hundred kilometers to the north of the capital, to 
P’yŏngyang, and forty kilometers to the south, to Asan.25 Those sent nearer Seoul came 
by sea along a predictable route, since large ships require large ports. The Japanese mili-
tary realized that these troops would be easier to dispose of at sea before they dug in on 
land. So the Japanese navy went after troopships en route to Asan. As tensions contin-
ued to escalate, the Chinese commander in Asan requested reinforcements.26 On 22 July, 
eight transports set off from Dagu, a fortified city at the mouth of the Hai River, linking 
Tianjin and Beijing. Two of these transports headed for Asan, where they arrived safely 
forty-eight hours later.27
That day news reached Asan that the Japanese had occupied the royal palace in Seoul. 
In response, China ordered its warships in Korean waters to return home, to avoid 
any chance of a confrontation. On 25 July, returning from Asan, two of these warships 
encountered three Japanese cruisers in the vicinity of Feng Island, on the sea approaches 
to Inch’ŏn and Asan.28 The Japanese disabled one Chinese vessel and damaged the other. 
While pursuing the damaged ship, the Japanese sighted a troop transport, the Chinese-
leased but British-owned steamship Kowshing. According to its master, Thomas Ryder 
Galsworthy, the steamer had picked up 1,100 Chinese troops and officers at Dagu. On 
23 July, it had left for Asan.
The three Japanese men-of-war now intercepted Kowshing. When Chinese officers on 
board refused to heed the Japanese order to follow them to port, the crew of the ship 
mutinied and demanded to be returned to Dagu. During several hours of fruitless ne-
gotiations, Chinese officers refused either to allow the Europeans to leave the ship or to 
heed their advice to follow Japanese orders. The Japanese commander, Tōgō Heihachirō, 
who had studied naval science in Great Britain and was probably aware of the strategies 
favored by the Jeune École and its followers, carefully examined the relevant provi-
sions of international law. The Jeune École had emphasized the great value of attacking 
such soft targets as troop transports. Upon finding the law to be on his side, Tōgō sank 
Kowshing.29 In doing so, he strictly followed international law, which gave him the right 
to sink the transport if it failed to follow his orders.
Unlike most of the Chinese, many of the Europeans could swim and so jumped over-
board as Kowshing started to go down. The Chinese responded by opening fire on their 
own foreign advisers.30 The Japanese made an effort to pick up the Europeans, but not 
the many drowning Chinese. On the contrary, some Japanese opened fire on them, 
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perhaps because significant numbers of Chinese troops were still armed and putting up 
a struggle. The Japanese then damaged a Chinese cruiser, captured one gunboat, and 
sank another, in addition to those damaged earlier, while two other naval ships es-
caped.31 Although accounts differ, approximately half of the Chinese troops went down 
with the ship, were drowned, or were shot. Many observers considered the Chinese 
troops lost on Kowshing to have been the best in the land.32
The owners of the sunken Kowshing—the British firm of Jardine, Matheson and 
Company, of opium-trade fame—aggressively sought compensation from the Japa-
nese government. For a time it had the support of members of the British press. But 
on 26 February 1895 the British government exonerated the Japanese of any wrongdo-
ing: since both China and Japan had been on a war footing as of the hostilities at Feng 
Island, since Kowshing had been carrying troops, and since it had refused to follow rea-
sonable Japanese orders, the British government considered the Japanese to have been 
justified in sinking it as a hostile ship.33
Renowned British international legal experts came out in support of Tōgō.34 The legal 
digests concluded
that at the time of the sinking of the Kowshing a state of war de facto existed between China and Ja-
pan; that the Kowshing, as a neutral ship engaged in the transport service of a belligerent, was liable 
to be visited and taken in for adjudication, with the use of so much force as might be necessary; that, 
as one of a fleet of transports and men-of-war engaged in carrying reinforcements to the Chinese 
troops on the mainland, she was clearly part of a hostile expedition, or one which might be treated 
as hostile, which the Japanese were entitled by all needful force to arrest; that the force used did not 
appear to be excessive, either for the capture of an enemy’s neutral transport or for barring the prog-
ress of a hostile expedition, and that, as the rescued officers were duly set at liberty, no apology was 
due to the British Government and no indemnity to any person.35
This was a victory, both legal and moral, for Japan. Owing in part to these complica-
tions—the legal niceties of the Kowshing sinking were not settled until two weeks after 
the destruction of the Chinese navy—neither Japan nor China again engaged in com-
merce raiding of any variety during the war.
Japan’s Winning Strategy
The hostilities at Feng Island and the sinking of Kowshing precipitated formal declara-
tions of war on 1 August.36 Within the first week of the war, the Japanese army settled 
its operational strategy. It divided its forces into two armies. The First Army, under 
General Yamagata Aritomo, would invade Korea and enter Manchuria from the north, 
while the Second Army, under the minister of war, General Ōyama Iwao, would invade 
Manchuria from the south to take the Lüshun (Port Arthur) naval base, on the Liaodong 
Peninsula, and, once the two armies met, leave for Shandong Province to take the naval 
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base at Weihaiwei.37 Possession of Lüshun and Weihaiwei would put Japan in control of 
the mouth of the Bo Hai and sea access to Beijing.38
On 28 July the Japanese defeated Chinese troops at Sŏnghwan, taking the town of Asan 
with ease the next day.39 During a three-day period in mid-September 1894, follow-
ing a month-and-a-half hiatus in hostilities, Japan trounced China on land and sea. 
On 16 September, Japan overran China’s prepared positions at P’yŏngyang after China 
failed to contest a dangerous river crossing or attack vulnerable supply lines. Chinese 
forces then retreated all the way to the Chinese bank of the Yalu River bordering Man-
churia, ceding Korea to Japan. A month and a half later, the Chinese forces again failed 
to contest a Japanese river crossing, when Japan pursued over the Yalu. China thereby 
ceded to Japan the latter’s original war objective, which was the expulsion of China 
from Korea.
Meanwhile, on 17 September, the Japanese navy sought out China’s Beiyang Squadron, 
sinking four Chinese vessels near the mouth of the Yalu River without losing any ships. 
Again Chinese forces all too easily gave up the initiative. They never again crossed the 
Yalu–Weihaiwei line, an imaginary line running from the river mouth to the naval base, 
effectively ceding to Japan command of the sea, allowing it to deploy and supply at will.
A second pair of key battles took place over the winter of 1894–95, at Lüshun and 
Weihaiwei. China failed to contest the landing of Japanese troops at Huayuankou, 
on the southern coast of the Liaodong Peninsula about a hundred miles northeast of 
Lüshun, which had the only facilities adequate to repair capital ships. On 21–22 No-
vember Lüshun fell to the ensuing landward attack. Japan then attacked China’s second 
naval base, at Weihaiwei, again by land, first blockading the Chinese fleet in port. On 
12 February 1895 Weihaiwei fell, and Japan destroyed the trapped fleet and captured 
its most modern warships, thus ending Chinese naval power for over a century. Japan 
threatened to make Beijing the next target, with regime-change implications that forced 
the Manchus to capitulate. In the resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki Japan gained full 
control over Korea and valuable rights in Manchuria, and it annexed Taiwan and the 
Pescadores.
For the Manchus, virtually any outcome would have been better than this one. They 
had lost every battle and the entire Beiyang Squadron, not in battle but at anchor. The 
fleet, which had consumed so much of the government’s scarce funds, had largely sat 
out the war. The foreign powers responded to Chinese incompetence in the field by di-
viding up the failing empire into a welter of spheres of influence—the so-called scram-
ble for concessions portrayed in Chinese history texts as the “Era of Humiliations.” 
The Manchus tried to use Russia as a postwar counterbalance to Japan. In practice, this 
meant that neighboring Russia, rather than overseas Japan, occupied Manchuria. Japan 
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and Russia soon, in 1904–1905, fought a war on Chinese territory over which would 
dominate Manchuria. The Qing dynasty limped along for another six years before col-
lapsing in the face of a mutiny of the army it had Westernized in response to its defeat 
by Japan in 1895. All of these events might have been avoided had China adopted a more 
aggressive guerre de course campaign aimed at interdicting Japan’s troop transports and 
supply ships.
China’s Alternative Strategy
In 1894–95 China actually had considerable strengths and Japan notable weaknesses, 
particularly its vulnerable logistical lines. China had manpower, resources, strategic 
depth, and interior lines that Japan could not match. If the Manchus had deliberately 
pulled the fighting inland, Japan would have quickly run out of manpower. Japan could 
ill afford a protracted war, not only because of its manpower limitations but also because 
of its financial ones. Japan was not a rich country. Its rural population bore the burden 
of industrialization, through taxes that allowed the government to invest in industry. 
The Meiji reforms that had Westernized Japanese political, economic, military, legal, 
and educational institutions remained deeply unpopular, as indicated by the antago-
nistic relations between the powerless but obstreperous Diet and the so-called oligarchs 
who actually ran the country.40 Had the fighting gone badly, popular anger might have 
focused on the government, with potential for domestic unrest.
Few realize that at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War China had a navy that 
was the equal of and in some ways superior to the Imperial Japanese Navy. Although 
it was divided into four autonomous squadrons—the Beiyang (northern), Nanyang 
(southern), Fujian, and Guangdong Squadrons—which did not cooperate, the Beiyang 
Squadron by itself had a force structure on a par with that of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy. The other three squadrons together had twenty-one destroyers and six cruisers, 
generally older.41
If Chinese land forces were outdated, the Beiyang Squadron ranked among the top 
navies of its day. Both the Beiyang Squadron and the Imperial Japanese Navy had state-
of-the-art equipment; prior to the war there was no consensus on which was superior.42 
China’s best ships were larger and carried bigger guns, while Japan had faster ships over-
all and an advantage in quick-firing guns.43 In May 1894 Viceroy Li had made a three-
week triennial inspection of the northern coastal defenses. One foreign correspondent 
present openly admired the “powerful forts, dock yards, work shops, armouries, piers, 
store-rooms, colleges, hospitals, etc., etc.,” at Lüshun, Dalian, and Weihaiwei.44
Despite the well-orchestrated naval maneuvers of that May, other commentators took 
a less sanguine view, noting peculation, inefficiency, lax discipline, insufficient stores, 
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insufficient coal, and “gross nepotism.” 45 Although the Beiyang Squadron had China’s 
most modern ships, its guns and ammunition were not standardized. The gunpowder 
was locally manufactured and not of the appropriate grade for the ships’ imported guns. 
This greatly complicated supplying the correct ammunition in adequate quantities. 
Moreover, the supply system was ad hoc, with the result that ships were grossly under-
supplied with ordnance. Foreign employees had complained about these problems for at 
least a year prior to the war.46 China could have addressed them, particularly as  
war loomed.
Instead of withdrawing behind the Yalu–Weihaiwei line after the battle of the Yalu, 
China should have waged a guerre de course against Japan’s troop transports. China still 
had two naval bases in the vicinity of the anticipated fighting, Lüshun and Weihaiwei, to 
support commerce raiding, while Japan had none.47 The Japanese government had long 
recognized the importance of the ability to conduct rapid and massive troop deploy-
ments. It had subsidized the country’s large steamship companies, to make their vessels 
available in times of war. The Japan Mail Steamship Company supplied almost ninety 
steamships for transport service during the war. 48 Even so, Japan required the services 
of foreign merchant ships to help supply its troops on the Asian mainland.49 Japan could 
not have easily compensated for merchantman sinkings or for troop losses at sea.
Also, Japan’s choices for landing points were limited and predictable. Korea’s finest har-
bors lay at Pusan, Wŏnsan, and Inch’ŏn. Each was a long march from the theater, which 
China had determined would be P’yŏngyang, spending the month and a half between 
the declarations of war and the battle of P’yŏngyang improving the city’s fortifications. 
In the event, the initial Japanese landings of elements of the First Army took place at 
Pusan on 19 August 1894 at the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, nearest Japan, 
followed by a second landing on 27 August 1894 of a detachment of the First Army in 
Chinese and Japanese Naval Force Structure Comparison, 1894










NANYANG, FUJIAN,  
GUANGDONG 
SQUADRONS
  SHIPS TONNAGE SHIPS TONNAGE SHIPS TONNAGE SHIPS TONNAGE
Battleships 3 12,840     4 20,480    
Cruisers 8 25,570     9 15,720 6 13,400
Destroyers 12 12,640 6 5,970 10 5,560 21 15,700
Torpedo boats 6 540 18 990 7 763 12 450
Small craft 29 51,590 24 6,960 30 42,523 39 29,550
Source: Tanaka, Illustrated Volume on the Meiji Navy, p. 35.
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Wŏnsan, on the central part of the eastern coast, as far away as possible from China’s 
two naval bases.
50
 These deployments entailed arduous marches to Seoul. They confirm 
deep Japanese concerns that Chinese forces might have attacked.
So long as the Beiyang Squadron remained intact, the Japanese military had to be very 
cautious about transporting these troops, which were the most vulnerable to attack 
when en route to Korea in transport ships. In late August, after the Japanese had de-
feated the Chinese at Sŏnghwan and the Chinese had fled northward to P’yŏngyang, the 
Japanese army concluded that considerations of disease, fatigue, and time made landing 
at Inch’ŏn worth the risk.51 Japan had already made three landings there prior to the 
outbreak of hostilities—completed on 12 June, 16 June, and 28 June, respectively—of a 
detachment followed by the 9th Brigade, in two groups. The fourth landing took place at 
the end of August, of the 5th Division, followed by a fifth and final unopposed landing 
at Inch’ŏn, completed on 1 October, of the 3rd Division.52
China could have easily tried to interfere with the final two landings, which were also 
the largest. Three divisions made up a field army, and Japan had only two. Given the 
right circumstances China could have crippled two-thirds of an army at Inch’ŏn. The port 
is a notoriously difficult place for an opposed landing, given its huge tides, constrained 
approaches, endless mudflats at low tide, and steep coastal embankment. China also had 
many small ships that could have operated in the narrow approaches to transform the 
troop landings into suicide runs. It could have posted troops on the high embankments 
and, if able to delay follow-on landings, eliminated the mud-bound troops below.
Between 24 October and 2 November 1894 Japan undertook an even riskier landing 
of the Second Army at Huayuankou, about a hundred miles up the southern coast of 
the Liaodong Peninsula from Lüshun, on the far side of the Biliu River.
53
 In theory, this 
Japanese army landed in the heartland of Manchu territory. China would have totally 
upset Japanese plans had it contested the landing of the entire Second Army, which in 
the event would capture the naval base of Lüshun by land and then repeat the maneuver 
at Weihaiwei. Had the Chinese patrolled the waters along the Liaodong Peninsula and 
put spotters on the coast, they could have contested the risky landing at Huayuankou, 
which took a whole week to complete. The Beiyang Squadron had nine cruisers to 
patrol the 175-mile-long southern coast of the Liaodong Peninsula. It had the entire 
local population, including fishermen, at its disposal to report on Japanese movements. 
The vulnerable troop transports, which were merchantmen not designed to withstand 
attack, could have been sunk by a wide variety of warships; the Beiyang Squadron had 
seven torpedo boats and ten destroyers fit for the task. Moreover, Japan had no counter-
parts for China’s two largest German-built battleships, which were virtually unsinkable, 
given the thickness of their hulls and the caliber of ordnance available to the Japanese.
54
 
Contested landings would have forced a deployment of the Imperial Japanese Navy to 
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cover the transports, some of which China would surely have sunk anyway, particularly 
if it had used its battleships to great advantage. China could have added to the Japanese 
losses if it had used mines more extensively. A joint defense from land and sea would 
have proved costly and perhaps lethal to Japan.
The risk equation also favored China. Japan would lose the war if it lost its navy, because 
its army could not get to or remain in the theater without the navy. After the defeat in 
Korea, the loss of the Chinese navy, however, had no effect, other than in morale, on 
China’s armies. Therefore, China could afford to risk its navy in a way that Japan could 
not. China should have hunted the Japanese transport ships and sunk them.
A guerre de course targeting Japanese troop transports by itself would not necessarily 
have delivered a Chinese victory, but in combination with other feasible adjustments, 
China might have imposed costs on Japan severe enough to reverse the outcome. China 
could have also contested Japan’s difficult river crossings at P’yŏngyang and the Yalu, 
causing further attrition of limited Japanese manpower. China could have then drawn 
Japan inland toward the historical Manchu capital at Mukden, where the Japanese 
initially headed, awaited the coming of winter, and then targeted Japan’s logistical lines. 
The Chinese could have protected their key naval bases more carefully. Foreign observ-
ers did not understand why the defenders abandoned their positions so rapidly. How the 
Chinese fleet allowed itself to be blockaded at Weihaiwei remains a mystery to this day.
Conclusions
Viceroy Li Hongzhang, whose military expertise had come from land warfare during 
the Taiping and Nian Rebellions thirty years prior, demonstrated his lack of under-
standing of naval or joint warfare. Rather than seizing the initiative and choosing the 
time and place of attack to suit Chinese interests, he fought on Japanese terms. Ap-
parently he wished to minimize the risk to his modern fleet, in order to save his two 
ironclad battleships to deter attack on the coast and then to use his fleet for convoy duty, 
to protect Chinese troop deployments, rather than to target those of Japan.55 He focused 
on a prevent-defeat strategy—that is, on a strategy to preserve his modern navy intact 
to fight Japan another day. He must have believed time was on his side, that an attrition 
strategy by Chinese land forces would yield victory.56 The viceroy may have assumed 
that if hostilities dragged on into the winter months, the bitter Korean weather would 
take its toll on the Japanese troops and their long logistical lines.57 He did not seem to 
perceive the possibility of destroying Japan’s land forces at sea, where they were most 
concentrated and vulnerable.
Li apparently thought of naval forces in terms of fleet-on-fleet engagements and convoy 
duties. Capital ships, in his view, could either target enemy naval vessels or protect 
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Chinese merchantmen. He did not turn the equation around to see that a naval ship 
could also attack enemy merchantmen and troop transports, creating a very favorable 
situation in which the naval ship could sequester or, if necessary, sink a defenseless 
vessel.
China should have applied its strength—its state-of-the-art navy, which it could afford 
to put at risk—against Japan’s vulnerable troop transports and navy, which Japan could 
ill afford to lose. Japan could lose the war on land or sea, whereas China had to be 
defeated on land. Loss at sea would have been financially costly for either but fatal only 
for Japan. As an island nation, Japan had to keep the sea lines of communication open to 
deliver and support its troops, but China did not. The Chinese could have responded to 
the sinking of Kowshing by adopting an aggressive guerre de course campaign. Japan was 
far more vulnerable than China to the cost-efficient strategy of disposing of armies at 
sea rather than fighting them on land.
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Chinese Neutrality and Russian Commerce 
Raiding during the Russo-Japanese War,  
1904–1905
BRUCE A.  ELLEMAN
During the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian squadron based at Vladivostok con-
ducted commerce raiding against Japanese inbound and outbound transport ships and 
merchantmen, even as Russian warships and “volunteer” cruisers stopped and searched 
commercial shipping far to the west in the Red Sea. While the campaign was initially 
quite effective, a truly successful Russian guerre de course operation would have re-
quired more numerous naval bases. Japan profited, therefore, from China’s declaration 
of neutrality, which excluded the Russian navy from its ports. Although the ground por-
tion of the conflict took place on Chinese territory—mainly in Manchuria—the Chinese 
government and its citizens did not join the war on behalf of either side.
Chinese neutrality made Beijing legally responsible for closing Chinese ports to Russian 
commerce raiders, interning enemy ships, and monitoring the behavior of any Russian 
sailors and soldiers on parole. Both the Russian and Japanese governments at times 
accused China of not acting as a truly neutral power. But China’s policy of neutrality 
was left intentionally vague from the very beginning to give the greatest range of action 
to all of the interested powers. Often the undefined nature of China’s neutrality led to 
divergent interpretations of international law and diplomatic practice.
This chapter will begin by examining Russia’s commerce-raiding operations in East 
Asia and in the Red Sea. It will then turn to the international diplomacy surrounding 
China’s declaration of neutrality, Japan’s assistance to China to eliminate Russian extra-
territoriality, and the ongoing Russo-Japanese disputes over the “incomplete” neutrality 
of Chinese ports. Despite all of the problems, neutrality allowed China to avoid becom-
ing embroiled as a belligerent in the Russo-Japanese War, and Beijing eventually halted 
Russian commerce raiding from Chinese ports.
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Russian Commerce Raiding Based in Vladivostok
Soon after war broke out between Russia and Japan on 8 February 1904, ships from 
the Russian naval squadron based in Vladivostok carried out a successful commerce-
raiding strategy. This effort was conducted by three heavy cruisers, Riurik, Rossiia, and 
Gromoboi, supported by a single armed merchantman and a number of torpedo boats.1 
On the basis of orders that had been issued by Vice Adm. Oskar Victorovich Stark on 
9 January 1904, any “valuable prizes captured at no great distance from Vladivostok 
may be sent to that port; all the remainder must be sent to the bottom without consider-
ations of pity and without hesitation.”2 This order not only followed the teachings of the 
Jeune École but took account of the highly publicized sinking of Kowshing during the 
Sino-Japanese War.
The Japanese navy and the Russian Pacific Fleet were approximately equal in numbers 
of battleships, with seven apiece, but Japan had six armored cruisers to Russia’s four, 
plus Japan had an additional eighteen protected cruisers and ten small cruisers. As for 
destroyers, Russia had twenty-five to Japan’s nineteen, but Japan’s eighty-five torpedo 
boats could easily outmatch Russia’s twenty-five. Given these uneven numbers, a fleet-
on-fleet engagement would have been very one-sided, so Russia wanted to avoid one. 
Good strategic sense dictated that the Russian forces in the Pacific avoid battle until 
the arrival of the Baltic Fleet. In the meantime, they adopted a strategy emphasizing 
commerce raiding. During the first year of the war, Russian cruisers attacked transport 
ships moving troops and supplies from Japan to Korea; they also transited the Tsugaru 
Strait and operated along the east coast of Japan, at one point cruising as far south as the 
mouth of Tokyo Bay and beyond.
At the beginning of the conflict the Japanese merchant marine was approximately 
50 percent larger than that of Russia, an estimated 979,000 tons compared to Russia’s 
679,000 tons.3 The primary strategic goal of the Russian squadron based at Vladivostok 
was to stop Japanese military supplies being shipped to Korea. Secondary goals included 
interfering actively with neutral shipping to Japan and by so doing raising the insurance 
rates paid by commercial shippers. In fact, over the course of several months dozens 
of Japanese transport ships, as well as many “neutral” British, German, and American 
commercial ships, were detained or sunk, interrupting the flow of food, guns, ammuni-
tion, and vital railway supplies to Manchuria.
The Russian guerre de course campaign had a significant impact on Japanese operations 
in Manchuria. On 15 June 1904, for example, Gromoboi sank a three-thousand-ton 
commercial vessel carrying Japanese wounded back from Port Arthur, as well as Hitachi 
Maru, a six-thousand-ton transport. The sinking of Hitachi Maru destroyed eighteen 
eleven-inch Krupp siege guns en route to Port Arthur: “The loss of arms, locomotives, 
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and Krupp siege guns intended for the bombardment of the Port Arthur fortress was a 
serious blow for the Japanese.” Without these guns the Japanese assault on Port Arthur 
was delayed by “many months,” and only in early December were replacements deliv-
ered and emplaced.4 During this period Japan lost the equivalent of a quarter of its force 
surrounding Port Arthur. This delay therefore helped Russia prolong its control over 
this crucial port. Port Arthur fell almost exactly one month, on New Year’s Day, after 
the guns arrived.
By contrast, Russian losses during these guerre de course operations were comparatively 
minor. For example, the protected cruiser Bogatyr was permanently disabled in May 
1904, but by hitting a rock, not through enemy action. During this early period of the 
conflict, therefore, Russia’s naval operations in East Asia appeared to be highly suc-
cessful. These attacks proved to be a “sober reminder that the fate of the Japanese army 
depended on [Admiral] Togo’s ability to command the sea and its supply lines to the 
home islands.”5 At the same time, Russia was conducting an apparently equally effective 
commerce-raiding operation to the west, in the Red Sea.
Russian Commerce Raiding in the Red Sea
Almost immediately after war broke out, the Russian navy adopted a guerre de course 
strategy in the Red Sea, to halt the shipment by neutral countries of “contraband” to 
Japan. The list of Russian contraband items was long, including not only obvious mili-
tary supplies like guns and ammunition but also any technological products for use in 
constructing telegraphs, telephones, or railways. In addition, all food—including staples 
like rice—was prohibited, as were all “fuel” products.6 Over time it became clear that 
this latter term included “coal, naphtha, alcohol, and similar materials.”7 This contra-
band list was potentially of concern to the British, major exporters of coal to Japan.
The best place to intercept the coal shipments was in fact not in East Asia, where Japa-
nese warships might be able to interfere, but closer to the source. One highly strategic 
choke point was in the Red Sea, just south of the Suez Canal. On 20 February 1904, a 
group of five Russian cruisers and three torpedo boats stopped the P&O steamship 
Mongolia in the middle of the Red Sea, at latitude 18° north, longitude 39° east. The 
search of Mongolia only took eight minutes. When no contraband items were found, 
the captain of the Russian cruiser politely signaled, “I beg to be excused,” and released 
the ship.8
However, other British merchant ships were not so lucky. On 21 February 1904 Rus-
sian warships approximately twenty miles south of Suez, on the “high seas,” seized and 
retained for several days SS Frankby. After being released, the ship had to return to Port 
Said, at the southern exit of the Suez Canal, to be reloaded, leaving again on 29 February 
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after a delay of eight days.9 The owners of SS Ardova, which was detained on 17 July and 
released a week later on 25 July, later claimed from the Russian government a total of 
£3,218 sterling in compensation for “the seizure and detention of the vessel.”10
British shipping companies and insurers were outraged at the Russian operations, since 
Britain remained neutral in the Russo-Japanese War. Insurance rates began to increase 
to offset the risk of being stopped and detained. The insurers were particularly upset, 
because many of these commercial ships had departed Britain prior to the outbreak 
of war, carrying what had been at that point not contraband but “peaceful” cargoes.11 
Their worst fears were realized in early March 1904, when the Russian government 
announced the creation of four prize courts, two in Europe, at Libau (in Latvia) and 
Sevastopol, and two in Asia, at Vladivostok and Port Arthur. The creation of European 
prize courts suggested that neutral ships in the Red Sea caught transporting contraband 
could be confiscated by Russia and treated as war prizes.
The British protested, noting that in December 1884 the Russian government had firmly 
declared that coal should never be considered a contraband item.12 In early March 1904 
the British government even considered sending Royal Navy ships to the Red Sea to 
protect British commercial shipping. However, concern about being drawn into the war 
militated against such a policy, since sending warships “would likely lead to increased 
friction, suspicion and unrest.”13 Instead, the British took advice given on 2 March 1904 
by Capt. Edmond J. W. Slade, RN, Senior Officer, Red Sea Division, who pointed out 
that the Russian cruisers were “using an anchorage in neutral waters as a base from 
which to exercise the belligerent right of search.”14 Rather than trying to pressure the 
Russian government directly, therefore, the British urged the Egyptian government 
to assert its rights as a neutral state and deny the use of its ports to Russian warships. 
Almost at precisely the same time, similar concerns about Russian warships making use 
of neutral ports had convinced the Chinese government as well to declare its neutrality.
The Chinese Declaration of Neutrality
From almost the very beginning of the war, both Russia and Japan had urged China 
to declare its neutrality. There were many reasons for this, including Russian concern 
about a Sino-Japanese alliance, should China decide to back Japan. There were also fears 
that France and Great Britain might get dragged into the war if it embroiled China. But 
even more importantly, Tokyo was concerned that Chinese ports might be used by Rus-
sian vessels to launch raids on troop transports and supply ships. One way to eliminate 
this possibility would be to convince China to remain strictly neutral, which would 
close its ports to Russian commerce raiders.
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During February 1904 Japan worked hard to secure China’s neutrality. According to one 
account, obtaining China’s promise to remain neutral was the “most hazardous aspect 
of Japan’s diplomatic struggle.”15 The Japanese feared that a too-public Sino-Japanese 
alliance against Russia might be proclaimed by St. Petersburg as proof of the oft-cited 
“yellow peril.” Not only would this claim gain sympathy from other European states, 
especially Germany, but it might inhibit Great Britain, Japan’s ally since the 1902 Anglo-
Japanese alliance, from assisting Tokyo. Therefore, Japan wanted to make clear that the 
Russo-Japanese War did not represent warfare of East against West.
A second factor for the Japanese, which was discussed by the cabinet as early as 28 
December 1903, was the fear that the war might escalate to include other European 
countries:
If we were to let China enter the war, the situation might become difficult and we could not be 
sure that complications might not take place. In view of the Franco-Russian declaration [of March 
1902] which was issued as a counterpoise to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it might be that, if a third 
country like China were to enter the war against Russia alongside Japan, France would have no al-
ternative but to come to Russia’s aid. If France were to help Russia, Britain would also be required to 
support Japan, thus leading ultimately to the involvement of all world powers. We therefore believe 
that it would be most opportune if China and all other countries stayed neutral and thus restricted 
the scope of the war to Russia and Japan. 
As a result, “any Chinese suggestions for taking part in the war had to be avoided like 
the plague.”16
From the beginning, St. Petersburg was more lukewarm than Tokyo about China’s neu-
trality. Some thought Beijing might be tempted to join Russia’s side. However, consider-
ing that St. Petersburg had violated its promises to withdraw troops from Manchuria, 
there was more reason to believe that China would support Japan. Therefore, following 
the advice of Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States, the Russian gov-
ernment agreed to accept China’s declaration of neutrality, while simultaneously wait-
ing for China to commit a breach of neutrality that would work to Russia’s advantage. In 
the meantime, St. Petersburg undoubtedly hoped that its commerce-raiding operations 
in East Asia would have a significant impact on the war.
Russian Commerce Raiding in East Asia
During the initial months of the war, Russian warships operating out of Vladivostok 
conducted a highly disruptive commerce-raiding operation. On 19 July 1904 the Rus-
sian ships sortied again from Vladivostok for a two-week cruise, returning on 1 August. 
Passing through the Tsugaru Strait, the Russian ships cruised along Japan’s eastern 
coast, sinking or capturing a total of eight merchant vessels. Before returning north they 
passed the mouth of Tokyo Bay, causing panic in Tokyo.17 Since they never encountered 
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any Japanese warships, the total Russian losses were negligible—one torpedo boat 
grounded and abandoned.18
Under the command of Adm. Kamimura Hikonojō, the Japanese navy force protecting 
Tokyo Harbor wished to intercept the Russian ships, but to no avail. Kamimura’s force 
consisted of four armored cruisers, five protected cruisers, and two flotillas of torpedo 
boats. Since he had to keep his ships ready for action in case the main Russian fleet at 
Port Arthur broke out of the blockade and attempted to flee to Vladivostok, he could 
not afford to chase the Russian commerce raiders. While this gave the Japanese public 
the impression that Kamimura was ineffectual, his decision actually followed orders 
given by Adm. Tōgō Heihachirō, whose top priority was dealing with the Russian ships 
trapped at Port Arthur. Tōgō admitted that “there is no special plan to deal with the 
large cruisers” working out of Vladivostok.19
On 11 August the Vladivostok squadron again left port and sailed for Korea. Admiral 
Kamimura sortied his fleet and encountered the three Russian armored cruisers on 14 
August about forty miles off Pusan. He was now in command of four armored cruisers, 
two protected cruisers, and a number of torpedo boats, although the latter had not been 
able to keep up with the faster vessels and so played no role in the ensuing battle. The 
slowest Russian vessel, Riurik, was quickly damaged; its commanding officer eventu-
ally scuttled the ship so it would not be taken by the Japanese. Meanwhile, Rossiia and 
Gromoboi were both badly damaged. These two cruisers returned to Vladivostok and 
were eventually repaired, but they rarely left port during the remainder of the war. 
For all intents and purposes, this battle put an end to Russian commerce raiding from 
Vladivostok.
Up to this point, the Russian ships working from Vladivostok had sunk a total of 
fifteen ships and captured another three.20 Because most of the Russian Pacific Fleet 
remained blockaded at Port Arthur, the “only practicable role for the weaker Russian 
squadron was the guerre de course against enemy communications,” and for a time these 
ships were “moderately successful.” 21 Julian S. Corbett, in his two-volume study of the 
Russo-Japanese War, points out that this campaign was useful, acknowledging that the 
Japanese navy could not “ensure absolute immunity for sea communications, so long as 
any fragments of the enemy’s fleet remain[ed] in the theatre of operations.” 22 This obser-
vation also largely describes British efforts to convince Egypt to enforce its neutrality in 
the Red Sea, thereby halting Russian commerce raiding there.
The Diplomatic Consequences of Egyptian Neutrality
On the one hand, the British government wanted to halt Russian patrols in the Red Sea, 
but on the other hand, it did not want to become an active belligerent. As a compromise 
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solution, it pressured the Egyptian government to enforce Egyptian neutrality in its Red  
Sea ports. As noted by the North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association  
in a 17 June 1904 letter of protest, the Russian naval patrols were actively infringing  
on “international law” when they made “use of neutral ports from which to search 
neutral vessels.” 23
Beginning in July 1904, the Russian navy shifted from using conventional warships to 
relying on Russian “volunteer ships” to enforce its guerre de course strategy in the Red 
Sea. On 13 July, for example, it was reported that the Russian volunteer ship Petersburg 
had stopped and searched Menelaus and Crewe Hall two days before, at latitude 18° 
north, longitude 40° east.24 Five days later, a second Russian volunteer ship, Smolensk, 
stopped SS Persia. Of even greater concern, in early July the Russians stopped a Ger-
man ship, Prinz Heinrich, and removed thirty-one sacks of mail and twenty-four sacks 
of parcels addressed to Japan. On 18 July, presumably after searching these sacks for 
anything of interest, Persia was ordered to deliver these mail sacks to Japan. The British 
considered such actions to “usurp the functions of His Majesty’s Post-Master General, 
detaining mail steamers and causing them to carry mails.” 25
After these reports, it became clear that the two volunteer ships Petersburg and Smo-
lensk had transited the Dardanelles and Suez as commercial ships and only afterward 
“transformed into cruisers,” a situation that the British government argued violated the 
18 March 1856 Treaty of Paris, which denied Russian warships access from the Black Sea 
to the Mediterranean.26 A “Very Confidential” report from Charles Hardinge, a British 
Foreign Office official stationed in St. Petersburg, stated that “on emerging into the Red 
Sea [the Russian volunteer ships] had thrown away the mask, hoisted the naval flag, 
mounted guns, and initiated a crusade against the merchant shipping in those waters.” 27 
According to R. Tupper, captain of HMS Venus, these Russian cruisers were being 
“mothered by the German S.S. Holsatia” and if allowed to refuel at will at local ports 
could operate indefinitely in the Red Sea.28
The British government loudly protested to St. Petersburg the decision to use volunteer 
ships to conduct a formal naval operation in the Red Sea. In particular, it argued that 
the Russian ships should not be allowed to buy coal in neutral ports in the Red Sea. In 
July 1904 British-controlled ports, including Aden, were ordered not to allow the Rus-
sian ships to purchase coal.29 Meanwhile, at Britain’s urging the Egyptian government 
had already announced in late March 1904 that Russian ships stopping at Port Said could 
purchase only enough coal “to take them to the nearest port on their direct route.” 30
In response to these protests, the Russian government finally agreed to recall Petersburg 
and Smolensk and replace them with two regular warships, Don and Vral. However, 
rather than going north through the Suez Canal back to Russia, the two volunteer ships 
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proceeded southward. On 22 August Smolensk stopped and searched SS Comedian just 
eighty miles from East London, South Africa. St. Petersburg disingenuously claimed 
that it was unable to communicate with its ships to recall them and so agreed to allow 
British ships to transfer a message telling Petersburg and Smolensk to “cease to act as a 
Cruiser.”31 This message was finally delivered by HMS Forte on 5 September 1904 off the 
coast of Zanzibar.32
Only after a British warship delivered to the two volunteer ships notice of their recall 
did they stop their search efforts and agree to return to Russia, passing Gibraltar on 4 
October and arriving in Libau in mid-October. It was clear to the British that St. Peters-
burg’s failure to recall the ships promptly was “proof of bad faith and lack of good will”; 
Charles Hardinge commented that it was a “pity that the Russian Government had not 
made a similar effort six weeks earlier.”33 The Foreign Office called the Russian conduct 
“shifty.”34 This commerce-raiding strategy in the Red Sea helped set the pattern in East 
Asia, where Russian commerce-raiding ships attempted to base their efforts in neutral 
Chinese harbors.
Chinese Internment of Russian Ships
In line with China’s standing as a neutral country, Beijing officials promised to moni-
tor any belligerent ships claiming succor. As Japanese fleets progressively dominated 
the seas, more and more Russian ships sought safety in Chinese ports. In August 1904, 
for example, the Russian warship Reshitelny took refuge in the northern Shandong port 
of Qifu (Chefoo). The next day Japan seized this Russian ship, disregarding China’s 
neutrality, and towed it out of the port. In the face of numerous protests, the Japanese 
argued that China’s neutrality was imperfect—since China was clearly incapable of en-
forcing its duties as a neutral, Japan had no choice but to act alone. This legal interpreta-
tion was to serve Japan’s needs quite well during the 1904–1905 conflict.
According to international law, Chinese neutrality included jurisdiction over ships that 
sought refuge in its ports. On 10 August 1904 Reshitelny, under the command of Lieuten-
ant Roshchakovskii, entered Qifu, a neutral port in Shandong Province. Roshchakovskii 
reportedly told the Chinese naval authorities at Qifu that he intended to disarm, but he 
did not immediately do so. There were legitimate fears in Tokyo that after resupplying, 
the ship might leave to conduct commerce raiding. For that reason, on the following 
day, 11 August 1904, a Japanese party under the command of Lieutenant Terashima 
boarded the ship. After determining that it had not yet disarmed, he ordered Reshitelny 
“either to get out into the open sea for a fight or prepare to be towed out.”35
In response to Japan’s ultimatum, Roshchakovskii ordered that charges be set to blow 
up his ship, which would be technically a violation of his request for refuge in a neutral 
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port. Tension quickly increased. Roshchakovskii struck Terashima, and the two fell 
overboard. Terashima was immediately pulled out, but Roshchakovskii reportedly re-
mained in the water for almost an hour; several nearby Chinese ships evidently refused 
to allow him on board. Fighting between the Japanese party and the Russian crew 
resulted, in which one Japanese was killed and fourteen were wounded. Reshitelny’s 
magazine exploded, apparently in an attempt to scuttle the ship, but it remained afloat. 
Reshitelny was soon towed out of port by a Japanese ship, after which Japan claimed the 
ship as a spoil of war.
This incident caused quite a stir in China. The Chinese government was represented at 
Qifu by Vice Adm. Sa Zhenping, who had personally agreed to give the Russian ship ref-
uge. During this dispute, Sa protested Japan’s action, but to no effect. Evidently Sa was 
“so deeply hurt that he handed over the command of his squadron to one of his cap-
tains.”36 Later Sa petitioned the empress dowager to relieve him from duty and punish 
him, but she declined.37
The U.S. government was particularly concerned by Japan’s apparent failure to respect 
Chinese neutrality. On 17 August 1904, President Roosevelt met with the Japanese 
ambassador Takahira Kogorō to “urge the surrender of the Russian ship to Chinese 
jurisdiction.” On instructions from Tokyo, Takahira explained that Russian ships were 
making only a “pretense” of disarming and were still “in a position to take to the sea.” In 
other words, he thought they were planning to use China’s neutral ports as bases to con-
duct guerre de course operations.38 To offset this possibility, Japan was “helping” China 
to enforce its neutrality against Russian ships.
For its part, the Russian government, in a parallel strategy to its successful commerce 
raiding in the Red Sea, was clearly trying to use neutral ports in Asia to carry out 
further attacks on Japanese shipping. In fact, by late summer 1904 there were already a 
fairly large number of Russian naval vessels docked in Chinese ports, not far from the 
war zone in southern Manchuria. Therefore, the concern in Tokyo that these Russian 
ships might continue to operate as independent commerce raiders to attack Japanese 
transports and logistical lines was legitimate. Convincing China to enforce its neutrality 
against the Russian crews became an important diplomatic objective, since only with 
Beijing’s active cooperation could Tokyo stop Russian commerce raiders from using its 
ports. To do this effectively Beijing had to abolish, or at the very least modify, Russia’s 
right of extraterritoriality, or diplomatic exemption from local law.
Chinese Attempts to Abolish Russian Extraterritoriality
A second important development limiting Russian commerce raiding in East Asia 
was China’s promise to detain the Russian crews and enforce their paroles. As part of 
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China’s decision to declare neutrality, Beijing assumed responsibility for any interned 
belligerents, including all Russian crews. The Chinese government soon published a 
guide entitled Manual of Neutral Public Law, which stated, “Any belligerent warship, 
which has entered the area of neutral territories in consequence of her defeat in battle, 
shall be disarmed and detained until the end of the war.” Furthermore, the captain, offi-
cers, and crew were required to give paroles, thereby promising not to fight again during 
the remainder of the conflict.39
In 1904 China agreed to intern paroled Russian sailors as part of its responsibility as 
a neutral power. However, it was virtually impossible to regulate the behavior of the 
interned Russian sailors so long as extraterritoriality existed. After receiving parole and 
promising to remain in China, many Russian officers and their crews simply broke their 
promises and, after returning to Russia, rejoined the Russian fleet. This undermined 
the whole reason for paroling them in the first place. With the tacit support of Japan, 
therefore, China determined that extraterritoriality could not possibly apply in these 
cases, thus abrogating the right of Russians to this privilege. Such a legal determination 
worked in 1904–1905 to the advantage of Japan, which wanted the maximum adminis-
trative control over the interned Russian sailors.
However, many Russian officers and sailors still breached parole and rejoined the 
Russian navy. The cases of Variag and Koreets were perhaps the most famous in this 
connection. After the beginning of hostilities, these two ships left the Korean port of 
Inch’ŏn to engage the Japanese fleet. Damaged beyond repair, Variag was destroyed by 
fire, while Koreets was dynamited. Their officers and crews were taken to Shanghai and 
released after pledging “not to come again to the north of Shanghai during the war.” 
However, many Russian officers soon left Shanghai and returned to Russia. When the 
Russian naval reserves were called to service, the London Times reported “that both of-
ficers and men of the Koreetz [sic] and the Variag had taken service again.” 4 0
Japan protested such Russian violations of parole on many occasions. In particular, 
on 21 January 1905, a memorandum was addressed to Beijing denouncing the recent 
violation of parole of both the captain and first officer of the Russian torpedo-destroyer 
Rastoropny. This protest forcefully concluded, “I believe the present event must have 
arisen from the imperfectness of your internment of the Russians, therefore, I must 
advise Your Excellency to put them under strict guard, and not to repeat such a trouble-
some occurrence.” 4 1
The Chinese officials were at a loss how to stop the Russians, however, since they did 
not have any legal authority over them. China’s declaration of neutrality was in direct 
conflict with its treaty obligations to uphold the extraterritorial legal privileges of for-
eigners. Prompted by protests from Japan, however, Chinese officials determined that 
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these circumstances demanded that China become the “constable of International Law.” 
Therefore “it was obviously requisite for her to have the corresponding high sovereign 
powers necessary to enable her to fulfill those duties.” In practice, this meant that “ex-
traterritoriality could not be allowed to interfere with her neutral functions.” 42
As a result of this legal reinterpretation, China determined that its neutrality out-
weighed the Russian sailors’ extraterritorial privileges. When Russian sailors refused to 
“give parole,” Chinese officials were authorized to retain them “as prisoners on board 
a Chinese man-of-war without reference to the Russian Consulate.” 43 One case that 
potentially could have tested China’s new legal interpretation was known as the “Shang-
hai murder case.” On 15 December 1904, a sailor from Askold named Terente Ageef 
killed a Chinese civilian. Instead of being handed over to Chinese authorities, Ageef 
was retained by the Russian consul at Shanghai. Over Chinese protests, a special court 
composed of Russians tried and sentenced Ageef to four years’ hard labor, although he 
was imprisoned in Shanghai’s French concession.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry sent an official protest via the Chinese minister in St. 
Petersburg, demanding the extradition of Ageef. China also asked Russia to agree that 
in all future cases “China shall, without the interference of the Russian authorities, 
have power to try those Russians who may, in violation of China’s neutrality, attempt to 
escape and are arrested.” 44 The Russian naval authorities eventually began to extradite 
criminals to China, but it was too late to retry Ageef. The Chinese government stated 
that in any future case in “which the prisoner was in their hands the case should be tried 
either at the Consular Court with a Chinese officer on the bench or on board a Chinese 
man-of-war by the Consul.” 45 This Chinese decision embodied a new interpretation of 
neutral rights and responsibilities.
A New Interpretation of Neutral Rights and Responsibilities
Faced with Japan’s insistence that all Russian ships observe China’s neutrality and that 
Russian crews honor their paroles, the Russian government accused the Chinese gov-
ernment of “complicity” with Japan. Pointing specifically to Vice Admiral Sa’s presence 
in Qifu when Reshitelny had been taken by force, St. Petersburg demanded “punishment 
of the Chinese Admiral, and the restoration of the ship.” 46 On 15 August 1904 the “Rus-
sian Minister P. M. Lessar accused the Chinese government of not fulfilling its responsi-
bilities for the protection of neutral vessels.” 47
In response to these Russian criticisms, however, the Japanese government argued that 
“the neutrality of China is imperfect and conditional.” Tokyo concluded, “Russia can-
not escape the consequences of an unsuccessful war by moving her army or navy into 
those portions of China which have by arrangement been made conditionally neutral.” 
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According to Japan’s main argument, “Experience has shown that China will take no 
adequate steps to enforce her neutrality laws.” 48 In short, if the Chinese government was 
unable to enforce its neutrality, the Japanese government would.
Japan’s arguments embodied a new interpretation of neutrality laws. According to one 
legal analysis, this controversy was likely to “open up a new chapter in the history of war-
fare.” This was especially the case because “at present, everything seems to depend upon 
the capacity of the nation whose neutrality is thus affected to maintain that neutrality, if 
necessary by force of arms.” 49 If this interpretation were generally accepted, only strong 
countries could afford to declare their neutrality; weak countries could not enforce it.
Later, following the defeat of the Baltic Fleet in the battle of Tsushima, Russian ships 
fleeing to the German port at Qingdao were quickly interned and their crews paroled. 
One Russian ship, Lena, was ordered to sea to continue fruitless guerre de course opera-
tions, but its crew quickly mutinied; the ship arrived in San Francisco on 12 September 
1904, where it was interned by American authorities.50 However, when several Russian 
ships appeared in Shanghai and refused to disarm, it appeared that Japan might be 
forced to attack again. The American Secretary of State, John Hay, was so disturbed by 
this possibility that he “was ready to throw up in despair the whole business of China’s 
neutrality in her ports” and instead make the ports “spheres of hostility,” in which Japan 
and Russia would be free to fight it out. Fortunately, Russia backed down and agreed to 
disarm and intern these ships.51
During the Russo-Japanese War, Great Britain and Japan were generally able to enforce 
their interpretations of the obligations of a neutral country. Russia’s attempt to conduct 
commerce-raiding operations from neutral ports in the Red Sea and to keep Japanese 
ships busy guarding neutral Chinese ports in which its ships had taken refuge ultimately 
failed. In 1905 one scholar concluded that Russia intended to waste Japanese resources 
and so there was a “probability that Russia has been cynically using the uncertainty 
which prevails as to the treatment of refugee ships to assist her materially in her warlike 
operations.”52 Japan’s tactics, however, proved more effective, especially after the resolu-
tion of the Reshitelny incident, when it became clear that Japan would not allow Russian 
warships to use Chinese neutral ports for commerce raiding.
Conclusions
The Russian navy’s policy of using volunteer ships in the Red Sea largely backfired, even 
while its Pacific squadron based in Vladivostok carried out a successful, albeit short-
lived, guerre de course operation. According to British statistics, forty-four British, seven 
German, and eight other neutral ships—a total of fifty-nine vessels—were directly im-
pacted.53 But this was a relatively small percentage of the total ships trading with Japan. 
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As one historian of the war concludes, “With the defeat of the final attempt at a naval 
sortie from Port Arthur and with the destruction of the Vladivostok squadron, both 
occurring in August [1904], the Japanese had acquired total sea control in the theater 
of war.”54 Japan met any further Russian attempts to continue guerre de course from 
Chinese ports with firm resistance. As a result, the overall impact of Russian commerce 
raiders proved insufficient to alter the outcome of the war.
Without a doubt, China’s neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War kept Russian com-
merce raiding to a minimum and thereby ultimately helped Japan win the war. Initially, 
it was unclear to the belligerents whether Chinese neutrality would help or hurt their 
respective military situations. During the war, neither side was satisfied: “China, due to 
her ignorance of international law and the inexperience of her officials, could not help 
making blunders in her endeavor to maintain a strict neutrality. Consequently, she was 
accused by both belligerents as having favored one party against the other while the war 
was going on.” 55
But taken as a whole, China’s neutrality played an important role in Japan’s victory, 
since it ensured that Russian commerce-raiding operations could not be conducted 
from Chinese ports. More importantly, no Russian naval vessel, once interned in 
Chinese ports, was ever allowed to leave again, and crews were eventually subject to 
Chinese legal regulations. To accomplish this, China used its declaration of neutrality 
to undermine the extraterritorial privileges of interned Russian sailors in Shanghai. The 
Chinese government may have failed to achieve its goal of canceling Russian extrater-
ritoriality altogether, but the diplomatic precedents created during this earlier period 
finally began to bear fruit during World War I, when Chinese neutrality resulted in not 
only the complete elimination of German and Austrian extraterritorial rights but also 
the eventual return of their territorial concessions to China.
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“Handelskrieg mit U-Booten”
The German Submarine Offensive in World War I
PAUL G.  HALPERN
The German navy faced a difficult geographic problem when examining the prospect 
of a maritime war against Great Britain. The British Isles have been compared to the 
stopper in a bottle, hindering Germany’s access to the open sea. Warships attempting to 
attack British trade would have either to proceed far to the north around Scotland or to 
risk the narrow waters of the Dover Straits. Furthermore, in comparison to the British 
Empire, Germany at the turn of the twentieth century possessed relatively few overseas 
bases where ships could obtain fuel or a safe refuge. This seemed to make the traditional 
recourse of a weaker navy—guerre de course—impractical.
This geographic accident was in fact one of the major arguments used by the state 
secretary of the Imperial Navy Office (Reichsmarineamt), Adm. Alfred von Tirpitz, for 
the view that Germany had no option but to develop a powerful battle fleet, one strong 
enough to deter the British, if only by inflicting losses heavy enough to imperil Britain’s 
worldwide position.1 This entailed the crippling of the Royal Navy in the face of such 
possible British enemies as Japan, France, and Russia. A battle fleet could also, however, 
increase Germany’s value as a potential ally.2
Nevertheless, the German fleet would have to pass developmentally through a danger 
zone before it was strong enough to constitute a true deterrent. Tirpitz succeeded in 
getting two major naval laws through the Reichstag in 1898 and 1900. The Germans 
thereby embarked on a steady building program that produced the second-largest fleet 
in the world. At this early stage, U-boats were not intended to play a major role.
The Challenge of German Expansion of Its Surface Fleet
Despite the technical excellence of the German navy, Tirpitz’s strategy of threatening 
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so that the danger zone kept lengthening. Moreover, they reached defensive agreements 
with major or potential rivals, notably the Japanese in 1902, the French in 1904, and the 
Russians in 1907. It was Germany and not Great Britain that appeared to be isolated, 
with only one reliable ally, Austria-Hungary, which, however powerful in the Adriatic, 
was hardly a world naval power.
Furthermore, confident German assumptions that technical superiority—in the form 
of submarines, torpedoes, and mines off the German coast—would whittle down the 
Royal Navy to the point where the smaller German navy might engage it with a good 
chance of success also proved to be false. The British adapted to the new technologies 
and abandoned the concept of a close blockade in favor of a distant one. They would not 
obligingly place their fleet in a potential trap. This problem was apparent even before 
the war, when Tirpitz asked the commander of the High Seas Fleet what he would do 
if the British did not come.3 The Germans never evolved a satisfactory answer to this 
conundrum.
Most importantly, Tirpitz failed to obtain a supplementary naval law to increase his 
building program in the year before the outbreak of war. The money was devoted 
instead to an increase in the army.4 Moreover, the German navy was assigned no role in 
the German army’s plan for a decisive and quick victory against France. After less than 
a month of hostilities a British raid deep into German waters resulted in the loss of three 
German cruisers and a destroyer in the Heligoland Bight before the bulk of the High 
Seas Fleet could intervene. The kaiser and the naval high command, however, opposed 
risking the fleet in operations close to the British Isles. Even Tirpitz, despite subsequent 
claims to the contrary, apparently opposed seeking battle more than a hundred miles 
from the German coast.5 The most risk the high command would accept was offensive 
minelaying or sporadic raids by fast battle cruisers on British coastal towns. This cau-
tion, however, involved political risks. Tirpitz pointed out that if the war ended “without 
the fleet having bled and worked, we shall get nothing more for the fleet, and all the 
scanty money that there may be will be spent on the army.” 6
Given these constraints on offensive operations, what could the German navy do? What 
were the prospects for an alternative guerre de course? The German government had 
in fact prepared for a certain amount of commerce warfare before the war. It was to 
be executed for the most part by “auxiliary cruisers,” converted merchant ships. There 
were thirteen of these auxiliary cruisers in existence at the beginning of the war.7 The 
Germans also organized the Etappe system, whereby the oceans were divided into 
zones linked to specific communications centers, each under a naval officer charged 
with transmitting messages to German ships in his zone in the event of war. These of-
ficers, usually located in cities where the Germans maintained diplomatic or consular 
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representatives, were, in turn, linked to Germany by, wherever possible, wireless 
communication.
The important shipping lines had equipped their ships with wireless units, and the 
German government had issued sealed orders to be opened in the event of war referring 
captains to the relevant Etappe. The Germans also sent out a large number of colliers 
and supply ships to provision cruisers at prearranged rendezvous, often remote or ob-
scure anchorages. The system was particularly noteworthy in South America, where the 
Germans counted on benevolent interpretations of neutrality.8
There were furthermore a number of regular German cruisers at sea at the outbreak 
of war, the most notable group being the Far East Squadron, under Adm. Maximilian 
von Spee. This squadron, however, would be quickly eliminated in the action off the 
Falkland Islands in December 1914. One of Spee’s cruisers, Emden, detached early in the 
war, enjoyed a spectacular career against commerce in the Indian Ocean before being 
sunk.
The auxiliary cruisers at the beginning of the war were on the whole less successful 
than Emden. Contemporary ships required great quantities of coal, which was difficult 
to transfer at sea. Wireless transmissions could quickly reveal the presence of a warship 
in neutral ports, although by the same token careless transmissions by British warships 
sometimes warned the Germans of their proximity. The Etappe system was a diminish-
ing asset. The vulnerable colliers were gradually sunk, captured, or interned.
Throughout the war, the Germans sent out surface raiders, generally converted freight-
ers that were relatively economical in their consumption of coal. Some, such as the 
raider Wolf in 1917, had considerable success; Wolf itself even managed to return safely 
to German waters, after a voyage of 444 days.9 But the losses these surface raiders in-
flicted are, given the scale of British and allied shipping, best described as pinpricks. A 
guerre de course waged by surface raiders could not have a significant effect on the war.
A Gradual Shift to U-boats
Surface ships proved inadequate to conduct guerre de course effectively. The potential 
danger that submarines posed to surface warships was not ignored before the war. 
However, more attention seemed directed at the threat to warships than to merchant 
shipping. The Germans began the war with but twenty-eight U-boats, of which four 
were suitable only for training and fourteen had unreliable, smoke-producing engines 
that required ventilation pipes that had to be lowered and stowed before the boat could 
submerge.10
During the early stages of the war this small number of U-boats scored a number of 
spectacular successes against British warships. However, these were sometimes against 
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older ships, handled in a foolish fashion. The dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet, the 
major striking force of the Royal Navy, were carefully screened by destroyers, and no 
dreadnought of the Grand Fleet would be sunk by a submarine during the entire war 
(one would be sunk by a mine laid by an auxiliary minelayer). The commander of the 
Grand Fleet, Adm. John Jellicoe, was so conscious of the threat from German U-boats 
that he temporarily shifted his fleet to the west coast of Scotland, and later northern 
Ireland, until the main base at Scapa Flow could be properly protected. Consequently, 
even an offensive use of U-boats in British waters was unlikely to reduce the Grand Fleet 
to such an extent that the German fleet could chance a battle.11
On 8 October 1914 a proposal to commence commerce raiding by U-boats along the 
British coast was made by Korvettenkapitän Hermann Bauer, commander of the Ger-
man U-boat flotilla in the North Sea (Führer der Unterseeboote, or F.d.U.). This action 
was ostensibly to be taken in retaliation for the British laying of a minefield in the ap-
proaches to the English Channel east of the Dover–Calais line, which Bauer considered 
a violation of international law.12 (Similar claims, that German actions were retaliations 
for British violations of international law, would be made throughout the war, but a 
proper evaluation of the rights and wrongs on both sides would require a volume of its 
own.) Bauer submitted a further memorandum at the end of December 1914 claiming 
that there would be sufficient U-boats in service to commence a campaign against com-
merce by the end of January 1915.
The first British merchant ship to become a victim of a U-boat is believed to have been 
the small steamer Glitra (866 tons), off the Norwegian coast on 20 October 1914. The 
commanding officer of U.17 allowed the crew ten minutes to abandon ship before 
sinking it and then towed the lifeboats in the general direction of the coast before cast-
ing them off, giving them general directions toward land. This action, while relatively 
humane and in most respects conforming to the accepted rules of “cruiser warfare,” 
also demonstrated the potential difficulties of using U-boats against merchant ship-
ping. There would not normally be sufficient men to form a prize crew to bring the ship 
into port, and U-boats were too small to accommodate the crews of sunken ships. This 
meant that under the best circumstances a crew would be left to the mercy of the sea in 
small boats; in other words, the safety of passengers and crew could not be assured.
Mistakes were also possible. Less than a week after the Glitra affair, another German 
U-boat torpedoed what its commander assumed was a troopship off Cape Gris-Nez in 
the Strait of Dover. The ship was actually a French liner carrying about 2,500 Belgian 
refugees; between thirty and forty people were killed, although the ship was not sunk. 
Fortunately for the Germans, the explosion was at first attributed to a mine rather than 
a submarine, but the potential for embarrassing charges of atrocities was obvious. 
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When these atrocities were committed on neutrals, diplomatic difficulties arose for the 
German government.
In January 1915 the Germans attempted another raid with battle cruisers against British 
fishing vessels assumed to be acting as scouts on the Dogger Bank in the North Sea. 
Thanks to their ability to decode intercepted German wireless messages, the Brit-
ish were forewarned, and in the ensuing action the Germans lost an armored cruiser 
and were lucky not to suffer even greater losses. The fiasco strengthened the kaiser’s 
determination not to risk the fleet again, led to a change of command in the High Seas 
Fleet, and convinced Tirpitz that a guerre de course involving not only cruisers but also 
a submarine blockade against British trade offered the best chance of success. He also 
advocated airship attacks against the docks and warehouses of London, as well as ag-
gressive raiding and minelaying in the Thames, to be executed from German bases in 
occupied Belgium.13
German Support for Submarine Warfare
By the end of January 1915 there was substantial support in Germany for U-boat war-
fare. Within the navy, the commander of the High Seas Fleet, Adm. Hugo von Pohl, as 
well as Vice Adm. Reinhard Scheer, commander of the 2nd Battle Squadron, favored 
increasing submarine warfare. Meanwhile, outside of the navy, an interview given by 
Tirpitz in November 1914 to an American journalist had been published in the German 
press and aroused widespread interest and support among German professors, financial 
experts, and segments of the public and press. There was a tendency to regard U-boats 
as a wonder weapon, capable of deciding the war.
During early 1915 there developed what has been termed a “U-Boat party,” whose noisy 
claims for “unrestricted” submarine warfare frequently went even beyond what Tirpitz 
at the time advocated.14 At the beginning of February a reluctant Chancellor Theobald 
von Bethmann Hollweg, despite the reservations of the German Foreign Office, ac-
cepted the navy’s proposals for the U-boat offensive against commerce. On 15 February 
1915 the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel, 
were designated by the German Admiralty Staff to be a “war zone” in which any enemy 
merchant vessels could be sunk.
Most importantly, this destruction could occur even when it was not possible to ensure 
the safety of passengers and crew. Further, because the Germans believed the British had 
misused neutral flags, it was declared that neutral ships entering the zone might also be 
attacked if mistaken for enemy ships. As a minor concession to the neutral Dutch and 
Scandinavians, a strip thirty miles wide along the Dutch coast was exempted, as were 
waters north of the Shetland Islands and in the eastern part of the North Sea.15
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The Germans began what has been termed the “first unrestricted submarine campaign” 
with a relatively small number of U-boats. While published accounts differ as to exact 
numbers, it is possible the Germans never had available for this offensive more than 
twenty-five U-boats, eight of them elderly with unreliable engines. Of this number, only 
one-third could be assumed to be in their operational areas at a given time, and not all 
U-boats had deck guns. A further seventeen boats were under construction when the 
war began, and orders placed after the outbreak of hostilities produced another seven-
teen during the December 1915–December 1916 period.16
The German navy also took over five U-boats under construction for the Austrian navy 
in German yards, as well as one for Norway. There was initially a tendency to hold back 
on new contracts, on the assumption that war would likely be over before orders were 
completed. Small coastal U-boats of the UB.I-class and UC.I-class submarine minelay-
ers could be built much more quickly, and the German seizure of the Belgian coast gave 
proximity to British waters that could be exploited by these classes. Consequently, the 
navy ordered fifteen UB.I boats, plus two for Austria, and fifteen UC.Is in October and 
November 1914.17 The majority of these were destined for the newly constituted Flanders 
Submarine Flotilla.
As the war progressed, however, the Germans developed an inland submarine base at 
Bruges, linked by canal to outlets to the North Sea at Zeebrugge and Ostende. Bomb-
proof shelters were eventually constructed at Bruges, and the Belgian coast would be 
heavily fortified with batteries of large-caliber guns. The area was held by a combined-
arms force of corps strength, designated the Marinekorps Flandern, under a vice admi-
ral directly responsible to the kaiser.18
The number of U-boats available in February 1915 to conduct commerce raiding was 
obviously very small. Tirpitz claimed that the declaration of unrestricted submarine 
warfare had been premature, although this did not stop him from proclaiming on 16 
February that the British would be forced to give in within six weeks.19 The campaign 
had no sooner been declared than it ran into strong opposition from the United States, 
specifically a warning that should American ships or lives be lost, the German govern-
ment would be held strictly accountable. This prompted Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg 
and the Foreign Office to assure the Americans that neutral shipping would not be 
harmed if recognized as such, thereby antagonizing German naval leaders, who hoped a 
ruthless campaign would frighten neutrals, whom they believed carried approximately 
25 percent of traffic to the British Isles.
With this development, a three-way tension developed among the chancellor and the 
Foreign Office, naval leaders, and the U.S. government that would persist for the follow-
ing two years. On 18 February 1915, U-boat commanders were ordered to spare ships 
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flying neutral flags unless clearly identified as enemy, although they would not be held 
responsible for mistakes. Furthermore, ships of the Belgian Relief Commission were not 
to be attacked, nor were hospital ships, unless obviously transporting troops.20
Despite grumbling at such restrictions by naval leaders, in the first three months of 
the campaign, from March to May 1915, the Germans sank 115 ships (approximately 
twenty-two of them neutral) representing 255,000 tons, for a loss of five U-boats. This 
represented what a British admiral later termed an “exchange ratio” of twenty to one, 
meaning about twenty ships sunk for every U-boat lost. These spectacular results were 
obtained even though there was a daily average of only six U-boats actually at sea. Brit-
ish and French countermeasures were obviously ineffective. However, the specifically 
British losses were only about fifty ships total, which were more than replaced by new 
construction and by the capture of German and Austrian merchant ships. Neutrals 
seeking profit were not deterred from trading with the British Isles, and the amount of 
tonnage available to the Entente rose, not fell, during this period.21
The Impact of German U-boats on Neutral Shipping
The perhaps inevitable incidents between German U-boats and neutrals occurred. 
These episodes involved Norwegian-, Swedish-, and Greek-flagged ships. A particularly 
troublesome incident involved the Dutch Katwijk, torpedoed and sunk without warning 
while en route from Rotterdam to Baltimore, Maryland, in an area designated safe by 
the Germans. This sinking involved a neutral ship trading between two neutral ports, 
which made it seem particularly outrageous to some. After a strong Dutch protest, the 
Germans offered to pay compensation—as they did in a few other cases as well—if it was 
determined that a U-boat had been involved. On 18 April 1915 the German government 
once again ordered U-boat commanders not to attack neutrals. However, after a U-boat 
was erroneously believed to have been lost through British misuse of neutral flags, those 
same U-boat commanders had received orders on 2 April no longer to surface to verify 
the identity of neutrals.
These incidents against neutral ships culminated in the sinking of the British liner 
Lusitania on 7 May 1915. This disaster resulted in the death of 128 American citizens 
among the 1,201 lost. Regardless of the legal questions involved, whether the ship had 
been carrying ammunition, or whether the Germans had warned civilians against em-
barking, the incident was a public-relations disaster. It turned American public opin-
ion against Germany. In the face of President Woodrow Wilson’s strong protests and 
demands to cease submarine attacks against commerce, Bethmann Hollweg managed to 
obtain the kaiser’s consent to order U-boat commanders not to attack large passenger 
liners even if they flew the enemy flag. This sharpened the division between the civilian 
government and the naval leaders and led Tirpitz and the chief of the Admiralty Staff 
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to attempt to resign. Tirpitz’s resignation was not accepted, but that of the chief of the 
Admiralty Staff was.22
After these new restrictions were adopted, the amount of tonnage sunk dipped slightly 
for two months but then climbed above pre-restriction levels, reaching 182,772 tons in 
August and 136,048 tons in September. The Germans were able to keep a larger number 
of U-boats at sea. They commissioned fifteen U-boats in this period, ten of them UC-
class coastal minelayers. This offset the ten U-boats lost during this period, as well as 
two provided to Austria. Furthermore, the prohibition against sinking ships without 
warning and the conduct of war under “cruiser” or “prize” rules were less problem-
atic than they might have seemed, for U-boats could carry only a limited number of 
expensive torpedoes and U-boat commanders naturally preferred to sink ships by other 
means, notably gunfire or explosive charges. Moreover, the commodities essential for 
British life were usually carried on freighters, not large passenger liners. The danger to 
merchant seamen did not create as much of a public-relations problem as the threat to 
women and children.
The Introduction of the Q-ship
German U-boat commanders adjusted quickly to these changing legal definitions. How-
ever, as the war progressed the nature of submarine warfare made adherence to cruiser 
rules difficult. Though the British and French still had few really effective antisubma-
rine weapons, one that showed promise was the Q-ship, a ship disguised as a harmless 
steamer or sailing vessel that would attempt to lure a U-boat close enough to destroy it 
with concealed weapons. The Q-ship became a diminishing asset as the Germans grew 
wary after a few successes in the summer of 1915; nevertheless, it made plain the fact 
that if a submarine conducted guerre de course under cruiser rules it lost its greatest as-
set, its invisibility, and thereby greatly increased its vulnerability.
Completely by coincidence, on 19 August 1915 two episodes gave each side its own 
grounds to charge the enemy with a war atrocity. A number of German sailors from the 
U-boat U.27 (which was itself sunk the same day, completely legitimately, by the Q-ship 
Baralong) were killed under questionable circumstances during the retaking of a steam-
er that their boat had previously stopped. Any potential German propaganda advantage 
from this incident was canceled, however, by the sinking without warning that day of 
the White Star liner Arabic, with the loss of two American lives, in an apparent violation 
of earlier German assurances to President Wilson.
German and American relations reached another crisis point, and so too did divisions 
within the German government. Naval leaders were embittered at the restrictions placed 
on U-boat operations, but Bethmann Hollweg was anxious to avoid a break with the 
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United States. He was supported by the chief of the German General Staff, Erich von 
Falkenhayn, though Falkenhayn was more concerned about the Netherlands being 
drawn into the war than the United States. At this time Bulgaria was on the verge of 
joining the Central Powers, and Falkenhayn anticipated a campaign in the Balkans, 
which would mean great difficulty in concentrating enough troops to counter any 
Dutch intervention.23
Once again the chancellor and the army prevailed. The kaiser ordered that even small 
passenger liners should not be sunk without warning, and he insisted on provision for 
the safety of passengers and crews. Shortly afterward, the kaiser also ordered that U-
boats were not to be stationed in the western approaches to the British Isles, where the 
worst incidents had taken place. U-boats would instead concentrate in the North Sea, 
working under cruiser rules. His decision marked the effective end of the first subma-
rine campaign. The acrimony in the navy against this decision was great enough to 
bring about the replacement of the chief of the Admiralty Staff by Adm. Henning von 
Holtzendorff, an opponent of Tirpitz. The latter resigned for a second time, and though 
his resignation was again not accepted, he was relegated to mere administrative duties 
rather than advisory status. Outside of the navy, however, Tirpitz’s threat of resigna-
tion generated what has been described as “a wave of support” for him as a symbol of 
Germany’s drive for victory.24
A Last-Ditch Return to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare
What had the first submarine campaign achieved? From August 1914 to September 1915 
1,294,000 tons had been sunk, and probably only a state insurance scheme spreading 
the risks among individual companies and owners prevented a paralysis of British trade. 
However, new construction had added 1,233,000 tons of shipping, and the capture or 
detention of enemy ships had added a further 682,000 tons. The percentage of loss com-
pared to the total volume of trade was small, less than that inflicted by privateers during 
the Napoleonic Wars.
Over a longer period of time, however, this situation might have changed. After the 
one-time gain represented by captures, shipping was likely to be a diminishing asset, 
with losses exceeding gains, as demonstrated by the final months of the campaign. In 
addition, the growing need for shipping caused by overseas campaigns in the eastern 
Mediterranean or Mesopotamia would heighten the problem. Furthermore, the British 
practice of devoting more resources to naval than to merchant-ship construction and re-
pair exacerbated this problem, along with potential shortages of material and manpower 
in the yards. Therefore, the final verdict on the submarine guerre de course remains in 
doubt.25
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Over the course of 1915 the submarine guerre de course opened a new area of operations 
in the Mediterranean.26 Germany’s ally Austria-Hungary had successfully employed a 
small U-boat force in the defense of the Habsburgs’ Adriatic coast. However, the Austri-
ans initially had little capacity to operate outside the Adriatic. The first German U-boats 
had arrived in the theater in response to a Turkish appeal for assistance at the time of 
the allied operations against the Dardanelles. On this occasion the Germans sent two 
small, UB.1-class boats, broken down into sections, overland by rail to the Austrian 
naval base at Pola, where they were assembled by German engineers. A large U-boat 
completed the trip directly from Germany, passing undetected through the Strait of 
Gibraltar.
These German U-boats soon made their presence felt at the Dardanelles, where they 
constituted a major—but not insurmountable—problem for the British and French. The 
Germans soon assembled an additional three UB boats at Pola, transferring two to the 
Austrian navy. The German Admiralty was well aware that an important portion of 
British and French trade passed through the Mediterranean and Suez Canal. There were 
also choke points through which traffic had to pass that facilitated U-boat operations, 
which would also be somewhat easier in the autumn and winter months of bad weather 
in the Atlantic. Austrian bases at Pola, and later in the Gulf of Cattaro, closer to the 
entrance to the Adriatic, could be used by the U-boats. The Mediterranean had another 
advantage as well—fewer American ships, or American citizens traveling on allied 
ships, than elsewhere meant fewer potential diplomatic complications.
By the end of October 1915 the Germans had half a dozen large U-boats operating in the 
Mediterranean. The Germans also sent materials and German workers to Pola for the 
assembly of six U-boats of the more capable UB.II class, considered ideal for Mediter-
ranean operations. The Germans readily accepted the delay in completion of U-boats 
for northern waters that this diversion of labor and material implied. The results were 
encouraging. In November 1915, 152,882 tons were sunk, a major portion of the 167,043 
tons sunk in all theaters; although the total fell the following month, the Mediterranean 
still represented more than half of all tonnage sunk.
There was a slight inconvenience, however. Italy was already at war with Austria-
Hungary, more than a year before declaring war on Germany. Consequently, when 
operating on the surface against Italian ships, German U-boats had to fly the Austrian 
flag. This meant that when the Italian liner Ancona was sunk by a German U-boat in 
November 1915, with the loss of twenty American lives, it was Austria-Hungary that 
had to take the blame. To cover their tracks, certain German U-boats were retroactively 
added to the Austrian navy list as of the moment they passed Gibraltar.27
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In 1916, the most successful cruise by any German U-boat during the war took place in 
the Mediterranean, when Kapitänleutnant Arnauld de la Perière in U.35 sank fifty-four 
steamers and sailing craft (90,150-plus tons) from 26 July to 20 August. German U-boat 
strength in the Mediterranean continued to grow to the point where at the beginning of 
1918 it was divided into two flotillas, one at Pola and the other at Cattaro. It was, how-
ever, increasingly difficult for the Germans to maintain U-boats far from home waters, 
largely because of a shortage of skilled labor. At the beginning of 1918 a substantial 
backlog of U-boats in the Adriatic awaited refit and repair.
In northern waters, the German naval command chipped away at the restrictions on the 
use of U-boats, although the rules seemed constantly to change, reflecting diplomatic 
considerations. The spreading installation of guns on hitherto defenseless merchant 
steamers caused problems. In mid-November 1915, the small U-boats of the Flanders 
Submarine Flotilla were authorized to sink without warning all enemy freighters be-
tween Dunkirk and Le Havre, and in January 1916 U-boats were allowed to sink without 
warning armed enemy freighters in the war zone. In March this was extended to all 
enemy freighters.
The adherents of unrestricted submarine warfare gained an important supporter when 
Holtzendorff, originally brought in as chief of the Admiralty Staff to oppose Tirpitz, 
converted to the idea. He in turn converted Falkenhayn, who now doubted that the 
British could be forced out of the war by operations on land. In February 1916 Reinhard 
Scheer assumed command of the High Seas Fleet. Scheer was equally offensive minded 
and a partisan of unrestricted submarine warfare. But the wavering kaiser and hesi-
tant chancellor continued to avoid unrestricted submarine warfare while they sought 
an agreement with the United States. However, they did authorize what was termed 
“sharpened” submarine warfare—enemy merchant ships inside the war zone could be 
destroyed without warning, while those outside could be destroyed without warning 
only if armed. U-boats either inside or outside the war zone could not attack passenger 
liners while submerged, even if the ships were armed. This was far less than Tirpitz 
wanted, and this time his resignation was accepted.
The period of “sharpened” submarine warfare in March and April 1916 lasted less 
than two months before diplomatic pressure brought it to a halt. There were problems 
with the Netherlands, particularly after the sinking of the Royal Holland Lloyd liner 
Tubantia on 16 March, the largest neutral ship sunk during the war. The Germans 
did not admit responsibility, and the German envoy in The Hague tried to divert and 
frighten the Dutch by spreading a rumor the British might invade, thereby forcing the 
German army to take countermeasures.28 Shortly afterward the French cross-channel 
steamer Sussex was torpedoed; it did not sink, but American lives were lost, and frag-
ments of the torpedo belied German denials.
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President Wilson took this final incident as a challenge. On 20 April 1916 he demanded 
that German U-boats cease operating in this manner. This demand amounted to an 
ultimatum, since Wilson threatened to sever diplomatic relations. The German navy 
had no choice but to yield to the civilian members of the government, and on 24 April 
U-boats in northern waters were ordered to operate under cruiser rules, provided ships 
did not offer resistance or attempt to escape.
This concession may have involved ulterior motives. Adm. Eduard von Capelle, Tirpitz’s 
successor, apparently thinking that almost as much could be accomplished under 
cruiser rules, preferred deferring any unrestricted submarine campaign until more of 
the U-boats then under construction entered service. Scheer strongly disagreed with 
the view that prize rules could be successful, instead claiming they exposed U-boats to 
undue danger. He accordingly recalled his U-boats (except the UC-class minelayers) by 
wireless and announced the submarine guerre de course would cease. The large U-boats 
in the north would be used in support of operations by the High Seas Fleet. Scheer 
too may have had ulterior motives; his action might have been an attempt to stimulate 
on the part of German supporters of unrestricted submarine warfare a protest strong 
enough to force Bethmann Hollweg from office. His decision aroused considerable criti-
cism in the German navy.29
Under Scheer’s leadership the High Seas Fleet embarked on a period of more aggres-
sive operations that culminated in the battle of Jutland on 31 May 1916. Regardless of 
German claims of a tactical victory in that action on the basis of larger British losses, 
the strategic position of the German navy did not change. Scheer recognized this in a 
memorandum to the kaiser on 4 July admitting that even the most successful sea battle 
could not compel the British to make peace and that victory could be achieved only by 
crushing Britain’s economic life through U-boat action against British commerce.30
But in early October 1916, contrary to Scheer’s wishes, the Admiralty Staff withdrew 
the U-boats from cooperation with his fleet and resumed a submarine campaign, re-
stricted by prize rules. Although the Germans now reserved the right to sink any armed 
merchantman without warning, in fact during the closing months of 1916 only about 20 
percent of ships destroyed were sunk without warning by torpedo. The majority were 
sunk by gunfire. Overall allied losses grew as more U-boats became operational, yet 
at the end of 1916 the British merchant marine remained at 94 percent of its size at the 
beginning of the war. No quick German victory was in sight.31
In a famous memorandum of 22 December 1916, Holtzendorff summarized the argu-
ment for unrestricted submarine warfare. Data for the memorandum had been com-
piled by the Admiralty Staff, including the reserve officers Dr. Richard Fuss, a banker, 
and Dr. Hermann Levy, a professor of economics at Heidelberg. These staff members 
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estimated that unrestricted submarine warfare would force Britain to make peace in five 
months. They based these calculations on British requirements for imports, estimated 
shipping available after worldwide commitments (minus the estimated six hundred 
thousand tons per month that unrestricted U-boats would sink), and the terror this 
would inspire in neutrals. No possible American intervention would be effective during 
this period, nor would shipping be available to bring American troops to Europe.32
There were, as events would later show, a number of questionable assumptions in this 
argument.33 But the preponderance of forces within the German government, including 
the all-powerful chief of the General Staff, Paul von Hindenburg, now sided with pro-
ponents of unrestricted submarine warfare. On 9 January 1917 the decision was taken to 
commence unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February.34
What resources were available to the German navy for submarine warfare at this time? 
On 1 February 1917 the Germans had 105 U-boats—sixty-nine on the North Sea or 
Flanders coast, twenty-three in the Mediterranean, and the remainder in the Baltic or 
at Constantinople. New construction more than offset losses, and in the second half of 
the year U-boat strength did not fall below 120.35 German attempts to increase the size 
of the U-boat fleet had been plagued by problems arising from the rapid expansion of 
German yards after the start of the war, the inexperience of subcontractors supplying 
engines, and a general shortage of trained labor after the mobilization of many experi-
enced workers. Delays were frequent, and there was a tendency to favor smaller, albeit 
improved UB.III and UC boats, with their shorter construction time, over the larger and 
more complex craft, which might not be finished before the end of the war. The navy 
won concessions from the high command, which agreed to provide the names of skilled 
workers now eligible for potential release from the army and granted the navy priority 
in the transport of critical raw materials and components for U-boat construction. In 
February the navy contracted for fifty-one U-boats (mostly UB.IIIs) and, as hopes for a 
quick end to the war faded, another ninety-five at the end of June. In August the Reichs-
marineamt suspended work on large warships and gave U-boat construction priority 
even over work on torpedo boats.36
The predictable incidents involving U.S. ships and American citizens occurred after the 
reintroduction of unrestricted submarine warfare, and these incidents led inexorably 
to the American declaration of war against Germany on 6 April 1917. Would U-boat 
operations force Britain out of the war before American participation had any effect? 
Failing that, would they prevent substantial American aid from crossing the ocean? At 
first the U-boats achieved spectacular success, and shipping losses jumped from 328,391 
tons in January 1917 to 860,334 in April. The world’s shipping tonnage was reduced by 
over two million tons, almost 1.25 million tons of which was British. New construction 
or transfer of ships from foreign flags could in no way compensate, and the predictions 
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of Holtzendorff and the U-boat enthusiasts—Britain forced to make peace by Novem-
ber—seemed likely to be fulfilled.37
But this did not happen, of course. Faced with a new crisis, the British adopted a series 
of antisubmarine measures, including the gradual extension of a convoy system that 
blunted the German threat. Shipping losses soon began to decline. There may have been 
momentary spikes, but the long-term trend was downward. Losses fell from their April 
peak to 411,766 tons by December 1917. Losses were still painful, however, and British 
imports in 1917 fell by 20 percent from those of 1916, and strict rationing and control 
of nonessentials remained in force.38 But the situation improved in 1918, with losses to 
U-boats down to 171,972 tons in September and 116,237 in October.39
Meanwhile, Entente countermeasures claimed more U-boats. The Germans began 
to feel the loss of experienced commanders, although the Admiralty Staff rejected a 
proposal to have wireless-equipped U-boats coordinate the attacks of other submarines, 
a forerunner of the World War II “wolf pack” system.40 The Germans tried instead, at 
the end of 1917, to strengthen their effort with an expanded 1919 building program of 
120 U-boats, but none were finished by the end of the war. In 1918 Admiral Scheer, now 
head of the navy, had even more grandiose plans for mass production, with 333 U-boats 
to be delivered in 1919 and a total of 405 to be ready in 1920.41 It is questionable how 
realistic these plans were.
Conclusions
The worsening situation of the army, joined with domestic disturbances, compelled the 
Germans to sign an armistice on 11 November 1918. The submarine guerre de course, al-
though close to achieving success for a few months in 1917, had ultimately failed to drive 
Britain out of the war or prevent massive American assistance from reaching European 
waters in 1918.
This experience raises several intriguing questions. Would the Germans have succeeded 
if they had begun and maintained without interruption their unrestricted warfare ear-
lier in the war, coupled with the ambitious U-boat construction program they adopted 
only later, when it was already too late? Would adoption of an early form of coordinated 
U-boat attack have altered the situation? Perhaps.
On the other hand, would earlier adoption of the antisubmarine measures eventually 
used by the Entente have prevented the U-boat menace from ever reaching the pro-
portions it did? These questions can never be answered. Regardless, in the long run 
“Handelskrieg mit U-Booten” was a failure.
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The Anglo-American Naval Checkmate of 
Germany’s Guerre de Course, 1917–1918
KENNETH J.  HAGAN AND MICHAEL T.  MCMASTER
By January 1917 the United States had spent almost two and a half years attempting to 
maintain a policy of qualified neutrality toward the two warring blocs in the stalemated 
war in Europe. One major obstacle to declaring neutrality was the growth of North 
America’s highly lucrative transatlantic trade in foodstuffs and war materiel with Brit-
ain and France, leaders of the Triple Entente. Commercial and financial relations with 
Germany, the principal power in the opposing Triple Alliance, simultaneously withered, 
because the Royal Navy effectively closed hostile ports on the Continent. The German 
navy periodically struck out against this lack of economic neutrality in the only way it 
could—with unrestricted submarine attacks against allied and neutral shipping.
President Woodrow Wilson’s diplomatic protests turned back the U-boats in 1915 and 
1916, but in January 1917 overly confident German naval officers persuaded the govern-
ment of Kaiser Wilhelm II that unrestricted U-boat attacks on heavily loaded transat-
lantic cargo ships, which were flooding Britain with American war munitions and food, 
could drive the United Kingdom out of the war within six months. According to this 
calculation, the United States would enter the war but mobilization would take so long 
that American military and naval participation could not alter the outcome.
On 31 January 1917, Berlin announced that starting the next day German U-boats 
would, without warning, attack and sink all enemy and neutral vessels found in or near 
British waters. Wilson was incensed. He ordered the severance of diplomatic relations 
with Germany and waited anxiously for the toll of sunken ships to mount. He also 
ordered U.S. Navy officers—first Rear Adm. William S. Sims and somewhat later Rear 
Adm. Hugh Rodman—to join their British counterparts in developing combined strate-
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Birth of a Naval Coalition
Germany’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare transformed Rear Admiral 
Sims from a man with a controversial career into an international warrior-diplomat. 
Within two months of assuming the position of President of the Naval War College at 
Newport, Rhode Island, he received a telephone call from Washington ordering him to 
report at once to the Navy Department. There he learned that in a cable dated 23 March 
1917 the staunchly pro-British American ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, 
had requested the immediate dispatch of “an Admiral of our own Navy who will bring 
our Navy’s plans and inquiries.” Page explained the benefits that would accrue to the 
United States: “The coming of such an officer of high rank would be regarded as a com-
pliment and he would have all doors opened to him.”1 The ambassador further confided, 
“I know personally and informally that they hope for the establishment of full and frank 
naval interchange of information and cooperation.” 2
President Wilson had by this point decided to declare war on Germany. He informed 
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, “The main thing is no doubt to get into im-
mediate communication with the Admiralty on the other side (through confidential 
channels until the Congress has acted) and work out the scheme of cooperation.”3 By 
31 March 1917 Sims was under way on the fast passenger liner New York, traveling in-
cognito in civilian clothes with a single aide, Cdr. John V. Babcock. While he was at sea, 
Congress on 6 April declared war against Germany. Sims now represented a belligerent 
power, a de facto ally of Great Britain.
The collective experiences of Admiral Sims served to prepare him well for the posi-
tion he was now to fulfill. For almost two decades he had been closely acquainted with 
leading figures of the Royal Navy. In 1901, in the British crown colony of Hong Kong, 
Lieutenant Sims had met Percy Scott, the Royal Navy’s leading specialist in gunnery 
and ordnance. In his memoir Scott would praise Sims as instrumental in the U.S. Navy’s 
“wonderful strides in perfecting their shooting.” 4 In 1906, as a lieutenant commander 
with navy-wide responsibility for improving the gunnery of American warships, he had 
been granted an informal preview inspection of the radically new Dreadnought as it was 
nearing completion. He was then so well-known and highly respected by senior officers 
of the Royal Navy that, on Christmas Day, First Sea Lord John Fisher and his family 
hosted Sims at an early-afternoon luncheon in their home. The hospitality was especial-
ly notable considering that Fisher was the preeminent First Sea Lord of the Edwardian 
era (1901–10). During the Christmas afternoon en famille, Fisher praised Sims for his 
technical vision and for boldly advocating the all-big-gun battleship, of which Dread-
nought was the first iteration.5
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Four years later, on 3 December 1910, Sims, now a commander, gave a speech in the 
London Guildhall that concluded, “If the time ever comes when the British Empire 
is seriously menaced by an external enemy, it is my opinion that you may count upon 
every man, every dollar, and every drop of blood of your kindred across the seas.” 6 The 
assemblage roared its approval as Sims proposed three cheers: “For the King, the British 
people, and the integrity of the British Empire.”7
President William Howard Taft had been less than enthusiastic, and in January 1911 he 
issued a public reprimand of Sims.8 Neither was Josephus Daniels a particular friend of 
Great Britain. He recalled after World War I that Sims “had been selected in spite of and 
not because of the Guildhall speech.”9 Sims might dispute Daniels’s interpretation of 
why he was chosen, but it is undeniable that the Guildhall speech of 1910 had endeared 
him to the British public as a popular figure and made him “the American Naval Officer 
most widely known to the British Navy.”10 The irony was not lost on Taft: “The ways of 
history are strange. When I was President I reprimanded an officer for saying exactly 
what he is doing now.”11
Sims was the perfect choice to go to London. On 10 April 1917 he greeted an old com-
rade, Adm. John Jellicoe, now the First Sea Lord. Sims had first met Jellicoe in 1901 in 
China, where according to Sims their common interest in ordnance and gunnery “had 
brought us together and made us friends.”12 They had renewed their friendship in 1906, 
during Sims’s visit to England to inspect Dreadnought, informally and unofficially. 
Their meeting on 10 April was a sobering experience for Sims, who had arrived in Eng-
land confident that the British had the war at sea well in hand. On the contrary, Jellicoe 
somberly informed him, German U-boats were ravaging British and neutral shipping 
at such a rate that the allied powers unquestionably would lose the war for want of food 
and materiel, possibly as early as August 1917, certainly by October. Sims later remem-
bered that he had asked Jellicoe, “Is there no solution for the problem?” The First Sea 
Lord had replied, “Absolutely none that we can see now.”13 Sims was dumbfounded: “I 
was fairly astounded; for I had never imagined anything so terrible.” He realized, “The 
thing must be stopped.”14
By the next morning Sims was well aware of the threat that the combined forces would 
be facing. He later recalled, “This morning at 10:30 I had another conference with 
Admiral Jellicoe, and Rear Admiral Sir Dudley R. S. de Chair, who is to be my ‘oppo-
site number’ in Washington. . . . It was most satisfactory. We all agreed perfectly as to 
what should be done.”15 Never before had a senior officer of the Royal Navy sought the 
help of the U.S. Navy in a major war at sea; never before had the U.S. and British navies 
been formally and informally linked at the top levels of command and strategy mak-
ing. Sims’s friendship with Jellicoe was a key ingredient in this success. Throughout the 
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remainder of the war he often met with him and occasionally also with Adm. Sir David 
Beatty, commander in chief of the Grand Fleet.16
By 30 April, with Sims’s encouragement, the sea lords had agreed to experiment with de-
stroyer escorts of convoys “as the general plan of campaign.”17 Washington proved more 
difficult to convince. For at least four months American naval strategy in World War 
I was the subject of an acrimonious transatlantic debate. From London, Sims and Page 
beseeched Washington to send every seaworthy destroyer to escort convoys of merchant 
vessels through U-boat-infested waters off the English coast. Wilson and Daniels agreed 
that the submarine constituted the chief threat to the allied cause, but they seriously 
doubted that the peril facing Great Britain was quite as extreme as portrayed by Ambas-
sador Page and Admiral Sims, both of whom they regarded as too Anglophilic. What fi-
nally won over Wilson and Daniels was the accumulating documentation of the gradual 
but inexorable reduction in the monthly rate of U-boat sinkings of merchant ships as the 
Admiralty and Sims expanded the convoy system. In the summer of 1917 the admin-
istration finally agreed to curtail the capital-ship construction program authorized in 
1916 and put the full weight of the American naval shipbuilding industry behind the 
construction of convoy escorts.
Sims divided most of his days and nights among his London residence in the Carlton 
Hotel, the Admiralty, and his own headquarters at the American embassy in Grosvenor 
Square. But because of his operational responsibilities he also spent time at the Royal 
Navy base in Queenstown (now Cobh), Ireland. Sims’s operational authority had been 
spelled out by the U.S. Navy Department in a telegram of 29 April from the Secre-
tary of the Navy. With the characteristic disdain for grammar and syntax (in favor of 
telegraphic brevity) typical of such messages, it stated: “Rear Admiral Sims detached 
all duty Newport assume command all United States destroyers operating from Brit-
ish bases including tenders and auxiliaries there to be sent later.” Sims subsequently 
explained, “Putting me in command of the destroyers that are sent over here means 
not that I will handle them at sea but that I will have general control of their operations 
while carrying out my present duties in connection with the admiralty.”18 As a com-
mander of operating ships, the admiral enjoyed the perquisite of a flagship, in this case 
USS Melville, a destroyer tender, which remained moored throughout the war at the 
base in Queenstown.
Given the competing demands on Sims’s time—his planning and diplomatic duties with 
the Admiralty in London and the complexities of operating squadrons of destroyers in 
combat—he made the remarkable decision to put the U.S. ships under the operational 
control of Vice Adm. Sir Lewis Bayly, commanding in Queenstown. This subordination 
of operational units of the U.S. Navy to the Royal Navy was historically unprecedent-
ed, and it ensured that the forces fighting the German U-boat threat would be most 
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efficiently used. At the time, Sims said his revolutionary action “will clear away many 
misunderstandings and considerable friction. I think it is now arranged so that there 
will be complete cooperation between headquarters and those in the ‘field.’”19
Sims’s Partnership with Bayly
Sims had been drawn to Queenstown because it was home for the American destroyers 
that escorted cargo vessels and troopships on the last legs of their journeys from New 
York or Hampton Roads to their destinations in southern England. Many of the destroy-
er skippers had served under Sims when he commanded the Torpedo Flotilla, Atlantic 
Fleet, from 1913 to 1915. But in a very short time the greatest source of Sims’s personal 
attraction to Queenstown became the British commander, Admiral Bayly, whom the 
British strategist Sir Julian Corbett considered “the father of destroyer tactics and 
organization.” 20 The less awestruck and more irreverent American sailors nicknamed 
the British sea dog “Old Frozen Face.” Figuratively, they first fell under his gaze when 
Cdr. Joseph K. Taussig led the first American destroyer flotilla into Queenstown Harbor 
on 4 May 1917. He immediately called on Bayly, who asked when he would be ready 
for combat patrols. Taussig replied, “I shall be ready when fueled.” He required neither 
repairs nor supplies. Bayly ordered, “You will take four days’ rest. Good morning.”21 No 
wonder Bayly later said of Taussig’s arrival—and of the joint patrols that immediately 
began—that they had made “all the difference” to the success of the convoys.22
The relationship between the two flag officers was as remarkable for its personal inti-
macy as it was for its strategic success. In May and June 1917 Bayly and Sims, who was 
promoted to vice admiral on 26 May, conspired to arrange for Sims to assume tempo-
rary operational command of the British and American destroyers operating out of 
Queenstown. The ostensible reason was Bayly’s need for a week of rest and recuperation. 
The British admiral advised Sims to broach the idea with the First Sea Lord and if he 
approved, “we will arrange it between us without any frills, and if the Admiralty during 
my absence ‘regret that you should have [done something other than what had been 
done],’ I will take the blame. If they give you a DSO [Distinguished Service Order] keep 
it.” 23 Sims rather disingenuously said the offer was the surprise of his life, but he was 
honest about feeling it to be a great “honour.” 24 He leapt at the opportunity.
The tone of camaraderie was further exhibited when on 18 July 1917 Sims instantly 
agreed to the wisdom of a suggestion by Bayly that Capt. Joel Roberts Poinsett Pringle—
the commanding officer of Sims’s flagship, Melville, and also his chief of staff in Ire-
land—be assigned additional duty as a formal member of Bayly’s staff. Many years later, 
Bayly reminisced about Pringle’s superb performance in a billet without antecedent: “At 
my request, Captain Pringle’s name was entered in the English Navy List—the first time 
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that a foreign naval officer had ever appeared there as serving on a British Admiral’s 
staff in time of war.” 25
The Sims-Bayly cooperation checked the U-boat attacks in the Atlantic. When Sims 
first arrived in London, as has been seen, Admiral Jellicoe predicted that the U-boats 
would strangle Britain through economic warfare at sea. This did not happen. By 
December 1917 the Entente was losing a more sustainable 350,000 tons of shipping per 
month, down from 900,000 in April. In October 1918, the month before the war ended, 
the U-boats could sink no more than 112,427 tons. This massive reduction in loss, with 
the corollary monthly increase in tonnage of materiel shipped from the United States, 
was accomplished between May 1917 and November 1918 by 1,500 convoys of eighteen 
thousand ships. The U.S. Navy provided almost 30 percent of the escorting destroyers in 
British waters, the Royal Navy just over 70 percent.
The American admiral repeatedly cited the Anglo-American disparity in combatant 
vessels to justify the subordination of his destroyers to the British operational com-
mander. His was a perfectly defensible stance, but at the same time he undercut himself 
with official Washington by appearing unnecessarily sycophantic in his relations with 
the Admiralty. In early 1918 the British offered him honorary membership on the 
Board of Admiralty, an unprecedented distinction that would have made him privy to 
the innermost deliberations of the Royal Navy’s central headquarters. Daniels forbade 
acceptance, saying later, “I regarded it as rather a love of glitter and foreign recognition 
and honor than anything else.”2 6
Perhaps shown up by the generous British treatment of Sims, however, the U.S. Navy 
Department did refrain from taking any further action inimical to its London com-
mander for the rest of the war. In December 1918 it even promoted him to the rank of 
full—that is, four-star—admiral. It was a bittersweet, ephemeral reward for Sims. Once 
he left the London command he had to revert to two-star rank, the highest permanent 
grade in the U.S. Navy at the time.27
American-British Cooperation in the North Sea
While Sims and Bayly were prosecuting the transatlantic naval war, two other Brit-
ish and American admirals joined forces to contain the German High Seas Fleet, not 
incidentally thwarting in the process the German U-boats and surface raiders that 
were preying on the vital maritime supply route from Norway to Britain and France. 
The Briton was Admiral Beatty, Jellicoe’s successor as commander in chief of the Royal 
Navy’s Grand Fleet, which had blockaded the Germans in their home ports since the 
battle of Jutland of May–June 1916. The American was Rear Adm. Hugh Rodman, com-
mander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet’s Battleship Division 9. Four dreadnoughts composed 
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the division: New York, Florida, Delaware, and Wyoming. They were the best coal burn-
ers in the U.S. battle fleet, and they had been chosen for that reason. Newer, oil-burning 
American dreadnoughts would have increased the overall thirst for scarce fuel oil once 
they reached their anchorages in Scapa Flow, but by contrast the British base had stored 
almost unlimited amounts of coal.
Rodman was a classmate of Sims from the small Naval Academy class of 1880, only four 
members of which reached flag rank. As cadet-midshipmen the two men had not been 
close friends. After graduation they had independently made the jolting transforma-
tion from sailors of the old navy into masters of the science and art of commanding the 
revolutionary all-steam warships of the new American navy, embodiments of Alfred T. 
Mahan’s doctrine of “seapower.” The personalities of Sims and Rodman were as differ-
ent as dreadnoughts were from wooden men-of-war. Sims had made his reputation as 
an outspoken critic of the status quo and a proponent of new technologies, especially 
in gunnery. Rodman’s reputation rested on his love of the sea, masterful ship handling, 
solicitous grooming of his junior officers, and—not least—his propensity to spin yarns 
for the bewitchment of all around him.28
Washington’s decision to send American battleships to the Grand Fleet had been even 
more protracted than that to deploy substantial numbers of convoy escorts to Queens-
town. The anguish over dispatching one of the four divisions of the U.S. battle fleet was 
particularly severe because the deployment directly challenged the prevailing strategic 
doctrine of the U.S. Navy, based on the lectures and writings of Mahan. Mahan’s influ-
ence, first felt when he had been a professor at the Naval War College in the late 1880s, 
continued with the publication of his globally influential book The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History, 1660–1783. More than any other individual in or out of the service, 
Mahan was responsible for the navy’s repudiation of its historical doctrine of guerre de 
course and coastal defense and its adoption of the neo-Nelsonian concept of command-
ing the seas with fleets of battleships prepared—even anxious—to engage similarly 
configured and deployed enemy battle fleets.
Rear Adm. William T. Sampson’s victory over the Spanish at Santiago de Cuba in July 
1898 was purposefully interpreted as an exemplar of Mahan’s doctrine. In the next 
decade the United States added new and improved battleships and heavy cruisers to 
its battle fleet at the rate of as many as two per year. At the same time, the new naval-
ists of Mahanian persuasion prepared strategic plans for fighting the two most likely 
enemies—imperial Japan (“Orange”) and imperial Germany (“Black”). The core of the 
American operational concepts can be stated succinctly. First, be prepared at any time 
to defeat the enemy’s approaching battle f leet in a massive and decisive sea battle, 
preferably annihilating the opponent’s fleet, as happened to the Franco-Spanish fleet 
that had had the temerity to challenge Horatio Nelson at the battle of Trafalgar on 
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21 October 1805. Second, and accordingly, never under any circumstances dilute the 
power of the battle fleet by dividing it prior to war.
This thoroughly embedded doctrine thwarted all attempts to dispatch a number of U.S. 
battleships to the war zone during the first eight months of American belligerency. In 
July 1917, after first obtaining the endorsement of Admiral Sims, Admiral Jellicoe, the 
First Sea Lord, requested a detachment of four American coal-burning dreadnoughts. 
The American battlewagons would strengthen the Grand Fleet in its blockade of the 
German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea. They also would permit the British to retire 
some of their predreadnoughts, thereby freeing up crews to man 119 new antisubmarine 
destroyers under construction in British yards.29
Adm. Henry T. Mayo, commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and the Chief of 
Naval Operations, William S. Benson, would have none of it. The two most senior of-
ficers in the U.S. Navy considered the Royal Navy to be insufficiently aggressive, and 
they regarded Sims as a supine instrument of the Admiralty. Of at least equal weight in 
the decision was their firm Mahanian conviction that they could not in good conscience 
fragment the battle fleet by detaching a quarter of its ships. To do so would emasculate 
the fleet should the United States find itself in a war with Japan, always a feared pos-
sibility given the perpetual tension over the American forward political and territorial 
presence in the Philippine Islands. The governing “Plan Orange” dictated that such a 
war was to be decided by an Armageddon fought in the Pacific by opposing battle fleets.
Four months passed before Benson changed his mind. Between July and November 1917 
he was subjected to constant lobbying by Capt. William Veazie Pratt, Assistant Chief of 
Naval Operations and a cohort of Sims, and by the popular American novelist Winston 
Churchill. The skeptical Admiral Mayo attended an Inter-Allied Naval Conference in 
London on 4–5 September and was impressed with Sims and his arguments regard-
ing the battleships, but Benson held firm in his opposition. Finally, President Wilson 
attached Benson as the naval representative to a delegation to Britain, a group with 
broad investigatory powers and headed by the president’s most trusted intimate, Col. 
Edward M. House.
The Americans arrived in Britain on 7 November 1917. Within three days Benson had 
capitulated to the Sims-Jellicoe proposition that four American battleships be attached 
to the Grand Fleet. On 10 November the Chief of Naval Operations fired off a somewhat 
incoherent cable advising Daniels to modify the sacrosanct Mahanian doctrine: “The 
principle not to divide the fleet does not apply to this matter in my opinion. It would 
apply to the portion of the fleet necessarily kept in American waters by logistical con-
siderations, rather than to a division to join the Grand Fleet.” 30 For the first time, four 
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principal American warships were to be integrated, as subordinate units, into a fleet 
commanded by an officer of the Royal Navy, the historical nemesis of the U.S. Navy.
Three days after Benson cabled Washington, Daniels appointed Rodman as commander 
of Battleship Division 9. Wasting no time, Rodman led his four coal burners to sea on 
25 November. After an extremely rough passage across the gale-swept, wintry Atlan-
tic, New York, Florida, Delaware, and Wyoming steamed into the massive base of the 
British Grand Fleet in the roadstead of Scapa Flow, in the Orkney Islands. The date was 
7 December 1917, and that day’s marriage of American and British capital fleets lasted to 
the end of World War I in November 1918. Following a series of postwar squabbles, the 
vows were to be renewed in 1939 and honored throughout World War II and the Cold 
War. The union persists in intimate amicability almost a century after Admiral Beatty 
first spied Hugh Rodman’s flagship New York entering Scapa Flow.
Rodman Subordinates Himself to Beatty
As soon as Rodman arrived, he called on Beatty aboard his flagship, Queen Elizabeth. 
Rodman offered to place his four battleships under the operational command of the 
Royal Navy. This historic subordination was a voluntary act on the part of Rodman: “I 
realized that the British fleet had three years of actual warfare and knew the game from 
the ground floor up; that . . . there would be a great deal to learn practically.” He could 
not conceive of harmonious cooperation if there were “two independent commands in 
one force . . . and [therefore] the only logical course was to amalgamate our ships and 
serve under the command of the British commander-in-chief.” 31
The American battleship division became the 6th Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet, 
constituting about 12 percent of the fleet’s capital ships.32 In administrative matters 
Rodman at least nominally reported to Sims in London, but he enjoyed direct access to 
the U.S. Navy Department in the form of weekly reports he sent to Secretary of the Navy 
Daniels.33 The multilinear network did not correspond to the navy’s ideal of straight-
line command responsibility; it had been cobbled together because of disagreements 
between strong personalities on how to conduct the naval war.
For fighting purposes the chain of command was clear and direct—Beatty was Rod-
man’s immediate operational commander and would remain so until the war’s end. This 
integration and subordination exceeded that of Sims’s relationship with Bayly, where the 
arrangement was more one of partnership than abdication of independent command 
authority. Moreover, Rodman gave Beatty command of four of the major warships of the 
U.S. battle fleet, not simply destroyers and other escort vessels. The symbolism of Rod-
man’s historic action was unmistakable.
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The American admiral was adamant that this was in fact the chain of command: “Every 
movement order to my command that had any relation to hostilities that I received dur-
ing the war after joining the Grand Fleet, emanated from Admiral Beatty and not from 
our liaison officer in London [Sims] or anybody else.”34 His admiration for Beatty was 
unbounded, and by the end of the war his Anglophilia at least matched that for which 
Sims had become notorious. Rodman readily stated, “I am free to admit that next to 
my own country and countrymen I admire the British more than any others on earth.” 
It became his fervent hope and prophecy “that the feeling of comradeship and broth-
erhood that was engendered in the Grand Fleet will last for many years, and that our 
respective nations will stand together in the future as they did in the World War.” 35
Three days after steaming into Scapa Flow, Rodman led his newly rechristened 6th 
Battle Squadron on a battle patrol in company with the rest of the Grand Fleet. The im-
mediate matters at hand were tactical: mastering the British codes of signaling, learn-
ing to take and keep station as one wing of the Grand Fleet, and measuring American 
accuracy in gunfire by British standards.36 The alien codes were quickly learned, and 
station keeping came easily to Rodman and his experienced captains, but their ships’ 
gunnery fell short of the expected standards of excellence. In early March 1918 Rod-
man bemoaned the poor scores in gunnery practice of one of his battleships. “In spite 
of her four years commission,” he wrote somewhat awkwardly to the Secretary of the 
Navy, and the fact “that she has now the [American] gunnery trophy, and was flying the 
efficiency pennant, she was not ready to fire under war conditions.” 37 He criticized the 
U.S. Navy’s system of emphasizing good scores compiled for salvos against fixed targets 
as inferior to the British system of firing against simulations of moving ships, although 
the fixed-target system had been refined in the prewar years by his Academy classmate, 
William S. Sims.
On the strategic level Rodman always kept in sight what he considered to be the crucial 
importance of the ability of the Grand Fleet to maintain its station in the North Sea 
until “the surrender of the whole German fleet.” 38 By containing the High Seas Fleet, the 
Grand Fleet prevented it from marauding throughout the North Sea and the Atlantic 
approaches to England and France. In this generalized sense, therefore, Rodman and 
Beatty indirectly guarded shipments of men and cargo. In addition, Beatty regularly 
deployed some of his smaller ships expressly for antisubmarine actions.
When Rodman’s squadron arrived, convoys of essential materiel from Scandinavia 
faced a new and more troubling menace—German surface raiders. The Admiralty’s 
failure to halt the severe threat to shipping posed by German light cruisers and destroy-
ers had contributed to the downfall of Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. Beatty cannily took 
the hint. In January 1918 he began to deploy battleships and other heavy warships to 
shield convoys originating in Norway from attacks by the German surface raiders. On 
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5 February, with elegantly understated British condescension, he confided to his wife, 
“I am sending old Rodman out on an operation of his own, which pleases him and gives 
them [the American sailors] an idea that they are really taking part in the war. I trust 
they will come to no harm.” 39 They did not.
The 6th Battle Squadron stood out from Scapa Flow for its first independent opera-
tional patrol on 6 February. Rodman was accompanied by the British 3rd Light Cruiser 
Squadron and its protective destroyers. In another precedent-shattering subordination 
of one navy’s capital ships to another’s, an act that showed a keen sense for diplomacy, 
Beatty had placed both units under American command. Rodman’s flotilla picked up 
an outbound convoy of cargo vessels, escorted it to Norwegian waters, loitered offshore, 
picked up an inbound convoy of about thirty ships, shepherded it to British waters, 
and reentered Scapa Flow on 10 February. No surface raiders were encountered, but 
jumpy lookouts spotted several submarine periscopes or conning towers and wakes, 
which were diligently attacked, with no confirmed hits. Rodman, Beatty, and the U.S. 
Navy Department accepted the sightings as genuine, but the shrewd and skeptical Capt. 
Henry A. Wiley, commanding officer of Wyoming, placed the blame on the lookouts’ in-
experience and on porpoises “bobbing up and down.” 40 Seasoning in subsequent patrols 
sharpened the eyesight of the American spotters.
The independent and combined operations to protect the Norwegian convoys continued 
until late April, when Adm. Reinhard Scheer’s entire High Seas Fleet finally ventured 
out to intercept a convoy and annihilate its protectors. The Germans miscalculated the 
date of the convoy’s sailing, and the battle cruiser Moltke lost a propeller and had to be 
taken under tow. Moltke’s intercepted radio signals pleading for help alerted the Grand 
Fleet, but before Beatty’s full force could confront the Germans they had fled to the 
safety of home waters.
This misadventure was the final excursion of the High Seas Fleet prior to its inglori-
ous surrender, internment, and scuttling in Scapa Flow at war’s end. Scheer’s mission 
had been to destroy the capital-ship escorts of a convoy that earlier in the war would 
have been protected by destroyers and attacked by nothing heavier than light surface 
commerce raiders. However, the Rodman-Beatty convoy screens of capital ships had 
drawn out the German battle fleet. A Mahanian battle might have ensued; the United 
States and Britain conceivably could have lost control of the North Sea as a corridor to 
the Atlantic, and then the vital transatlantic convoys of men and materiel from North 
America would have been fatally imperiled.41
Rodman astutely perceived the potential danger and expressed his alarm in a general 
report to the Secretary of the Navy on 27 April: “I am of the opinion, which is shared 
by most, if not all of the flag officers of the Grand Fleet, that there are possibilities of a 
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grave disaster to the supporting force.” 42 Made privy to the alleged danger, Sims scath-
ingly rebuked Rodman for his “lack of confidence in the ability of the Commander-
in-Chief [Beatty] and the Admiralty to handle the fleet with safety to its detachment.” 
He archly dismissed Rodman’s concerns: “the danger which you have assumed has not 
at any time existed.” 43 Sims forwarded his critical evaluation of the battle squadron’s 
commander to the Chief of Naval Operations, Benson, noting sharply that “Rodman has 
been doing excellent work with the fleet but he is rather impulsive and liable to ‘slop 
over’ at times.” 44
From the comfort of London, Sims was disparaging a senior commanding officer who 
had been in combat at sea for five continuous months. In June the dispute between 
Rodman and Sims evaporated with the British Admiralty’s decision to discontinue the 
practice of covering the Scandinavian convoys with battleships and heavy cruisers. Only 
more expendable light cruisers would be used for that purpose.45 Thereafter, the allied 
naval strategy in the North Sea and beyond reverted to what it had been.
Throughout the rest of the war, the Grand Fleet would stand guard over the sheltered 
High Seas Fleet, while the transatlantic convoys covered by Sims and Bayly flooded 
Britain with materiel and France with American fighting men. There would never be 
an apocalyptic Mahanian battle in the Atlantic, only perpetual preparation for one. 
In its place there would be the painstaking, systematic defeat of the deadly modern 
practitioners of the ancient art of guerre de course, the U-boats of imperial Germany, a 
war-winning triumph that in the years between the two world wars would be dismissed 
as irrelevant to future planning.
Conclusions
The cooperation of Sims and Bayly and that between Rodman and Beatty protected 
the convoys of troopships carrying the balance-tipping force of two million American 
soldiers “without losing a single man.” 46 But beyond the destroyers at Queenstown and 
the battleships at Scapa Flow, Admiral Sims, Commander, United States Naval Forces 
Operating in European Waters, directly or indirectly commanded naval detachments 
of varying sizes and compositions at Murmansk, in Russia, and in Brest and elsewhere 
on the coast of France; submarine chasers stationed at Plymouth, England; an Ameri-
can naval base at the British naval bastion in Gibraltar; more submarine chasers on 
the island of Corfu; the U.S. mine force in Scotland; all U.S. naval aviation bases; and 
six U.S. Navy port offices.47 Ultimately a total of 196 officers staffed Sims’s London 
headquarters.
There had not been anything remotely approaching this scale of overseas commands 
and operations in the entire history of the U.S. Navy, and the whole complex apparatus 
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was improvised. There had been no prewar planning for cobelligerency with Great 
Britain, and as a result there had been no anticipation of this array of installations and 
operations. In a relatively brief period between April 1917 and November 1918, two Brit-
ish admirals and two American admirals had overcome their navies’ historical distrust 
of one another in order to forge a victorious Anglo-American naval alliance.
Highly personal and born in reaction to a lethal sea war of unprecedented magnitude, 
the alliance would fragment in 1919. It would lie shattered throughout the two interwar 
decades. But as soon as Great Britain went to war with Nazi Germany in September 
1939 it was reconstituted and reshaped, often under the guidance of officers who had 
served in World War I as disciples of Beatty, Rodman, Bayly, or Sims. Notable among 
the understudies was Cdr. Harold R. Stark, the personnel officer at Sims’s London head-
quarters. He became Chief of Naval Operations in 1939, and the next year he wrote the 
comprehensive plan—known as Plan Dog (the traditional naval phonetic term for the 
letter D)—for fighting Germany and Japan. In April 1942, Stark was sent to London to 
establish a naval headquarters modeled on the “London Flagship” of 1917–18.48
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Logistic Supply and Commerce War in the 
Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939
WILL ARD C.  FR ANK,  JR .
The course and outcome of the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39 largely depended on the 
supply of arms, specialists, and troops from abroad. Airplanes, tanks, and personnel 
from Italy and Germany, with major support from Moroccan troops, provided the back-
bone for the forces in service to the rebel generals. Meanwhile, aircraft, tanks, and ad-
visers for waging war on land, in the air, and at sea, mainly from the Soviet Union (the 
USSR), supported Republican militia and other forces of an emerging Popular Army, 
for which the International Brigades served as shock troops. The great majority of these 
forces came to the Iberian Peninsula by sea, a fact that gave rise to significant attempts 
to use the sea or deny its use by the naval and air forces of the Spanish belligerents and 
their international allies. The Spanish Republic, in particular, lacked the raw materials 
and workforce necessary for a war industry. In Catalonia, only forty of 246 industries 
did defense work; the rest were more engaged in the ongoing socioeconomic revolution. 
The Republic needed 150,000,000 bullets per month to wage war but produced only fif-
teen thousand. The rest had to come from abroad.1 In addition, the economic viability of 
both sides was largely determined by trade, imports to provide for domestic needs and 
exports to pay for needed foreign military aid.
The struggle for control of sea-lanes in the Spanish Civil War was deeply intertwined 
throughout with major legal issues, starting with the legal status of the participants 
and their shipping.2 The Spanish Republic in July 1936 declared the seas a war zone 
and adopted a blockade on the coasts and ports of the Nationalist enemy. Neither the 
Nationalists nor the intervening or neutral maritime nations recognized this blockade, 
which could not be made effective in the absence of a determined and strong Repub-
lican blockade by warship patrols. In time, however, Nationalist patrols mounted just 
such a determined and strong effort, producing a de facto, if never a de jure, blockade, 
particularly in the Strait of Gibraltar. Warships visited, searched, and frequently seized 
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Mine warfare, aerial bombardment, and interference within the territorial waters of 
the Spanish parties or neutral states, especially France, were special cases that recurred 
throughout the war. Attempts in May–June 1937 to give warships belonging to Britain, 
France, Italy, and Germany specific assurances of their neutrality and to provide them 
with safety zones in Spanish waters failed to gain agreement. In particular, submarine 
attacks were major issues to Britain and France, and they will be treated separately.
One of the most important legal issues was the international nonintervention system, 
with its deep roots in nineteenth-century international relations. On 15 August 1936 
Britain and France inaugurated a Europe-wide effort to contain the Spanish conflict by 
an international ban on all intervention in Spain, direct or indirect, including all war 
material, even that already under contract. The Non-Intervention Agreement (NIA) 
would come into force whenever either inaugurating power—Britain or France—and 
Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, and Portugal adhered. Language varied in many of 
the national declarations, but eventually twenty-seven states of Europe declared their 
adherence.3 This agreement eventually led to the 1937 Nyon agreement outlawing the 
use of submarines in unrestricted warfare.
International Influence in the Spanish Civil War
Soon after the Spanish Civil War broke out on 17 July 1936, foreign countries took 
sides, supporting the Republicans or the Nationalists. For their part, Britain and France 
attempted to contain the Spanish conflict, but their efforts failed to be enforced by the 
interventionist states of Italy, Germany, and Portugal, on one side, or on the other by 
the non-European states of Mexico and—for a while—the United States, and eventu-
ally the Soviet Union and its Communist International (Comintern) affiliates operating 
throughout Europe.
When immediate self-control failed, the states party to the Non-Intervention Agree-
ment formed on 9 September 1936 a Non-Intervention Committee (NIC) of European 
ambassadors in London and, on 14 September, a smaller Chairman’s Sub-Committee 
comprising the major intervening states, which traded barbed accusations of gross 
violations of the NIA. Britain and France refrained from making accusations and rather 
tried to work as smoothly as possible toward some form of a practicable noninterven-
tion scheme. Italy, Germany, and Portugal flagrantly violated the terms of their own 
declared prohibitions, even while accusing the Soviet Union of shipping military aid to 
the Spanish Republic at a stage when it was only sending nonmilitary supplies, such as 
clothing, medicine, and food.4 On 7 October 1936, and particularly on 23 October, the 
Soviet representative on the NIC announced that the Soviet Union would abide by the 
NIA only so far as other states did so as well.5 By late October, intervention with arms 
shipments to both sides was in full swing.
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Further legal problems included foreign vessels, some of which carried arms or volun-
teers, sailing in the territorial waters of member states, where attacks by submarines, 
surface warships, mines, and aircraft persisted. So did the question of whether or when 
belligerent rights might be accorded to both sides. Britain and France were concerned 
lest granting belligerent rights lead to a wider war and refrained from doing so through-
out the conflict. The League of Nations heard the Spanish Republican appeals against 
foreign intervention but referred all legal issues normally under its purview to the NIC 
for resolution.
The United States, as a non-European state, was not party to the nonintervention system 
but largely abided by its terms in separate and parallel measures. American ships did 
come under attack—the steamship Exmouth in August 1936, the destroyer Kane in 
August, and the gunboat Erie in December. The Nationalists seized the tanker Nan-
tucket Chief, which carried petroleum from the Black Sea to the Republic, only to release 
it after an American protest. As for selling arms to the belligerents in Spain, the United 
States moved to follow a separate and parallel support for the policies of Britain and 
France in applying the Non-Intervention regime in Europe. Moral persuasion prov-
ing insufficient to prevent licenses to export arms, on 8 January 1937 the United States 
made it illegal to export arms to either side in Spain, an act that appeared to be strength-
ened by an embargo law of 1 May 1937 giving the president the authority to act if the 
export of arms “would threaten or endanger the peace of the United States.” 6
Germany and Italy sent their military aid to the Nationalists openly by sea to southern 
Spanish ports as special cargoes in national merchant ships protected by their war-
ships.7 Meanwhile, Stalin hesitated to get more deeply involved than to send cargoes of 
humanitarian aid to Republican ports. On 29 September, the Politburo, with the escala-
tion of German and Italian military aid threatening to become decisive and the Non-
Intervention Agreement a dead letter, changed course and started to send military aid 
in Soviet and Spanish merchant ships. The shipments went at first openly to Alicante, 
where German warships were watching and reporting the arrival of Soviet aid, and by 
mid-October to the more secure port of Cartagena, which, as the Republic’s main naval 
base, was better defended by coastal and antiaircraft artillery and airfields.8
This prompted a Nationalist and Italo-Germanic response in the form of an Ital-
ian, German, and Nationalist commerce war against Soviet and Spanish Republican 
arms ships. Of the first twenty-nine voyages of such “Igrek” arms ships organized and 
dispatched by the Intelligence Department of the Politburo, twenty-four sailed from 
the Black Sea to Cartagena, two from Leningrad to the northern front on the Bay of 
Biscay, and three from third countries. Igreks at first sailed individually and alone, 
leading to the sinking or capture of six of the seven dispatched in December 1936. Yet by 
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6 December 1936 the Republic had received sufficient arms—including 136 aircraft, 106 
tanks, 30 armored cars, and 174 pieces of artillery—to hold Madrid.9
To pay for the Soviet arms the Republican government decreed on 13 September 1936 
that the finance minister, Juan Negrín, could dispatch Spain’s national treasure of gold 
then held in the vaults of the Bank of Spain to “wherever he considers safest.” Some gold 
had already been sent to Paris, the hub of European arms-traffic transactions.10 A sec-
ond possible alternative considered was the United States, which was in any event used 
as cover for the actual transfer to the USSR.
With Nationalist armies only twenty miles away from Madrid and pressing hard, 
Alexander Orlov, the senior operative of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs 
(NKVD) of the Soviet Union in Spain, received a telegram directly from Stalin ordering 
him secretly to send the Spanish gold to the Soviet Union, without signing any formal 
receipt. The USSR was by mid-October sending major arms shipments to the Span-
ish Republic and was in competition with Premier Francisco Largo Caballero on the 
guiding of the Republic politically. Several Soviet merchant ships were in Cartagena 
and ready after unloading arms to return home, with space for special cargoes. Stalin 
ordered Orlov to organize the transfer in Soviet merchant ships. Orlov had the gold 
brought to Cartagena, where it was temporarily stored in the Algameca munitions caves 
just outside the naval base. Sixty Republican submarine sailors were employed carrying 
the boxes of gold, from train to munitions depot to trucks, to be loaded into four Soviet 
merchant ships ready to depart from Cartagena for Odessa. From there the gold would 
be transported by special train to the State Bank in Moscow, where a receipt was prom-
ised. Commanding officers of Republican warships under sealed orders were stationed 
along the intended route to intercept any Nationalist search-and-seizure attempt.
By 6 November the four vessels, each with a portion of the treasure, had arrived in 
Odessa, where the gold was transferred to the train. Bank of Spain officials who accom-
panied the gold were put up in a hotel in Odessa but were not allowed to go home until 
the end of the war. Stalin clinched his intention by openly quoting an old Russian prov-
erb: “The Spaniards will never see their gold again, as they don’t see their own ears.” The 
gold paid for arms shipments and the expenses of Soviet military specialists serving in 
Spain. An inventory of the gold, some 510 metric tons, was finally prepared and signed 
on 5 February 1937, but without any indication of its intended use, which Orlov later 
reported as dual in nature: to safeguard the gold from Nationalist capture and to serve 
as security for Soviet arms shipments to the Republican government.
In 1937, as Soviet arms shipments reached a peak, Stalin drew on the gold as payment; 
the gold treasure was soon exhausted in the purchase of military supplies in the Soviet 
Union and elsewhere in Europe. Spaniards learned to their surprise that further aid 
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would only come on credit, a bill that the Spanish government would have to pay after 
victory had been attained. The Spaniards were in no position to dicker. After the war, 
Negrín and his sons tried to get the Soviet Union to return to the Spanish state the 
gold—which they understood had been sent for “safekeeping” to the USSR—only to be 
told that Spain actually owed the Soviet Union fifty million dollars of an eighty-five-
million-dollar credit extended in 1937 and not repaid. There the matter remains to 
this day.11
The Maritime Conflict Deepens
The Soviet Union found itself deep in a maritime war it had not wanted. The Soviet am-
bassador in London, Ivan Maiskii, who was also the Soviet representative on the NIC, 
proposed sending a squadron of Soviet warships to Spanish waters to engage in surveil-
lance of the Germans and Italians and perhaps to escort Soviet supply ships themselves. 
The top Soviet naval leader, Flagman of the Fleet 1st Rank (that is, Admiral) V. M. 
Orlov, however, wanted to avoid any possible complications and incidents in the Medi-
terranean, especially given a still-weak Soviet fleet and the absence of friendly bases in 
the western Mediterranean. He found reasons to delay and oppose the deployment of a 
Soviet squadron to Spanish waters. This came, however, just as Stalin was in the early 
stages of building a grand “sea and oceanic fleet” that could give the Soviet Union clout 
in foreign waters. Admiral Orlov was soon liquidated in Stalin’s bloody purges of the 
Soviet military’s top commands.12
Germany and Italy found it relatively easy to flout the terms of the NIA. Italy in late 
1936 and early 1937 sent massive numbers of troops to Cadiz by ocean liner and es-
corted their munitions ships and troopships with its navy, which escort the NIC had of-
ficially sanctioned. It also reflagged Spanish Nationalist supply ships as Italian, a device 
that got around nonintervention rules. Italy soon abandoned the use of large Italian 
liners as troopships and relied instead on smaller vessels that flew the Italian flag for the 
first half of their voyages from Italian to Nationalist ports, especially Palma de Mallor-
ca, and then the Spanish Nationalist flag when nearing Spanish territorial waters, where 
international naval patrols were in evidence. (Italy returned to the use of large troop-
ships under escort later in the war for large-scale movements of forces and for repatria-
tion of wounded and sick soldiers.) The deception worked smoothly; the Republicans 
understood its mechanisms but were unable to respond effectively against Italy, with its 
powerful navy on the loose.13
Italy was also first to engage in commerce war, deploying submarines, at first in pairs 
and later four at a time, from 8 November 1936, two days after Italy had signed the 
international Submarine Protocol outlawing attacks on unarmed merchant ships.  
Nationalist officers on board Italian submarines, if challenged, were to pose as the boats’ 
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commanding officers and pretend that the submarines were Spanish.14 Italo-Nationalist 
instructions allowed these Italian craft to torpedo Spanish Republican warships when-
ever found but Soviet merchant ships only within the international three-mile limit, 
with positive identification of the target ship required in all cases.
Each submarine had a zone of operations on the Spanish east coast, usually off a major 
port. Since arms ships entered Cartagena only after dark, with no colors flying and 
names painted out, the Spanish-Italian rules of engagement could not be met, and Ital-
ian boats engaged in frustratingly fruitless patrols under orders that disallowed attack 
on unknown darkened shapes entering Republican ports at night. Success finally came 
on 22 November, when the chief Soviet naval adviser to the Spanish Republican navy, 
Capt. N. G. Kuznetsov, in hopes of reducing the threat of air attack to warships within 
the harbor of Cartagena, persuaded the Republican naval command to place valuable 
warships in the open roadstead outside the port—a supposedly safe anchorage, since 
the Nationalists had no submarines of their own. The Italian submarine Torricelli, 
with Spanish lieutenant commander Arturo Genova on board, slammed two torpedoes 
into the machinery spaces of the anchored Republican flagship, the cruiser Miguel de 
Cervantes, which was then laid up under repair for most of the rest of the war. “Authori-
ties” in Cartagena, as well as Adm. J. F. Somerville of the Royal Navy, assumed that 
the Republican submarine B-5, missing in action, had defected to the enemy and was 
responsible. For the moment the Italian deception worked.15
Germany was second to attack. Out of fear of an international incident if German 
complicity were to come to light, and with Britain keeping a sharp eye on German fleet 
development since the 1935 Anglo-German naval treaty, Berlin deployed to the area 
two of its seven new oceangoing U-boats (U-33 and U-34), under complete secrecy and 
with all identifying marks removed. The Nationalists could only guess at the existence 
of this “Training Exercise Ursula,” named for Adm. Karl Dönitz’s daughter.16 Rules 
of engagement allowed attacks on Republican warships and within territorial waters on 
any darkened warship or escorted merchant vessel. Secrecy was so effective that the ex-
istence of Ursula came to light only through the chance discovery in German archives 
during the 1960s of a coded handwritten note on one page in a folder that showed that 
the Germans secretly tried to make this operation appear to be a training exercise for 
merchant ships.17
Defective torpedoes frustrated the two skippers and their crews; the torpedoes ran foul 
and exploded, if at all, far from their intended targets. U-34, however, did attain one 
success, sinking the Spanish Republican submarine C-3 patrolling on the surface off 
Málaga on 12 December. Yet a Republican investigation concluded that the loss of C-3 
had been due to an accidental internal explosion, whereupon the issue was dropped.18 
Three earlier German torpedo firings had achieved no success. In any case, C-3 was a 
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target of opportunity; Operation Ursula was officially over and not scheduled to be 
renewed. Identifying numbers and names were repainted off the northern Netherlands 
coast. Deception, the Oberkommando der Marine (OKM), or naval high command, 
reminded all, was “of the highest principle to avoid compromising Germany,” especially 
in the eyes of the British.19
The OKM was far more cautious than was its Italian counterpart about risking charges 
of flagrant violations of the Non-Intervention terms. Hitler agreed with the war minis-
ter, Gen. Werner von Blomberg, that the principle of unity of command should prevail, 
without confusing movements, as one nation’s submarines cleared the common operat-
ing area so that the other’s submarines could move into vacated patrol stations. German 
and Italian admirals agreed on 14 December to divide their responsibilities, so that the 
Italians could continue clandestine submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, and the 
Germans to operate only with surface forces, to attain quality intelligence on ship move-
ments.20 The German navy thus felt relieved of any complications when an unexploded 
Italian torpedo ran up the beach near Barcelona on Christmas Day, 1936, and another 
near Tarragona the next day. All the world could see Italian responsibility in these 
actions, while Germany escaped blame. Fragments of exploded torpedoes in Miguel 
de Cervantes revealed the Italian origins of that attack. Italy had so far sent forty-two 
submarines into action in the Spanish War, had tracked 133 targets, and had launched 
twenty-seven torpedoes, which had damaged one cruiser and sunk two freighters, but it 
had stopped no Soviet arms ships. Germany had deployed two U-boats, tracked twelve 
targets, and launched four torpedoes but had sunk only one Spanish submarine.
Italy soon loosened its instructions to the extent of allowing cruiser and submarine 
bombardment of port facilities at night, but only if secrecy was maintained. Never-
theless, Italian shell fragments were found at Valencia and Barcelona after nocturnal 
bombardments; Italian admirals acted puzzled and surprised when British admirals 
raised the issue of responsibility.21 In frustration, and with the war not going as well as 
hoped, Mussolini abandoned his ineffective clandestine submarine warfare in mid-
February 1937. The large Italian destroyer Giovanni da Verrazzano, with its identifying 
marks painted out and a false third funnel installed, towed two motor torpedo boats to 
participate in the final assault on Málaga. In the nighttime confusion, the boats took Da 
Verrazzano for a Republican submarine and fired a torpedo that missed the destroyer by 
just a few meters. They escaped detection by returning to the Nationalist port of Ceuta 
before dawn.22
The Nationalists received reliable German and Italian intelligence on Soviet ship 
movements from the Black Sea, through the Turkish Straits and the Mediterranean 
to Spain. On 14 December, the cruiser Canarias caught the motorship Komsomol in a 
compromised position that made its cargo of “ore” from Poti to Ghent appear to mask a 
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real cargo of arms. Komsomol could have been carrying both kinds of cargo. Canarias 
took the passengers and crew prisoner and sank Komsomol with gunfire.23 Soviet naval 
advisers realized that all future arms ships would have to be better protected by the 
Republican fleet, especially during the last leg of the dash from the Algerian coast into 
Republican ports.
The NIC Control Scheme in Operation
Throughout the autumn and winter of 1936–37, the NIC wrestled with how to proceed. 
The Spanish belligerents refused to cooperate by allowing neutral observers on their 
territories and in their seaports, a problem that was supposedly settled in April 1937 
by a land and sea Control Scheme, by which neutral observers would be stationed on 
land frontiers to observe and report to an NIC office in London any arms traffic or 
volunteers crossing frontiers, while neutral “observing officers” would be assigned to 
all merchant ships heading for Spanish ports, to ensure that no proscribed cargoes or 
volunteers were introduced into Spain. Further, the Spanish coast was divided among 
the powers with significant naval forces in Spanish waters. German and Italian war-
ships were assigned to patrol the Republican coast and the British and French to patrol 
Nationalist coasts.24
The Control Scheme operated as planned in April and May 1937.25 But on 29 May, as 
part of a planned Republican deception to facilitate the arrival of the arms ship Ma-
gallanes, the Republican fleet bombarded the harbor of Ibiza while Soviet SB-2 bombers 
attacked it from the air.26 By mistake, the Soviet bombers hit the German pocket battle-
ship Deutschland, lying at anchor off the island town, killing or mortally wounding 
thirty-one sailors. The German admiral, Hermann von Fischel, had assumed that Ibiza 
was a safe and secluded port in which to give his warships on NIC patrol some rest and 
recreation, while the Republicans assumed that it was an open port in enemy hands, 
against which a diversionary strike was acceptable. Neither assumption proved to be 
accurate.
That night’s Republican squadron convoying Magallanes sailed through a German 
squadron that Hitler had ordered to gather. Hitler was determined to retaliate against 
the Cartagena naval base and its moored warships, which the Republic could have used 
to escalate its conflict with Germany, perhaps into a declared war between Germany 
and the Republic. The Republican defense minister, Indalecio Prieto, urged that the 
Republican navy seek out the German retaliatory squadron for combat, hoping thereby 
to provoke just such a German declaration of war against the Republic, which he hoped 
would lead in turn to a full European war, which he saw as the best circumstance for the 
survival of the beleaguered Republic.27
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The Germans were especially sensitive to being labeled “baby killers,” as they had been 
after the Scarborough and Hartlepool raids of 1914. A less volatile sentiment eventu-
ally prevailed in Berlin. Under Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath’s moderating 
influence, Hitler abandoned his early demand for a strong retaliation against the well-
defended naval port of Cartagena and instead ordered the bombardment by Admiral 
Scheer of the open, or at least poorly defended, city of Almería on the 31st, an attack that 
killed nineteen townspeople at first count and destroyed thirty-five buildings. Hitler 
had counted on the Republican battleship Jaime I, his target of choice, being present, 
but it had slipped out to return to Cartagena, which was thought to be safer. Germany 
immediately dropped out of the Control Scheme, while demanding further measures 
by the international naval forces in Spanish waters to counter what seemed to be a 
provocative act (i.e., the Deutschland bombing) by the Republic. As Nationalist Spain 
was primarily playing the grand-strategic role of masking the German rebuilding of its 
military during the “danger zone” of its early phases, Neurath diverted Hitler’s demand 
for vigorous retaliatory action.28
Tension mounted further in June, however, when the German cruiser Leipzig reported 
that on four occasions between June 15 and 18 noises heard against the cruiser’s hull had 
indicated attacks by “Spanish-Bolshevist submarine pirates.” In an emergency four-
party meeting, Germany demanded, first, the internment of all Republican submarines; 
second, “an immediate joint naval demonstration by the four powers off Valencia”; 
and third, a stern warning to the Valencia government that “any further attack would 
result in immediate military reprisals by the four powers.” These were in addition to a 
proposed retaliation by three German U-boats then in the Atlantic: they would secretly 
enter the Mediterranean and, in a repeat of the 1936 Operation Ursula, attack Repub-
lican warships and escorted merchant ships as they approached Cartagena. Neurath 
refrained from going that far, but he instructed the other powers that if they doubted 
whether the attacks had actually taken place, such doubts must be “sharply rejected even 
to the point of walking out of the conference.” Yet as Berlin reacted in bold certainty, 
Adm. Hermann von Fischel, on reflection, became increasingly doubtful that there 
had been any attacks at all. German tests in these same waters showed that hydrophone 
indications of torpedoes were often actually machinery noises from one’s own ship. The 
supposed indications of attacks on Leipzig might have been caused by porpoises. Yet von 
Fischel asserted that even if these had been false alarms, “one has to expect the possi-
bility of a submarine attack” sometime; he prepared an even more deniable retaliation 
plan, in which the same three U-boats would enter the Mediterranean, secretly, and use 
only electric torpedoes to sink just Republican submarines. Hitler remained “extremely 
wrought up” but refrained from retaliatory action on his own, while the Republican 
navy was especially careful to avoid any action that might trigger a German retaliation.29
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The potential for a major incident remained high. On 30 June, a Republican convoy 
on the north coast encountered the German U-boat U-35, on the surface; the boat had 
black-white-red recognition stripes on its conning tower, but they were not seen by the 
two destroyers guarding the Republican convoy. The destroyers immediately went on 
the attack. U-35 immediately submerged and eventually cleared the area. Both the Ger-
mans and Republicans were following established rules, each assuming hostile intent by 
the other, assumptions that were not always the case.30
The Creation of the “Rome–Berlin Axis”
Under constant Nationalist pressure to donate surface warships, Mussolini agreed at 
least to transfer in April 1937 two submarines, Torricelli and Archimede, with partly 
Spanish crews. In Italian waters they were Italian, but on war patrols or at their forward 
base at Sóller, in Mallorca, they were Spanish—with the designations C-3 and C-5, 
respectively, as if these submarines, both previously lost, had actually defected to the 
Nationalist cause.31 These two submarines sank or damaged seven Republican vessels; 
the world continued to assume direct Italian responsibility, thus indicating to Spaniards 
how others viewed Mussolini’s outrages in the Mediterranean.32
In the case of Germany, locomotive carriers with extra-large hatches that could accom-
modate crated aircraft were disguised as Panamanian ships, since non-European states 
were not signatories to the Non-Intervention Agreement. These “Panama steamers” 
were directed to the northwestern port of Vigo whenever no foreign ships would be 
within sight. Even so, they were escorted during the last legs of their voyages by Ger-
man or Nationalist warships, thus keeping the deception intact. French warships were 
assigned to patrol these waters for the Non-Intervention Committee, and Nationalist 
patrol boats from Vigo stood ready to rush out and “capture” any uncontrolled “Panama 
steamer.” 33 The scheme became routine and remained effective. A total of 180 Ger-
man and 290 Italian arms cargoes arrived in Nationalist Spain in disguise. All but the 
first two German arms vessels (Usaramo and Kamerun) arrived without the slightest 
incident. In such ways Nationalist Spain, Germany, and Italy—and to a lesser degree 
Portugal—became active coalition partners in their aid of Francisco Franco’s Spain.
The Nationalist navy, making full use of good German intelligence reports, captured 
actual or suspected arms carriers, many of them under the Soviet flag, made possible 
by the fact that the Soviet merchant marine was relatively weak in the 1930s and only 
slowly recovering with new construction, and then put these ships and their cargoes in 
service to the Nationalist cause. All this was deeply frustrating to Soviet and Republican 
Spanish leaderships, which could neither enforce nor end the policy of nonintervention, 
to which the Soviet Union had signed on.
frank  175
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch11-Frank.indd  September 11, 2013 12:00 PM
Since many merchant ships used in the European trade with the Spanish Republic 
were chartered from British firms or from companies located in the smaller European 
states, merchant ships from all over Europe found themselves at the mercy of National-
ist naval patrols and open to capture and confiscation. One exception comprised Dutch 
merchant ships, which as neutrals in compliance with the rules of nonintervention were 
escorted past Gibraltar toward the Dutch East Indies by Dutch warships stationed in the 
strait for that purpose. Dutch ships became relatively safe from Nationalist capture, a 
protection that ships of other, less powerful nations did not enjoy.34
Out of the Spanish Civil War was formed Mussolini’s “Rome–Berlin Axis” and a concert 
of policy making in which Germany and Italy came ever closer politically, at least 
outwardly so, standing in opposition to Britain and France, the leaders of the Non- 
Intervention movement. Reports of violations noted by the “observing officers” stationed 
by the April 1937 NIC scheme on each merchant ship heading for Spanish ports went to 
a NIC office in London for record keeping. Thus the Spanish Civil War, particularly at 
sea, where escalation of the war was most likely, was a major impetus toward drawing 
together Italy and Germany on one side and Britain and France on the other.35
The Culmination of the Commerce War
The costs of this commerce war were significant. The Spanish Republic and the Soviet 
Union bore the greatest economic costs, including higher insurance and chartering fees. 
They paid the greatest military price as well, as Soviet and Comintern aid greatly slack-
ened during the second half of the war, leaving the Spanish Republic without the means 
to achieve victory. The Germans attained the greatest economic benefits, especially in 
strategic raw materials, primarily ores, which they gained through special agreements 
with their Spanish Nationalist friends. Since Italy was mostly seeking prestige in Spain, 
Mussolini never asked for the practical strategic economic benefits that the Germans 
demanded and gained as a matter of course. Therefore, Fascist Italy came out of this 
war economically weakened, which made it more dependent on its Nazi German Axis 
partner.36
In early August 1937, prompted by dire warnings from excited but inaccurate National-
ist intelligence operatives, Italy was greatly to expand the maritime and geographical 
dimension of the Spanish conflict by vastly increasing Italian submarine, surface, and 
air attacks on merchant shipping throughout the Mediterranean. This expansion of the 
scope of the war would prove intolerable to France and Britain, which would orga-
nize Mediterranean and Black Sea states in September 1937 to take concerted action 
to contain the Spanish War, restore security to the trade routes of the Mediterranean, 
and contribute to the stabilization of Europe. This initiative would become an opera-
tional success, in that it ended indiscriminate attacks, but a strategic failure, in that it 
176  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch11-Frank.indd  September 11, 2013 12:00 PM
contributed to the onset of the Second World War under more favorable conditions for 
the Axis powers.
In response to Spanish pleas for decisive action at sea against alleged massive Soviet 
aid shipments coming to the Republic by convoy, Mussolini in August ordered his air 
force and surface and submarine navy to engage in a major clandestine naval and air 
campaign to cut the Republic’s sea lines of communications from the Black Sea through 
the Mediterranean to Republican Spain. Soon reports came in from across the Mediter-
ranean, from Spanish waters, the Sicilian Channel, and the Aegean Sea, of systematic 
Italian naval and air surveillance of merchant traffic in the Mediterranean, punctuated 
by attacks by aircraft, surface warships, and submarines. From 5 August to 5 Septem-
ber 1937, fifty-two submarines, forty-three surface warships, and squadrons of aircraft 
scouted over five hundred suspect merchant ships on Mediterranean sea-lanes, carried 
out fifty attacks, sank twelve ships, and captured two.37 Italian responsibility was often 
very clear. On 11 August, the destroyer Saetta, “SA” painted on its side, shadowed the 
Spanish tanker Campeador, full of Romanian oil, in the Sicilian Channel, and after 
nightfall, while Spanish crewmen watched, it came abreast and sank the tanker with 
four torpedoes.38
On 15 August, a submarine with “C-3” painted on its conning tower surfaced near the 
Spanish arms ship Ciudad de Cádiz in the Aegean Sea, sank it with gunfire and torpe-
does, and disappeared. The Spanish Republican submarine C-3, of course, accused of 
defecting to the Nationalists, had actually been sunk by the German U-34 in 1936. The 
ruse was transparent, as the designation “C-3” was painted in red, in Italian style, not in 
white as in Spanish practice. The attacking submarine had two deck guns, while C-3 had 
had only one. The sketch made by survivors matched the features of the actual assailant, 
the Italian Ferraris.39
On 31 August, the Italian submarine Iride launched a torpedo against the British 
destroyer Havock, having mistaken it for a Spanish Republican destroyer of similar sil-
houette. The torpedo missed, but Iride surfaced momentarily on launching the torpedo, 
advertising its Italian identity to British crewmen. For hours Havock depth-charged 
Iride as it made its escape. There were forty-seven similar incidents. Italian, German, 
and Spanish Nationalist authorities maintained that the assailants were Spanish, or 
alternatively Soviet. Yet Italian responsibility was obvious.40
The culmination of the commerce war was to come with the increased Italian-led at-
tacks in August–September 1937 on Soviet and neutral shipping in the Mediterranean 
and the resulting international Nyon Arrangement of 14 September 1937, which was to 
affect deeply the way Europeans faced the crisis that ultimately led to the Second World 
War.41 The Nyon Arrangement would be a regional security system that pitted two 
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established powers, France and Britain, against Fascist Italy. This arrangement would 
arguably be triggered by Italian naval intervention in the Spanish Civil War, in which 
the international struggle for arms supply was decisive.
The League Takes Action: The Nyon Arrangement
Broad sentiment among Mediterranean states called for action. At first each state took 
its own measures. The French started escorting, the British ordered counterattacks, the 
Turks patrolled, and the Soviets readied destroyers for the Aegean. The French premier, 
Camille Chautemps, and the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, were cau-
tious, with Chamberlain taking the lead in trying to woo Mussolini away from the Axis 
with Germany. The French foreign minister, Yvon Delbos, and the British foreign sec-
retary, Anthony Eden, however, were ready for action to coerce Mussolini into chang-
ing his behavior. Eventually Chamberlain concurred. Officials considered and rejected 
several options: granting belligerent rights to both Spanish factions, retaliating against 
Nationalist Spain (such as sinking the Nationalist cruiser Canarias), negotiating a broad 
Mediterranean Pact, holding direct talks with Italy, and raising the issue in the League 
of Nations or the Non-Intervention Committee. None of the officials, however, would 
produce quick action to force Mussolini to back down.
With the League of Nations scheduled to meet in mid-September, Delbos proposed 
a conference of Mediterranean states in Geneva to provide international sanction for 
action. Eden quickly agreed and proposed a narrow agenda to gain rapid support and 
produce quick action. Delbos agreed. Mussolini saw the signs and withdrew his forces 
from the attack. The democracies did not know it yet, but they had won their victory 
even before the conference had met.42
Delbos and Eden built an effective coalition through compromise, and Maxim Litvinov, 
the Soviet foreign minister, helped make it effective. Delbos wished to invite the Spanish 
Republic, or if not, the Soviet Union. Eden would not invite the Spaniards and wished 
not to invite the Soviets, but he did accept the Soviet Union if, to keep bridges open for 
appeasement, Italy and Germany were also invited. To maintain momentum, Delbos 
and Eden compromised by inviting all Mediterranean and Black Sea states and Germa-
ny. To prevent Italy from sabotaging the conference, the Soviets sent a stinging rebuke 
to Italy for its aggression in the Mediterranean. The maneuver pricked Italian sensitivi-
ties, and the Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, who had said he would attend, fell 
into Litvinov’s trap and declined. So did Germany. The greatest troublemakers in the 
Mediterranean thus excused themselves. Now, with the right grouping of states for rapid 
practical action, Litvinov became uncharacteristically agreeable, allowing Delbos and 
Eden the leadership and scope to make this exercise in collective security a success.43
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To encourage Italy to attend, Delbos moved the conference from Geneva, with its nega-
tive associations for Italy (over Ethiopia), twenty-five kilometers up the lake to the town 
of Nyon. Nine delegations, representing all Mediterranean and Black Sea powers but 
Spain and Italy, met in the town assembly hall on 10 September 1937. On Eden’s nomi-
nation, Delbos assumed the presidency of the conference. Delbos charged the delegates 
to arrive at “a rapid agreement which will put an end to the state of piracy, and an im-
mediate lessening of the intolerable tension which involves the risk of new and graver 
incidents.” He hoped that “rapid success” would pave the way for wider conciliation and 
collaboration. All the delegations were ready for action.44
A second factor that favored success was that quick practical action came through an 
approach that was intentionally limited, focused, and technical. Delbos and Eden—
working remarkably smoothly and rapidly, given past Anglo-French tension—developed 
a joint plan based on Eden’s insight that only a limited technical, not a broad political, 
counter to submarine attacks would succeed. A political solution was unlikely, given 
Italian pride and temperament, and a broad agenda would introduce delays. British na-
val and diplomatic officials produced the basics—a focus solely on “unknown” subma-
rines, assignment of navies to hunt down and destroy all submerged submarines found 
in the vicinity of an attack, and the legal basis for such action. The conference adopted 
the concept of submarine attacks as “piracy,” which in international law is a matter of 
private, not state-sponsored, attacks at sea. The approach had the advantage of likely 
deterring further attacks by not accusing the Italians, while prosecuting the supposedly 
stateless submarines as outlaws, and perhaps even enlisting Italy in the effort.45
The conference also invoked article IV of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, which had 
been ratified—even by Italy—as the 1936 “Submarine Protocol,” stipulating that subma-
rines must follow the rules that applied to surface ships prohibiting the sinking of unre-
sisting ships without first providing for the safety of passengers, crew, and ship’s papers. 
Any submarine not following this rule could face destruction. Merchant shipping was to 
use prescribed routes under protection of British and French naval patrols.46
The French and British navies were to patrol routes in assigned zones in the western 
Mediterranean. In the Aegean—to obviate the presence of Soviet warships, which 
Greece and Turkey opposed—France made an additional contribution of a number of 
large four-stack destroyers (contre-torpilleurs), greatly pleasing the British. Litvinov 
acquiesced. Thus the plan moved forward, with the Soviets remaining as partners but 
refraining from deploying naval forces in the Mediterranean. British and French war-
ships, stretching available capacity, took up their patrols.
In two days the delegates had come to complete agreement. The nine powers created a 
restricted “arrangement”—rather than a political agreement—by means of which the 
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French and British accomplished their own goal of a rapid and tangible counter to the 
Italian ravages against shipping.47 In doing so, they captured the initiative from the 
Axis powers for the only time in the prewar years. Public opinion across the political 
spectrum in both France and Britain was solidly for the Anglo-French collaboration and 
their unhesitating action against Mediterranean “piracy.” Neither Mussolini nor Hitler 
was prepared for such rapid and resolute action. For a brief time the dictators were at a 
loss as to how to respond.
The success of the limited approach at Nyon allowed an extension to include the more 
difficult question of countering attacks by surface warships and aircraft. This Supple-
mental Agreement, signed in Geneva three days later, put the Nyon system on an even 
stronger basis.48 Immediately, however, Britain urged Italy to join the Nyon regime. 
France went along so as not to jeopardize its British partnership. Ciano now joined, and 
Britain and France rewarded the Fascist regime’s hunger for prestige with the empty 
designation of Italy as “a great Mediterranean power.” The pirate of the Mediterranean 
was now one of its policemen, a state of affairs that elicited widespread anxiety and sar-
casm. The naval staffs of the democracies diverted every Italian attempt to obtain patrol 
authority over the Dardanelles-to-Spain route except a hundred-mile stretch (to scare 
off Soviet aid), over Suez as a “gate” imprisoning Italy in the Mediterranean (to needle 
Britain), and over French strategic routes with Algeria. To meet Greek and Turkish 
objections, they precluded Italy from patrolling the Aegean. Although outwitted, Italy 
signed the Paris Agreement of 30 September that included Italy in the Mediterranean 
patrols, but only after it was granted its request that patrol zones not be made public for 
fear of adverse domestic reaction.49
Following the signing of these agreements, Soviet aid finally came to a ragged end. 
Three arms ships were marooned in Algiers, while Nationalist cruisers remained on 
the prowl. In October 1937 the large Igrek Cabo Santo Tomé, full of war material and 
defensively armed, came under Nationalist surface attack off the Algerian coast and was 
destroyed.50 This left the eleven unarmed merchant ships of the Comintern-controlled 
firm France-Navigation to continue to ply a low-level clandestine arms trade between 
the Black Sea and Spain. They did so without major incident through 1938.51 Yet major 
arms shipments neither from the Black Sea nor from Leningrad were any longer operat-
ing on the Soviets’ behalf. Only in early 1939, with a special plea from the Republicans 
through their air force chief, Ignacio Hidalgo de Cisneros, were arms shipments re-
newed, from the Baltic Sea to French Atlantic ports for transshipment by land to Catalo-
nia and Barcelona. The play of Stalin’s mood was critical, especially in this period, when 
terror ruled at home.52 Most of these supplies never made it to the fighting front, most 
being abandoned in France at the end of the Spanish Civil War.53
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Shipments of Italian and German aid operated much more smoothly throughout the 
end of the civil conflict. Smaller Italian or reflagged Spanish vessels constantly plied the 
routes between Italy and Nationalist Spain, flying the Italian flag except when just off 
Nationalist ports, where Nationalist escorts took over escort duty. Large Italian ocean 
liners came back into use as troopships in 1938, for major troop moves or to return to 
Italy forces to be repatriated in the expectation of the implementation of the Anglo-
Italian accords of April 1938. At the end of the war, large troopships repatriated, with 
great ceremony, the rest to Naples. Mussolini had hoped to gain prestige in Spain as a 
great military power, but Italy came out of the struggle weaker economically than it 
went in. Prestige did not come easily or cheaply.
German aid through “special steamers” containing military cargoes continued uninter-
rupted, thanks to the wide Atlantic, the Panamanian ruse, German escorts, and the iso-
lated destination port of Vigo. Bulk cargoes of strategic minerals for the return voyage 
were common, as Germany obtained the maximum trade advantages it could gain from 
its Spanish friends. Pressure for trade concessions continued after peace was restored 
in Spain. German forces were repatriated in Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy) 
cruise ships, in which peacetime shipboard games substituted for military training. 
Back in Germany these forces, still in their Spanish uniforms, paraded in Berlin for 
Hitler before shifting back into their Wehrmacht uniforms for the much larger military 
contest just ahead. Soviet logistic support allowed the Spanish Civil War to continue 
until by late 1937, with the Nyon and Paris accords, the shifting of Moscow’s strategic 
priorities to China, and a likely priority for a military buildup at home, active Soviet 
military support for the Spanish Republic became only a trickle. Such low-level support 
continued in 1938, as Stalin pondered his next moves in response to the aggressively 
ambitious Germany so close at hand.
By starting with a limited focus and expanding the Nyon system by degrees, Delbos 
and Eden had given direction and courage to the democracies and to the cluster of 
Mediterranean and Black Sea states that relied on them. Italy, although admitted into 
their company, had to be content with the trappings and not the reality of parity.54 The 
Italians made a pretense of patrols, while the French and British, understanding the 
political and psychological value involved, maintained their own intensive patrols on 
assigned Nyon routes. The Nyon system remained in force until the end of the Spanish 
War eighteen months later.55
Conclusions
The respect the democracies gained at Nyon was later squandered when Franco declared 
peace on his own terms on 1 April 1939 after the last of the Republican forces had sur-
rendered. Alert to the irony of pirates becoming policemen, Ciano called the agreement 
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in Paris a great victory. Emboldened, he dispatched new “Legionary” submarines to 
Spain, but under stringent rules of engagement.56 Soviet hopes for collective security, 
buoyed by Nyon, sank again with the Paris Agreement making Italy an equal partner. 
By October 1937 the Soviet Union had stopped sending military aid via the Mediter-
ranean, a fact that marked the beginning of Stalin’s abandonment of Spain and proved 
a major factor in the Republican defeat. Soviet aid now shifted to China. Significantly, 
the Spanish defeat came only five months before the onset of World War II, precluding 
an anti-Fascist Spain in the coming fight for Europe. The Soviet abandonment of Spain 
was a major step toward the USSR’s giving up on the democracies and toward the Nazi-
Soviet pact of 1939.57
The piracy and Nyon episodes also arguably prompted Hitler to begin his conquest 
of central Europe earlier than he had anticipated. Hitler realized that the prolonga-
tion of the internationalized Spanish crisis had allowed him to pass safely through the 
“danger zone” of early rearmament in 1936–37, while the eyes of Europe were fixed on 
Spain. Then in August 1937 the breadth of the Mediterranean erupted in flames, and 
warships of the opposing European camps had each other in their sights. A full-scale 
Mediterranean war seemed possible at any moment. To understand the effect of the 
Mediterranean crisis on Hitler, we should view it from the prevailing mind-set of Nazi 
Germany—that the Mediterranean crisis was a creation of Bolshevik Russia to advance 
nefarious schemes to wrap its tentacles around all of Europe. The German naval com-
mander in Spanish waters, Rear Adm. Rolf Carls, was so certain that the rampages were 
Bolshevik sponsored that he spontaneously offered the cooperation of the German navy 
“in the strongest possible action” with the British navy to hunt down the pirates.58
This vision of a Mediterranean about to erupt into a major conflict prompted Hitler 
in his speech to his diplomatic and military chiefs on 5 November 1937—at the so-
called Hossbach conference—to advance plans for the early conquest of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia.59 With Fascist Italy on the rise and imperial Britain in decline, and with 
French-Italian hostility or Soviet intrigue providing the spark, the Mediterranean at 
any moment might explode into an Anglo-French-Italian war. It was Hitler’s most likely 
scenario for the near future. With the West embroiled in the Mediterranean, Germany 
must make a lightning strike against the Czechs, earlier than previously anticipated. 
The piracy-Nyon crisis was the specific catalyst that prompted Hitler to formulate early 
moves in central Europe.
Yet even as Hitler laid out his plan, all of the Mediterranean outside Spanish waters was 
already calm again.60 Nevertheless, Hitler mobilized his war machine for action, surpris-
ing his unprepared military, and he never let up. Sprung by the Mediterranean crisis, 
Hitler’s momentum toward war continued without interruption straight into catastro-
phe. The piracy-Nyon crisis, therefore, was a major factor in the inauguration of the 
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Second World War earlier than otherwise would likely have been the case. In addition, 
the Soviet Union was at this very time responding to the Japanese assault on China with 
new aircraft and truck convoys carrying military aid (Operation Z). Major military aid 
to Spain ended in October 1937, just as it was picking up in support of Soviet interests 
in China.
The Nyon Arrangement was also the first concrete step in the Soviet Union’s eventual 
abandonment of the West in favor of a pact with Hitler. Munich then continued the 
process of distancing the Soviet Union from the West, just as Stalin’s terror was taking 
a firm grip on the Soviet psyche. Thus, in the end, the regional security scheme of Nyon 
brought but temporary calm to the Mediterranean. Although it produced short-term 
operational success, it was in a longer view a strategic failure. It sowed the seeds of 
World War II under conditions less favorable to the democracies than they would likely 
have been otherwise.
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The German U-boat Campaign in  
World War II
WERNER R AHN
The peace treaty of Versailles reduced Germany to the status of a third-rate naval power. 
Submarines and military aircraft were forbidden altogether.1 As a result, the German 
navy lacked weapons that most other modern navies acquired as a matter of course. 
All British attempts to abolish the submarine altogether for all nations were thwarted 
by France’s opposition, however, and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on 18 June 
1935 allowed Germany to have a surface fleet with a tonnage up to 35 percent of that 
of the British Empire. The 35 percent ceiling applied not just to the total tonnage but 
also to the individual categories of warships. Only in the case of U-boats was Germany 
allowed to achieve first 45 percent and later even 100 percent of British submarine 
strength.
One week after the Naval Agreement was announced, the German navy commissioned 
the first small, 250-ton U-boat, uncovering its secret activity in this matter. Since 1918, 
though the U-boat had not been basically improved, it had been given better torpedoes 
with trackless and bubble-less ejection and noncontact pistols; minelaying capacity for 
all U-boats; the ability to transmit and receive signals both surfaced and submerged; 
greater diving depths; and increased power of resistance, through welded pressure 
hulls.2 Nevertheless, widespread opinion prevailed in all navies, including the German 
navy, that the U-boat had lost the crucial role it had achieved in World War I as one of 
the most effective naval weapons. Contrary to this opinion, the U-boat Staff, centered 
on Capt. Karl Dönitz, was convinced that antisubmarine-warfare weapons were greatly 
overrated and had not made decisive progress since 1918.3
The German experiences in World War I acted as the starting point for the develop-
ment of “wolf pack” tactics against an enemy’s sea routes. In 1917–18, a number of 
U-boats had successfully attacked on the surface under cover of darkness. In his book 
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attacks. Despite this, World War II night attacks would take the British by surprise. 
Their escort forces would be unable to cope with the tactic, particularly as the early 
form of sonar known as ASDIC (Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Commit-
tee) had an effective range of no more than about 1,400 meters, which left it ineffective 
against U-boats operating on the surface.4 Captain Dönitz also recognized that the con-
centration of merchant shipping in convoys could be countered by a similar concentra-
tion of U-boats. During the initial stages of World War II, U-boats would as a rule be on 
their own when conducting reconnaissance west of the British Isles, although supported 
by effective radio intelligence. But before long, U-boats concentrated in large numbers 
to attack convoys.
Strategic Setting and Operational Concept
At the outbreak of war in September 1939, the German navy confronted an enemy that 
was ten times stronger and that enjoyed the additional benefit of an excellent strate-
gic position.5 Therefore, the German Naval Command, forgoing a struggle for naval 
supremacy, concentrated on an offensive concept of naval warfare aimed solely at de-
stroying the maritime transport capacity of the English-speaking powers. In Directive 
No. 9 of 29 November 1939, entitled “Principles for the Conduct of the War against the 
Enemy’s Economy,” Hitler considered paralyzing “Britain’s economy through inter-
rupting it” the “most effective means” to defeat that nation.6 However, Hitler expected a 
short war, limited to Europe, and did not want to jeopardize the hope of better relations 
with Britain with a radical war on its economy. From the start, in contrast, the Naval 
Staff was convinced that the conflict with Britain would be a long one.
In the summer of 1940, after the defeat of France, “Germany was the dominant power 
in Europe and had a military position and sufficient freedom of action to make Britain’s 
defeat inevitable, if not quick and easy. Considering the enormously greater resources 
of a German-controlled Europe, Britain’s position, without outside help, was hopeless.” 7 
After the failure of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, however, invasion of the Brit-
ish Isles no longer presented the possibility of a quick victory. The only strategic choice 
was to strangle the Atlantic supply line by naval and air attacks before the United States 
could mobilize its strength.
The surface force of the German navy was insufficient for a successful war against 
Britain. To supplement it, the navy concentrated on a weapon that had proved its worth 
during the First World War—the U-boat. From the experience of the Great War, the 
German navy knew that employment of the U-boat against the enemy’s merchant fleet 
could be successful only if as many U-boats as possible were continuously deployed 
along the enemy’s sea-lanes in the Atlantic. Time was the most important factor in each 
of the four major strategic considerations:8
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1. In an economic war waged against a country that depended on supplies by sea, suc-
cess could only be achieved in the long run. It was therefore a question of continu-
ously weakening the enemy’s maritime transport capacity to a degree that exceeded 
the rate at which new merchantmen could be built.
2. From the summer of 1940 onward, it became apparent that the British war effort 
was being increasingly supported by the resources of the United States. Therefore, 
the Naval Staff was intent on “putting Britain out of action soon, before the effects of 
even greater American aid make themselves felt.” 9
3. Since it took around two years to build U-boats and to make them operational in the 
quantities envisaged by the navy, plans had to be made at a very early stage in order 
to have the necessary concentration of forces.
4. While a numerically increasing U-boat fleet held out the prospect of success, the 
Naval Staff had to take into account that the enemy would do everything to strength-
en his antisubmarine-warfare effort, in view of the threat that was looming.
From their analyses of the U-boat campaign in the World War I, Dönitz and his staff 
saw the introduction of convoys in 1917 as the decisive turning point and as the main 
cause for the U-boats’ eventual failure. Dönitz’s intention, therefore, was to succeed 
“technically and tactically in meeting the concentration of ships in convoys with a 
concentration of U-boats.” 10 The main problems were, first, to find the convoys and 
then, second, to concentrate the available boats for attacks. This required efficient 
reconnaissance support by the Luftwaffe, a sufficient number of U-boats, and free-
dom of communication. Sea-air cooperation would fail in the long run; the number of 
operational U-boats would rise only slowly, from twenty-seven in June 1940 to fifty-
three in July 1941; and free communications would always make an individual boat 
vulnerable.
Dönitz planned deployments to maximize the number of available U-boats and their 
real success rate. The result was “the effective U-boat quotient,” by which U-boat Com-
mand meant the average sinking per U-boat per day for all boats at sea.11 Operating out 
of French bases from July 1940, U-boat Command increased the number of boats at sea 
west of the British Isles. The monthly sinking rate climbed steadily from July to Octo-
ber, in which month the effective U-boat quotient reached 920 tons. However, owing to 
the limited number of boats and their need for replenishment, U-boat Command could 
not maintain this attrition rate on British transport capacity. Furthermore, because of 
the Admiralty’s successful rerouting policy, the long search for convoys now began and 
ended mostly in failure.12
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Although the average number of U-boats in the Atlantic in 1941 increased from twelve 
in February to thirty-six in August, the number of ships they sank declined drastically. 
Noticing this serious discrepancy, staff officers at U-boat Command began to suspect 
that the U-boat positions must be known to the British, especially since their own radio 
intelligence sometimes found that convoys at risk suddenly got orders to change course, 
thereby evading the U-boat lines.13
Late in June 1941, fifteen U-boats were on patrol, spread over a large area in the center 
of the North Atlantic. Since no ship sightings were being reported, Dönitz decided in 
mid-July to concentrate these boats in a scouting line farther to the east. On 17 July, a 
convoy was detected by air reconnaissance, but the boats could not attack—the convoy 
was rerouted away from the outpost patrol when the British deciphered German radio 
signals.
In a report to the Naval Staff on 22 August, Dönitz stated that in view of the enemy’s 
reinforced defenses and air surveillance, it was now “necessary to employ approximately 
three times as many U-boats as before in order to achieve any decisive successes in at-
tacking convoys.” Consequently, he demanded a greater concentration of forces.14 The 
Naval Staff perhaps agreed with Dönitz on this fundamental issue, but given the critical 
situation in the Mediterranean, they already expected that additional U-boats would 
eventually have to be employed there.15
At the beginning of September 1941, the number of operational U-boats had increased 
to over seventy, of which thirty-eight were at sea, operating in two groups: one south-
west of Ireland and the other between Iceland and Greenland. At that time, deciphered 
Ultra intelligence from U-boats’ radio traffic was available to the British after ap-
proximately forty to fifty hours. From 11 September on, however, British deciphering 
was impeded when the U-boat Command Staff, ever suspicious and concerned about 
security, ordered an additional superencryption for position information. For several 
weeks thereafter this presented British radio intelligence with a considerable new prob-
lem in locating and identifying U-boat positions.16
Under these circumstances, the Admiralty was unable to reroute every convoy. On 
9 September, despite following an evasive course, convoy SC.42 was detected east of 
Greenland and within three days had lost sixteen of its sixty-two ships in the war’s larg-
est convoy battle to that time. The escorts sank only two U-boats. This success did not 
blind Dönitz to the fact that the vast majority of the convoys were sighted more or less 
accidentally. He believed that the reason his forces were failing to detect convoys must 
be that the enemy had learned about the close formation of U-boat groups “by means of 
sources or methods which we have not yet grasped.” 17
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On 28 September 1941, Dönitz became highly suspicious when two U-boats that had 
met at a remote bay in the Cape Verde Islands in a rendezvous arranged via radio mes-
sage only narrowly escaped a torpedo attack by a British submarine. He asked the Naval 
Staff for an immediate investigation into cryptographic security. The Naval Intelligence 
Division reached the conclusion that “without any contradiction from any of the experts 
who have been involved in extensive work, . . . and the most important experts from the 
OKW [Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces], the procedures based on Key-M 
are regarded by far as the best of all known methods for ensuring the secrecy of military 
intelligence in time of war.” 18 Remarkably, it seems that no attempt was made to have the 
security of the ciphers investigated by independent scientists outside the military. The 
result was a dangerous underestimation of the human and technical resources that the 
enemy had concentrated on code breaking.19
The average number of thirty-six U-boats at sea did not vary from August to October, 
but the number of ships they succeeded in sinking decreased noticeably in October. By 
late autumn 1941 U-boat Command was clearly losing the race against time. One reason 
for this failure lay “in the absence of independent thinking” within the small staff of U-
boat Command: “Although Dönitz is credited with encouraging the open expression of 
opinion within his command, the U-boat professionals who surrounded him were built 
in his image and shared his convictions.”20 The evasive action taken by the convoys on 
the basis of Ultra information led to a reduction in losses of around 65 percent in the 
second half of 1941. Without Ultra, the Admiralty would have faced a much greater 
number of U-boat attacks on convoys, leading to probable losses of another 1.5 million 
gross register tons (GRT).21
Long-Range Operations in the Western and Southern Atlantic 1942
Members of the Naval Staff had anticipated the eventual entry of the United States into 
the war, but they had not expected it as early as December 1941. They were caught by 
surprise, therefore, and were largely unprepared for a fast push by U-boats as far as 
the coastal waters of North America.22 The fight against Allied merchant tonnage in 
the Mediterranean and off Gibraltar during the autumn had resulted in heavy U-boat 
losses—from September to December 1941 a total of twenty-three U-boats were sunk—
with only small successes. Now, the rapid extension of operations to the whole Atlantic 
gave Dönitz the opportunity to concentrate his forces in areas where a significant rise in 
sinkings could be expected.
This applied initially to the sea-lanes along the Eastern Seaboard of America, which—
although three thousand nautical miles away—promised to be a rewarding area of 
operations as long as the shipping there was uncontrolled and largely unprotected. 
Dönitz intended to take advantage of these favorable conditions as quickly as possible. 
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Consequently, on 9 December 1941 he applied to the Naval Staff for the immediate 
deployment of twelve large Type IX B and C boats. With their great sea endurance 
(thirteen thousand nautical miles at ten knots) and their large stocks of torpedoes, they 
seemed particularly suited for this task. Dönitz meant to “roll the drums,” as he said 
in his war diary. The Naval Staff, however, still mindful of the critical situation in the 
Mediterranean, released only six U-boats for missions off the American east coast, a 
decision that Dönitz regretted.23
Between 7 and 9 January 1942, seven medium-sized Type VII U-boats arrived at the 
Newfoundland Grand Banks, and a few days later the first five Type IX boats reached 
the U.S. east coast. Within a fortnight both groups had sunk fifteen ships, total-
ing 97,242 GRT. More boats were to follow, so that between six and eight boats were 
operating at the U.S. East Coast and Newfoundland at any given time. By February 
1942, another group of five large boats was available, which meant that the long-range 
operations could be extended. The successes of German and Italian submarines in the 
Atlantic alone rose from 295,776 GRT in January to 500,788 GRT in March 1942.24 
These figures underlined again the principle of “economic use of U-boats,” particularly 
since the losses in these areas of operations had remained extremely low.
Even after two and a half months U-boats continued to score impressive successes off 
the U.S. east coast. Bearing in mind that the U.S. Navy had been involved in escorting 
convoys since September 1941, it seems to modern eyes especially remarkable that this 
weakness in American coastal waters should have prevailed for so long. Several months 
passed before the U.S. Navy could protect its own sea-lanes. Dönitz was gratified to 
state in March 1942 that the enemy defenses were thin, badly organized, and untrained. 
Dönitz expected convoys to be formed eventually, but for the time being the sea-lanes 
were too numerous and there was chronic shortage of escort vessels.25
Dönitz’s hopes revolved around the new U-tankers that were expected to become opera-
tional during spring 1942, greatly extending U-boat endurance in distant waters.26 The 
first U-tanker, U-459, reached its area of operations about five hundred nautical miles to 
the northeast of Bermuda on 23 April 1942. By 5 May it had replenished no fewer than 
fifteen boats, most of them of the medium-sized Type VII C. In the spring of 1942 boats 
of this type operating off Halifax, Nova Scotia, could remain at sea for an average forty-
one days without replenishment but achieved an average sea endurance of sixty-two 
days after one refueling, and up to eighty-one days if resupplied twice.27
From mid-June 1942, two to three U-tankers constantly deployed in the Atlantic. They 
were stationed beyond Allied air surveillance. This opened up entirely new operational 
perspectives for U-boat Command, both in the hitherto untouched busy waters of the 
Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, and in the North Atlantic, where a resumption of 
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convoy battles was envisaged. Dönitz decided to launch U-boat attacks into even more 
distant areas, and by mid-July 1942 from four to six boats, supported by a U-tanker, 
were operating in the central Atlantic, off Freetown, Sierra Leone, to pressure Allied 
supplies to the Middle East and their links with India. The southward move was to be 
concealed for as long as possible. Beginning on 19 August, four large Type IX U-boats 
and their tanker U-459 left their bases in western France.28 The plan provided for the 
boats just mentioned to arrive off South Africa without prior warning. From 7 October, 
the boats, operating independently, succeeded in sinking fifteen ships, of 108,070 GRT, 
within six days. By the end of the month the score had risen to 156,235 GRT, or some 28 
percent of all German U-boat successes in October.29 These U-boats were followed by 
a second group, of three Type IX D
2
 boats (1,616 tons). They advanced into the Indian 
Ocean along the African coast as far as Laurenço Marques, and by the middle of De-
cember 1942 they had sunk twenty-five ships, 134,780 GRT.
From the point of view of overall strategy, these wide-ranging U-boat operations actu-
ally came at least six months too late. The successes achieved off Cape Town and in 
the Indian Ocean from October 1942 hardly impaired the buildup of Allied military 
potential in Egypt, which was already well advanced and was to be the vital precondi-
tion for the successful British defense of El Alamein and the offensive in North Africa 
that followed.
Differing Views of Resources and Priorities
With a total of 249 boats in service on 1 January 1942, the German navy had achieved—
in purely numerical terms—impressive strength. However, this figure can easily give 
a false impression, for only ninety-one were actually frontline boats. On that date one 
hundred new boats were in training or undergoing trials, and a further fifty-eight were 
training boats only. Of the frontline boats, twenty-six were already tied to the Mediter-
ranean, six to Gibraltar, and four to the Norwegian region. For the decisive struggle 
against the Allies in the North Atlantic there remained fifty-five boats, of which only 
twenty-two were at sea—approximately half on station and half in transit. If just from 
ten to twelve boats were actually engaged in operations against Allied shipping—that 
is, 12 percent of the boats available, or, speaking purely quantitatively, 4.8 percent of the 
total potential of the German submarine weapon—one can hardly speak of a strategic 
concentration, let alone a “war-winning” fresh start.30 Nevertheless, the U-boats had 
shown considerable capability, and their losses before the end of December 1941 had 
remained at a very low level, an average of 2.5 boats per month.
Despite all the efforts of the preceding years, at the end of 1941 the numbers of U-boats 
had not been brought to a level that could have better exploited this favorable position 
in the Atlantic through increased concentration of force. The subsidiary status of the 
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Atlantic in the framework of German strategy became very clear when Germany de-
clared war against the United States on 11 December 1941. Of the ninety-one frontline 
boats, only six were immediately assigned to the American east coast. Given the number 
of boats tied up in the Mediterranean and the Norwegian Sea, Dönitz at the beginning 
of January 1942 was seriously worried “that we will finally arrive too late for the Battle 
of the Atlantic.” He therefore called for a radical concentration of U-boats to cope with 
this task: “We are in a tight spot, but one which clearly shows that everything, absolutely 
everything should be invested into the U-boat arm, and that the fiction that we are still 
a naval power with surface forces collapses as soon as any kind of demand of the naval 
war is made of us anywhere.” 31
Beginning in July 1942, following the introduction of the convoy system in American 
coastal waters, U-boat Command shifted the main field of U-boat activity back to the 
North Atlantic. Dönitz aimed to bring his U-boats into action for several days outside 
the range of enemy air cover. This necessitated the earliest possible detection of convoys. 
On any given day the boats could cover 320 to 370 nautical miles, whereas the convoys 
could manage a maximum of only 240. Dönitz used this speed advantage to subject a 
given convoy, once detected, to repeated attacks by the same U-boat group, a mobile 
operation that could last several days.
U-boats sailing from Germany or from western France initially attacked convoys 
heading from Great Britain to the Newfoundland Grand Banks. Afterward, they 
were resupplied by U-tankers south of the North Atlantic routes, before attacking 
eastbound convoys in a second operation. During some operations, the U-tankers fol-
lowed the convoy at a distance of only fifty to a hundred nautical miles, so as to refuel 
U-boats immediately after their attacks. Until the end of 1942, Allied airpower in the 
North Atlantic could provide close cover only for the convoys known to be at risk. 
At selected rendezvous points, the Germans were therefore conducting their supply 
operations undisturbed and without any problems. However, these prolonged opera-
tions, alternating between combat and replenishment, stretched the German crews to 
their limits.
After 1 February 1942, British radio intelligence was badly affected by a “blackout” 
in the deciphering of U-boat Command’s Atlantic communications. The Admiralty’s 
Operational Intelligence Centre was reduced to relying on conventional sources, but 
since March 1941 the Admiralty had known that the German navy was developing 
supply U-boats. Although there had been factors hinting that German U-boats were be-
ing replenished at sea as early as in June 1942, it was only in August that prisoner-of-war 
interrogation definitely established the existence of U-tankers.32 Until the end of 1942, 
however, the British apparently underestimated their operational significance. Given 
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the achievements of British radio reconnaissance, it is scarcely credible that they failed 
to pick up the radio traffic in the vicinity of the supply sites, particularly as directional 
signals were frequently sent in the autumn of 1942 to guide U-boats to the U-tankers.
Tonnage Race: Facts, Figures, Fallacies
Within the German navy there were two differing views of the U-boat war. On the one 
hand, the Naval Staff wanted to concentrate on attacking sea lines of communication 
and individual transports vital to the war effort. On the other hand, Dönitz right from 
the start upheld a conception of tonnage warfare. To him, the U-boat war had always 
been a struggle against the Allies’ merchant tonnage, not ships performing particular 
missions.
On 15 April 1942, Dönitz briefly summarized this conception in his war diary:33
1. The enemy merchant navies are a collective factor. It is therefore immaterial where any one ship 
is sunk, for it must ultimately be replaced by new construction.
2. What counts in the long run is the preponderance of sinkings over new construction. Ship-
building and arms production are centered in the United States, while England is the European 
outpost and sally port.
In Dönitz’s estimate of the enemy’s potential, every ship sunk counted double—not 
only in terms of mere tonnage but also through elimination of its cargo, which was 
lost to the enemy’s arms industry. He believed that the war at sea would be decided 
by the “race” between the number of ships sunk and the rate of new construction: if 
for a lengthy period of time Germany were to sink more ships than its enemies could 
replace, the British economy and defense effectiveness were bound to slacken and 
eventually collapse.
In Dönitz’s opinion, the tonnage war also constituted an effective contribution to 
the prevention of a second front and at the same time to the direct defense of France 
and Norway. Since the Allies were constantly increasing their shipbuilding capacity, 
the time factor played a crucial role. It was imperative that the maximum tonnage be 
sunk as fast as possible, before the enemy could make good the number of ships sunk. 
In a briefing to Hitler on 14 May 1942, Dönitz emphatically advocated the sinking 
of enemy tonnage “where as much as possible can be sunk as cheaply as possible, i.e., 
incurring only minor losses.” He also stressed to Hitler the importance of sinking 
ships as soon as possible: “What is sunk today is more effective than what is not sunk 
until around 1943.” 34 Optimistically, he pointed out that the race between the Allied 
building of new merchantmen and the sinking of them by U-boats was “in no way 
hopeless.” In this context, he presented the following quantitative analysis of Allied 
shipbuilding capacities. In 1942, the United States would build new ships totaling 6.5 
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million GRT, and the British Empire would build new ships totaling approximately 
1.6 million GRT, giving a combined total of 8.1 million; in 1943 the Allies would reach 
approximately 10.3 million GRT. From this calculation, Dönitz drew the conclusion 
that it was necessary to sink 700,000 GRT per month in 1942 to offset the newly built 
ships. Anything sunk in addition to 700,000 GRT would decrease the Allied maritime 
transport capacity in absolute terms.
Dönitz was of the opinion that taking into account the successes achieved by other 
means of naval warfare, including mines, surface forces, and the Luftwaffe, as well as by 
the Japanese and Italian naval campaigns, this result had already been achieved. Going 
by the German reports on sinkings, his assessment was surely correct from a subjective 
point of view. For March 1942 alone the Naval Staff had calculated a total loss of 362 
enemy ships of 1,095,493 GRT. However, Allied losses were in fact considerably lower; 
in the first quarter of 1942 they really only averaged 644,568 GRT per month. Thus, on 
the basis of Dönitz’s own capacity calculations for the year 1943, the Axis powers would 
eventually have had to increase their monthly rate of ship sinking to over 860,000 GRT 
on average to thwart the Allied strategy directed against Europe.
On 27 August 1942, Section 3 of the Naval Staff—responsible for the evaluation of 
intelligence—concluded that if the number of sinkings remained the same and Allied 
plans for new ships were maintained, the difference between new ships and sinkings 
would decline considerably and “in purely numerical terms the tonnage of the enemy 
powers would have reached its lowest point at the turn of 1942–43.” 35 Section 1 of the 
Naval Staff (i.e., the Operations Section) had to reconsider the strategic objectives of the 
economic war. Should priority be given to hitting the supply traffic heading for Great 
Britain, or should the enemy’s overall tonnage potential be the prime target?
In a lengthy study published on 9 September 1942, Section 3 reduced this question to its 
crucial point: “In an economic war, can a decisive influence be gained by the sinking of 
ships alone, regardless of where and whether laden or unladen, or must specific tonnage 
in specific areas be sunk in order to achieve this aim?” The study also estimated the ene-
my’s monthly output of new ships at 750,000 GRT currently, rising to over 800,000 GRT 
by the end of 1942, and expected to reach a monthly average level of some 900,000 GRT 
in 1943. During the first eight months of 1942 the enemy had suffered a net loss (i.e., the 
difference between the number of newly built ships and ships sunk) of 3,380,000 GRT, 
which had forced the delay, at least for the time being, of a second front in Europe. The 
U-boats had accounted for 78 percent of this achievement, making the performance of 
this arm the absolute “yardstick for the success of the merchant war.” 36
The study by Section 3 pointed out that whereas in 1942 the U-boats had achieved their 
greatest results by launching surprise attacks into areas where the enemy’s defenses 
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were weak, it would hardly be possible to repeat such successes. The number of U-boats 
would have to be significantly increased, and the U-boats’ fighting power against de-
fenses would have to be enhanced “in order to keep previous monthly sinkings achieved 
at the same level.” For the vital strategic question of the race between launchings and 
sinkings, Section 3 produced a pessimistic prognosis: “However, in view of increased 
output of new ships from the end of 1942, a permanent increase in the monthly sinkings 
to about 1,300,000 GRT will be necessary in order to achieve a reduction in tonnage 
equivalent to the current one. Given the situation, it is questionable whether such a high 
rate of sinkings can be achieved on a permanent basis.” 37
The obvious discrepancy between what was desired and what was feasible was soon 
manifest in the Atlantic, where the U-boats were considered to be “the main pillar in the 
supply war.” By falling back on the argument that “in history no war has been won by 
employing just one means of warfare,” the Naval Staff was unconsciously moving to a 
view that was close to actual conditions.38 In light of enormous American capacities and 
of U.S. production methods in shipbuilding, Germany could never win a race between 
the building of new ships and sinkings. The Naval Staff was forced to recognize “that 
the enemy is about to match the figures for sinkings with its figures for building, or at 
least to reduce the previous losses of tonnage.” 39
A comparison of Allied shipbuilding capacity and German estimates for 1942 and 
1943 (see the figure) reveals that both Dönitz and the Naval Staff were accurate in their 
predictions and regarded a further increase in 1943 as possible. Actual new Allied ton-
nage in 1943, however, exceeded the German estimates by nearly four million gross 
registered tons.40
Within the German Naval Command hopes were expressed that in the long term the 
enemy would reach material limits in his output of new ships and face difficulties in 
providing crews for the new vessels. These hopes, however, proved unrealistic. In the 
pure tonnage war, the race became hopeless in the last quarter of 1942. Undoubtedly 
the Allies continued to have a strategic Achilles’ heel in the problem of sea transport, 
as the Naval Staff explained once again: “They have or manufacture enough, but they 
cannot transport enough for waging war, the economy, and their food supply. Against 
this weakness the import war must continue to be waged with all means.” 41 Whether 
Germany would succeed in warding off an Allied offensive by conducting a “supply 
war” remained for the moment an open question.
The answer was not long in coming. On 8 November 1942, only three weeks after the 
Naval Staff was still arguing that the shortage of shipping capacity was frustrating the 
enemy’s strategic plans and depriving him of his operational freedom of action, the 
Allies took the initiative in North Africa and in the Mediterranean. Now, Grand Adm. 
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Erich Raeder was forced to admit to Hitler that the enemy was in a position to use his 
available sea transport capacity for strategic purposes and could launch another major 
operation in December.42 This assessment was based on new calculations concluding 
that in September the enemy had already offset his monthly losses from sinkings by 
building new ships.43
The Naval Staff was well aware that in the battle against enemy shipping capacity, the 
manpower factor played an important role. Therefore, the manpower bottleneck facing 
the Allies was to be intensified by increased effectiveness of weapons—for example, with 
a new torpedo ignition, which should have a tremendous destructive power. However, 
the Naval Staff shrank from endorsing the principles of a war of annihilation, since 
it would be “the first instance within the annals of naval warfare that an order to use 
force against shipwrecked personnel would be given.” 44 However, during the Nuremberg 
trials after the war the “Laconia order,” issued by Dönitz to all U-boat commanders on 
16 September 1942, was interpreted by the prosecution as a demand for the destruction 
of shipwrecked persons, in violation of international law.45
The Defeat of the U-boats in 1943
Between 1 and 20 March 1943 alone, U-boats in the Atlantic sank no fewer than seventy 
ships, sixty of them in the context of operations against convoys. During that month 
the shipping capacity lost to attack by Axis U-boats throughout the world reached 
643,337 GRT, 512,303 GRT in the Atlantic. But Allied antisubmarine warfare operations 
grew more effective month by month. The size of naval and naval air forces involved 
rose continuously, and there was a steady improvement in weapons technology and in 
tactical and operational command and control. On 13 December 1942 the British had 
achieved their great breakthrough in deciphering the U-boat code.46 Thereafter the 
entire radio traffic of U-boat Command’s Atlantic operations was once again read, with 
only brief delay.
At the beginning of January 1943 Dönitz had at his disposal 212 frontline boats, of 
which 164 were earmarked for the North Atlantic. Of these Atlantic U-boats, more 
than ninety were at sea on any given day. Further increases were foreseen. In view 
of these figures, the operational advantages provided by Ultra gradually declined, 
for the simple reason that the convoys now had very little chance of evading U-boat 
formations.47 But the Admiralty’s convoy routing proved so successful notwithstanding 
that Dönitz presumed the enemy countermeasures were based on actual knowledge of 
U-boat positions. Doubts about the security of the German cipher system reemerged, 
because some of the British reports of U-boat positions that were regularly deciphered 
by B-Dienst (the naval code-breaking office) coincided closely with actual conditions 
and could not be explained by the results of enemy reconnaissance or radio direction 
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finding alone.48 However, the German experts went down a false trail, wrongly blaming 
Germany’s technological inferiority in the area of radar.
At the beginning of March 1943 there were fifty boats in three patrol lines in the North 
Atlantic. Four Allied convoys ran into these and experienced serious losses. But the 
volume of Allied naval transport in the Atlantic increased significantly, because more 
and more troops and war materiel had to be brought across to Britain. Between 6 and 
11 March some forty U-boats engaged in action against two eastbound convoys, which 
suffered the loss of sixteen ships, 79,836 GRT overall. Only one U-boat was lost. Several 
days later, forty boats were operating against the eastbound convoys SC.122 (sixty ships) 
and HX.229 (forty ships). The battle lasted four days and was the most bitterly fought of 
the entire war. The Allies lost twenty-one ships, 140,842 GRT.49
Dönitz described this fighting as “the greatest success achieved in a convoy battle to 
date;50 the tactical concept of a purposeful and massive employment of U-boats in differ-
ent groups appeared at last to be producing vital results. One important reason for these 
successes—in addition to the large number of boats in the area of operations—was that 
B-Dienst had once again broken Allied radio codes for convoy routing (Naval Cypher 
No. 3). With the support of the B-Dienst, between February and March 1943, 54 percent 
of all North Atlantic convoys were sighted and reported by U-boats, and 24 percent 
were actually attacked by U-boats groups. This was the highest level of location of and 
attack against convoys in the entire war. Yet a glance at the actual situation in the North 
Atlantic revealed that in these critical days, aside from the convoys HX.229 and SC.122, 
another fourteen convoys were also under way, either eastward or westward. All except 
one of them escaped unscathed.
During this critical phase, there was some doubt within the Admiralty as to whether the 
convoy system could be maintained at all in the future, particularly as the large num-
bers of U-boats operating in the Atlantic made it very difficult to take evasive action. Yet 
there was no alternative. Some months later, in December 1943, by then secure in the 
knowledge of the coming Allied victory, the Admiralty made an analysis of the bitter 
and fluctuating convoy battles of March, concluding that “the Germans never came so 
near to disrupting communications between the New World and the Old as in the first 
twenty days of March 1943.” 51
After the war both British and American naval histories quoted this sentence from the 
“Monthly A/S [antisubmarine] Report” of December 1943 without qualifying it, thereby 
encouraging the erroneous belief that in March 1943 the German U-boat campaign in 
the Atlantic was within reach of imminent, decisive victory and Britain on the verge of 
defeat. There is no doubt that the high losses of that month brought supply problems 
and caused damage to the British war economy, but on the whole Britain’s supplies and 
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the preparations for the strategic offensive in Europe were no longer directly threat-
ened—the massive American shipbuilding program was already taking effect. From the 
autumn of 1942 the monthly rate of new building exceeded losses by so clear a margin 
that the U-boats could only delay, not prevent altogether, the Allied seizure of the strate-
gic initiative.
In April 1943, faced with the heavy fighting and high submarine losses of the spring of 
1943 (nineteen boats in February and seventeen in March), Dönitz—since 30 January 
1943 the new commander in chief of the navy—told Hitler that he had serious doubts 
whether the U-boat war in the Atlantic would be successful in the long run. His hopes 
and demands concentrated on increasing the monthly output of the U-boat building 
program to thirty boats, “in order to prevent the ratio of losses to newly built boats from 
becoming too unfavorable.” 52 However, by 24 May 1943 Dönitz had no choice but to call 
a halt to attacks on convoys in the North Atlantic and withdraw the boats to the south. 
In May 1943, because of heavy Allied air cover, forty-one boats had been lost, a figure 
out of all proportion to their successes.
At the same time the mobilization of the American shipbuilding industry reached its 
first peak. From January to May 1943 Allied merchant-ship building exceeded sink-
ings by more than three million gross registered tons. The increasing buildup of Allied 
maritime transport capacity sustained the British people and their war production, 
securing the decisive strategic base for the Allied offensive in Europe. Paying a U-boat 
for the sinking of each Allied merchant ship as of the spring of 1943, Dönitz had clearly 
lost the “tonnage race,” and his staff knew the facts and figures. Neither more nor better 
U-boats could make a difference.53
Conclusions
In the spring of 1943, Dönitz and many officers in the Naval Command still believed 
that only the deployment of more boats of the improved Type VII C would force a 
strategic decision in the Atlantic in the face of Allied antisubmarine warfare, which 
Dönitz himself noticed and assessed realistically. First, enemy reconnaissance aircraft 
and escort vessels had been fitted with precision radar equipment, resulting in frequent 
surprise attacks on surfaced U-boats at night and during bad visibility. These attacks 
often damaged or sank the boats—increasingly so in the Bay of Biscay, where the British 
had finally gained such air superiority that the passage of the boats through this area 
quickly became the most dangerous phase of an operation.54
Second, and no less important, the Allied development of long-range air reconnaissance 
in the Atlantic became more and more intensive. On 3 September 1942, with deepest 
concern, Dönitz had predicted “that the day was coming when in almost all areas of the 
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North Atlantic—the U-boats’ principal battle ground—the situation in the air would be 
just as bad around the convoys. This would reduce the chances of success of the U-boats 
to an unacceptable degree unless adequate countermeasures were taken.” 55
A third development was the Allies’ own increasing experience. Once a submerged U-
boat had been discovered by an experienced antisubmarine warfare group with ASDIC, 
its slow submerged speed did not allow drastic evasive maneuvers. After being fixed and 
suffering the effects of ever-improving weapons, there was little chance of escape.
There were clear alarms that the established concept of the U-boat no longer promised 
success. The U-boat in service until then had, in fact, been only a submersible—a mobile 
torpedo boat with long seagoing endurance and the ability to vanish from the surface 
for relatively short periods of time. Underwater the boat was very slow (though at the 
lowest creeping speed it could remain submerged for nearly fifty hours). The exploita-
tion of Ultra information, the growing surveillance of the Atlantic, and the advent of 
powerful submarine-hunting groups and, especially, offensive airborne antisubmarine 
operations soon showed that the previous concept of U-boat operations was doomed to 
failure.
In the face of these changes, from the summer of 1943 the German U-boat authorities 
underestimated the situation and planned badly. On the one hand, they began build-
ing modern and powerful submarines. On the other hand, they continued building and 
employing the old submersibles well into 1944, although their performance capabilities 
no longer met the requirements of the changed warfare conditions.
The few missions of the Types XXI and XXIII boats put the superior capabilities of the 
new U-boat designs to the test.56 No boat of these types was detected or destroyed by 
antisubmarine warfare forces. The only losses occurred during Allied air attacks on na-
val yards and bases or during surface cruising in mine-infested German coastal waters. 
The Allied antisubmarine warfare forces and the “technology developed during the war 
were designed to exploit the old U-boat’s reliance on the surface. How the Allies would 
have dealt with a deep diving, very fast U-boat which did not need to surface to fire its 
torpedoes remains a mystery—one of the great what ifs of the War.” 57
After 1945, the U.S. Navy faced the possibility of a future Soviet submarine threat based 
on high-speed Type XXI U-boats. However, in the meantime the navy used two U-boats 
of this type in a series of tests to determine the effectiveness of its own antisubmarine 
warfare techniques. On 4 June 1946 the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Adm. Chester 
W. Nimitz, wrote to President Harry Truman that these tests “demonstrated that this 
particular submarine can with relative immunity attack a convoy or task group screened 
by the usual means and in deep water is virtually immune from destruction by any ship 
or aircraft or combination of both yet developed.” 58
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The Shipping of Southeast Asian Resources  
Back to Japan
National Logistics and War Strategy
KEN-ICHI AR AKAWA
A major goal of the Greater East Asia War, according to the imperial decree declaring 
war, was to secure the so-called Southern Resources Area and to deliver raw materials 
to Japan, in order to counter what Tokyo perceived to be the economic aggression of the 
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in the form of a complete embargo. In 
other words, Japan tried to replace its supply of strategic materials, which it had largely 
imported from the embargoing powers, by taking Southeast Asian resources by force.
Previous research on this subject has focused on the problem of Japanese shipping. Ship-
ping was indeed a bottleneck for Japan’s wartime economy, and Japan’s unexpectedly 
high shipping losses precluded the importation of sufficient resources from Southeast 
Asia, resulting in the disintegration of the home economy. However, if the war is viewed 
in its entirety, Japan’s shipping losses were less than predicted during the first year of the 
war—that is, through the fall of 1942—because of faulty American torpedoes, among 
other reasons. It was not until 1943 that Japan’s shipping losses increased rapidly, owing 
to increasingly effective U.S. submarine and air attacks. After 1943, the military momen-
tum too lay on the Allies’ side, and the possibility of an ultimate Axis victory evaporated 
rapidly. Because of the increasing and enormous shipping losses suffered from this time 
onward, Japan’s resource transportation system functioned less and less efficiently.
This chapter examines the origins of the strategic concept for shipping southern 
resources back to Japan, the plans developed to realize the concept, the organizations 
implementing the plans, and the actual results. Regarding the ships used, the “C” ships 
(merchant ships for civilian use) and “A” and “B” ships (merchant ships requisitioned 
by the army and navy, respectively) played key roles. It is important to emphasize that 
the origins of the Southern Resources Shipment System predated Japan’s war with the 
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Origins of the Southern Resources Shipment System
Japan’s incursion into central China in 1937 sparked international concern, including 
in the United States. Tokyo first began seriously to consider the shipment of resources 
from Southeast Asia in the summer of 1940, when the U.S. government began turning 
its threats of economic sanctions into action. Specifically, Japanese authorities were 
spurred by the rapid development of events in the European war and had drafted an 
Emergency Plan for Materials Mobilization, a study concerning the impact of a war with 
the United States and Great Britain on the supply of and demand for major strategic 
materials. The findings were extremely discouraging.
According to this study, if Japan joined the war on the side of the Axis powers and cut 
itself off economically from the United States and Great Britain, its supply of strategic 
materials would dwindle to a third of 1940 levels. Faced with such dire predictions, the 
Japanese military responded not by avoiding war but by frantically rushing to stock-
pile strategic materials before the outbreak of such a war, through Special Imports and 
Early Imports Programs and, after the outbreak of war, by developing plans to seize the 
Southern Resources Area by force and thereby to establish a long-term, self-supplying 
structure for national self-preservation.
On 6 June 1941, the Japanese Supreme Command adopted a document, entitled “An 
Outline of Southern Policy,” which stated:
The purpose of the Southern Policy is to insure Japan’s survival and self-defense, and to expand 
Japan’s overall defense capabilities. In order to realize this, relations (especially economic rela-
tions) with the countries in the south, i.e. French Indochina, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies, and 
others (in order of priority) will be maintained and strengthened. The main method by which this 
objective will be attained will be diplomacy. If, however, the United States, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands should implement an embargo against Japan, or if China should join these countries 
and cooperatively establish an anti-Japanese encirclement and pressure Japan, Japan will have no 
recourse but to resort to military force in order to insure her survival and self-defense. If the fall of 
the British home islands in the European War should become certain, the policies included herein, 
in particular the diplomatic measures to be carried out with respect to the Dutch East Indies, shall 
be strengthened and our objectives attained.1
By early June 1941 Germany had already abandoned its plans to invade Britain and 
had completed its preparations to invade the Soviet Union. Operation Barbarossa 
began on 22 June 1941. On 25 June, Japan’s “Plan to Promote the Southern Policy” 
was approved by the Imperial Supreme Command, Government Liaison Confer-
ence (hereafter “Liaison Conference”), and the cabinet and was sent to the emperor 
for his approval.2 The emperor questioned its necessity, to which Army Chief of Staff 
Sugiyama Hajime replied that it was necessary for the establishment of the Greater East 
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and that it included plans for the occupation of southern 
French Indochina, so as to establish a stable East Asian defensive order. Such steps had 
to be taken before an embargo and other economic sanctions were put into place.
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A Liaison Conference session of 2 July ratified the “Outline of Imperial Policy to Deal 
with the Change of Events.”3 Its main points concerned parallel efforts to advance both 
northward and southward. The measures for advancing to the south that had been 
agreed on in the earlier “Plan to Promote the Southern Policy” would be strengthened, 
regardless of the risk of war with Britain and the United States. In response to this deci-
sion, the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands froze all Japanese assets in 
their respective countries in early August and established a total embargo against Japan.
Development and Implementation of the Complete Embargo on Japan
Before the complete embargo, Japan had envisioned the use of trade to secure southern 
resources—that is, such resources would be peacefully imported to meet Japan’s needs. 
The changes from peaceful importation to the “returning” by force of raw materials 
from occupied areas and from trade to “compulsory trade” were closely related to the 
freeze of Japan’s overseas assets and the complete embargo in August. The severing of 
trade with the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands included trade with those 
nations’ economic spheres of influence, such as India, Burma, Malaya, the Straits Settle-
ments (with Singapore as the capital), Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, 
New Zealand, and the Philippines. As of 1935, Japan relied on these areas for more than 
90 percent (in terms of import value) of its crude oil needs. Of that total, fully 76 percent 
was imported from the United States and 16 percent from the Dutch East Indies and 
British Borneo.
Japan’s leaders, in particular its military leaders, feared that if the embargo continued 
the empire would collapse. They therefore decided on war against the United States, 
Britain, and the Netherlands to preserve Japan’s very existence, and they turned to se-
curing the Southern Resources Area. If Japan was to maintain its 1935 levels of imports 
of the main strategic materials, however, the Southern Resources Area would have to 
supply almost six times the amount it had in 1935.
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, many consumer products in Japan 
were in short supply. Sugar, for example, became a rationed item and more difficult to 
obtain. Japan was not the only country that in anticipation of war stockpiled strategic 
materials not available domestically. From 1939 to 1940, or soon after the outbreak of 
war in Europe, such imports as processed sugar to the Netherlands decreased, but these 
same imports to Britain increased rapidly by approximately 450 percent. Soon after the 
start of the Pacific War, Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki likewise ordered the army’s requisi-
tioned A (civilian) ships to carry sugar from Taiwan and other areas on their return 
journeys to Japan. Owing to the higher rate of imports, Japan’s foreign currency reserves 
were drained more rapidly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. This in turn re-
sulted in strict foreign-currency controls. Imports of consumer products that had to be 
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purchased with foreign currency were given low priorities and were reduced. Whenever 
possible, such products were purchased from yen-bloc countries, such as Taiwan.
Because of these factors, Japanese imports from the Dutch East Indies decreased rapidly 
after 1937, until they reached almost zero in 1940. Meanwhile, Malaya exported more 
than it imported—retaining a particularly large trade surplus with the United States, 
and importing goods mainly from the rest of Asia. In 1940, more than 56 percent of its 
exports, by value, were rubber and related products, and more than 25 percent were 
accounted for by tin. In the same year, 26 percent of its imports were food, and more 
than 35 percent were manufactured goods. Broadly speaking, when Japan began the 
Greater East Asia War in 1941, the Dutch East Indies lost more than 60 percent of its 
peacetime trade, while British Malaya lost more than 80 percent of its exports and just 
under 40 percent of its imports.
The Decision for War and the Outlook for Southern Resource Shipments
The “Outline of Imperial Policy,” adopted by the Imperial Conference on 6 September 
1941, set a deadline for diplomacy, stating, “If by early October there is no reason-
able hope of having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned 
above, we will immediately make up our minds to prepare for war against America (and 
Britain and the Netherlands).” On 16 October, the cabinet of Prime Minister Konoe 
Fumimaro resigned, to be replaced by a Tōjō cabinet. When Tōjō assumed the prime 
minister’s position, the emperor directed him to “return to the state of a blank piece of 
paper and reconsider the problem of peace or war, regardless of the decision of Septem-
ber 6.” In accordance with these instructions, the Tōjō cabinet in late October debated 
whether “to make war or to sustain perseverance.” At this time, a systematic evalua-
tion was conducted regarding the resources that could be obtained in the south if war 
broke out and the problems entailed in bringing them back to Japan. As a result of these 
deliberations, the Liaison Conference of 1 November 1941 “decided upon war with the 
United States, Britain and the Netherlands, with the outbreak of hostilities scheduled for 
early December.” 4
When discussing whether “to make war or to sustain perseverance,” Japan’s leaders were 
most interested in the impact on Japan’s national power, in particular on the outlook for 
importing critical strategic raw materials. A key problem concerned the availability of 
shipping capacity to transport such raw materials to Japan in the event of war. During 
this debate, forecasts were made of shipping losses and maritime transport capabili-
ties. A comparison of figure 1, “Projected and Actual Shipping Losses,” and figure 2, 
“Projected and Actual Civilian Shipping Capacity,” shows that actual shipping capacity 
was less than predicted from the second quarter of 1942 (April through June) onward, 
arakawa  213
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch13-Arakawa.indd  September 11, 2013 1:11 PM
or half a year before actual shipping losses exceeded predictions, which was not until the 
fourth quarter of that year (October through December).
The earliest recorded plan for the transfer of southern resources to Japan , including the 
issue of shipping, was that known as “Details of Ship Allocations” (hereafter referred 
to as the “October 1941 Plan”). This was part of the “Calculations of the Supply Capa-
bilities for Critical Materials,” dated 22 October 1941, which was one of the so-called 
Sugiyama Memos. This plan determined that an annual volume of 960,000 tons of 
critical materials had to be transported from the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and 
Malaya (the “A” regions, Indochina and Thailand being the “B” regions), and assigned 
the necessary C (civilian) ships to this task.
A plan entitled “Charts Regarding Freighters” (hereafter the “December 1941 Plan”) 
provided more detail; it was included in the “General Plan on Measures for Manag-
ing the Southeast Asian Economies,” dated 18 December 1941. According to this 
detailed plan, 2,814,000 tons of materials were scheduled to be shipped back from the 
FIGURE 1 






1942 1st qtr. 250 178 80 45
1942 2nd qtr. 250 167 70 42
1942 3rd qtr. 250 209 155 74
1942 4th qtr. 250 403 202 50
1943 1st qtr. 250 366 243 66
1943 2nd qtr. 250 371 329 89
1943 3rd qtr. 250 386 320 83
1943 4th qtr. 250 667 472 71
Source:  Ōi Atsushi, Kaijō  goeisen (Tokyo: Asahi Sonorama, 1983), pp. 374–85.
FIGURE 2
Projected and Actual Civilian Shipping Capacity (thousands of gross tons)
YEAR PROJECTED ACTUAL DIFFERENCE
1942 1st qtr. 7,719 8,611 892
1942 2nd qtr. 10,561 9,291 –1,270
1942 3rd qtr. 13,590 10,726 –2,864
1942 4th qtr. 13,461 10,853 –2,608
1943 1st qtr. 13,215 9,148 – 4,067
Sources: Projections from Sanbō  Honbu [Japan, Army General Staff], ed., Sugiyama Memo (Jyo) (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967), vol. 1, 
p. 467. Actual capabilities from Senpaku Uneikai, ed., Senpaku Uneikai Kaishi (Zenpen) Jyo, 1947, pp. 589–90, National Institute for 
Defense Studies Archives, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, Japan.
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A regions in 1942. Of this total, the C ships would carry 960,000 tons (or 34 percent of 
the total), and the army’s A ships and the navy’s B ships would carry 1,854,000 tons (or 
66 percent). Exports to Japan were prioritized into four classifications, with the C ships 
assigned the two top classifications, and with the lower classifications transported, if 
possible, by the A and B ships.
A third plan was the top secret “Allocation of Ships according to the Materials Mobi-
lization Plan” (hereafter the “June 1942 Plan”). The drafter of this plan is unknown. 
It was originally dated 11 March 1942 and revised on 11 June of that year. It called for 
the transport in 1942 of 2,300,000 tons of materials from the A region (roughly five 
hundred thousand tons less than called for in the December 1941 Plan). C ships would 
carry 1,203,000 tons (or 52 percent of the total, which was 25 percent greater than that 
assigned under the December 1941 Plan). For their parts, the A and B ships would trans-
port 1,095,000 tons (or 48 percent of the total, an approximately 40 percent reduction 
from the December 1941 Plan).
As can be seen in figure 2, the total projected volume for C ships during 1942 was 
45,331,000 tons, but the actual total was 39,481,000 tons, or 87 percent of the planned 
volume. Comparison of the June 1942 Plan and the Shipping Administrative Associa-
tion’s “Chart of Maritime Transport, Planned and Actual” (hereafter the “SAA’s Chart”) 
reveals that of the 3,112,000 tons of materials scheduled for transport in 1942 from the 
A and B regions on C ships, a total of 1,601,000 tons, or 51.4 percent of the total, was ac-
tually transported. The June 1942 Plan also shows that while A ships were assigned the 
transport of 832,000 tons of materials, B ships were assigned 1,553,000 tons, just under 
twice as much as the A ships.
How did the plans for transporting the southern resources fare in 1942? Accurate 
records have not yet been found. However, figure 3, “Actual Imports of Southern Re-
sources in 1942,” is assembled from the following three sources: the Tanaka Documents 
(believed to have been compiled around 1943); statistics compiled by the U.S. Strategic 
Bombing Survey, compiled around 1950; and the Iwatake Study, prepared in 1980, based 
on the Ministry of Finance’s Japanese Foreign Trade Annual.
When compared, these three sets of data show that the figures given by the Strategic 
Bombing Survey are the highest (excluding shipments of raw rubber). These data were 
compiled after the war, by a surveying team sent from the United States with the coop-
eration of the Allied General Headquarters to interview Japanese politicians, industrial-
ists, high-level bureaucrats, and military officers. Of the three sources given above, the 
Strategic Bombing Survey’s data are thus believed to be the most reliable. The Iwatake 
Study, based on Ministry of Finance reporting, excludes materials that did not pass 
through customs. The Tanaka Documents are based on the reports sent by the army, 
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navy, and Shipping Administrative Association (SAA) to the Planning Board. This set 
of data is probably the least reliable of the three, because it is questionable whether the 
army and navy accurately informed the Planning Board of the tonnage of materials car-
ried by the A and B ships under their respective jurisdictions.
The data on crude oil and rice shipments included in figure 3 merit special attention. 
The figures for crude oil shipments from the Strategic Bombing Survey are approxi-
mately four times greater than those from the Tanaka Documents, even greatly exceed-
ing the import target for that year. The transport of oil to Japan came under the sole 
jurisdiction of the armed forces, and the amounts transported were highly classified. 
It is believed that the army and navy were wary of each other and thus did not send the 
Planning Board accurate reports of the amounts their respective ships transported back 
to Japan; however, it is also likely that actual oil imports did indeed exceed predictions 
in 1942. Rice imports in 1942 were also five times the target amount. If these figures are 
accurate, it means that in the first year of the war Japan allocated more than 70 percent 
of its maritime shipping capacity (excluding tankers) assigned to the Southern Resources 
Area to shipments of rice, whereas the original plans called for an allocation of only 
about 10 percent of shipping capacity for this basic staple.
FIGURE 3
Actual Imports of Southern Resources in 1942 (thousands of gross tons)
RESOURCE TANAKA DATA USSBS* DATA IWATAKE DATA TARGET VOLUME
Nickel 21.1 100
Manganese 17.4 100
Iron ore 135.2 215 131.7 800
Tin 2.8 3.8 20
Bauxite 238.1 305 2 400
Copper ore 0.6 6.8 0 100
Rubber 20.8 29.7 44.2 200
Hemp 14.4 — 10.5 80
Copra 21 — 0 350
Crude oil 330.7 1,295.2 — 1,100
Rice — 1,527.7 1,341.8 286
Scrap iron — 9 2 164
* U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
Sources: Tanaka data from Tanaka Shinichi, Nihon Senso Keizai Hishi (Tokyo: Computer Age, 1975), pp. 228–29; U.S. Strategic 
Bombing Survey, Nihon Senso Keizai no Hōkai (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1950); Iwatake data from Iwatake Teruhiko, Nanpō 
gunseika no keizai shisaku [Economic Policies under the Southern Army’s Administration] (Tokyo: Ryukei Shosha, 1995), vol. 2, 
charts 2–15; target volume from “Besshi Daiichi Kamotsusen Kankei,” in Committee No. 6, “Nanpo Keizai Taisaku Yō kō,” 
12 December 1941, National Institute for Defense Studies Archives, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, Japan, and “Showa 17-nendo 
Nanpō Chiiki yorino Busshi Shutokuryo narabini korega Haisen Kubun Keikakuhyo,” 11 June 1942, National Institute for Defense 
Studies Archives, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, Japan.
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Organizations and Procedures Involved in the Shipments of Southern Resources
On 20 November 1941, the Liaison Conference approved the “Outline of Administrative 
Control of Occupied Areas of Southeast Asia.” The document specified that the main 
objectives of Japan’s administration of the occupied areas were the reestablishment of 
order, the rapid securing of raw materials critical for national defense, and the establish-
ment of a self-supply system for the Japanese armies operating in the area. 
To attain these objectives, it was decided that the army and navy would administer the 
occupied areas for the time being. The Liaison Conference would be responsible for 
approving matters critical for such administration, and the army and navy chain of 
command would be responsible for giving the orders necessary to implement such deci-
sions in the occupied areas. As for raw materials, a central organization, in which the 
Planning Board would play a key role, would make all necessary decisions. Important 
issues required the Liaison Conference’s approval, after which the army and navy would 
be responsible for orders to units in the occupied areas.
On the basis of this “Outline of Administrative Control,” an “Army-Navy Agreement 
Regarding the Military Administration of Occupied Areas” was signed on the same 
day, 20 November. This agreement specified the respective administrative areas for 
which the army and navy would assume responsibility. The army was assigned primary 
responsibility, with the navy having secondary responsibility, over Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, British Malaya, Sumatra, Java, British Borneo, and Burma. Meanwhile, the 
navy had primary responsibility over Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, the Molucca Islands, 
Lesser Sunda Islands, New Guinea, the Bismarck Islands, and Guam.
The military services dealt with the problem of administering occupied areas in vari-
ous ways. The navy established a Political Affairs Office for Southeast Asia within 
the Navy Ministry to handle in a unified manner issues involving politics, economic 
development, and raw-material extraction. In the occupied areas high-ranking officers, 
typically fleet commanders, would be directly responsible for administration, acting 
on the orders of the navy minister. The army, on the other hand, did not set up a new 
organization but rather used the same system it had during the Sino-Japanese War.5 In 
other words, the basic structure for the administration of occupied areas came under 
the jurisdiction of the Army General Staff, with administrative problems handled by the 
army minister. In occupied areas, “military administrations” were established directly 
under army commands at the start of the war in the Pacific.
Since existing records do not detail the procedures by which the army actually arranged 
and carried out the sending of southern resources back to Japan, one must make an 
educated guess, but the outlines probably were as follows. First, the Planning Board 
informed the army “how much” of “what” items was to be sent “from where,” and “by 
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when.” This guidance was probably ordinarily accompanied by a ship assignment plan. 
Upon receiving this request, the Army Section of the Supreme Headquarters—more 
specifically, the Operations Department and the Third Department of the General Staff 
and the Military Preparedness Bureau of the Army Ministry, among others—coordi-
nated with the sections and departments involved and drafted a transport plan; the 
Military Preparedness Bureau was responsible for shipping plans.6 The Army Supreme 
Headquarters then sent the necessary directives to the Shipping Transportation Head-
quarters, located in Ujina, Japan, which had overall responsibility for the requisitioned 
ships under the army’s control.
The next plan was the “Outline of Southern Economic Measures,” which was drafted 
by the Sixth Committee of the Planning Board and approved by a meeting of cabinet 
ministers on 12 December 1941. It stated clearly that the primary objective was the se-
curing of resources in the south. This outline divided the southern area by importance 
to Japan. British Borneo was added to the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya, and the 
Philippines as an “A” region; French Indochina and Thailand continued to be designated 
“B” regions. Most of the A regions were areas assigned to the army. The outline further 
stated that force would be used to secure the resources in the A regions and to prevent 
their export elsewhere.
The Special Military Compulsory Trade method was a form of forced trade under the 
jurisdiction of the armed forces. According to the “Outline of Administrative Con-
trol of Occupied Areas of Southeast Asia” mentioned above, ships, railroads, and port 
facilities were to be controlled by the armed forces, along with all matters pertaining 
to trade and currency exchange. As a rule, local currencies remained in use, except for 
certain cases in which special military coupons were issued. In other words, all matters 
concerning compulsory trade fell under the jurisdiction of army and navy units or the 
military administration offices. This was because “it came to be believed that since such 
compulsory trade would take place in areas of military operations, which involve special 
dangers, the form of military control which would enable the strongest direct interven-
tion by the military, i.e., purchases, transport and sales by the military itself, would be 
most appropriate.”7
The “Outline of Southern Economic Measures” specified the collection of goods, alloca-
tion, and compulsory trade as follows: “(1) Purchases and imports in connection with 
the supply to Japan of collected goods and materials shall for the time being be paid for 
by public accounts; exports of goods to the areas in question shall be handled likewise. 
(2) Exchanges of goods within the areas in question shall be handled in accordance with 
(1) above.”8
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These measures show that civilian goods handled by the military administration were 
to be treated like military goods—that is, goods to be used by the military units in the 
field. The “Public Accounts” mentioned here were the “Special Accounts of Extraor-
dinary War Expenditures.” This compulsory trade method should therefore be classi-
fied as under military rather than national administration. This system had a number 
of merits. First, it enabled the compulsory trade to be fully controlled, which in turn 
enabled the systematic and organized regulation of the supply and demand of various 
materials. Second, transportation costs were borne not by the parties actually involved 
in the trade but rather by the military. Finally, problems related to currency exchange 
rates could be avoided, since payments were not made with differing currencies. On the 
other hand, it can be imagined that the procedures that had to be taken to engage in 
such trade were overly complicated and inefficient, because the military was responsible 
for the accounting and other necessary activities, in which it had little experience.
Under this method, the military’s accounting departments and the sea transport units 
acted simultaneously as foreign-currency banks, maritime transport companies, and 
insurance companies. This method was ultimately used for trade between Manchuria / 
North China and the A regions to the south, as well as between the occupied A regions 
and the B regions in French Indochina and Thailand. In addition, since it was decided 
to use the Special Military Compulsory Trade method for the occupied areas in the 
south, all trade involving at least one party in an occupied area fell under Special Mili-
tary Compulsory Trade.
Military Developments and Shipments of Southern Resources during 1942 
From the Japanese perspective, for half a year after Pearl Harbor the war progressed 
much better than anticipated. The British surrendered in Singapore in February 1942. 
By the time the Dutch forces on Java surrendered on 9 March 1942, the entire Southern 
Resources Area was in Japanese hands, with the exception of the Philippines, where the 
last American forces fighting on Corregidor capitulated on 7 May.
For that first half of 1942, unofficial records exist discussing the volume of materials the 
army shipped back to the home islands, including one entitled “Mainly an Outline of 
Maritime Transport during the First Half of the Greater East Asia War,” by the former 
commander of the army’s ship transportation forces, Lt. Gen. Saeki Bunrō (hereafter the 
“Saeki Memo”). The issue of army shipping during this period will be considered using 
the figures given in the Saeki Memo.
According to the June 1942 Plan, 5,500,000 tons were to be shipped back from the 
southern area (A and B regions combined) in 1942, of which the army’s A ships were 
to carry 832,000 tons. According to the Saeki Memo, the Southern Army transported 
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654,000 tons on A ships from the outbreak of war in December 1941 through May 1942. 
This meant a yearly total of 1,308,000 tons, which would be 157 percent of what was 
planned. Of the army shipments to Japan, 69.1 percent, or 452,000 tons, was rice, which 
constituted 37 percent of all rice shipments to Japan. 
The Saeki Memo also gives data for shipments on A ships of the Southern Army in 
April 1942. According to the “Details of Ship Allocations,” approximately 82 percent, or 
98,000 tons, of the 120,000 total tons to be shipped back to Japan in one month from the 
A regions came from the Dutch East Indies. According to the June 1942 Plan, how-
ever, no A, B, or C ships were allocated to the Dutch East Indies in the second quarter 
(April through June) of 1942. Nevertheless, the Saeki Memo states that 28,500 tons were 
shipped from the Dutch East Indies on the Southern Army’s A ships. If this is true, it 
means that the target amount given in the June 1942 Plan for the first quarter of 1943, 
which was twenty-four thousand tons, had been met about a year earlier.
It should be remembered that the materials shipped back on A and B ships enjoyed ex-
traterritoriality and were not required to pass through customs. It is therefore unlikely 
that accurate import-export records of such shipments ever existed. The volume of 
such shipments was also supposed to be reported to the Planning Board, but the army 
and navy both had a tendency to deflate their reports. The Saeki Memo also states that 
240,000 tons of rice were shipped back from the southern area (excluding Taiwan) in 
April 1942. According to the shipment plans of individual items for 1942 given in the 
SAA’s Chart, however, 259,000 tons of rice shipments were scheduled for April 1942, 
with 156,300 tons actually shipped, which would mean that the Saeki Memo’s data are 
in excess for April by about eighty-four thousand tons.
Estimates of Actual Amounts of Southern Resources Shipped during 1942
Given the scarcity of documents, details of the actual amounts shipped back from the 
southern area can only be estimated. One set of data that is useful in this respect is the 
“Transport Plans and Records” compiled by the SAA immediately after the war, as part 
of its efforts to prepare an association history. However, data revealing how the total 
amount transported in ships came from the southern area are available only from July 
1942, perhaps because the SAA itself was established only in April 1942. Another factor 
to remember is that the data are mainly about shipments on C ships, since it was those 
ships that the SAA was responsible for operating; the SAA data are therefore incomplete 
for shipments made on A and B ships. Furthermore, bauxite, tin, and other metals are 
lumped together as “non-ferrous” materials, meaning that data on shipments of indi-
vidual metals are also incomplete.9
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The amounts of iron ore, nonferrous metals, rice, and crude oil shipped by A and B 
ships combined and C ships have been estimated. The results are given in figure 4. 
According to these estimates, just under 60 percent of the total volume of iron ore and 
nonferrous metals shipped and just under 30 percent of the total amount of rice went to 
Japan on ships controlled by the military—the A and B ships.
In other words, an average of 48 percent of the total volume of these three items shipped 
back to Japan came on the military’s A and B ships. This figure exceeds the total that 
the A and B ships together were scheduled to carry from the southern area in the plan 
for 1942, which was 43 percent of all such shipments. From this, it may be concluded 
that the scheduled amounts of crude oil, rice, and nonferrous metals (especially bauxite) 
were more or less actually shipped in 1942, through the effective use of the A and B 
ships. In particular, the target volume for crude oil, which was 0.6 to one million tons in 
the “Outline of Southern Economic Measures,” was greatly exceeded, with 1.295 million 
tons actually shipped back to Japan.
If Japan had not suddenly lost a large portion of its merchant shipping, this shipping 
system, while perhaps not the most efficient possible, could have provided Japan the 
necessary raw materials during the war. But from the second half of 1942 onward, 
Japan’s war fortunes reversed. Following the disastrous defeat at Midway, especially 
during the battle for Guadalcanal, which took place from August 1942 to the end of 
the year, Japan tried to meet its growing shipping needs by re-requisitioning ships that 
were due to be returned from government service, but it ultimately lost most of them to 
submarine attacks.
While the actual volume shipped declined from 1943 onward, the ratio of shipments 
from the southern area to all shipments combined increased from mid-1943. This 
FIGURE 4
Estimates of Southern Resources Shipments of A, B, and C Ships, 1942 (thousands 
of gross tons)
PERIOD IRON ORE OTHER METALS RICE CRUDE OIL
C ships April–June 1942 15.9 1.2 450 180.1
July–Sept. 1942 19.2 1.3 352 295.9
Oct.–Dec. 1942 53.3 37.4 186 491.8
Jan.–March 1943 — 106.2 117 327.4
C ship total 88.4 146.1 1,105
USSBS data 215 354.1 1,527.7 1,295.2
A/B ships (percentage) 126.6 (58.9) 208 (58.7) 422.7 (27.7)
Source: Senpaku Uneikai, ed., Senpaku Uneikai Kaishi (Zenpen) Jyo, pp. 615–76. Under “other metals,” nickel and manganese 
shipments are from the Tanaka data, while tin, bauxite, and copper ore are from the USSBS data.
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means that Japan prioritized shipments from the southern area. For example, the total 
amounts of nonferrous metals shipped back were approximately three times the total for 
1942, with respect to both the C ship totals and the Strategic Bombing Survey. In 1944, 
American air attacks on Japanese shipping became more frequent and more effective, 
reflecting the deterioration of the overall situation, and shipping losses were four times 
the losses incurred in 1942. Not until late 1943, however, did the United States fix its 
defective submarine-launched torpedoes, dramatically improving their accuracy.10
The rapidly increasing efficiency of the U.S. submarine campaign is reflected in the 
shipping figures. For example, shipments of nonferrous metals, which had increased 
greatly in 1943, were only 42 percent of that total in 1944, according to the Strategic 
Bombing Survey’s figures, while similar figures for crude oil shipments show a 30 per-
cent decline. It is interesting to note that much of the remaining transport capacity was 
used to ship rice and sugar. Just as the Saeki Memo indicates, in the period immedi-
ately after Pearl Harbor much effort had focused on shipments of rice and sugar. Japan’s 
shipments of resources from the southern area seemingly came full circle and by 1944 
were back to basic staples.
The Unification of Shipping Operations
All Japanese merchant shipping, in theory at least, came under the control of the army, 
the navy, or the SAA, but in practice it was as if the army and navy each controlled all 
of the ships, since either could, when necessary, ask the SAA to operate its ships for the 
army’s or navy’s purposes.11 The United States, by comparison, established the federal 
government’s War Shipping Administration on 17 February 1942, which exercised sole 
control over all merchant shipping. Some Japanese realized that shipping coordination 
was getting worse. From the fall of 1942, voices from both the army and navy called for 
the unified operation of all of these ships, to increase Japan’s maritime shipping capac-
ity. But these voices were largely ignored.
It was not until 8 March 1945 that this idea was realized in a meeting of department and 
bureau chiefs of the Army and Navy Ministries. The decision reached was as follows: 
“‘A,’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ ships and related port facilities will be put under unified operation. 
Specifically, this will be done as follows: The sections within the Army and Navy that 
are responsible for operating the ships will be combined, and a unified transportation 
headquarters will rapidly be organized (so that it may begin working by the start of 
April), and will work to realize the unified control of shipping.”12
The Headquarters of War Shipping Administration was thus set up within the Supreme 
Headquarters to control the merchant marine in a unified manner. Its first com-
mander, Admiral Nomura Naokuni, was appointed on 1 May 1945. By that time Japan’s 
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merchant marine totaled approximately 1.8 million tons, or 35 percent of the total at 
the start of the war, while the Americans had 32.8 million tons, or 240 percent of their 
December 1941 total. The Americans thus had eighteen times the shipping available to 
the Japanese. By this late date Japan had lost too much merchant capacity for unifica-
tion to affect the outcome of the war, even had the use of the A-bomb and the Soviet 
declaration of war, both occurring in August 1945, not pushed Japan into a more rapid 
surrender.
Conclusions
The Pacific War is often characterized as a war of supply, especially maritime supply. 
Whichever side could send to the front a force of superior combat capability and keep 
that force supplied eventually won the attrition campaigns. In this context, it is often 
overlooked that for six months after Pearl Harbor the Japanese ships requisitioned 
by the military—the A and B ships—transported more supplies than was originally 
planned. The main problem concerned the C ships, which did not keep up with de-
mand. When the civilian shipping organization was reformed in April 1942 into the 
SAA, this new organization had to overcome more problems than expected. Because of 
these challenges, it was not until mid-1943 that Japan was able to place top priority on 
shipment of southern resources back to Japan. But by then the needs of the military and 
the civilian sector clashed, and it was too late to make compromises.
By 1943 the low standards of the Japanese escort forces—especially their inadequate 
antisubmarine capabilities, including detection technology inferior to that used by 
the British and Americans—became the main reason for the gap between plans and 
reality. By 1944 the U.S. redesign of its flawed torpedoes, in combination with its use of 
cryptography to locate Japanese convoys, greatly increased the U.S. submarine kill rate. 
Thereafter, Japanese shipping losses grew alarmingly, a trend that was accelerated by the 
decline in the general war situation and insufficient (albeit ever-increasing) efforts by 
Japan to build new merchant ships. Thus did the vaunted Southern Resources Shipment 
System crumble away, and by early 1945 shipments from the south to Japan had ceased 
entirely. The seaports of Southeast Asia, occupied by Japan but bypassed by the advanc-
ing Allied forces, had huge stockpiles of raw materials that could not be sent to Japan 
but simply sat.
In retrospect, Japan’s only chance for winning the Pacific War was probably during 
the spring to fall of 1942, if Tokyo had placed more importance on destroying Allied 
maritime supply lines. By severing the maritime transport capabilities of the United 
States, which were the arteries of its war machine, it might have been possible to retain a 
relative superiority in supply capability. Given the severe limitations of Japan’s maritime 
escort capabilities at the time, however, even this strategy would have been difficult to 
arakawa  223
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch13-Arakawa.indd  September 11, 2013 1:11 PM
execute. From 1943 onward the difference in industrial production capability of the two 
sides became even more pronounced, resulting in an ever-increasing superiority of the 
Allies’ combat power. After 1943, therefore, it was no longer possible for Japan to regain 
the momentum by the mere introduction of a few new merchant ships.
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Unrestricted Submarine Victory
The U.S. Submarine Campaign against Japan
JOEL HOLWIT T
Most of the commerce raiding campaigns described in previous chapters had debatable 
impacts on the greater wars. This is not to say that these campaigns were trivial. But 
the British probably would still have lost at Yorktown without American privateers, 
and there is no guarantee the Union would have won any sooner if CSS Alabama had 
never sailed. While there is some argument whether the German U-boat campaigns in 
either world war could have succeeded against the Allies, there is no question that they 
in fact failed.
In sharp contrast to these operations, the U.S. submarine campaign against Japan in 
World War II not only succeeded but played a decisive role in neutralizing the Japanese 
Empire. The U.S. submarine campaign was no fluke or bizarre anomaly. The victory 
resulted from decades of war planning, a final year of specific planning for an unre-
stricted submarine campaign, and innovation and courage in combat by American 
submariners.
It also owed its success, in no small part, to the manner in which Japan’s national lead-
ers mishandled their maritime vulnerability. Despite the unmistakable similarities 
between Japan’s and Great Britain’s geographic situations, as well as the success of Ger-
man U-boats during the two years before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese naval leadership 
gravely mismanaged the merchant marine and made little effort to protect the empire’s 
economic lifelines before hostilities began. But as the previous chapter has shown, the 
Japanese merchant marine performed better than expected from 1942 through 1943 in 
bringing crucial southern resources to the home islands. This early and illusory suc-
cess lulled the Japanese naval leadership into continuing its inadequate antisubmarine 
measures. By 1944, when Japan belatedly attempted to organize and adequately protect 
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Interwar U.S. Submarine Development, Strategy, and Doctrine
From the earliest iteration of the U.S. war plan against Japan, War Plan Orange, the 
United States always intended to achieve victory by preying on Japan’s greatest strate-
gic vulnerability—its reliance, as an island nation, on the importation of war materiel 
by sea.1 Having only a very few natural resources in abundance, Japan required its 
merchant marine to import oil, steel, aluminum, and even foodstuffs. Indeed, despite 
Japan’s own supply of coal, it still required significant imports of coal to meet domestic 
demand, as well as imports of the higher-grade coal necessary for industrial uses. Japan 
also depended on a strong merchant fleet to supply its many island possessions with the 
daily necessities. If Japan’s supply lines could be cut off, not only would Tokyo be unable 
to supply its war machine, but even the Japanese home islands would be choked from 
inexorable economic pressure.2
However, the blockade envisioned by War Plan Orange did not initially include 
submarine warfare. Plan Orange presumed that sufficient naval forces would be 
available to destroy the Japanese fleet and gain control of the sea to enforce a regular 
naval blockade. Surface ships, utilizing cruiser rules of warfare, would maintain that 
blockade.3 Orange envisioned the submarine force’s primary mission as that of a naval 
combatant. In 1936 the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, 
stated, “The primary employment of submarines will be in offensive operations against 
enemy larger combatant vessels. . . . No submarines will be assigned in the early stages 
of the war to operate against enemy trade routes.” 4
American submariners were limited not only by strategy but by law. The United States 
was a signatory to both article 22 of the London Naval Treaty and the London Subma-
rine Protocol of 1936. The two documents, which in this respect were identical, required 
a submarine to remove a merchant ship’s crew to a place of safety before sinking the 
ship. A lifeboat on the open sea, furthermore, was not considered to be a place of safety. 
It did not matter whether the merchant ship belonged to a belligerent nation or a neutral 
nation. It did not matter whether a merchant ship was arguably in the service of a bel-
ligerent nation’s war machine. Regardless of origin or ownership, merchant ships simply 
could not be attacked without warning.5
Consequently, the interwar submarine force planned to support Plan Orange by 
scouting ahead of the battle fleet and skirmishing with the Japanese fleet somewhere 
in the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean. This was a pretty tall order, given that the 
predominant type of submarines built at the end of World War I, the S class, did not 
have the surface speed or endurance needed to make a long transpacific transit and stay 
ahead of the battle fleet. Therefore, the navy used a 1916 congressional authorization 
to build nine “fleet submarines” to investigate the characteristics necessary for future 
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submarines.6 By 1930 the U.S. submarine force had identified the ideal characteristics of 
a fleet submarine: long range, high surface speed, and sufficient weaponry.7
After a subsequent decade of experimentation, submariners developed 1,500-ton (sur-
face displacement) Gato-class fleet submarines. These submarines, as designed, fully 
met the U.S. Navy’s needs in the Pacific. They could regularly make twenty knots on the 
surface, allowing them to proceed far ahead of American surface forces and maintain 
contact with enemy battle fleets. With their displacement, fuel capacity, and technologi-
cal innovations, they had the range to shadow Japanese fleet movements all the way 
from the Sea of Japan or to stay on station for almost two months at a time. The Gato 
class turned out to be extremely versatile and capable, but prewar doctrine and training 
differed greatly from the reality of the war that the submarine force eventually fought.
The U.S. Navy Submarine Force tactical doctrine released in April 1939 broke down the 
strategic missions of scouting and skirmishing into more detailed guidance.8 The doc-
trine explicitly separated attack on fleet units from secondary missions like “patrol.” 9 
The doctrine explained that submarine patrolling differed from “attack” in that the 
former’s purpose was to destroy sea lines of communication, not specific fleet units.10 
The doctrine limited commerce destruction to armed merchant ships and convoys:
Patrol against enemy lines of communication may include the destruction of commerce. It may be 
expected that the convoy system will be used, especially at focal and terminal points. On the high 
seas circuitous routing will be employed. Due to the limitations of submarines in exercising the 
right of visit and search, and the difficulty of distinguishing between enemy and neutral shipping 
because of the disguise of enemy shipping as neutral, submarine operations against enemy com-
merce is limited to attacks on convoys, or attacks on positively identified armed enemy shipping, 
unless unrestricted commerce destruction is directed as a last resort.11
In any case, traditional cruiser warfare was prohibited because of the danger from 
armed merchant ships: “Under the limitations imposed by the laws of war and as inter-
preted in the Treaty of London, submarines cannot be used effectively against merchant 
ships without running undue risk of destruction.” 12
The published doctrine established what the U.S. Navy expected from its submarines, 
with emphasis on attacking enemy fleet units, particularly capital ships, and pro-
hibitions against cruiser warfare. The submarine force doctrine acknowledged the 
remote possibility of unrestricted submarine warfare, “in its operational and tactical 
preparations, [but] the service held a consistent view: the U.S. Navy would not allow 
its submarine captains to attack merchant shipping without warning.”13 Submarine 
commanders like Dick Voge, who commanded USS Sealion at the outbreak of hostili-
ties, even believed that “submarines who [sic] violated [article 22] were subject to being 
‘hunted down and captured or sunk as pirates.’” 14 This view changed dramatically with 
the beginning of the war.
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The Shift to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare
During the early 1940s, the primary mission of the submarine force shifted from naval 
combat to commerce warfare. This change dated from November 1940, when the U.S. 
Navy’s senior leadership had to confront squarely a number of strategic choices. These 
strategic choices were encapsulated in a document that would lay the foundation for the 
American national military strategy in the Second World War—Plan Dog (that is, D).
Unlike many U.S. war plans, Plan Dog was the brainchild of one person, the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO), Adm. Harold R. Stark, who was promoted to this position 
on 1 August 1939. Stark quickly found himself bringing the U.S. Navy up to wartime 
readiness when the Germans invaded Poland only a month later. Stark worked hard to 
enlarge the navy, while also devising an appropriate strategic vision for employing the 
forces he had. Shortly after the reelection of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to a third 
term, Stark committed his thoughts to a long memorandum, which was revised by 
the chief war planners from both the army and the navy. The memorandum was then 
studied and approved by a joint board that included Admiral Stark and the army chief 
of staff, Gen. George C. Marshall. From there the memorandum went to the secretaries 
of state, war, and the navy, who then forwarded it on to the president. Although he never 
formally approved the plan, Roosevelt agreed with its general principles.15
The memo offered several possible scenarios for war involving the United States, as well 
as several plans to go with those scenarios. The planners listed the advantages and dis-
advantages of each one before settling on the fourth (thus D) as the most advantageous 
to the United States no matter how war came, whether from Nazi Germany or imperial 
Japan. Of course, the planners hoped not to fight a two-ocean war, but no matter the cir-
cumstances, they called for immediate aid to Great Britain upon the commencement of 
hostilities. Almost a full year before Pearl Harbor, therefore, the U.S. Navy had already 
adopted a plan that called for first winning the war in the European theater, while fight-
ing a delaying action against the Japanese.16
Plan Dog’s influence on the decision to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare came 
in its conclusion that to fight a delaying action against the Japanese the U.S. Navy would 
have to wage an economic war of attrition. In fact, the American war planners did 
not believe that the United States would be able to defeat Japan totally in a two-ocean 
war, so “it should therefore settle upon a war having a more limited objective than the 
complete defeat of Japan. The objective in such a limited war against Japan would be the 
reduction of Japanese offensive power chiefly through economic blockade.” 17
In a sense, this economic blockade was no different from what War Plan Orange al-
ready projected. But Orange presumed that sufficient naval forces would be available 
to destroy the Japanese fleet and gain control of the sea to enforce such a blockade. By 
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late 1940, however, the United States simply did not have the overwhelming naval forces 
necessary to conduct the blockade operation envisioned by the plan.
Without American control of the western Pacific, there was only one force that could 
still attack Japan’s economy—U.S. submarines. Maintaining their stealth and chances of 
survivability, however, meant abandoning cruiser warfare. Consequently, the campaign 
of economic strangulation against Japan to be waged before the United States could gain 
control of the sea implicitly required unrestricted submarine warfare.
Putting the Rainbow Plans into Effect
Admiral Stark and his chief war planner, Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, subse-
quently used Plan Dog as the template to write the navy’s “Rainbow” war plans, which 
were drafted to defeat the Axis powers. In particular, the new Rainbow 3 plan autho-
rized “Strategical Areas . . . from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and 
merchant aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships 
or aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would be 
detrimental to our own forces.” 18
As soon as Rainbow 3 was complete, Admiral Stark sent advance copies to his fleet 
commanders, including the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Adm. Thomas C. 
Hart. Admiral Hart immediately noticed the section regarding “strategical areas” in 
Rainbow 3, and he queried Stark about how much freedom he had regarding mer-
chant shipping: “The possibilities in raids on Japanese sea communications,—meaning 
shipping other than naval forces,—would be great if our submarines were free to wage 
‘unrestricted’ war.” However, Hart quickly added, “Unless we are otherwise ordered, our 
submarines will not be directed to depart from the War Instructions now in force.” 19
Admiral Stark responded, “The term ‘sea communications’ includes all naval as well 
as merchant shipping. Raids on military and naval supply ships should prove very 
profitable. The question of inability to sink merchant shipping by submarines, without 
warning, is unlikely to arise, since it is probable that all shipping within your reach will 
be under Japanese naval operation or control. . . . The employment of submarines as 
proposed is considered suitable and highly desirable.” 20
Stark’s response highlighted his assumptions about an unrestricted submarine war 
in the Pacific would not produce the sort of backlash that the German unrestricted 
submarine war had caused in World War I. First of all, Stark assessed that there would 
be little or no neutral shipping for U.S. submarines to sink. In his opinion, the remain-
ing merchant ships, all Japanese flagged, would be, although perhaps nominally in the 
employ of Japan’s civilian merchant marine, actually under the control of the Japanese 
military. As such, they would be legitimate military targets, not civilian targets.
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The strategic reasoning of Plan Dog evolved over 1941, particularly after the U.S. Naval 
War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, strongly recommended against a formal block-
ade in the event of a war with Japan and instead recommended the creation of “war 
zones.” Before the Naval War College’s recommendations, whenever Admiral Stark had 
discussed “strategical areas” he had ostensibly been describing “strategic war zones” for 
the defense of the fleet. From this point on, “strategical areas” would come to mean war 
zones for unrestricted air and submarine warfare. This became clear in subsequent cor-
respondence by Stark and his chief war planner, Rear Admiral Turner, who wrote that 
strategical areas, if established, would actually be for unrestricted warfare and that the 
United States would establish them “immediately upon the outbreak of war.” 21
By the end of November 1941 that moment appeared to have arrived. Negotiations be-
tween the United States and Japan had reached a critical impasse. Beginning on 27 No-
vember Admiral Stark issued a number of dispatches to prepare the Pacific Fleet and 
the Asiatic Fleet for war. Among his first dispatches was a message, lengthy but direct 
and to the point, to Admiral Hart: “If formal war eventuates between US and Japan . . . 
instructions for the Navy of the United States governing maritime and aerial warfare 
May 1941 . . . will be placed in effect but will be supplemented by additional instruc-
tions including authority to CINCAF [Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet] to conduct 
unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare.” 22
Two weeks later, between 0753 and 0755 Hawaii time on 7 December 1941, the first 
Japanese bombs fell on Oahu, bringing the stunned U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Army 
units straight into battle. After informing President Roosevelt of the attack, Admiral 
Stark issued his orders to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare at 1752 Washing-
ton time, which was 1222 at Pearl Harbor: “Execute against Japan unrestricted air and 
submarine warfare.” 23
Overcoming Prewar Mistakes
The smoke had not even begun to clear over Pearl Harbor when Admiral Stark issued 
his orders to destroy all Japanese shipping. These orders, however, turned out to be 
easier to transmit than to execute. For almost two years, numerous self-imposed prob-
lems hamstrung the U.S. submarine force.
The most vexing and complicated problem facing the U.S. submarine force turned out 
to be the submariners’ own torpedoes. Just before the war began, the navy’s Bureau of 
Ordnance revealed its top secret warhead for the Mark XIV steam-driven torpedo, with 
the Mark VI magnetic exploder. By all accounts, the weapon was truly remarkable. The 
warhead sensed the magnetic field around an enemy ship and was designed to detonate 
at the point of maximum magnetism, directly underneath the target. The resulting 
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detonation of over six hundred pounds of explosive would snap the target’s keel like a 
toothpick.24
But unbeknownst to the submariners, the Bureau of Ordnance, as both a cost-saving 
measure and a misguided effort to maintain secrecy, never live-tested the Mark VI war-
head. Instead, the bureau presented the untested warhead to the U.S. submarine force 
and claimed that torpedoes carrying it would need only one shot against a target. As it 
turned out, submariners could fire six shots directly at a target, and the torpedoes still 
would not work. Instead, torpedoes ran too deep, exploded prematurely, or reached the 
target but did not explode. Consequently, American submariners would pursue daring 
attacks only to see their torpedo wakes bubble under a target or prematurely detonate, 
giving away their own position.25
If the failure of the American torpedoes was not extraordinary enough, even more 
incredible was the Bureau of Ordnance’s reaction to criticism, steadfastly insisting 
that the problem was not the Mark VI exploder but the aim of American submariners. 
Eventually, submarine force leaders carried out their own tests using fishing nets, un-
derwater cliffs, and even cherry pickers, the latter used to drop torpedo warheads onto 
the ground to see why they failed. At the forefront was Vice Adm. Charles A. Lockwood, 
who would become the commander of the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force from February 
1943 until the end of the war. Throughout the war, Lockwood and his staff persistently 
pursued the torpedo problem. They discovered that the depth-excursion defect was due 
to a combination of the weight of the Mark VI warhead and a poorly designed depth-
sensing mechanism. Lockwood ultimately pulled the problematic magnetic exploder out 
of service after determining it was too complex, eventually determining that the contact 
exploder was improperly constructed as well. Lockwood and his staff finally fixed the 
torpedoes, but it was a painfully prolonged process. American submariners could not 
put to sea knowing that their torpedoes would actually work until October 1943, over 
twenty-one months after the start of hostilities.26 Even so, a few torpedo malfunctions 
continued to plague the American submarine force for the rest of the war, including 
circular runs that could have been responsible for the sinking of as many as eight U.S. 
submarines with all hands.27
The torpedo issue was the most serious problem facing the submarine force, but it was 
hardly the only one. Timid commanding officers and unrealistic tactics developed in 
the interwar period constrained the submarine force just as much as did the torpedoes. 
When the test of war came, neither the tactics nor the commanders shaped up. Some 
U.S. submarine commanding officers simply could not handle the stress of combat. 
Others were relieved out of hand for lack of aggressiveness. Simultaneously, American 
submariners were forced to reinvent their tactics and learn how to fight while in combat, 
an unenviable task for any combatant.28
232  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch14-Holwitt.indd  August 12, 2013 8:54 AM
Younger and more aggressive American submarine commanders eventually proved 
equal to the task. Without a doubt, the one submarine commander who most instilled 
aggressiveness and tenacity into the force was Lt. Cdr. Dudley W. “Mush” Morton, com-
manding officer of USS Wahoo. Starting in January 1943, Morton’s ferocity transformed 
U.S. submarine warfare. He audaciously took Wahoo into a Japanese-controlled harbor 
in Wewak, New Guinea, using only an enlarged almanac map as his chart. Although 
he was in water that was in depth less than a third of Wahoo’s length, Morton attacked 
a Japanese destroyer, sinking it at point-blank range. Later during the same patrol he 
daringly attacked and completely destroyed an entire convoy (earning Wahoo, when it 
reentered port, a broomstick on its periscope for a “clean sweep”). Out of torpedoes and 
finding another convoy, Morton once more attempted to strike, using only his small 
deck gun. His plan derailed when the escorting destroyer discovered Wahoo and shelled 
it; Wahoo barely escaped.29 This sort of tenacity and determination inspired the entire 
force. After the war, Cdr. (and author) Edward L. Beach praised Morton, who “more 
than any other man . . . showed the way to the brethren of the Silent Service.” 30
Men like Morton energized the submarine force, but new and reliable equipment was 
necessary as well. In addition to the improved Mark XIV, new types of torpedoes ap-
peared, including the wakeless Mark XVIII electric torpedo and the acoustic Mark 
XXVII.31 Also, in the last years of the war the Americans gained even greater techno-
logical edge over the Japanese with the new SJ radar and its plan position indicator, the 
improved target bearing transmitter, and a bathythermograph to find thermal layers, 
which allowed U.S. submarines to evade Japanese sonar.32
The Momentum Shifts 
As a result of the myriad of equipment and leadership problems plaguing the U.S. 
submarine force, American submariners did not get much chance to shine during the 
first year of the war. By the end of 1942 they had only sunk 180 ships in exchange for 
seven American submarines. It was a start, but since the total number of Japanese ships 
sunk by all American submarines equaled the number of Allied ships sunk by German 
U-boats in only two months of 1942, it was disappointing.33
But even this small beginning was enough, because Japanese military leaders under-
valued the protection of their merchant marine. At the beginning of the war, Japan had 
only about six million tons of merchant shipping, and of that, only 525,000 tons of tank-
ers. Even though Japan went to war over raw materials in Southeast Asia, the Japanese 
military command saw no inherent contradiction in requisitioning almost two-thirds 
of Japan’s merchant marine solely for military transportation and supplies. Thus, even 
as the war began, Japanese military leaders had already drastically cut the vital impor-
tation of raw materials to supply the Japanese war machine and economy. Moreover, 
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Japan’s leaders spared little thought to building up the merchant marine. Further, the 
ships that were afloat were used so inefficiently that they might as well have been on 
the bottom—empty merchant ships passed other empty merchant ships leaving ports to 
which they were themselves heading. If that was not enough, the Japanese navy essen-
tially chose to ignore commerce protection, disregarding the lessons of the First World 
War and interwar Japanese submarine exercises. Consequently, despite the numerous 
troubles plaguing the U.S. submarine force, the amount of Japanese tonnage sunk in 
1942 exceeded the amount Japan constructed.34
In 1943, the momentum began to shift even more to the U.S. submarine force, thanks 
to the aggressiveness of commanders like Mush Morton and the correction of the 
numerous torpedo problems. By the end of 1943, 335 Japanese ships had been sunk in 
exchange for fifteen submarines. But the Japanese had focused on one important slice 
of their tonnage in which U.S. submarines had not made enough of a dent—oil tonnage. 
The Japanese started off the war with few tankers, but Japan’s shipbuilding industry 
quickly ramped up to supply more. Despite the rising success of U.S. submarines, the 
Japanese replaced their tanker losses in both 1942 and 1943.35 The torpedo problem 
explains in part why Japan’s tanker fleet seemed to have remained so far relatively 
unscathed—tankers were hard targets to sink, and even being holed by an unexploded 
torpedo was no great emergency. Indeed, Japanese merchant mariners claimed that “a 
tanker would not sink if torpedoed.” 36 If the Japanese believed that their momentary 
success with tankers was decisive, however, they were completely mistaken. Japan still 
lost twice as much shipping as it constructed in 1943.37
As 1944 began, Japan’s leaders finally began to awaken to the mortal danger they had 
faced since the beginning of the war. Ironically, Japan’s awakening was probably slowed 
by the miserable performance of American torpedoes, which lulled Japanese naval lead-
ers into a false sense of security arising from the apparent impotence of U.S. subma-
rines. Toward the end of 1943, however, Japanese naval leaders suddenly “realized that 
some innovation had come to the American torpedoes . . . [and the] sinking rate of our 
torpedoed ships suddenly began to increase.” The date that the Japanese sensed that the 
Americans had solved their torpedo problems was reportedly 20 August 1943, about a 
month before the Americans officially considered that to be the case.38
The Japanese finally began systematic convoying in March 1944 and attempted to 
establish and equip an effective antisubmarine force, but it was too little too late. Even 
if the resources had been present to create such a force, the rest of the Japanese military 
would have greedily seized them, as happened to the few air components of the Japanese 
antisubmarine effort. Consequently, 1944 turned out to be the halcyon year of the U.S. 
submarine force. Finally equipped with reliable torpedoes and equipment and manned 
by experienced crews, it chewed into the Japanese. American submariners sank 603 
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ships in 1944, at the cost of only nineteen U.S. submarines. Importantly, they annihilat-
ed the Japanese tanker fleet, quadrupling the number of tankers sunk. By the beginning 
of 1945 virtually no oil from the oil fields of Southeast Asia, for which Japan had gone to 
war, was reaching the home islands.39
As 1945 went on, American submarines found fewer and fewer targets to sink. In a quest 
for what little remained of Japanese shipping, Admiral Lockwood approved Operation 
Barney, the invasion of the mined Sea of Japan by submarines specially equipped 
with antimine sonar. But even that once-protected haven offered little shipping to sink. 
By the end of the war Japan had only 700,000 tons of “serviceable” merchant tonnage 
remaining.40
A Decisive Factor in Victory
The U.S. submarine force carried out its mission to strangle Japan with devastat-
ing efficiency. By the end of the war American submarines had sunk 1,113 Japanese 
merchant ships and 201 warships. That came out to 4,779,902 tons of enemy commerce 
and 540,192 tons of naval warships. The commerce figures were particularly impres-
sive, since Japan had started the war with only 6,337,000 tons of commercial shipping. 
In terms of casualties, the Japanese lost virtually their entire prewar merchant marine; 
out of 122,000 sailors, 27,000 were killed and 89,000 were wounded or “otherwise 
incapacitated.” 4 1
But the true effectiveness of the U.S. submarine guerre de course did not lie at sea. Com-
merce raiding severely affected the Japanese military throughout the Pacific, as well as 
the population on the home islands. In particular, the U.S. unrestricted campaign dra-
matically reduced the nutritional intake of most Japanese soldiers and civilians. Instead 
of combat, it was starvation—as well as related illnesses, such as beriberi—that ended up 
killing many Japanese soldiers overseas.42 On the home islands, the Japanese population 
felt the pangs of hunger from a very early stage of the war. Even before U.S. bombers 
destroyed Japanese industrial centers, a large percentage of the Japanese workforce 
suffered from malnutrition and related illnesses. By the end of the war the food situa-
tion was so bad that authorities in Osaka recommended that civilians add such items 
as acorns, rose leaves, silkworm cocoons, grasshoppers, and sawdust to their diet. Even 
after the surrender, as many as six people a day died from starvation in just one center 
for the homeless in Tokyo. In October 1945 the Japanese minister of finance told the 
United Press that as many as ten million people would starve to death without immedi-
ate American food aid. Although this number was perhaps exaggerated, it reflected the 
desperate situation facing Japan. The exact toll on the Japanese military and population 
due to starvation and privation during and immediately after the war may never be fully 
known, but the number is probably staggering.43
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How important was the U.S. submarine contribution to the Allied victory against 
Japan? By some accounts, American submarines single-handedly broke the Japanese 
war machine. For instance, submarine historian Clay Blair claims, “Many experts 
concluded that the invasions of the Palaus, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, 
and the dropping of fire bombs and atomic bombs on Japanese cities were unnecessary. 
They reasoned that despite the fanatical desire of some Japanese to hang on and fight to 
the last man, the submarine blockade alone would have ultimately defeated that suicidal 
impulse.” 44 Other historians have argued vigorously against this extreme conclusion. D. 
M. Giangreco points out that while many ordinary Japanese citizens would have starved 
by 1946, military leaders had hoarded food collected from farming areas.45 These lead-
ers and die-hard military units would have hardly caved in under the pressure of the 
submarine attacks, particularly given how vigorously and fanatically many of Japan’s 
military leaders refused to consider surrender even after the atomic bombings. On the 
basis of this premise, it seems safe to say that the U.S. submarine force alone did not 
achieve Japan’s unconditional surrender.
But few people, on either side of the war, would dispute that U.S. submarines were 
devastatingly effective. Mark Parillo, the foremost American expert on the Japanese 
merchant marine in the Second World War, writes, “The submarine had stopped Japan’s 
industrial heart from beating by severing its arteries, and it did so well before the bomb-
er ruptured the organ itself.” 46 After the emperor decided to surrender, the Japanese 
cabinet reported to the Diet that “the greatest cause of defeat was the loss of shipping,” 
a remarkable admission given the Japanese navy’s earlier extraordinary nonchalance 
toward antisubmarine warfare.47
Conclusions
It is undeniable that unrestricted submarine warfare played an essential role in defeat-
ing Japan. Indeed, unrestricted submarine warfare’s impact went far beyond the eco-
nomic holding action envisioned by Plan Dog, to contribute significantly to the overall 
Orange strategy to advance across the Pacific and encircle Japan. But it is important to 
note that the United States did not rely solely on the unrestricted submarine campaign 
to achieve its strategic goals. Rather, the unrestricted submarine war was just one part 
of a much larger and cohesive strategy that overwhelmed Japan’s defenses. As Edward 
S. Miller concludes, “The old concept of blockade by surface vessels could not have been 
made effective until late in the war. The decision for undersea predation magnified the 
success of one of the Orange Plan’s most basic prescriptions.” 48
The American victory is even more remarkable given the small size of the U.S. subma-
rine force. Including all rear-echelon personnel, the submarine force amounted to only 
fifty thousand officers and men, about 1.6 percent of the entire U.S. Navy’s personnel. 
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Of those fifty thousand, only sixteen thousand actually went to sea. Of those submari-
ners, 3,500 never returned, amounting to a 22 percent casualty rate, the highest of any 
combat branch in the U.S. armed forces during the Second World War. 
Yet despite the high casualty rate and extremely low number of personnel serving in 
the U.S. submarine force, American submarines sank 55 percent of all Japanese ships 
destroyed in World War II.49 In terms of sheer magnitude and cost-effectiveness, it is 
hard to argue with the conclusions of Japanese naval historian Masanori Ito, who writes, 
“U.S. submarines . . . proved to be the most potent weapon . . . in the Pacific War.” 50
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Guerre de Course in the Charter Era
The Tanker War, 1980–1988
GEORGE K.  WALKER
The Tanker War in many ways typified post–World War II conflicts. This war was 
regional in geographic scope and so did not have a global military impact. But for the 
antagonists, Iran and Iraq, it was a major war. By war’s end they had spent the equiva-
lent of their combined oil revenues since World War II. For Iraq, the Tanker War led to 
the 1990–91 first Gulf War, to the 2003 second Gulf War, and to a nine-year postwar 
U.S. occupation.
These “small wars” were not small in the belligerents’ perspectives, and they raised is-
sues of merchant ship interdiction similar to those in World Wars I and II. There were 
new variables, however, including more modern technologies and changes in oceango-
ing shipping. After 1945 all ships had radar and radio communications, and Internet us-
age later became increasingly common. Vessels also became larger, with smaller crews, 
thanks to greater automation. Increasingly warships used missiles instead of traditional 
powder-based guns. Men-of-war became larger in size, smaller in number, extraordi-
narily expensive, and more “fragile,” in the sense that an unerring missile or torpedo 
could send one to the bottom, instead of a possibility of slight damage from gunfire or 
a bomb. Sea mines had always been able to sink a ship, and newer mines—such as the 
Mark 60 Encapsulated Torpedo, or CAPTOR—were more sophisticated.
Following Iraq’s invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, each state tried to interfere 
with the other’s international trade, especially in petroleum, in order to hamstring its 
military procurement programs and undermine its economy. This chapter will exam-
ine the 1980–88 Tanker War, in particular with regard to how new technologies and 
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The Origins of the Tanker War, 1980
Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, claiming self-defense. Soon afterward an Iranian 
notice to mariners (NOTMAR) declared the waterways near its coast a war zone; estab-
lished new shipping lanes for vessels passing the Strait of Hormuz, at the Persian Gulf ’s 
southern end; abjured responsibility if a ship did not follow those lanes; refused access 
to Iraqi ports, including those in the Shatt al-Arab waterway; and warned of retaliation 
if Gulf states gave Iraq port facilities.1 Iran later called the access refusal a “blockade” 
of the Iraqi coast. There were Iranian attacks on shipping in the Shatt in the war’s early 
days, and some of those hulks still remain in the waterway, which divides Iran and Iraq. 
Seventy neutral-flagged ships were trapped in the Shatt and, despite UN good offices 
in seeking a cease-fire to allow them to leave under a United Nations or Red Cross flag, 
Iraq refused, citing “full” sovereignty over the Shatt. Iran accepted the UN proposal, but 
most of these ships remained trapped until war’s end.
The European Community (EC) quickly endorsed an Arab League cease-fire appeal 
calling for freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council 
called for an end to hostilities, with Iraq this time accepting the resolution but Iran call-
ing first for an end to Iraqi aggression.2 Japan and the United States stressed the impor-
tance of freedom of navigation of the Gulf, and the United States furthermore pledged 
neutrality, while emphasizing maintaining unhindered passage through the strait as a 
matter of national policy. The Soviet Union (USSR) also declared neutrality. 
Iran confirmed its commitment to freedom of the seas by keeping the Strait of Hormuz 
open for navigation and said it had never extended its war zone to the strait. But in 
October 1980, Iraq declared all of the Gulf north of 29° 30' north latitude a prohibited 
war zone. Iran began shuttling merchant convoys under naval protection down its coast 
through its Gulf maritime exclusion zone (GMEZ) to the lower Gulf. In response, Iraq 
began using pipelines to export oil and imported war-sustaining goods through nearby 
third-state Gulf ports.
In November 1980, Iran’s NOTMARs directed ships entering or leaving Iranian ports to 
get Gulf travel coordinates from its navy and to inform the relevant Iranian port of their 
hourly positions. Inbound ships had to give their estimated times of arrival at Bandar 
Abbas and be cleared. If not cleared, they had to anchor at Bandar Abbas. Early in 1981 
another Iranian NOTMAR further directed very large crude carriers or ultra-large 
crude carriers not inbound for Iranian ports but intending to cross the Iranian restrict-
ed zone to contact Iran’s naval headquarters and provide travel information forty-eight 
hours before departure.
The belligerents did not declare contraband lists, but because both governments 
attacked neutral-flagged oil carriers both loaded and in ballast, it is clear that they 
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regarded oil as contraband. Whether considered to be absolute or conditional contra-
band, foreign-made armaments, which were paid for by either selling or bartering oil, 
were indispensable to the war efforts. Neither state established prize courts until the 
very end of the war, when Iran finally published its rules. These still excluded detailed 
contraband lists, which did not satisfy the international community.
The International Reaction to the Tanker War
From almost the very beginning of the conflict, the international response to the Tanker 
War was both quick and highly critical. Britain rapidly established the Armilla Patrol, 
designed to escort and protect its shipping in the Gulf. By mid-October 1980 at least 
sixty Australian, French, British, and American warships were in the Indian Ocean to 
protect this oil route, and twenty-nine Soviet vessels were also present. In 1981, the Is-
lamic Conference Organization offered a peace plan, but it was rejected. UN mediation 
also failed. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising all Gulf states except the 
belligerents, was established.
In May 1981 tensions increased after Iran seized a Kuwaiti survey ship and the Danish-
flagged Elsa Cat, bound for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait and carrying 
military equipment destined for Iraq. Baghdad protested the seizures, and both ships 
were released. Beginning in 1981 and continuing through 1984, however, Iraq frequently 
attacked commercial shipping in the northern Gulf, usually tankers and cargo ships 
calling at Bandar Khomeni or Bushire after being convoyed through Iranian territo-
rial waters. In 1982 it was reported that Iraq had mined the Bandar Khomeni–Bandar 
Mashahr channel to the open sea.
During 1982 Iraq tried to invoke the Arab League mutual defense treaty, analogous to 
the NATO agreement, to receive military aid from league members. But Syria warned 
that if Egypt, a league member, lined up with Iraq, Syria would join with Iran. The 
result was a political deadlock. By late 1982 all the Gulf states except Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, which favored Iraq, had declared neutrality. In August 1982 Iraq proclaimed 
its own GMEZ, announcing it would attack any ship within the zone and that tankers 
of any nationality docking at Iran’s main export terminal, at Kharg Island, would be 
legitimate targets. In announcing its GMEZ and the Kharg “blockade,” Iraq stressed 
that its war zones were designed to cope with the difficulty of distinguishing among 
vessel nationalities in the Gulf. Later that month, Iran declared it would protect foreign 
shipping, began escorting foreign vessels, and deployed ships with surface-to-air mis-
siles to Kharg. Iran also began providing naval protection to convoys of Iran-flagged 
and neutral merchantmen transporting oil from Iranian northern Gulf ports to others 
farther down its coast for world export.
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Iraq modified its GMEZ in November 1982 by advising companies and tanker owners 
that their ships would be subject to attack upon entering the zone. In general, however, 
Iraq attacked virtually all ships in the GMEZ through March 1984—the only aspect of 
the war where the initiative lay with Iraq. The London-based War Risks Rating Com-
mittee raised marine cargo insurance rates in 1982 and again in 1984 because of Iraqi 
attacks on Gulf shipping. Also, the United States redefined its freedom of navigation 
policy in 1982, making nonbelligerent access to the Gulf a top priority. These third-
party decisions undoubtedly influenced local governments to consider taking action to 
maintain freedom of navigation.
An October 1983 UN Security Council Resolution again called for a cease-fire, con-
demning violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. The resolution affirmed the right of free navigation and commerce in 
international waters, called on states to respect this right, and urged the belligerents to 
cease hostilities in the Gulf region, including in sea-lanes, navigable waterways, harbors, 
terminals, offshore installations, and ports with sea access. The GCC endorsed the 
resolution and went on record as supporting Gulf freedom of navigation. As a result, the 
French, British, Soviet, and American naval presence in the Indian Ocean adjacent to 
the Gulf continued unchanged.
A Turning Point in the War
The year 1984 was a Tanker War turning point. A January U.S. notice to airmen 
(NOTAM) and NOTMAR proclaimed a “cordon sanitaire” around American warships 
and aircraft, warning of possible defensive action if a ship or aircraft ventured inside the 
zone.3 Iran protested this decision and opposed transits by U.S. Navy ships of its territo-
rial sea, but the American response was that these measures had been adopted only in 
self-defense. The United Kingdom decided not to declare a security envelope around its 
Armilla Patrol.
In February 1984, Iraq extended its GMEZ to fifty miles around Kharg, warning that 
ships approaching Bandar Khomeni or Bushire would be sunk. The United Kingdom 
protested an Iraqi attack on a convoyed cargo ship in the Khomeni approaches; Indian 
and Turkish vessels were also attacked. Tankers were hit in Iraqi attacks on Kharg. Iraq 
also destroyed Saudi tankers steaming outside its GMEZ. Iraqi forces appeared to have 
devoted only minimal effort to obtaining visual identification before launching missiles. 
In response, Iran attacked Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers for the first time in April and May 
1984. Iran mainly used rockets, not missiles, and seemed to do a better job than Iraq of 
identifying targets. An Arab League summit in May condemned the attacks on Kuwaiti 
and Saudi ships. The GCC complained to the UN Security Council. Many states, 
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including open-registry countries, raised freedom-of-navigation concerns in council 
debates. The resulting Council Resolution 552 called on all states to respect freedom of 
navigation, reaffirmed the right of freedom of navigation in international waters and 
sea-lanes, and condemned attacks on ships en route to and from Kuwaiti and Saudi 
ports. Significantly, the council decided that if there were future noncompliance with 
Resolution 552, it would meet again to consider measures to ensure freedom of naviga-
tion. This warned belligerents of the possibility of binding council decisions, perhaps 
involving force. International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—the Interna-
tional Transport Workers Federation, the International Chamber of Shipping, and the 
International Shipping Federation—expressed concern over the deteriorating situation. 
These were cited in the UN secretary-general’s report, and they are an example of how 
NGO protests can contribute to binding rules.
In 1985, a temporary truce in the land war was broken. Iraq renewed attacks on Kharg 
and Iranian tankers, and Iran restarted a desultory campaign against neutral tankers. 
In June 1985, Iran intercepted and detained a Kuwait-flagged ship, Al-Muharaq, which 
was Kuwait-bound but carrying Iraq-destined merchandise. Iraq had used Kuwait as 
an entry port since 1980. Iran’s ex post facto prize-court law justified its seizing Al-
Muharaq and other ships headed to Kuwait. In September, Iran stepped up its visit-and-
search procedure. If enough shipping were warned off, it thought, that might tip the 
scales, since oil sales financed Iraq’s war effort. To be sure, oil left Iraq by international 
pipeline, but all nations save Turkey had refused Mediterranean Sea access for Iraqi oil. 
Meanwhile, Iran’s crude was being ferried in Iranian tankers from Kharg to Sirri Island 
in the lower Gulf, where it was stored in “mother” ships for transfer to customers’ tank-
ers. Iranian tankers also shuttled between Kharg and Lavan Island in the lower Gulf. 
By the end of 1985 the Tanker War had become the Iran-Iraq conflict’s most important 
feature.
During late 1985 the United States issued a NOTMAR “special warning” advising of 
ship visit and search and occasional seizure within the strait and the Gulf of Oman in 
the lower Gulf. American mariners were advised to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and 
coastal waters and to remain outside declared zones. The NOTMAR added that the 
United States did not recognize the validity of any foreign rule, regulation, or proclama-
tion. While asserting freedom of the seas and straits transit rights, the United States 
offered to work with the GCC and to help militarily if publicly requested. 
In October 1985, France began defending French-flagged ships, and a French warship 
moved between a merchantman and an Iranian warship, warning that it would use force 
if the Iranian tried to intercept the merchantman. France’s rules of engagement (ROE) 
declared that its warships could fire on forces refusing to break off attacks on neutral 
merchant ships. The end result was a sudden drop in attacks near French men-of-war.
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The U.S. Navy Enters the Fray
In January 1986 Iran boarded and searched a U.S.-flagged vessel. The United States 
recognized belligerent rights to board and search but cautioned against overstepping 
these rights. Later that month the United Kingdom also justified Iranian interceptions 
and seizures of British-flagged ships as self-defense. The Netherlands recognized board-
and-search rights, but only for ships proceeding to or from belligerents’ ports. Finally, in 
February 1986 UN Security Council Resolution 582 called for a cease-fire, deploring all 
attacks on neutral shipping.
During February 1986, Iraq extended its zone up to an area near Kuwait’s territorial wa-
ters. In April 1986 a U.S. destroyer warned off an Iranian warship from what may have 
been a planned boarding of a U.S.-flagged merchantman. In May, after more Iranian 
strikes on shipping, the United States reaffirmed a commitment to Saudi self-defense, 
freedom of navigation, free flow of oil, and open access through the strait. In response, 
Iran warned that its naval forces would attack U.S. warships escorting or convoying 
cargo ships carrying material for Iraq or those that tried to interfere with Iran’s inter-
ception procedures.
A U.S. NOTMAR advised of additional cordon-sanitaire precautions in force for U.S. 
ships in the Gulf, the strait, the Gulf of Oman, and the northern Arabian Sea. These 
measures would also apply to U.S. forces transiting the strait or in innocent passage in 
foreign territorial waters and when operating in such waters with coastal-state ap-
proval. The NOTMAR added that its publication served to advise that U.S. forces would 
exercise self-defense and that freedom of navigation of any ship or any state should not 
be impeded.
In August Iraq bombed the Sirri terminal, badly damaging a British-flagged, Hong 
Kong–owned tanker. By then Iraq had hit five of the eleven shuttle ships running 
between Kharg and Sirri. Later that year it struck the Larak and Lavan terminals. In 
September, Iranian warships fired on, stopped, and searched a Soviet-flagged Kuwait-
bound ship with arms on board destined for Iraq. This was but one of a thousand 
Iranian ship inspections during 1985–86. In November Iraq bombed the UAE’s Abu 
al-Bukosh offshore installations.
The 1986 attacks reduced Iranian oil production considerably, and a fall in world oil 
prices aggravated Iran’s economic problems. Iraq was also in financial trouble, but its 
creditor states rescheduled debts while supporting increased military aid. Meanwhile, 
American arms sales to Iran came through Israel; one shipment even came from Eilat, 
an Israeli port in the Gulf of Aqaba, to Bandar Abbas aboard a Danish-flagged ship.
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By 1987 the war had become more internationalized. In April Iran delivered a note on 
strait transit passage. The U.S. response rejected Iran’s claim that straits-passage rights 
under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) were contractual and 
not customary international law, arguing that UNCLOS rules recited long-standing cus-
tom. The United States also rejected Iran’s claim of a right to interfere with any vessel’s 
lawful transit passage in a strait used for international navigation. In May the Kuwaiti 
Oil Tanker Company reregistered eleven tankers under the U.S. flag, and three others 
went under British registry. The USSR chartered three more to Kuwait.
Iran tried to convince Kuwait to stop reflagging, but when this failed Iran concluded 
that Kuwait had for all practical purposes turned itself into an Iraqi province, placing 
its resources at the disposal of France, the USSR, and the United States. Iran declared 
it could not allow Iraq to receive oil income to build its war machine through Kuwaiti 
tankers’ flying other flags. Then an Iranian warship fired on a Soviet merchantman. In 
mid-May, a Soviet-flagged tanker hit a mine that the USSR claimed the Iranian navy 
had laid. Another Kuwait-bound tanker hit a mine in June. Sea mines were detected in 
approaches to the channel leading to Kuwait’s Mina Ahmadi terminal. Mines, apparent-
ly laid by Iranian Revolutionary Guards using small boats, began appearing throughout 
the Gulf. The Saudi and U.S. navies cleared a channel to Kuwait, and the USSR sent 
three more minesweepers to the Gulf.
On 17 March 1987 two Iraqi fighter-bombers launched Exocet missiles that severely 
damaged a frigate, USS Stark, and killed thirty-seven sailors.4 The United States ordered 
its forces to a higher state of alert, revising its ROE for possible interaction between 
American and Iraqi forces or against anyone displaying hostile intent or committing 
hostile acts. British rules continued to reflect the view that the UN Charter permitted 
self-defense, as an attack on merchantmen would trigger the self-defense clause. U.S. 
NOTAMs and NOTMARs from July and September reflected a stronger self-defense 
policy, including anticipatory self-defense if a warship were illuminated by a weapon 
fire-control radar. However, these measures were to be implemented so that they would 
not unduly interfere with freedoms of navigation and overflight.
In July 1987 the U.S. Navy began convoying reflagged tankers that carried no contra-
band from Iraq. On 24 July the reflagged Bridgeton, and on 10 August Texaco Carib-
bean, chartered to an American company, hit mines. Immediately the U.S. Navy began 
mine protection. The Bridgeton incident opened a new chapter of direct U.S.-Iranian 
naval confrontation. Mines began appearing all over the Gulf, outside the Gulf in the 
strait and the Gulf of Oman, and in Kuwaiti and Omani territorial waters. French and 
British naval operations expanded to meet the threat in the latter areas.
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The Armilla Patrol began “accompanying” but not escorting or convoying British mer-
chantmen. As a result, foreign ships were attracted to British registry to get protection 
in the lower Gulf. British seafarer unions opposed arming merchantmen, a plan that 
was reminiscent of the Q-ships of World War I, but this soon became British and Italian 
policy. Some merchant ships began carrying chaff canisters to confuse incoming mis-
siles, while others were repainted dull, nonreflective gray for the same reason.
In August 1987 the U.S. Navy, claiming self-defense, attacked an Iranian minelayer. 
Iran countered that this was overt aggression, that self-defense could be claimed as 
a response only to an armed attack. The American action effectively halted Iranian 
minelaying for six months, but by mid-1987 there had been over a hundred mine attacks 
on ships of thirty nationalities. Meanwhile, Iraq had attacked over two hundred ships, 
mostly Iran-flagged or -chartered.
A June 1987 Vienna Economic Summit had reaffirmed freedom of navigation and 
free, unimpeded flow of oil and other traffic through the Gulf. Also in July 1987, UN 
Security Council Resolution 598 again “Deplore[d] . . . attacks on neutral shipping[,]” 
“Demand[ed] an immediate cease-fire,” and “Call[ed] upon all other States to exercise 
the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to further escala-
tion and widening of the conflict.” Iraq accepted Resolution 598, but Iran refused. In 
September the EC also supported the resolution, reiterating firm support for freedom of 
navigation, “which is of the utmost importance to the whole international community.” 5
On 3 August 1987 Iran announced planned naval maneuvers in its territorial waters 
and the Gulf of Oman, warning ships against approaching those waters. Iraq protested, 
noting that Iran’s territorial waters included part of the strait and correctly claiming 
that under the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and 1982 UNCLOS a country could 
not suspend passage through territorial straits. Contemporaneous with a Gulf buildup 
among the U.S., Saudi, and European navies, the Western European Union declared 
that Europe’s vital interests required that Gulf freedom of navigation be assured at all 
times.6 In November an Arab League Extraordinary Summit supported Resolution 598 
and called on Iran to do so.
Interestingly, from 1980 Iran and Iraq had maintained diplomatic relations; these finally 
ended only in October 1987.7 On 8 October Iranian speedboats fired on U.S. helicopters. 
In accordance with American self-defense principles and ROE, the helicopters returned 
fire, sinking one boat and damaging others. U.S. forces, claiming self-defense, respond-
ed to an Iranian Revolutionary Guards attack on a U.S.-flagged tanker by destroying 
Iran’s Rostum offshore oil platform in the lower Gulf. Iran claimed the attacks were 
aggression and, again, that self-defense could only be asserted in response to armed 
attack.8
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The United States did not respond to a similar attack on Sungari, a Liberian-flagged, 
U.S.-owned tanker. At that time Washington did not consider open-registry ships, even 
if owned by American interests, to have enough U.S. connection to merit protection. It 
also followed a long-standing law of armed conflict rule that the flag flown and only 
the flag flown—not ownership—counts, as distinguished from law of the sea rules. 
These Iranian attacks seemed aimed at tankers in Kuwait’s al-Hamadi port, where 
Kuwaiti and Saudi oil donated to Iraq was transported to pay for munitions shipped to 
Iraq through neutral ports. Three days after the American attack on Rostum, Iran hit 
Kuwait’s deepwater Sea Island Terminal. In November Iranian speedboats shot up three 
tankers carrying Saudi oil.
In December 1987 a U.S. warship helped rescue a Cypriot tanker’s crew after an Iranian 
gunboat attack set it ablaze. Although the conflict was outside territory covered by the 
NATO agreement, the NATO Council supported Resolution 598 in December, recall-
ing the importance of security of navigation in the Gulf. The GCC urged the Security 
Council to implement the resolution and approved a comprehensive security strategy 
approaching the level of a collective self-defense pact. But as the year ended it appeared 
that some permanent council members who held the veto (China, France, and the 
USSR) under UN Charter articles 23 and 27 would vote against a U.S.-sponsored sanc-
tions resolution.
An early 1988 U.S. NOTMAR summarized the perilous situation in the Gulf, warning 
of the belligerents’ apparent intentions and a possibility of mine attacks and of visit, 
search, and possible seizure or diversion of nonbelligerent merchantmen. Iran pub-
lished its Prize Law, effective in January 1988, of which article 3 declared these to be war 
prizes:
(a) All goods, merchandise, means of transport and equipment belonging to a State or to States at 
war with . . . Iran.
(b) Merchandise and means of transport . . . belonging to neutral States or their nationals, or to  
nationals of the belligerent State if they could effectively contribute to increasing the combat 
power of the enemy or their final destination, either directly or via intermediaries, is a State at 
war with . . . Iran.
(c) Vessels flying the flag of a neutral State as well as vehicles belonging to a neutral State transport-
ing the goods set out in this article.
(d) Merchandise, means of transport and equipment which . . . Iran forbids from being transported 
to enemy territory.
The language in article 3(b), “effectively contribute to increasing the combat power of 
the enemy,” echoes the language of current views on neutral merchant ships carrying 
military materials.9 The law declared that article 3(a) property would become Iranian 
property and that articles 3(b) and 3(c) property of neutrals would be confiscated 
and adjudicated. Article 3(d) property would “become the property of . . . Iran or be 
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confiscated according to circumstances. Any person contesting this must appear before 
the [prize] Tribunal.” 10
Winding Down the Tanker War
Iraqi tanker attacks resumed in February 1988. The U.S. government was willing to 
consider a UN Gulf naval force if a collective action plan were spelled out clearly. But 
the United States would not support a UN force replacing U.S. and American-aligned 
forces. The United Kingdom was also unenthusiastic, even though Italy and the USSR 
supported the idea. The USSR, in particular, wanted to replace the large Western naval 
presence with a UN flotilla.
In April, however, an Iranian mine severely damaged the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts. 
Four days later the United States responded by engaging Iranian warships, sinking or 
damaging them, and destroying the Sassam and Sirri oil platforms, which had been 
the speedboat bases. Iran branded the attacks as aggression, but some later saw these 
actions, plus Iran’s simultaneous loss of the Fao Peninsula to Iraq, as a turning point 
in the war.11 Even more warships now crowded the Gulf. Unprecedented international 
concern within the United Nations and within NATO ushered in a new phase of the war 
for neutral countries.
In April, after Iranian gunboats attacked a Saudi tanker off Dubai, the United States an-
nounced it would begin assisting, upon their request, “friendly, innocent neutral vessels 
flying a nonbelligerent flag outside declared war exclusion zones that [were] not carry-
ing contraband or resisting legitimate visit and search”by a belligerent, if the U.S. war-
ship’s or aircraft’s mission allowed rendering such aid.12 This offer, more expansive than 
a British policy of protecting foreign-flagged ships with a clear majority British owner-
ship interest, was partly a response to Saudi, UAE, and American oil shippers navigat-
ing under foreign flags. The British policy was really a distinction without a difference, 
since British warships gave humanitarian assistance to neutral ships after attacks and 
were prepared to interpose between an attacker and a target ship. French warships 
were “available to assist [merchantmen] according to circumstances.”13 Italy’s escort 
was limited to Italian-flagged ships, although its ROE promised a military response if a 
belligerent committed a hostile act; however, these did not contemplate “repressive acts” 
on bases of operation, such as oil platforms.14 Mine clearance became more cooperative. 
In May 1988, Iraq damaged the Liberian-registered Seawise Giant, the world’s largest 
supertanker, among five ships at Iran’s Larak terminal in the strait.
During July 1988, tragedy struck when the United States accidentally shot down a civil-
ian airplane. The United States claimed self-defense in USS Vincennes’s shooting down 
of an Iranian airbus in July.15 A week later U.S. helicopters attacked Iranian gunboats 
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that had set ablaze a Panamanian-registered, Japanese-owned tanker with American 
nationals in the crew, thus implementing the new U.S. policy. By the war’s end the U.S. 
Navy had conducted over a hundred convoys in the Gulf, and other states had also been 
engaged in many escort operations. 
International organizations like the Arab League, the EC, the GCC, and the Toronto 
Economic Summit continued to support Resolution 598. In July 1988 Iran finally ac-
cepted the resolution, perhaps prompted by the airbus incident. On 8 August the UN 
secretary-general announced a cease-fire effective 20 August 1988. Iran announced 
on that day that it would continue inspecting vessels during the cease-fire—largely a 
theoretical gesture. Nevertheless, Iraq protested the announcement. U.S. convoy opera-
tions ended in October, and in January 1989 “deflagging” procedures began, reverting 
tankers to Kuwaiti from U.S.-flag status.
The Importance of the Tanker War
The Tanker War was the most important single theater of naval warfare during the 
Iran-Iraq conflict. Over two hundred mariners died in attacks by Iran and Iraq on over 
four hundred ships, almost all of which flew neutral flags. The attacks resulted in over 
forty million deadweight tons of damaged shipping, thirty-one sunk merchantmen, and 
another fifty damaged ships eventually declared total losses. By the end of 1987, write-
off losses stood at nearly half the tonnage of all merchant shipping sunk in World War 
II. One reason was that ships had become larger in size and fewer in number. The rela-
tively low figure for lives lost reflected the fact that modern vessels’ crews are smaller, 
owing to automation. Ships under the flags of more than thirty countries, including UN 
Security Council permanent members, were attacked.
Only about 1 percent of Gulf voyages involved attacks. Nevertheless, in terms of per-
centages of losses due to maritime casualties worldwide the statistics were staggering. 
During 1982 alone, 47 percent of all Liberian-flag tonnage losses due to maritime casu-
alty occurred in the Gulf; in 1986 it was 99 percent; in 1987 it was still over 90 percent. 
Most Gulf tankers were open registry, but American nationals owned a third of them, 
while American nationals chartered another substantial portion. The U.S. financial loss 
was therefore substantial. Insured losses reached thirty million dollars in one month, 
and there were tremendous increases in war-risk insurance premiums, which drove up 
shipping costs. The total price of the war and the direct or indirect damages it caused 
was estimated to be nearly $1.2 trillion.
Although nothing about the war can be considered truly positive, there were two indi-
rect “benefits.” Because of the large number of ship sinkings and the extensive damage 
to ships, there was a sharp reduction in what was seen as an oversupply of available 
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tanker tonnage. As a result, Western reliance on the strait as an oil lifeline declined from 
twenty million barrels of petroleum a day in 1978 to 6.4 million in 1985. Meanwhile, 
pipelines were built to transport Gulf oil through Saudi Arabia. Increased production 
from other fields, including those in the North Sea, may have prevented a worldwide oil 
shortage during 1980–88.
Convoying or escorting merchantmen, a tactic that the United States and Great Britain 
had used in both world wars and that Britain employed during the Icelandic fishing 
disputes of the 1960s and 1970s, turned out to be a big factor during the Tanker War. 
A good question is whether traditional rules for escorting neutral convoys during war, 
practiced as long ago as the Spanish silver fleets, still applied during the charter era. 
Practice thus far seems to say yes to this question. 
One of the continuing issues for self-defense of naval platforms and their convoys or 
of escorted ships is whether anticipatory self-defense, or reactive self-defense, as Iran 
seemed to have advocated, appears to be the rule rather than the exception during 
the charter era. The U.S. position, which was supported by many other states, allowed 
anticipatory self-defense to be invoked so that a ship need not “take the first hit” before 
there is a response to a threat. 
Collective self-defense through prior agreement, except perhaps among the GCC mem-
bers, was never an issue. On the other hand, states with Gulf naval presence cooperated 
to a greater or lesser degree. The legal basis for this cooperation was “informal” collec-
tive self-defense, which was analogous to coalition warfare to defeat a common enemy. 
A further question is whether this was a “war” as traditional international law would 
have it. Iraq declared war, but Iran never did, which raised many issues under self-
defense and aggression doctrines flowing from charter articles 2(4) and 51.
Conclusions
Tanker War statistics clearly show the trend toward transporting oil on larger vessels 
with smaller crews. The number of ships lost was small, but the tonnage sunk or dam-
aged was huge. Proliferation of open-registry shipping and factors like containerization 
meant that there were more private players from more nationalities. Chartering has 
always presented a possibility of more private interests, but today there are subcharters 
and sub-subcharters. Containerization aboard ever-larger cargo ships means poten-
tially more claimants among consignors and consignees. Entry of governments through 
national shipping lines and problems in private law, like sovereign immunity, remain 
important factors. Reflagging under the law of the sea can result in different practices 
for belligerent interception and attack. Additionally, crews are multinational in origin. 
Because of the problem of determining ownership of cargoes and ships, diverting for 
walker  251
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch15-Walker.indd  September 13, 2013 9:07 AM
inspection instead of boarding and prize taking has become a new modality, accepted 
in international law. Diversion has been widely practiced in wars since 1945, especially 
during the Tanker War.
New weapons and weapon-delivery systems have resulted in different methods for 
boarding-and-search operations. States often use helicopters instead of warships’ boats 
because of merchantmen’s size and the relative speed of helicopters, allowing a warship 
to stand off at a safer distance, given the risk of a missile response. Use of guided mis-
siles, whereby one unerring projectile can do great damage to or even sink a warship, 
has become nearly universal, and some of these can be carried aboard relatively small 
warships.
The possible roster of national and international players has also increased dramati-
cally. There are over two hundred entities claiming statehood status today. Besides 
states’ traditional protests and individual state actions, decision makers must contend 
with a spectrum of intergovernmental organizations—ranging from those with direct 
maritime interests in a situation, like NATO, the GCC, or the Arab League, to those on 
the geographic periphery, like the European Union / EC—as well as nongovernmen-
tal organizations, including shipping associations, international maritime insurance 
interests, labor organizations, and human rights or humanitarian law organizations like 
the International Committee of the Red Cross. These were all important factors during 
the Tanker War. Some NGOs may have agendas that conflict with those of the ship-
ping companies, such as Greenpeace campaigns against the whaling and tuna fishing 
industries.16
At the top of the law and policy pyramid is the United Nations and its lawmaking po-
tential. This has been a growing factor in most confrontations since 1945. For example, 
belligerents’ acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598 ultimately ended the 
Tanker War, subject to a UN-brokered cease-fire. This may have legal ramifications 
different from armistices, which ended many post–World War II conflicts, including 
the Korean War and some Arab-Israeli conflicts. Sometimes UN law even supplied legal 
decisions that differed from customary law, which proved to be a major feature of the 
1990–91 Gulf War. 
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Twenty-First-Century High-Seas Piracy off 
Somalia
MARTIN N.  MURPHY
Previous chapters have shown how countries with stable governments have adopted 
commerce raiding strategies mainly to injure opponents, even while enjoying the profits 
that could be made from these endeavors. An entirely different type of commerce raid-
ing by failed states uses similar methods mainly to obtain profits, both for the pirates 
and for the government or local officials backing the pirates’ efforts. Between 1993 and 
2005, for example, over seven hundred piracy incidents were reported in the waters off 
Somalia, and there was also a dramatic increase in kidnap and ransom crimes. 
This problem appeared not just because Somalia was a failed state but because of geog-
raphy: for much of recorded history, significant trade routes have passed through Soma-
lia’s coastal waters, which also contain rich and underexploited fishing grounds. Piracy 
arose after 1991 with the spread of conflict and disorder and the rise to power of elites 
who countenanced a type of behavior that would be regarded as criminal—not by them 
but by much of the developed world. These elites gradually realized that what worked so 
well for them on land, kidnapping and extortion in particular, worked even better at sea, 
where targets worth hundreds of thousands and even millions of dollars were at risk.
The pirates’ primary goal is to obtain ransom for captured ships and crews. The initial 
ransoms were small. In 2005 the Haradheere-based pirates called “Somali marines” 
demanded only $300,000 for the return of their first major hijack. By 2006, however, 
they were signaling that they were looking for much more when they demanded a mil-
lion dollars for the return of Dongwon-ho, a South Korean tuna-fishing vessel, which 
they accused of illegally fishing in Somali waters, even though they eventually settled 
for half this amount.1 As of September 2011 Somali pirates held “at least 49 vessels and 
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The failure of the Somali state is due to many causes, including poverty and domestic 
chaos. However, the political dimensions of the problem are perhaps the most relevant 
for the spread of state-sponsored piracy. The activities and fortunes of pirates are linked 
to a small number of Somali clans and their political leaders who have struggled for 
control of the country since the fall of the Mohammed Siad Barre regime in 1991. The 
problem of piracy will be resolved only once some form of political stability is achieved. 
The complex situation in Somalia is not pure and simple piracy, therefore, but a new 
form of commerce raiding, in which the pirates, the Somali people, and Somali officials 
share in the proceeds of these criminal endeavors.
The Origins of Somali Piracy: 1989–2006
Piracy, whose spectacular success has been splashed across the world’s headlines, has 
occurred both off Somalia’s Indian Ocean coastline and in the Gulf of Aden between 
Somalia’s northern coast and Yemen, a large expanse of water that narrows gradually to-
ward the Bab el-Mandeb choke point, through which ships must pass to reach the Suez 
Canal. Ship hijackings began in the gulf long before President Barre’s overthrow. Dur-
ing the 1950s yachts were seized occasionally there and held for ransom, while British 
colonial records note incidents of piracy against dhows and fishing vessels.3 After 1989, 
however, the pace and scope of maritime predation gradually increased.
The initial incidents came after the Somali National Movement (SNM), dominated by 
the Isaaq clan in what is now Somaliland, lost the support of its Ethiopian backers. It 
needed to capture weapons, even while preventing supplies from reaching government 
forces, a goal that led it to warn all shipping agencies “not to cooperate with the dying 
regime of Mogadishu, because they are not able to ensure the safety of ships and their 
crews against any dangers that they may be exposed to.” 4 As a result, according to the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the “SNM Coast Guard” seized on 5 
December 1989 a Panamanian-flagged ship on its way to Berbera, a port then controlled 
by Barre’s regime.5
But not all hijackings even then were obviously related to political struggles. From the 
start of the civil war in 1989, captains of the dhows and small freighters that form the 
majority of ships carrying cargoes around the Arabian Peninsula alerted each other 
about attacks in Somali waters.6 However, the problems got worse after the Barre regime 
collapsed at the end of January 1991. In the same month pirates attacked MV Naviluck, 
outbound from Mombasa to Jeddah off Cape Guardafui, in what is now Puntland. 
Three boatloads of attackers set the ship on fire. They reportedly took some of the crew 
members ashore, where they killed three of them; the remainder were forced overboard 
and were later rescued.
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A small number of attacks took place up and down the Somali coast in 1993, but the 
most extraordinary occurred off Yemen in May 1994, when two German vessels, 
Norasia Samantha and Glucksburg, reported being fired on by missiles that landed 
close to both ships but hit neither one. No one claimed responsibility for either attack. 
In September 1994 a party of twenty-six pirates posing as members of the Somali Coast 
Guard, North East Region, hijacked MV Bonsella and used it for six days as a base of 
operations to attack other ships.7 Experience from other pirate-prone areas around the 
world indicates strongly that many if not most pirate incidents go unreported.8 The level 
of organization displayed by this attack suggests, therefore, that the pirates were too well 
practiced for it to have been anything other than part of a pattern.9
Some of these early attacks, such as that on Bonsella and another on the motor vessel 
Full City in 1995 during which currency and drink were stolen, share strong similari-
ties with pirate attacks the world over.10 However, many other features now distinguish 
Somali piracy, such as the use of “mother ships,” the prevalence of kidnapping, the 
targeting of foreign fishing boats and aid ships, the great distance from shore where 
the incidents took place, and the involvement of corrupt political figures.11 In 1997, for 
example, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that an armed faction 
seized MV Baharihindi and sailed it to Gara’ad on the east coast.12 In the same year a 
Taiwanese trawler, MV Shen Kno II, was captured by the Somali Salvation Democratic 
Front (SSDF), the political organization of the Majarteen clan, which demanded a “fine” 
of $800,000 to release the ship—forty thousand dollars for the captain and ten thousand 
for each member of the crew. It threatened that if payment was not made, each man 
would be imprisoned for ten years for “stealing maritime products.” 13
Fishing craft, however, were never the only targets. In 1998, seven armed men stole a 
freighter, the 299-ton Noustar, from dockside at Boosaaso. They sailed the vessel to Ras 
Hafoon, near Socotra, where they released half the crew. The remaining crew reported 
that heavy guns had been placed on board and that the ship was then used to prey on 
small ships and dhows in the Gulf of Aden.14 In fact, by 1998 fully two-thirds of all 
maritime abductions worldwide took place in the Gulf of Aden. During 2000 there were 
twenty-three piracy incidents recorded in the Red Sea–Aden–Somalia region, a third of 
the African total.15 Most importantly, the IMB warned seafarers that attacks by men in 
small speedboats firing rifles and rocket launchers were taking place up to forty nautical 
miles (seventy-four kilometers) offshore and advised ships to sail at least fifty nautical 
miles (almost ninety-three kilometers) off the coast. Most attacks were taking place off 
Puntland, but some were occurring at unspecified locations along the Somali coastline 
farther south.16
After 9/11, Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 was assembled under the authority of Unit-
ed Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368, 1373, and 1378 to patrol the northern 
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Arabian Gulf from the Pakistani coast across to Somalia. In addition, a U.S. military 
presence known as Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was 
established in Djibouti.17 This appeared to make the pirates more cautious while they 
assessed the new situation. The number of reported piracy incidents declined to a low of 
ten in 2004, although the respite was brief. Incidents resumed in 2005 to the extent that 
the U.S. State Department even advised ships traveling though the Gulf of Aden to do 
so in convoy.18 In 2004 the IMB advised ships to sail at least fifty nautical miles (almost 
ninety-three kilometers) from the coast and preferably farther. Nonetheless, and despite 
the presence of coalition warships attached to CTF 150, fifteen attacks occurred in Janu-
ary to July 2005, including eight in July alone.
Off the east coast, a new pirate gang based in Haradheere demonstrated that it was 
prepared to mount attacks far out to sea, which, while not unique, is something that few 
other modern pirate groups have proved willing to do. Although pirates were on occa-
sion able to locate distant targets, during this period their abilities and the frequency of 
such incidents appear to have been exaggerated. There are grounds for believing that 
some of the attacks, which were reported to have taken place two hundred nautical 
miles or more from the coast, could have been erroneously attributed to Somali pirates 
as a result of misidentification.
Owing to the continued domestic chaos in Somalia, cases of piracy continued to climb, 
reaching thirty-two vessels in just the nine months between March and November 2005. 
During the entire year Somali waters “topped the piracy high risk areas,” with thirty-
five attacks taking place—sixteen actual and nineteen attempted attacks. As a result of 
these seizures, over 130 crew members were being held hostage as of November 2005; 
negotiations for their release were pending.19 On 5 November 2005 two pirate speed-
boats even attempted to attack a luxury cruise ship, Seabourn Spirit, which fought them 
off with a sonic boom gun. The cruise ship had 151 passengers and 161 crew members 
on board, of whom forty-eight were American citizens.
In response to this failed November 2005 attack, the International Maritime Orga-
nization (IMO) issued Resolution A 979(24), “which called on all seafarers and other 
involved parties to work within international law to ensure that further acts of piracy 
in the region were prevented and current ones terminated.” The UN Security Council 
did not adopt this resolution, however, but instead issued its own antipiracy state-
ment warning local navies to “take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, 
in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with 
relevant international law. . . . The Council further urges cooperation among all States, 
particularly regional States, and active prosecution of piracy offences.” 20
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While the United Nations urged regional states to solve the problem, many newly inde-
pendent countries—especially in Africa—did not have sufficient naval units to patrol 
their own territorial waters. This was especially true for countries divided by civil war. 
In the case of Somalia, what the international community has referred to as “piracy” 
could also be seen as Somalia’s attempts to protect its natural resources in its exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). For example, when the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer USS 
Gonzalez located and subsequently captured several Somali pirates in March 2006, the 
pirates claimed “to be defending local fishermen by ‘taxing’ illicit foreign trawlers.” 
Nevertheless, and though the pirates considered themselves to be commerce raiders of 
a sort, because these men were armed and were operating from unmarked ships on the 
high seas they exactly fit the standard international definition of “piracy.” 21
Piracy and Illegal Fishing
Some observers consider Somalia’s huge increase in maritime depredation as a response 
to widespread illegal fishing in its sovereign waters. Somalia’s coastline, which is almost 
equivalent in length to the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, is the longest in Af-
rica. Thanks to the periodic upwelling of the nutrient-laden Somali Current, its waters 
are rich in fish and shellfish. In defiance of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Barre regime claimed that its territorial waters extended 
to two hundred nautical miles rather than the twelve that are allowed. This claim has 
never been recognized and has no standing in international law. Nonetheless, because 
UNCLOS has broadly been accepted as customary international law, Somalia has been 
deemed to have a two-hundred-nautical-mile EEZ, meaning that foreign fishing there 
without permission is illegal. Unfortunately, the lack of an effective successor govern-
ment has made enforcement impossible. After 1991, in particular, there was no force to 
protect these fishing grounds. Foreign boats moved in aggressively to catch tuna, shark 
and ray for their fins, and lobster, in the process destroying reef habitats.
During the civil war in Somalia, fishing boats from Egypt and Yemen and whole fish-
ing fleets from such distant-water fishing nations as Belize, South Korea, and Taiwan 
moved in, exploiting Somalia’s offshore resources with “near impunity.” French and 
Spanish fishermen have reportedly been observed using the Belizean flag to circumvent 
European Union (EU) rules prohibiting fishing by member states in Somalia’s maritime 
areas. Although it is difficult to estimate exactly, the value of foreign annual fish catches 
in Somali waters may vary from $90,000,000 to as much as $300,000,000.22 
The size and sophistication of the foreign vessels hurt the local fishermen. Estimates 
suggest that in 2000 there were around thirty thousand full-time and sixty thousand 
part-time Somali fishermen who sold most of their catch for export. In the years that 
followed reports became increasingly frequent of local boats being crushed by the larger 
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foreign boats, their nets destroyed, and catch stolen.23 Local fishermen, who were not 
licensed, reported being fired on by the foreign fishermen and by Somali militiamen on 
board foreign vessels; on occasion they retaliated, attacking foreign vessels in attempts 
to drive them off.24 There have been reports of foreign fishermen destroying gear on 
Somali boats. Attempts have also been made to ram and sink or disable local fishing 
vessels, so as to chase local fishermen away from lucrative fishing grounds. In response 
to this unfair foreign competition, Somali fishermen began to use force to protect their 
interests. This Somali response has been described as the effective “decentralization of 
fisheries enforcement to the grass-roots level.” 25
It has been suggested that Somali piracy, aided and abetted by Somali political inter-
ests on land, evolved out of this defensive response to foreign exploitation, but to what 
extent Somali fishermen turned their skills to piracy remains unclear. According to one 
theory—which might be termed the “evolutionary explanation”—once fishermen real-
ized how much money foreign interests were prepared to pay for the return of fishing 
boats and crews, they abandoned fishing to exploit this more lucrative line of work. “It’s 
true that the pirates started to defend the fishing business,” a Somali diplomat explains, 
but then, as he puts it, “they got greedy.” 26 Over time these groups turned their attention 
to nonfishing vessels, which in some cases commanded even higher ransoms.
According to a second theory, which might be labeled the “adaptive explanation,” once 
the warlords began selling fishing concessions and in some cases providing foreign 
boats with armed guards, the self-protection groups turned their attention to unarmed 
commercial vessels as the only option left open to them to make a living.27
According to a third theory, which might be dubbed the “complicity explanation,” some 
fishermen, recognizing economic reality, sold their services as boat handlers to warlord 
groups, which then supplied the equipment and the men who actually boarded and 
captured the foreign ships.28
The fourth theory might be described as the “unemployed coast guard explanation.” 
The Puntland administration first hired a British private security company, Hart Secu-
rity, and then, after it left, entered into a joint venture with a Canadian company named 
SomCan to train and equip a fishery-protection force. When this ended in 2005, men 
trained by both companies apparently used their interception and ship-boarding skills 
as pirates.
Whatever the reality, Somali pirate groups have not hesitated to claim that they are 
defending the country’s fishing grounds and preventing toxic-waste dumping. Time 
and again they have justified their activities as restitution for the theft and destruction 
foreigners have wrought on Somalia’s natural resources.29 Consequently, the Somali 
fishermen may be called pirates, regardless of whether their actions are more in line 
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with state-sponsored commerce raiding than with traditional piracy. Understanding 
this ongoing problem requires an examination of the political backing for the pirates, 
backing that originated not so much in government institutions as in the clan-based 
structure of Somali society.
Somalia: A Clan-Based Society
Reaching any understanding of Somali piracy—or indeed, any understanding of Somali 
society and politics generally—demands the recognition that Somalia is a lineage-based 
society where almost everyone is identified by membership in a clan. Clan affiliation 
(or clanism) has been the organizing principle in Somali life and the basis of most 
social and political institutions, including “personal identity, rights of access to local 
resources, customary law (xeer), blood payment (diya) groups and social support sys-
tems,” since the precolonial era.30 Critically, clans are the principal source of individual 
and family security.31 Restitution is addressed by blood payment, but criminal acts are 
deterred by the threat that an entire subclan will retaliate if one of its members is at-
tacked.32 Consequently, the clan tends to be the institution that people turn to in times 
of violence and danger.
However, it is important to note that only in situations of conflict do these clans mo-
bilize as actual groups. They form what anthropologists term a “segmentary political 
system,” in which the constituent parts are relative, constituting what is perhaps best 
thought of as a collection of interlocking, emergent groupings akin metaphorically 
to Russian nesting dolls.33 Such systems are decentralized, highly individualistic, and 
democratic in nature. Clans and subclans are led by “elders,” generally senior, adult 
males, but the idea of “elder” is not synonymous with “chief.” 34 “Clan heads (commonly 
styled ‘Sultan’) have little established authority. At every level of political division, the 
elders (oday, duk) make policy, meeting in ad hoc councils (shir) in which every adult 
male traditionally has the right to speak.” 35
Clans also provide the critical political context. “A Somali genealogy,” Ioan Lewis 
writes,
is not a mere family tree. . . . [I]t represents the social divisions of people into corporate political 
groups. By reference to his ancestors, a man’s relations with others are defined, and his position in 
Somali society as a whole determined. Thus an understanding of political relations between groups 
requires a knowledge of their genealogical relationships. At the same time, the range of agnatic rela-
tionship recognized on one occasion need not be the same as that on another, so that the corporate 
kinship group in which an individual has political status varies with the context. Thus although 
political and legal affiliation might be elastic it f luctuates largely within the range of agnatic con-
nection “defined in the genealogies.” 36
As Moshe Terdman puts it, in Somalia “one does not have a permanent enemy or a 
permanent friend—only a permanent context.” 37 There are six major clan families. Of 
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these, the Hawiye, Darood, Isaaq, and Dir are traditionally pastoralist groupings. They 
have a higher status than the two other, agro-pastoralist, groupings, the Rahanweyn 
and the Digil, known collectively as the “Sab.” 38 Each grouping is made up of numerous 
subclans, lineages, and extended families.39 The Darood are the largest and geographi-
cally most widely distributed group; the Isaaq are derived historically from the Dir and 
linked to the Hawiye in a genealogical grouping known as the “Irir.” 40
Notions of government and statehood can quickly wither in the face of clan-based 
conflict, much of which has been driven since 1991 by the desire for the wealth and 
power revolving around commercial opportunities, including ports and airports, 
access to land and natural resources, jobs, and contracts with aid agencies. All the 
rather modern-sounding political groupings that emerged to confront Barre, such as 
the United Somali Congress (USC) and the SNM, were in the main vehicles for indi-
vidual clans—in these examples the Hawiye and the Isaaq, respectively.41 Although the 
SNM cooperated closely with the Hawiye USC, it retained its own Isaaq character and 
focus on the liberation of what is now Somaliland.42 The Somali Salvation Democratic 
Front, led by Abdullahi Yusuf, was always an essentially Majarteen organization whose 
purpose, at least in the view of the SNM, was the restoration of Darood (and Majarteen) 
hegemony throughout Somalia.43
Somalia’s deep-seated clan loyalties have impeded the creation of any sort of unifying 
political entity, let alone a “state” in the Western sense. Creating such structures may not 
be easy anywhere but appears to be particularly problematic in Somalia, where social 
positions can be felt acutely and defended fiercely. This state of affairs has spurred the 
belief that the creation of clan homelands may well offer the most practical solution to 
Somalia’s political problems. Northern Somalia is divided among three clan families: 
the Dir, in the west, who reside partly in Somaliland and partly in Djibouti; the Isaaq, 
in the center; and the Darood, in the east. The borders of Somaliland largely coincide 
with those of the Isaaq. Those of Puntland embrace the territory of the Harti clan of the 
Darood, which consists of the Warsangeli, Dulhabante (who live partly in Somaliland), 
and the Majarteen but is dominated by the Majarteen.44 
In southern Somalia, however, decades of migration and settlement, some of it forced, 
have produced an intermingling of clan areas that makes the formation of clan home-
lands much more difficult, although this did not prevent the Marehan from exercis-
ing power in the Gedo region at the expense of the Rahanweyn, and the Rahanweyn 
declaring nonmembers outsiders in the south-central Bay region. Nor have affiliations 
prevented clans from forming what usually prove to be fluid but mutually beneficial 
alliances.45 For example, the Marehan and Habir Gedir Ayr formed the “Jubba Valley 
Alliance” to control the lucrative traffic through the port of Kismayo.46 
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Clan affiliations are not immutable, as Lewis makes clear. Peter Little too argues that 
clans are not the rigid, easily identifiable, and internally homogeneous groupings beloved 
in Western analysis.47 While several political and social organizing factors can weaken 
clan affiliation, clanism remains the principal organizing force in Somali society.48 Islam 
might be one such nonclan organizing factor, but any move to unify the country on the 
basis of religious allegiance is likely to depend on its effect on clan interests.
The clan structure of Somalia makes government corruption particularly potent, and 
“corruption is the main vehicle, and likely the most socially damaging activity, by which 
criminal gangs achieve their aims.” 49 Poverty comes a close second; it is perhaps the 
major reason why pirate gangs find it so easy to attract recruits. For these reasons, in 
addition to civil war and the lack of proper maritime supervision, Somalia has seen a 
rapid increase in piracy incidents. Experience elsewhere in the world suggests that the 
number of actual attacks exceeds the number reported, by an unknown margin, and it 
is therefore quite possible that Somali piracy attacks are more numerous than publicly 
available figures suggest.
The Financial Backing for Somali Piracy
Piracy quickly became a multimillion-dollar business in the midst of what many consid-
er to be a failed state. Funding for these ventures now comes from a variety of sources, 
ranging from individuals, who provide the equipment and consumables; and invest-
ment groups, some of them almost certainly based overseas, that take shares in indi-
vidual ventures much as merchants used to buy shares in ship cargoes in the early days 
of sail; to owners of boats who allocate places to men who contribute food or guns and 
whose eventual reward reflects these contributions. Profits have not been simply spent 
on indulgences; some limited reinvestment is made in GPS systems, satellite phones, 
and even night-vision goggles.
Although the pirates’ main goal is to capture ships and their crews for ransom, there 
is a symbiotic relationship between the internal political situation in Somalia and the 
maritime security situation offshore. In the north of the country, the self-proclaimed 
Republic of Somaliland has effective control over its territory and has established a 
coast guard to combat piracy off Somaliland’s shores. Because of effective policing on 
and off shore, there have been no reports of piracy attacks off Somaliland, even as the 
number of incidents has escalated elsewhere along the coast. That escalation has been 
most marked off Puntland in the northeast and the neighboring regions of Mudug and 
Galguduud to the south. Coast guards alone, however, are not the solution and may, if 
their activities are not sustained, as indicated already, contribute to the problem. In 1999 
the Puntland authorities contracted (as noted above) a British company, Hart Security, 
to establish such a force. The fees for fishing licenses that it would enforce would pay 
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for its services. In 2001, however, President Abdullahi Yusuf refused to step down at the 
conclusion of his constitutionally mandated term, sparking a conflict with his rival, who 
was eventually forced to flee. The conflict caused the coast guard to split into factions 
that supported the rival candidates, forcing Hart to withdraw.50
In 2002 Hart’s role was taken over by a new venture, which took its name SomCan 
from its Somali-Canadian joint ownership. The Somali partners were members of the 
Taar, a diya-paying group aligned with members of the same Oman Mohammed subclan 
as Yusuf. The same exploitative model as Hart has used funded the new company but 
on a greater scale—Hart had deployed one fisheries enforcement vessel with between 
seventy and eighty men, while SomCan deployed six together, with a four-hundred-man 
force, the members of which Jay Bahadur, who interviewed two Taar leaders, described 
as “marines.” Not all of the licenses the company issued originated in the Ministry of 
Fisheries; some were of its own make. Given, however, its close connection with Yusuf 
and the corrupt nature of his regime, this issue may be regarded as a quibble. In a 
crucial difference from Hart, SomCan required license holders to obtain Somali agents, 
with whom it could deal directly. In return it not only mounted patrols using its own 
ships but placed militiamen on board foreign vessels to protect them, in the main, from 
local Somali fishermen, who suffered from the foreign boats’ rapacious fishing methods. 
Between 2002 and 2005 SomCan operated what was effectively a protection racket for 
privileged foreign (and some domestic) concerns. Its own boats and those it was protect-
ing regularly moved close to the coast, driving off local artisanal fishermen and tearing 
up their gear.51
It is likely that the main domestic operator who benefited from their protection was 
Hassan Munya. Munya had been the manager of the Somali High Seas Fishing Compa-
ny (SHIFCO), a joint venture between an Italian company and the Barre regime prior to 
Barre’s overthrow in 1991. Equipped with five trawlers and a freezer-equipped mother 
ship, it supplied fish to Italy and the European Economic Community (as the EU was 
then known).52 When the Barre regime collapsed, Munya took over the ships and sailed 
them to Aden. It becomes something of a moot point to describe the continued use of 
SHIFCO’s vessels as illegal, but their actions were enough to provoke local fishermen 
into holding them for ransom on at least four occasions.53 In addition to fishing without 
due regard for local interests, Munya’s operation was also accused of piracy against local 
and international shipping; he was said to have equipped his ships with heavy weapons 
and to have had between fifty and sixty men under his command. His men fired on the 
Hart-operated protection vessel at least once. When confronted with evidence of his 
crew’s misbehavior, Munya agreed to purchase licenses from Yusuf ’s regime. The deal 
was reached despite his apparent threat to kill anyone who worked for Hart Security.54 
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The official position of the Yusuf administration was that it had no evidence with which 
to prosecute him.55 
Many other pirate groups appear to be closely linked with the ruling clans. The “Somali 
marines” began operating in 2005 from Haradheere, a village that lies outside Puntland 
in the part of the Mudug region inhabited by the Suleiman subclan of the Hawiye. This 
is an area that even in Somalia is regarded as little more than a no-man’s-land between 
the more populous regions to the north and south. It was founded by Mohamed Abdi 
Hassan “Afweyne,” a Suleiman, on a cross-clan understanding. The Suleiman, while 
they are Hawiye, had no particular affiliation with the main clan and reportedly little 
in common with the politically active Habir Gedir  and Abgaal subclans to the south 
that dominated Hawiye affairs.56 They certainly had no lasting disagreements with 
the Majarteen. According to the pirate leader “Boyah,” Afweyne handpicked his pirate 
group carefully, taking pirates and pirate trainers from Puntland, including “Boyah” 
himself, plus Mohamed Garad and Farah Abdullahi.57 The remoteness of the base left it 
isolated from the ravages of Somalia’s civil war and underpopulated with public officials 
needing to be bribed. The result was “an entrepreneurial alliance” between the Suleiman 
and the Majarteen, which remain the dominant forces in Somali piracy even though it 
has included other clans subsequently, the Saad in particular.58 
It seems unlikely that such an operation could have arisen, survived, and then thrived, 
however, without powerful political protection or without drawing on the reservoir of 
piratical and commercial expertise that resided within Puntland.59 The Haradheere 
group announced its presence with the hijacking of a liquefied–petroleum gas carrier, 
Feisty Gas, fifty nautical miles off the coast in April 2005, about six months after Yusuf 
became president of the Transitional Federal Government and only one month after Yu-
suf ’s successor Muhamed Muse Hersi terminated SomCan’s contract. The evidence may 
be circumstantial, but during his time as a civil servant Afweyne was a close associate 
of Yusuf ’s, particularly during his struggle to secure the Puntland presidency in 2001.60 
Senior Majarteen political figures were used to taking shares of the proceeds in recogni-
tion of their positions: “You can’t have that much money coming in or going out without 
the top clan people being involved,” as Abdirahman Ibrahim, a Puntland academic, puts 
it.61 It seems inconceivable they would have allowed such a lucrative source of revenue 
to slip beyond their control. Meanwhile, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the 
political front organization for the Majarteen clan, led by then colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, 
is suspected of being behind the attacks on Bonsella and Baharihindi.62 Yusuf is believed 
to have financed his rise in Puntland politics from the proceeds of the huge ransom 
extorted for the release of MV Shen Kno II in particular.63
Although the “Somali marines” were openly recognized as a pirate group, they empha-
size their role in protecting Somali resources and the livelihoods of coastal communities 
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from foreign exploitation. They portray any fees collected or cargoes expropriated as 
connected with legitimate defensive efforts.64 The evolution over time of Somali piracy 
from individual attacks to organized group attacks, often having more in common with 
commerce raiding than piracy, has resulted in the adoption of new, more successful, 
strategies.
Evolving Piracy Strategies
The Haradheere high-seas piracy ring used the traditional tools available to Somali fish-
ermen to increase its success rates. From the outset it employed small motorized boats 
made of fiberglass with Styrofoam cores. Its members used multiple skiffs, with a larger 
skiff acting as a “mother ship” to support one or more smaller boats. The smaller skiffs, 
each with a crew of four or five pirates, would come alongside a vessel, one to starboard 
and the other to port, with the larger skiff astern in pursuit. They then placed one or 
more of their number on board the target vessel to intimidate the crew, allowing the 
rest of the boarding party to bring the captured vessel into port.65 This technique, first 
implemented in early 2005, resulted in some huge captures. 
The diversion of Combined Task Force 150 elements, especially after the Seabourn Spirit 
incident during 2005, perhaps prompted a change in pirate habits. For example, the 
Haradheere group soon began using captured low-value vessels as mother ships. During 
2006 the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) tried to halt the pirate activities. The CIC 
briefly reopened the port of Mogadishu and began to gather port entry fees and profits. 
However, this new regime lasted only a very short time. Even before the Ethiopian Na-
tional Defense Force had defeated the CIC in 2006, the pirates were back at sea hunting 
for new targets.
Beginning in 2007, the number of pirate attacks quickly increased. A small cargo ship, 
MV Rozen, was hijacked in February and another cargo ship, MV Nimattulah, on 1 
April. The influence of the Afweyne family had temporarily declined during the CIC 
interlude, allowing several new groups to emerge.66 These ranged in size from father-
and-son combinations to large organizations of two hundred pirates or more. Although 
the older pirate organizers like Afweyne and Mohamed Garad remained active, Stig 
Hansen reports that many of the newer groups were often “a loose constellation around 
a pirate leader, usually a veteran pirate that re-invests funds in new pirate missions and 
who often functions as a fund-raiser.” 67
One of the most astonishing confirmations of the commercial nature of Somali piracy 
was the report in December 2009 of the existence in Haradheere of a cooperative, or 
“stock exchange,” that was attracting a wide range of potential investors. According 
to one pirate, the cooperative had proved to be an excellent way of involving the local 
murphy  265
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:03 NP_40 Ch16-Murphy.indd  September 11, 2013 2:27 PM
community: “The shares are open to all,” he told a reporter, “and everyone can take 
part, whether personally at sea or on land by providing cash, weapons or useful materi-
als[;] . . . we’ve made piracy a community activity.” A local official appeared to confirm 
this: “Piracy-related business has become the most profitable economic activity in our 
area and as locals we depend upon their output. The district gets a percentage of every 
ransom from ships that have been released, and that goes on public infrastructure, 
including our hospital and public schools.” 68 In actuality, such public infrastructure 
investment, as compared to private construction, has been hard to find.
The international dimension remains murky. Members of the Somali expatriate com-
munities in Kenya and Dubai figure regularly in reports.69 Initially money was probably 
paid to interests based outside the country, but much of what entered Somalia never 
came out again.70 What money did come out appeared to be invested in Dubai and in 
Kenya, where the most obvious consequence was a property boom in Eastleigh, a suburb 
of Nairobi dominated by Somali refugees and expatriates.71 In May 2009 the head of 
Interpol, Ronald Noble, pressed for a global alliance of criminal investigators to track 
pirates through the ransom-money trail, while at an Interpol meeting held in Singapore 
later in the year Australia’s inspector of transport security, Mick Palmer, suggested there 
was “clear evidence” of increased organization based on the use of more sophisticated 
weapons and the gangs’ ability to locate ships farther and farther from the coast.72 This 
would certainly fit the classic pattern of criminal gang evolution, but the evidence for 
these specific assertions remained thin.73
Attempts by Western investigators to track the money once it has entered Somalia have 
to date borne little fruit.74 Somalis traditionally base everything on trust.75 Their society 
remains closed and xenophobic, while as one maritime analyst pointed out, the degree 
to which payments needed to be split among various domestic groups to enable the 
gangs to continue to operate probably left little margin for international syndicates to 
make money.76 Whether or not this remains the case now is questionable. Gangs still 
need to pay off their political protectors and local officials and to spread the proceeds 
among the members of their clans, but most sources now agree that pirate financiers 
could take between 20 and 30 percent of the reward. Thus, enormous potential returns 
on investment suggest that overseas investors have become much more prominent in the 
gangs’ activities.
Because of the very success of these pirate organizations, financial links among the 
pirates, the Somali clans, and government officials are almost certain. What portion 
would go to the pirates’ government supporters is unclear. However, at least some of the 
pirates are undoubtedly working hand in hand with clan leaders and local administra-
tions—or at the very least, corrupt officials in those administrations—which makes 
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that portion of Somalia’s piracy problem similar to government-sponsored piracy, or 
commerce raiding.
Conclusions
Although attacks off the Somali coast appear to be pure piracy on the surface, 
they should in fact be considered as a new form of government-sponsored, at least 
government-complicit, commerce raiding. Clan-based political groups, such as the SSDF, 
needed from their inceptions to fund their operations. The UN intervention in Somalia 
in 1993–95 had taught them that foreign kidnap victims could readily be turned into 
cash. The armada of foreign fishing vessels that entered Somalia’s unprotected waters 
presented tempting targets that warlord groups up and down the coast preyed on, 
arguing all the while—some more genuinely than others—that they were “legitimate 
coastguards protecting the waters from unlawful fishing or contamination.”77
But years of successful boat seizures and kidnappings, which have led to ever larger 
ransoms, have made this highly lucrative form of commerce raiding even more attrac-
tive to a wide range of backers, including most importantly clan leaders, local govern-
ment officials, and shadowy financial figures overseas. As a result, cases of piracy in the 
waters off Somalia have increased rapidly during recent years, to the point where the 
international community seems to be at a loss for a strategy to deal with the problem.
Any effective strategy would first need to recognize that Somali piracy is a rational 
response that satisfies an economic need by exploiting a security weakness. That 
security weakness will never be closed by using naval forces operating only at sea. To 
exert control the security forces would need to raid ashore. But Somali piracy is not a 
criminal fraternity hiding in the midst of an otherwise largely law-abiding society. It 
constitutes a significant part of that society. It has a human and geographic hinterland. 
It furthermore displays features of a commercial system that shows signs of turning into 
a permanent way of life.
Navies will have a clear and purposeful role in the solution of this riddle, but only in 
combination with strategies conducted on land. Better intelligence from land-based 
sources will improve chances of interdiction. Those caught can be returned with relative 
ease to face Somali, not international, justice. Ports and stretches of coastline can be 
closely patrolled and even effective “exclusion zones” established, because ships can be 
supported by land-based policing. Over time, expensive multimission warships could be 
replaced by more specialized and less expensive coastal patrol craft and converted civil-
ian ships that can gradually be turned over to local coast guards as their capacities and 
capabilities increase. Illegal fishing in Somalia’s EEZ can be curtailed, perhaps by the 
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navies of the nations from whence some of the illegal boats come. Unity of effort, which 
has proved elusive so far, might thus be achieved.
But the solution is not solely naval. Suppressing piracy means securing the land, which 
in turn demands engagement with the Somali people, thus requiring a realistic political 
strategy. If the Somali pirates were to be treated not as simple pirates but as commerce 
raiders, a whole new range of options might open to those groups attempting to halt the 
attacks. It would be most important, of course, to find and eliminate the real operational 
and financial masterminds behind the pirate organizations. These backers include clan 
leaders and government officials locally, and financiers, who often reside abroad—just 
as the merchants who underwrote seventeenth-century piracy often lived in London or 
New York. The assets of those who persist in piracy, however, by spurning attempts to 
draw Somalia into the international order, will need to be squeezed, and their money 
needs to be confiscated wherever it is held. Only when the piratical activities become 
unprofitable for the clans, for members of the Somali government engaged in piracy, 
and for international backers will the Somali people as a whole desire to put a stop to 
these activities.
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Conclusion: Guerre de Course in the Modern Age
Guerre de course—or more generically, commerce raiding—is a means to contribute to 
the achievement of national or nonstate-actor goals. What kinds of commerce raiding 
have been employed? What types of operational goals has commerce raiding furthered 
most effectively? What types of strategic effects have various kinds of commerce raiding 
produced? What circumstances are most and least conducive to their operational and 
strategic success? How have other parties—both belligerents and neutrals—responded? 
What kinds of enemy adaptation and counterstrategies have been most effective? 
These questions will be examined here in terms of time, space, force, operational versus 
strategic goals, countermeasures, and overall operational and strategic effectiveness. 
Time includes both the rate of implementation and duration. Space focuses not just 
on the area under attack but also on the sea and land lines of communications of both 
sides. Force refers to all available instruments of national power. Operational goals con-
cern the intended first-order effects of the commerce raiding, while strategic goals mean 
the objectives of the conflict. Countermeasures concern enemy adaptation. Finally, ef-
fectiveness is measured at both the operational and strategic levels.
Commerce raiding types can be categorized in a number of ways: rapid, intermittent, 
tightening, or loosening (in terms of implementation); short, medium, and long (in 
terms of duration); close or distant (in terms of the distance of the theater from the terri-
tory of the victim); near or far (in terms of the distance of the theater from the territory 
of the perpetrator); joint (when different military services of one country cooperate) 
or combined (when militaries of allied countries coordinate); and partial or total (in 
terms of porosity). Over time technological breakthroughs have greatly influenced the 
cost, execution, and feasibility of all types of commerce raiding, as shown initially by 
the development of instruments to locate and target specific ships in World War II, and 
most recently by the ability of small Somali skiffs to hijack huge oil tankers with the aid 
of handheld GPS tracking devices.
Time: Implementation and Duration
Both the rate of implementation and duration of a commerce raiding campaign can 
influence its effectiveness. Implementation can be rapid, intermittent, tightening, or 
loosening, while the duration can be short, medium, or long. For instance, the French 
quickly adopted commerce raiding operations during the French Wars, but over the 
long term they conducted them only intermittently; meanwhile, because of faulty 
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torpedoes and poor leadership, American commerce raiding against Japan during 
World War II tightened only gradually over several years.
Table 1, “Time,” shows how these factors played out in the sixteen case studies in this 
volume. The five rapidly implemented commerce raiding campaigns comprise the 
Confederate side of the U.S. Civil War, the Jeune École (in theory, at least), the Japanese 
in the First Sino-Japanese War, the American campaign upon entry in World War 
I, and the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War. In all of these conflicts rapid commerce 
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raiding operations were relatively short (one to two years) to medium (three to four 
years) in duration and were usually waged by the victorious side—but not always, as 
the American Civil War showed. In the First Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese never 
contested Japanese command of the sea after suffering the loss of a troop transport and 
then defeat in one naval engagement. Once the United States entered World War I, its 
convoys and antisubmarine warfare campaign began rapidly and soon neutralized Ger-
man commerce raiding. In line with the expectations of Jeune École theorists, the rapid 
introduction of commerce raiding seemed to force the Spanish Republic to capitulate. 
Nevertheless, commerce raiding was not the sole determining factor in the outcome of 
these wars.
Likewise, in all four cases of gradually tightening commerce raiding—Britain in the 
Seven Years’ War, Germany in both world wars, and the United States against Japan in 
World War II—the raiding did not determine the outcome of the wars. Rather, com-
merce raiding worked in conjunction with other strategies: the attrition of ground 
forces, blockade, naval combat, alliance, and (in the World War II case of Japan) the 
American use of atomic bombs. The extensive size of these theaters perhaps explains 
why implementation was gradual versus rapid. Strategies of gradually tightening raiding 
worked for the dominant sea power but not for land powers, or even for a secondary sea 
power such as Germany in both world wars. Britain and the United States successfully 
combined commerce raiding with other strategies to win, variously, the Seven Years’ 
War and both world wars, while unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany in World 
War I cost that nation the war by transforming a great naval power, the United States, 
from a neutral into a belligerent.
Five cases of intermittent commerce raiding—the American Revolution, the French 
Wars, the War of 1812, the Tanker War, and Somalia—produced mixed results: loss, 
draw, or victory due partly to other factors (such as French intervention at Yorktown, in 
the case of the American Revolution). These campaigns were perhaps most strategically 
effective in what they prevented from happening—in other words, in their deterrent or 
diversionary effects. For example, U.S. commerce raiding in the War of 1812 tied down 
many Royal Navy ships that might otherwise have attacked conventional American 
targets. However, when intermittent commerce raiding negatively affected the inter-
national community, such as during the French Wars, the Tanker War, and Somalia, it 
spurred the intervention of neutral powers.
There were only two cases in this book of loosening campaigns—Russia in the Russo-
Japanese War and Japan in World War II—both powers whose attention turned to 
massive land battles that they were losing. In Russia’s case, threats of neutral interven-
tion convinced Russia to terminate commerce raiding from neutral Chinese ports. By 
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contrast, huge Japanese naval and merchant ship losses after 1943 precluded effective 
countermeasures.
Six commerce raiding campaigns were long (five years or more)—the Seven Years’ War, 
the American Revolution, the French Wars, Germany during World War II, the Tanker 
War, and Somali piracy. Two of these six gradually tightened over time, while the others 
were intermittent. Short and medium-length commerce raiding campaigns generally 
concentrated on an operational center of gravity, such as the Japanese sinking of the 
Chinese troopship Kowshing or the Confederate focus on Union shipping.
Only six of the cases examined (not counting Jeune École theorists) ended in clear 
victories for the sides with the more robust commerce raiding campaigns. In the Seven 
Years’ War, the American Revolution, the First Sino-Japanese War, the American 
campaigns during both World Wars I and II, and the Spanish Civil War, the ability to 
conduct a commerce raiding campaign or to protect vital imports by sea appears to have 
been crucial for victory. Even so, it was but one of multiple critical factors that together 
determined the outcome. In eight cases, however, a side engaging in commerce raiding 
either lost or the conflict ended in a draw. All were continental powers, with the excep-
tion of Japan in World War II, and Japan in that war chose a continental strategy rather 
than a purely maritime strategy that could have led to a more productive use of its navy 
and merchant marine.
In other words, generally commerce raiding seems more strategically effective for a 
naval power than a continental power. Land powers that pursue the strategy can often 
achieve the operational effect of imposing far greater financial losses on their enemy 
than their raiding operations cost. Although the ships sunk are not available for future 
passages and their replacement requires a vigorous shipbuilding capacity, dominant 
naval powers typically have such capacity, either domestically or through allies. So the 
costs from lost ships are significant and cumulative but potentially disastrous only for a 
country lacking the capacity to replace lost ships and dependent on crucial war materiel 
delivered by sea. Usually, most of the trade still gets through, with the result that the 
financial losses constitute a small fraction of total trade. Moreover, commerce raiding 
can become a morale-enhancing catalyst for an angry victim. Although it might seem 
that overseas commerce would be a critical vulnerability for a maritime power, foreign 
trade has actually been most vulnerable when targeted by the dominant maritime power 
against a continental adversary. In fact, overseas commerce turns out to be an even more 
important critical vulnerability for continental powers, let alone secondary maritime 
powers, which lack the means to protect their trade. Dominant maritime powers tend to 
combine blockade with commerce raiding to cut off the victim’s overseas trade virtually 
in its entirety—as exemplified by Germany’s fate in both world wars.
conclusion  275
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:04 NP_40 CommerceConclusion.indd September 13, 2013 11:44 AM
Space: The Nature of the Theater
In most cases—ten of the sixteen—land powers adopted commerce raiding operations, 
and in eight they targeted sea powers. Only two of the campaigns were part of victorious 
wars: the American Revolution (targeting a sea power) and Spanish Civil War (targeting 
a land power). In each of these two cases the outcome depended in part on conventional 
military aid supplied by great-power allies—France for the decisive battle of Yorktown 
and the Axis powers for the Spanish Fascists. In half of the ten cases, the land powers 
engaged in commerce raiding had significant navies, and yet only one case resulted in 
victory—the Fascists in Spain, whose maritime assets were allied navies. The Spanish 
case was also the only one of the five in which the victim was a land, not a sea, power. 
In other words, commerce raiding conducted by land powers against sea powers has not 
generally resulted in a victorious war.
Five of the campaigns were conducted by sea powers, which won all but one of the wars. 
The only loss was Japan’s in World War II, in which it took on the dominant naval 
powers, the United States and Great Britain. All the victorious campaigns save one took 
place in theaters distant from the victims and far from the perpetrators, the dominant 
sea power roaming the seas in search of targets. These were global wars—the Seven 
Years’ War, World War I, and World War II—in which the global order was at stake and 
fighting took place around the planet. The exception, the First Sino-Japanese War, was a 
regional war between only two belligerents, not between global coalitions, and geogra-
phy dictated a close-near theater.
The nature of the theater of operations can help determine success or failure. Com-
merce raiding distances can vary greatly. The terms “close” (for roughly a hundred to 
150 nautical miles) and “distant” (more than 150 nautical miles) refer to the distance of 
the theater from the victim country, while “near commerce raiding” and “far commerce 
raiding” refer to the distance of the theater from the commerce raiding country. As 
shown in table 2, “Space,” most cases included operations both distant from the shores 
of the victim and far from the shores of the perpetrator, such as in the Seven Years’ 
War, the American Revolution, the French Wars, the War of 1812, the American Civil 
War, World War I for the United States, World War II for Japan and the United States, 
and more and more so in Somalia. Prior to technological improvements in the ability 
to locate hostile ships, nations engaged in far raids tended to pursue targets close to 
enemy shores. Technological improvements, however, made raids adjacent to enemy 
shores increasingly dangerous, so close commerce raiding campaigns have become rare. 
For a limited time submarines changed this dynamic in World War II, when Germany 
sank U.S. merchant ships along the Eastern Seaboard, but only until the United States 
implemented countermeasures. In the case of the Spanish Civil War and the Tanker 
War, the belligerents lacked significant navies, permitting commerce raiding close to 
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shore. Only three cases entailed commerce raiding near to the raider’s shores—Japan 
in the First Sino-Japanese War, Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and the Iran-Iraq 
Tanker War—cases where the belligerents bordered on each other or were separated by a 
narrow sea. Normally, merchant ships would not be sent near enemies intent on raiding, 
unless geography offered no alternative.
TABLE 2
Space
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In virtually all of these case studies the country victimized by commerce raiding 
was too far away to retaliate effectively against the home territory of the perpetrator. 
The exclusively “distant” commerce raiding was also “far” commerce raiding. In the 
exceptional case, the Spanish Civil War, the commerce raiding occurred far from the 
perpetrator but close to the victim, mainly because the Republic lacked an adequate 
navy. Meanwhile, in the two cases of raiding exclusively close to the shores of the victim, 
the raiding was also near the shores of the perpetrator: the First Sino-Japanese War and 
the Tanker War. Both were regional, not global, wars, and the close-near factors reflect 
the constricted geography of the theater. In the Russo-Japanese War, which occurred 
in much the same theater as the First Sino-Japanese War, Russia took advantage of its 
geography to engage both in near commerce raiding, with its locally based naval assets, 
and also in far commerce raiding in the Red Sea, with its European-based naval assets. 
As for the situation in Somalia, as shipping companies ordered their vessels to sail 
farther away from Somalia, the “pirates” would also venture out onto the “high seas” to 
find prey.
Thus history suggests that countries that are primarily land powers have a very small 
chance of successfully using commerce raiding operations, except perhaps for a deter-
rent effect or to improve leverage for a peace settlement in the rare case when the costs 
from commercial losses are sufficiently disproportionate to promote negotiations, such 
as U.S. commerce raiding operations during the American Revolution and the War 
of 1812. Commerce raiding has been most significant in global wars as one of many 
elements of national power necessary to defeat a great power, such as Germany in both 
world wars and Japan in World War II.
Force: Joint and Combined Operations
After time and space, force constitutes a critical dimension of commerce raiding opera-
tions. Commerce raiding violates the “commons,” historically defined in an internation-
al context as the oceans, which under international law are open to the common use of 
all. Commerce raiding normally attempts to transform passage through the commons 
into a gauntlet that imposes heavy costs on the enemy by diverting, restricting, or elimi-
nating traffic. With the advent of aircraft, submarines, and now satellites, the commons 
have expanded from the surface of the oceans to their depths and to the air and space 
above them. Prior to the development of aircraft and submarines, commerce raiding 
required mainly surface ships; in cases of raiding far from the raider’s home territory it 
has also required “mother ships” or ports in friendly countries to service and replenish 
ships. With the development of technology, commerce raiding has relied increasingly on 
submarine, air, satellite, and intelligence assets to locate targets.
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Over time, commerce raiding has moved away from purely naval operations to joint 
operations—entailing close cooperation among air, sea, and intelligence. In past eras, 
commerce raiding was often conducted by privateers and judged by prize courts. How-
ever, the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law made privateering illegal, 
transforming privateers into pirates. In the era of modern international law, professional 
navies, not individuals, conduct commerce raiding, with the Somali pirates an obvious 
exception. In practice, naval attacks on trade have been most effective for sea powers in 
global wars, which by their nature are coalition wars, so that coordinated (if not com-
bined) operations have also figured prominently in these cases.
According to table 3, “Force,” surface patrols were crucial in virtually all of the sixteen 
case studies. The main exceptions are represented by the predominant roles played by 
submarines in Germany’s commerce raiding operations during both world wars, plus 
the U.S. Navy’s unrestricted submarine-warfare campaign against Japan during World 
War II. Airpower, after its advent, also played a prominent role, particularly to locate 
German submarines in World War II. Land-based missiles became an important instru-
ment of force in only one case study—the Tanker War—but their potential for use in 
future commerce raiding is great, especially in restricted waters like the Persian Gulf.
TABLE 3
Force
 CONFLICT PATROLS SUBS LAND OPS AIR OPS ALLIES
Seven Years’ War X X X
American Revolution X X X
French Wars X X X
1812 X X
U.S. Civil War X X
Jeune École X (theory)
First Sino-Japanese War X X
Russo-Japanese War X X
WWI Germany X X X X X
WWI USA X X X X
Spanish Civil War X X X X X
WWII Germany X X X X X
WWII Japan X X X X X
WWII USA X X X X X
Tanker War X X X
Somali pirates X
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The most successful commerce raiding operations worked in combination with simulta-
neous land campaigns and often in combination with blockades. All three were evident 
in the American Civil War, the First Sino-Japanese War, the Entente strategy in World 
War I, the Spanish Civil War, and the Allied strategy in World War II. Commerce 
raiding was usually at best an important but secondary means to pressure an adversary 
to capitulate. Usually land campaigns exerted far more pressure than did commerce 
raiding. The only exception was the U.S. unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan, 
which targeted not only commerce but also the Imperial Japanese Navy and army troop 
transports. Although the United States never invaded the Japanese home islands prior to 
its surrender, a devastating air campaign including atomic bombs leveled Japan’s cities, 
and a Soviet land invasion loomed had the war protracted further.
Commerce raiding was cheap to execute, at the operational level, for all sides, and 
eventually it imposed greatly disproportionate costs on the enemy, both from trade 
losses and from countermeasures to end the raiding. U.S. submarines in the Pacific 
theater of World War II inflicted by far more damage against Japanese forces per dollar 
of American investment than any other military service or branch.1 These dispropor-
tionate costs were evident in the Seven Years’ War, the American Revolution, the War of 
1812, the U.S. Civil War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I for all sides, the Spanish 
Civil War, World War II for all sides, the Tanker War, and Somalia. The only exception 
might be the French Wars, where France might have suffered more than Britain did, not 
because of the privateering, but because of the British blockade of French ports and the 
British policy of warehousing thousands of detained commerce raiders in prison hulks.
At the strategic level, however, the costs could also become enormous, as Germany 
discovered with its unrestricted submarine-warfare campaign that brought the United 
States into World War I. Commerce raiding that threatens neutral shipping risks escala-
tion and retaliation. Russia recognized these costs and cut short its campaign in the 
Russo-Japanese War rather than suffer British and American intervention. Conversely, 
however large the economic costs, they may be insufficient to alter the outcome of the 
war—for example, the American Revolution or the U.S. Civil War.
Finally, commerce raiding can be executed unilaterally or in combination with allies. 
Combined operations have figured prominently in commerce raiding. Global wars 
usually depend on allies—the Seven Years’ War, the French Wars, and both world wars. 
Weak powers also often depend on allies—the colonists in the American Revolution 
and the Fascists in Spain. However, commerce raiding of neutral shipping is not to be 
undertaken lightly, since it is likely to produce an opposing alliance. The conduct of 
diplomacy was made complicated thereby for the American colonists targeting British 
trade, for revolutionary France, for the Confederates targeting Union trade, for Russia in 
the Russo-Japanese War, for Germany in World War I, for the Fascists in Spain, and for 
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both sides in the Tanker War. The United States largely escaped political ramifications 
from destroying Japanese trade in World War II because Japan’s simultaneous attacks 
on all of the neutral powers had left it with no friends in Asia.
Operational and Strategic Goals 
Commerce raiding is a means to an end. At the operational level, it provides a means 
to impede enemy trade, transportation, and communications through such actions as 
the destruction of merchant ships, the elimination of land forces while on shipboard, 
and the destruction of enemy naval forces; strategic effects can range from sanction 
enforcement, cost escalation, and bottleneck creation to full economic strangulation, 
if applied in combination with blockade. At the strategic level it can contribute—some-
times alone, but more often in combination with other strategies—to the achievement of 
war aims, whether limited or unlimited. Since it tends to work slowly, guerre de course 
has been most important in protracted coalition wars, which are often fought for unlim-
ited objectives. World War I, for example, left Germany blockaded and hungry, its trade 
from the sea cut; World War II left Japan in even worse shape.
Commerce raiding can be total or partial. Total commerce raiding operations are 
designed to halt prohibited traffic completely, while partial campaigns, by intent or by 
default, allow either a percentage or certain categories of trade to continue. Commerce 
raiding strategies that are effective at sea but fail to cut alternative land routes are still 
partial, even though they may make critical contributions to victory. In practice total 
campaigns are rare, because they require specific circumstances to become feasible—for 
instance, China’s unwitting cooperation with Japanese designs by failing to contest 
command of the sea in the First Sino-Japanese War, or the unusual oceanic theater of 
the World War II Pacific, marked by widely scattered islands and long distances separat-
ing Japan from key resources. Such factors allow a dominant naval power totally to cut 
off a secondary naval power by sea.
Finally, the commerce raider’s goals can be unlimited, meaning the overthrow of the 
enemy government, or something less, such as a negotiated peace. Hence the terms “un-
limited” and “limited” commerce raiding, defined in terms of strategic objective, not 
the quantity of resources devoted to the operation. As shown in table 4, “Operational 
and Strategic Goals,” in seven of the sixteen cases the original strategic objectives were 
unlimited, and in at least one case—the German attack on Great Britain during World 
War II—the original, limited goal escalated to an unlimited goal for at least a time. 
These were mainly global wars. Two additional cases were Russia in the Russo-Japanese 
War and the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War.
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Limited strategic objectives include U.S. goals in both the American Revolution and the 
War of 1812, neither of which involved seeking regime change in London. Likewise, the 
Confederacy in the Civil War did not seek to destroy the North and reunite the country 
under its own government but merely to achieve a negotiated settlement establishing its 
own independence. Other limited wars include the First Sino-Japanese War, which end-
ed in a negotiated settlement, and the current situation off Somalia, which is more about 
maximizing revenue rather than overthrowing any particular country or challenging 
TABLE 4
Operational and Strategic Goals







Seven Years’ War British stop French 
trade
defeat France trade partial U U
American 
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navy + trade partial L U
French Wars cut British trade defeat Britain trade partial U U
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defeat Britain navy + trade partial U U




navy partial U U




trade partial U U
WWII Germany cut British imports defeat Britain trade partial L-U-L U
WWII Japan keep supplies 
flowing to Japan
protect empire navy partial L U
WWII USA cut trade/
petroleum imports 
to Japan
defeat Japan trade total U L
Tanker War halt oil exports weaken 
enemy
trade partial L L




trade partial L L
U—unlimited L—limited
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the global trade system. Japan tried to fight a limited war against the United States in 
World War II but became the object of an unlimited counterattack that overthrew the 
imperial government in Tokyo.
Not surprisingly, most commerce raiding operations focus on an enemy’s trade, al-
though the enemy’s military force—including both naval vessels and troop transports 
(for instance, Japan’s sinking of the Chinese troopship Kowshing)—can also be targeted. 
Wars for unlimited objectives always targeted both civilian and military vessels, and 
many (but not all) wars for limited objectives also targeted both.
Adaptations and Countermeasures 
Countermeasures against commerce raiding include reconnaissance, patrols, and in-
terdiction of the raiders from the surface, under water, from the air, and now even from 
space. In the Age of Sail, surface ships conducted mainly search-and-destroy operations 
and such defensive measures as sailing in convoys. As submarines and aircraft became 
more available and dependable, they too were used for patrol and search-and-destroy 
duty. Thus, joint operations have played an increasingly important role, with joint sea-
air operations substituting for joint land-sea operations in the modern period.
Enemies can make commerce raiding extraordinarily expensive in terms of money, per-
sonnel, prestige, and strategic effect, so much so that the costs can ultimately outweigh 
the benefits. For instance, Napoleon’s strategy of commerce raiding hurt France more 
than Britain, because Britain was far better positioned to cut off French overseas trade 
than the reverse. Germany’s unrestricted submarine campaign eventually cost it World 
War I by spurring the entry of the United States. The Tanker War, which sank nearly 
half the merchant tonnage lost in all of World War II, produced crippling economic and 
political effects for both sides. Moreover, the Tanker War ushered in an era of intru-
sive great-power intervention in the Middle East, which continues to this day. Such 
outcomes can easily become nightmare scenarios for countries engaged in commerce 
raiding operations. However, if the victim either lacks effective countermeasures or does 
not incorporate them in time (such as Republican Spain or Japan in the Pacific theater 
of World War II) and the victim requires goods delivered by sea (critical war materiel, 
in the cases of Spain and Japan), commerce raiding can have critical “dream scenario” 
effects. But these situations are rare. Most commerce raiding operations fall somewhere 
between these extremes.
As table 5, “Adaptation and Countermeasures,” shows, of the sixteen case studies exam-
ined there are arguably five nightmare scenarios for the country first to adopt com-
merce raiding operations—Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, Germany in both World 
War I and World War II, Japan in World War II, and both parties in the Tanker War. In 
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the first case, Russian naval vessels attempted to capture all commercial ships supply-
ing Japan, but in the process prompted an opposing neutral reaction by Britain and to a 
lesser degree the United States, which was an emerging sea power at the time. German 
attacks on neutral commerce in World War I triggered a fatal third-party intervention. 
Initially, Germany’s U-boat campaigns in World Wars I and II were operationally suc-
cessful, but once the Allies ramped up production, especially of new ships, organized 
convoys, and fine-tuned intelligence assets to locate the raiders, the long-term tonnage 
trends worked against Germany. Japan met a similar fate in World War II, when it 
underestimated the damage American submarines could do to its commercial fleet and 
all attempts to reform its shipping system proved too little too late. Likewise, both Iran 
and Iraq experienced huge financial losses and intrusive third-party interventions in the 
Tanker War.
In the first of the two dream scenarios—the First Sino-Japanese War and the U.S. 
unrestricted submarine campaign in World War II—the theater of hostilities was small 
and the victim (China) took no countermeasures, while in the second the theater was 
TABLE 5



















X X X X X potential
American 
Revolution
X X X X X X
French Wars X X X X X
1812 X X X X
U.S. Civil War X X X X potential







X X potential X
WWI Germany X X X X X X
WWI USA X X
Spanish Civil 
War
X X X X
WWII Germany X X X X X X
WWII Japan X X X X
WWII USA X X X X
Tanker War X X X X X X
Somali pirates X X
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huge and the victim (Japan) took few countermeasures. In both cases the theater ide-
ally suited the capabilities of the commerce raider. In the first war, the Japanese had a 
navy with regional capabilities facing a Chinese navy under incompetent command. In 
the second war, Japan’s reliance on numerous overseas resources in combination with 
the dispersion of its troops over scattered islands allowed the dominant naval power, 
the United States, to freeze the movements of Japan’s goods and troops. In the dream 
scenarios, the victims largely followed the scripts anticipated by the commerce raiders, 
effectively becoming “cooperative” adversaries that could have imposed far higher costs 
on their enemies had they taken countermeasures and, in World War II, had Japan real-
ized that its military codes had been compromised. Indeed, China could have won the 
First Sino-Japanese War had it targeted Japanese troop transports, contested their land-
ings, and drawn any remaining Japanese forces inland for a long winter on low rations 
before delivering on them an annihilating counterattack during the spring.
Most of the sixteen commerce raiding case studies involved neither dream nor night-
mare scenarios. Usually both sides adapted to the other’s strategies. For example, in 
the U.S. Civil War the Union merchant-marine companies quickly sold their ships to 
foreign countries, mainly Great Britain, to protect them from Confederate attack. Like-
wise, France sold off much of its merchant marine during the Seven Years’ War. During 
the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese quickly halted Russian attempts to use neutral 
Chinese ports to conduct commerce raiding attacks. But not all adaptations were ef-
fective. For example, in the American Revolution the U.S. government initially formed 
its own fleet of ships to attack the British, before belatedly deciding to grant letters of 
marque to private commerce raiders instead.
In one set of paired cases—the German U-boat campaigns in the two world wars—the 
commerce raiding country used the same basic strategy twice, with greater initial suc-
cess the second time. However, in World War II not only did the Allies eventually obtain 
an Enigma machine and break the German codes, but the introduction of new technolo-
gies, including radar and aerial antisubmarine patrols, offset the greater capabilities of 
the German U-boats. Just as the war was ending, however, the Germans were about to 
introduce a new class of submarines that might have in turn offset these Allied advan-
tages. Thus the speed of adaptation can be crucial.
Over the years, the countermeasures to commerce raiding have become more effective 
as the technology for locating and targeting has improved. Search-and-destroy missions 
undermined commerce raiding in the Seven Years’ War, the French Wars, the U.S. Civil 
War, World War I, the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II, and the Tanker War. 
The targeting of bases proved most effective by Britain in the French Wars, by the 
Union in the U.S. Civil War, and by the United States in World War II. Convoys greatly 
reduced the damage in the Seven Years’ War, the French Wars, the War of 1812, World 
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War I, World War II (Europe), and the Tanker War. Note that these countermeasures of 
search-and-destroy, base raids, and convoys are more accessible to the dominant than 
to the secondary naval power, and more accessible to maritime than continental powers 
generally. Base raids are rarely feasible for a secondary naval power, let alone a continen-
tal power.
When evaluating the efficacy of commerce raiding, it is important to consider all pos-
sible enemy responses, as well as the intervention of third parties. For example, French 
assistance during the American Revolution and the American intervention in both 
World Wars I and II cut short what might have otherwise been promising commerce 
raiding campaigns. In addition, geography determines the availability of alternate land 
lines. In theaters with alternative land routes available to replace trade by sea, effec-
tive commerce raiding requires the cooperation, if not the active support, of the third 
parties that control the alternative land routes, in order to sever them. The likelihood of 
operational and strategic effectiveness plummeted for commerce raiders that triggered 
major additions to the victim’s coalition; hence the relatively cautious commerce raid-
ing conducted by the Confederacy in the Civil War, Japan in the First Sino-Japanese 
War, Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, and the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War. Such 
precedents for neutral intervention do not bode well for Somalia, which as a pariah state 
has no allies.
Operational and Strategic Effectiveness
Evaluating the effectiveness of a commerce raiding campaign is a three-part process. 
Did the commerce raiding operation achieve its operational goals? Did this contrib-
ute to the achievement of strategic success? Were the costs entailed worth the benefits 
delivered? Factors influencing effectiveness include the number of commerce raiders, 
the size of the theater, the economic or military importance of the targeted goods, and 
the availability of substitutes to offset bottlenecks. Tight commerce raiding operations 
do not in theory let any prohibited items through, whereas porous operations stop only 
a percentage of the traffic.
Rather than a binary choice of targets—naval ship or merchantman—these case stud-
ies reveal a wide spectrum of potential targets, ranging from neutral merchantmen to 
enemy-commandeered merchantmen, enemy merchantmen, enemy-allied naval vessels, 
and finally enemy naval vessels. Each type of target entailed a different level of opera-
tional risk of the attacker surviving the engagement and a different level of strategic risk 
of precipitating a third-party intervention. For this reason, strategic effectiveness can be 
difficult to measure with any certainty.
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Table 6, “Operational and Strategic Effectiveness,” shows that of the six commerce raid-
ing operations conducted by victorious powers (excluding the Jeune École), half were 
porous (Seven Years’ War, the American Revolution, and the Spanish Civil War) and 
the other half tight (the First Sino-Japanese War, the Entente’s destruction of German 
trade in World War I, and the U.S. destruction of Japanese trade in World War II). With 
the exceptions of the First Sino-Japanese War and Spanish Civil War, the other four 
involved large geographic areas, and the tight commerce raiding campaigns focused on 
interdicting specific war materiel, such as petroleum, or in halting the enemy’s com-
merce raiding efforts. By contrast, all cases resulting in a loss or a draw were porous. 
Nevertheless, in all eight of these cases commerce raiders managed to reduce the flow 
of goods, drive up costs, and impose burdens on the enemy. In all cases the outcome of 
the war turned not solely on commerce raiding but rather on the integration of multiple 
strategies.
Of the eight commerce raiding campaigns that were either victorious or a draw (again, 
excluding the Jeune École), only four were conducted by naval powers, while in the 
four others—the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Spanish Civil War, and the 
Tanker War—the perpetrator hardly had a navy, which is also the case for Somalia. This 
suggests that selected land powers can successfully use commerce raiding operations to 
TABLE 6
Operational and Strategic Effectiveness
CONFLICT THEATER SIZE BOTTLENECK W/L EFFECT
Seven Years’ War (Britain) huge trade W porous
American Revolution (colonies) huge trade W porous
French Wars (France) huge trade L porous
1812 (USA) huge trade D porous
U.S. Civil War (Confederacy) huge trade L porous
Jeune École huge (theory) trade + war materiel W tight
SJWI (Japan) medium troopships W tight
RJW (Russia) medium war materiel L porous
WWI (Germany) huge war materiel L porous
WWI (USA) huge antisubmarine warfare W tight
Spanish Civil War (Fascists) limited coastline war materiel W porous
WWII (Germany) huge war materiel L porous
WWII (Japan) long SLOC petroleum imports L porous
WWII (USA) huge petroleum imports W tight
Tanker War Persian Gulf petroleum exports D porous
Somali pirates long coastline hijack ships  
transiting SLOC
N/A porous
W—commerce raider wins L—commerce raider loses D—draw SLOC—sea line of communication
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further their objectives, in particular if a draw leading to a negotiated settlement is an 
acceptable outcome. On the operational level, commerce raiding provides a means to 
inflict disproportionately high costs on the enemy. For this to translate favorably at the 
strategic level requires avoidance of hostile third-party intervention and the absence of 
cost-effective countermeasures.
Of the six cases studied here that ended in defeat for the side engaged in commerce raid-
ing, four involved land powers targeting the dominant maritime power—France target-
ing Britain in the French Wars, Germany targeting Britain and the United States in both 
world wars, and Japan also targeting the United States in World War II. Similarly, in the 
U.S. Civil War the Confederate navy was inferior to that of the Union. Not surprisingly, 
maritime dominance positions a country to minimize the impact of commerce raiding.
Outside intervention by another great power was the most common reason for strategic 
failure. For example, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries France played a major 
role in opposing Britain—most successfully in the American Revolution—while in the 
twentieth century the United States twice came to Great Britain’s assistance against 
Germany. Whenever commerce raiding has affected the global trade system, such as 
in the Tanker War or potentially in Somalia, great-power diplomatic if not military 
intervention becomes more likely. Affected third parties actively engaged in diplomacy 
in the Seven Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, the First Sino-
Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, both world wars, the Spanish Civil War, and the 
Tanker War. Thus, commerce raiding can entail significant strategic risk.
As naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan observed over a century ago in the concluding 
paragraphs of his classic The Influence of Sea Power upon History, commerce raiding has 
been “a most important secondary operation of naval warfare.” Mahan predicted that it 
was “not likely to be abandoned till war itself has ceased.” But he warned against regard-
ing it as the cheap silver bullet, sufficient on its own “to crush an enemy.” He called such 
optimism “a most dangerous delusion,” particularly when aimed at a strong sea power 
with a “widespread healthy commerce and a powerful navy.” As he argued and this work 
has shown, far-flung commerce “can stand many a cruel shock.” 2
Mahan wrote these lines a generation before the First World War, when commerce raid-
ing figured more prominently than he imagined it might, let alone the Second World 
War, when commerce raiding brought imperial Japan to its knees. Particularly in global 
wars, commerce raiding in combination with other military strategies and other instru-
ments of national power can produce outcomes lethal to the victims. Although the 
Jeune École presented commerce raiding as a weapon of the weaker maritime power to 
defeat the dominant maritime power, in practice it has most often offered a strategically 
288  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP_40 Commerce:_InDesign:04 NP_40 CommerceConclusion.indd September 13, 2013 11:44 AM
effective way for the dominant naval power to set the conditions for the economic 
decline of a continental adversary and thereby to put time on its side in a high-stakes 
attrition war.
Commerce raiding was not strategically decisive but tended to work in combination 
with other strategies, such as blockade, embargo, invasion, and bombing, and together 
these strategies were strategically effective. The maritime powers were more finan-
cially able to conduct these strategies than their continental adversaries were to endure 
them. Over time the cumulative effects changed the balance of forces in the favor of the 
maritime powers by inducing the financial and military exhaustion of the continental 
adversaries. The British victory in the Seven Years’ War, the Entente victory in World 
War I, and the Allied victory in World War II illustrate this pattern.
Certain geographic conditions are particularly favorable to the strategy. Peninsular 
or island adversaries dependent on trade to conduct military operations in conflicts 
against more powerful foes proved particularly vulnerable to commerce raiding. For 
example, the Spanish Republic did not survive the Spanish Civil War, nor did impe-
rial Japan survive World War II. For them, when commerce raiding cut military supply 
lines, defeat loomed.
In most of the case studies examined, the weaker naval power, not the stronger, adopted 
a commerce raiding strategy, since the stronger power, often the guarantor of the 
international order, was more likely to impose a blockade rather than to put interna-
tional commerce at risk.3 This suggests that a weaker naval power could not effectively 
blockade a stronger power and so fell back on commerce raiding as the only feasible way 
to attack the enemy’s trade, disperse it, and impose costs on the enemy’s navy seeking 
to protect endangered trade. Weaker maritime powers engaging in commerce raiding 
have included the American colonies in the American Revolution, France in the French 
Wars, the United States in 1812, the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War, Russia in the 
Russo-Japanese War, and Germany in both world wars. All lost or drew except for the 
American colonies, and in that war a costly insurgency in combination with the French-
supported victory at Yorktown, not commerce raiding, accounted for the British change 
of heart.
Commerce raiding seemed to impose disproportionate costs on the adversary in the 
cases studied, mainly because it was far cheaper to conduct than to eradicate, but this 
was insufficient to change the wars’ outcomes. In fact, with the possible exception of the 
Seven Years’ War, through the end of World War I commerce raiding actually had only 
a minor impact on commerce. In the American Revolution, the French Wars, the U.S. 
Civil War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I, most of the traffic arrived safely. 
Only with the development of technology capable of efficiently locating merchant ships 
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at sea and accurately targeting them did commerce raiding become a potentially lethal 
strategy for the dominant maritime power. In the Pacific theater, this American strat-
egy sank so many Japanese commercial ships so quickly that it virtually froze Japan’s 
expeditionary forces in place, strangled its economy, and immobilized its fleet for lack 
of fuel.
The most strategically effective guerre de course operations included the Entente elimi-
nation of German trade in World War I and the Allied elimination of German, Italian, 
and Japanese trade in World War II. In these cases the victors combined commerce 
raiding with blockade. The dominant naval powers allied themselves and wiped out 
the commerce of their enemies. It was most effective against the one maritime enemy, 
Japan, that had no internal trade routes. Key conditions for these examples were, first, 
the technology to find and destroy targets—in World War II, a combination of cryp-
tography and torpedoes; second, commerce raiding in conjunction with blockade to 
minimize seepage; and third, a global war with no powerful neutrals to ally with the 
victim and resist the raiding.
In regional wars with powerful neutral nations sitting on the sidelines, commerce raid-
ing is likely to prejudice their interests. Second-order effects against neutrals can trigger 
a war-changing third-party intervention. For example, British commerce raiding in the 
Seven Years’ War threatened Dutch interests. In the Russo-Japanese War, Russia aban-
doned its commerce raiding lest Britain and the United States intervene.
Because commerce raiding is inexpensive to conduct but costly to stop, theoretically the 
strategy would work best in a low-stakes war, to work in combination with other strate-
gies to impose high enough costs on the adversary to induce a negotiated settlement. 
But the case studies in this volume do not support this conclusion. For the dominant 
maritime power, naval attacks on commerce threaten the very global commercial order 
it is intent on preserving; any sustained restriction on commerce quickly ups the stakes 
from commercial loss to the survival of the global system. Also, such attacks can affect 
neutral shipping, through higher insurance and freight rates, bringing other interested 
parties into the conflict. Counterintuitively, then, in limited wars where belligerents 
seek to minimize escalation, commerce raiding actually turns out to be extremely ex-
pensive to conduct, given its potentially alienating effect on others.
As technology has changed, so have commerce raiding operations. Attacking coun-
tries have turned to smaller boats, which depend on speed and darkness to succeed. 
The deployment of large naval ships to oppose these efforts has become increasingly 
expensive and often ineffective. In “choke point” commerce raiding, such as the Tanker 
War or Russian commerce raiding in the Red Sea during the Russo-Japanese War, the 
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disruption of trade can impact stock, commodity, and insurance markets, causing nu-
merous second-order effects with potentially global reach.
Owing to the interconnections of the international trading system, commerce raiding 
by developed countries will probably decline, since these nations have ever larger stakes 
in the global economy, but commerce raiding operations by failed or pariah states will 
most likely increase, as they perceive them to be a lucrative business in lands of little 
economic opportunity. The widespread use of GPS and other modern technologies sug-
gests that future commerce raiding attacks may take place hundreds, or even thousands, 
of miles from shore. Countermeasures will thus extend farther out to sea as well, which 
means they will increasingly rely on new forms of aerial and space-based surveillance 
and even interdiction. As before, navies will remain essential for countering commerce 
raiding, but the necessary sensing tools will increasingly require the integration of 
naval, air, and space assets.
Notes
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Mobile Bay  78
Mogadishu  254, 264
Mohican (Union)  81
Molly (merchant)  56n66
Moltke (German)  161
Molucca Islands  216
Mombasa  254
Mongol  107
Mongolia (British merchant)  123
Monte Cristi  18
Monte Cristi Bay  18
Montgomery  73
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morale  63, 79, 86, 116, 272, 274
Morlaix  16
Morocco  165
Mortefontaine Treaty (1800)  44
Morton, Dudley W. “Mush”  232–33
mother ships  127, 243, 255, 262, 264, 277
Moylan, Stephen  33–34
M’Pherson, Captain  15
Mudug region  261, 263
Mukden  116
munitions factories  106
Munya, Hassan  262
Murata rifle  106
Murmansk  162




Nantes  4, 20, 44, 46
Nantucket Chief (U.S. tanker)  167
Nanyang Squadron  113, 114
Naples  180
Napoleon  See Bonaparte, Napoleon
Napoleon III  82–83, 102
Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815)  48, 55n50, 143, 
287 
See also French Wars (1793–1815)
Nassau  19, 77
National Convention  43
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  254
national honor  See honor
Nationalists  See Spain: Spanish Nationalists
NATO  7, 241, 247, 248, 251, 252n6
Nautilus (USN)  70n15
naval warfare  93, 94, 98, 102, 188, 196, 200, 
249, 287
Naviluck (merchant)  254
Nazi Germany  163, 175, 181, 228 
See also Germany
Negrín, Juan  168–69
Nelson, Horatio  157–58
Netherlands  3, 6, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24n52, 
26n94, 43, 79, 83, 139, 141, 143, 145, 171, 175, 
184n24, 184n34, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 216, 
217, 218, 219, 244, 289 
See also Dutch Borneo; Dutch East Indies
Neurath, Konstantin von  173
neutral powers  2, 3, 5, 13–16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
42–43, 44–45, 46, 47, 50, 51–52, 75, 77, 86–87, 
90, 91, 92, 96, 99, 102, 103, 109, 111, 121–33, 
137, 139, 140, 141–42, 145, 147, 151, 165, 166, 
172, 175, 226, 227, 229, 240–41, 243, 244, 246, 
247, 248, 249, 250, 271, 272, 273, 276, 279, 280, 
283, 284, 285, 289
neutral shipping  13–16, 19, 21, 43, 44–45, 46, 
47, 50, 51–52, 75, 77, 90, 91, 92, 96, 109, 111, 
140, 141–42, 145, 151, 153, 176, 226, 227, 229, 
240–41, 243, 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 279, 
283, 285, 289
New England  28, 38n33, 79
Newfoundland  46, 53n13, 79, 192, 194
Newfoundland Grand Banks  192
New Guinea  216, 232
New Orleans  75, 76, 80
Newport  12, 18, 152, 154, 230
new school  See Jeune École
New World  10, 201
New York  12, 15, 16, 18, 54n30, 65, 75, 97, 155, 
267
New York (passenger liner)  152
New York (USN)  157, 159
New Zealand  211
Nian Rebellion  116
nightmare scenario  282, 283, 284
night-vision goggles  261
Nimattulah (merchant)  264
Nimitz, Chester W.  203
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Nine Years’ War (1688–97)  53n16
NKVD  See People’s Commissariat for Internal 
Affairs (NKVD)
Noble, Ronald  265
Nomura Naokuni  221–22
nonferrous metals  220–21
nongovernmental organization (NGO)  7, 243, 
251
Non-Intervention Agreement (NIA)  166, 167, 
171, 174, 175
Non-Intervention Committee (NIC)  6, 166, 
172–74, 177, 184n24
Norasia Samantha (German merchant)  255, 
267n7
North America  3, 10, 12, 16, 18–19, 20, 27, 28, 
33, 46, 57, 59, 67, 151, 161, 191
North Atlantic  4, 57–58, 190, 192–93, 194, 200, 
201, 202, 203 
North Carolina  85
North German Confederation  92, 93, 95, 101
North Sea  98, 138, 139, 140, 143, 147, 156–59, 
160, 161, 162, 250
Norway  138, 140, 141, 156, 160–61, 193, 195
Norwegian Sea  138, 161, 194
notice to airmen (NOTAM)  242, 245
notice to mariners (NOTMAR)  240, 242, 243, 
244, 245, 247, 252n1
Noustar (merchant)  255
Nova Scotia  3, 28, 192
Nuremberg trials  200, 204n3, 206n45
Nyon Arrangement (14 September 1937)  6, 
166, 176–80, 181, 182, 186n55, 186n60
O
Oahu  230
Oberkommando der Marine (OKM)  171
occupy territory  41, 105, 110, 112, 139, 210, 
211, 216–18, 222, 239
Ocean Eagle (Union merchant)  75





New York  152
Seabourn Spirit  256, 264
Tubantia  145
Ocmulgee (Union merchant)  79
Odessa  168
oil  2, 7, 12, 157, 167, 176, 205n26, 211, 215, 
220, 221, 226, 233, 234, 239–51, 263, 271, 272, 
281, 286
oil platforms  246, 248, 252n8, 252n15
oil tankers  2, 7, 167, 176, 192–95, 205n26, 215, 
232, 233–34, 239–51, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 
276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 
286, 287, 289
Bridgeton  245–46
Campeador  176, 185n38
Nantucket Chief  167
Seawise Giant  248
Sungari  247
Texaco Caribbean  245
O’Kane, Dick  238n29
Okinawa  235
Oldenburg  44–45
Old Regime France  41 
See also France
Oman, Gulf of  243
Oman Mohammed subclan  262
Onward (Union)  81
Operational Intelligence Centre, Admiralty  
185n40, 194
Opium War, First (1839–42)  107
Opium War, Second (1856–60)  107
Orange Bay  13
ordnance  78, 83, 114, 115, 152, 153, 230, 231
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Orkney Islands  159
Orlov, Alexander  168, 183n11
Orlov, Vladimir Mitrofanovich  169
Osaka  234
Ostende  140
outfitting ships  35, 42, 76, 78, 79
overseas bases  3, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 90, 95, 96, 
100, 101, 103, 129, 135, 139, 140, 154, 157, 159, 
162, 167, 169, 174, 189, 193, 261
Ōyama Iwao  111
P
P&O Steam Navigation Company  123
Pacific Fleet, Russia  122, 126
Pacific Fleet, United States  230–31
Pacific Ocean  5, 86, 122, 226, 227, 229, 234, 235
Pacific Squadron, Russia  132
Pacific Squadron, United States  80
Pacific War  6, 158, 211, 216, 222, 235–36, 279, 
280, 282, 289  
See also Greater East Asia War
Page, Walter Hines  152, 154
Palanqui, Monsieur  16
Palma de Mallorca  169, 184n26
Palmer, Mick  265
Panama  80, 174, 180, 248–49, 254
“Panama steamers”  174, 180, 184n33
Papenburg  44–45
pariah state  285, 290 
See also failed state
Parillo, Mark  235
Paris  41, 44, 45, 46, 48, 83, 168, 180–81, 183n10
Paris Agreement (30 September 1937)  179, 
180–81
Parliament  11, 19, 21, 22, 39n50
paroled seamen  See prisoner parole
Peace of Amiens (1802)  50
Peace of Paris of 1763  22
Peacock (USN)  65
Pearl Harbor  218, 221, 222, 225, 228, 230, 
236n2
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs 
(NKVD)  168
Perry (Union)  75
Persia (merchant)  127
Persian Gulf  240, 278, 286 
See also Arabian Gulf
Petersburg (Russian)  127–28
Philadelphia  15, 18, 29, 50, 75
Philippines  10, 158, 211, 213, 216, 217, 218, 235
pipelines  240, 243, 250
piracy  ix, 2, 6, 7, 11, 21, 31, 178–79, 181, 
186n58, 253–67, 274
pirates  2, 7, 74–76, 173, 179, 180–81, 185n45, 
227, 253–67, 268n29, 270n54, 272, 276, 277, 
278, 281, 283, 286
Plan Dog  163, 228, 229, 230, 235
plantation economy  12, 20
Plymouth  50, 162
Pohl, Hugo von  139
Pola  144, 145
Poland  228
Politburo  167
Port Arthur  See Lüshun
Port-au-Prince  18
Porto Praia da Vitória  78
Port Royal  13, 81
Port Said  123–24, 127
Portugal  166, 174
Poti  171–72
Pratt, William Veazie  158
President (USN)  60, 62, 65, 70n43
press  11, 13, 15, 16, 21, 35, 62, 76, 80, 106, 108, 
109, 111, 139, 234 
Prieto, Indalecio  172
Pringle, Joel Roberts Poinsett  155–56
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Prinz Heinrich (German merchant)  127
prisoner-of-war exchanges  18
prisoner parole  49–50, 80, 81, 85, 121, 129–31, 
132
prisoners  18, 31, 33, 42, 49–50, 76, 80, 81, 94, 
131, 255
prison ships  49–50, 279
privateer  See commerce raiding: commerce 
raiders
Prize Council  44–45 
See also Conseil des Prises
prize courts  11, 35, 36, 42, 54n19, 55n41, 74, 
75, 98, 124, 142, 146, 241, 243, 247, 248, 278
prize crews  17, 31, 46, 81–82, 138
prize master  19
prize money  3, 4, 7, 9, 11–12, 13, 19, 21, 22, 
28, 34–35, 42–43, 44, 45, 47–51, 52n2, 54n24, 
55n36, 61, 65, 75–76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 92, 
94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 122, 138, 142, 146, 250–51
prize shares  9, 28, 34, 43
propeller  76, 79, 161
Prussia  9, 87, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 106 
Augusta  92, 95
Psyché (French CR)  46
Puerto Rico  80
Puntland  254, 255, 258, 260, 261, 263, 269n44
Pusan  114, 126
P’yŏngyang  110, 112, 114, 115, 116
Q
Qifu  128, 129, 131
Qingdao  132
Qing dynasty  106, 107, 108, 113
Q-ship  142–43, 246
Baralong  142
Quasi-War (1798–1800)  44, 46, 51, 252n7
Queen Elizabeth (HMS)  159
Queenstown  78, 154, 155, 157, 162
R
radar  201, 202, 232, 239, 245, 284 
See also Anti-Submarine Detection 
Investigation Committee (ASDIC) 
radio  161, 188, 190, 191, 194, 195, 200, 201, 239 
See also wireless communications
Raeder, Erich  200
Rahanweyn clan  260, 269n38
raid ashore  266
railways  106, 109–10, 122, 123
Rainbow 3 war plan  229–30
ramming  81, 91, 258
Rappahannock (CSS)  74, 83
Ras Hafoon  255
Rastoropny (Russian)  130
Rattlesnake (USN)  71n65
razee  57, 67, 68, 69n2
reconnaissance  80, 188, 189, 190, 195, 200–201, 
202, 282
Red Cross  240, 251
Red Sea  5, 121, 123–26, 127, 128, 129, 132, 255, 
277, 289–90
Reed, Joseph  33–34
Reeves, Joseph M.  226
refueling  98, 127, 182n7, 192, 194
Reichsmarineamt  See Imperial Navy Office, 
Germany
Reichstag  135
Republicans  See Spain: Spanish Republic
Republic of Somaliland  See Somaliland
Reshitelny (Russian)  128–29, 131, 132
Rhode Island  12, 29, 31, 152, 230
rice  123, 215, 219, 220, 221, 236n2
Richmond  74, 85
Riurik (Russian)  122, 126
Rochefort  16
Rochelais  20
rocket launcher  255
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Rockland  75
Rôdeur (French CR)  48
Rodger, N. A. M.  51, 56n58
Rodgers, John  60, 62, 66
Rodman, Hugh  151, 156–63
Romania  176
Rome–Berlin Axis  See Axis
Roosevelt, Franklin D.  182n6, 228, 230
Roosevelt, Theodore  129
Roshchakovskii, Mikhail Sergeevich  128–29
Rossiia (Russian)  122, 126
Rostum oil platform  246, 247
Rotterdam  13, 15, 141
Royal Holland Lloyd  145
Royal Navy  See Great Britain: British ships
Rozen (merchant)  264
rules of engagement (ROE)  57, 170, 181, 
186n60, 243, 245, 246, 248
Russell, John  74–75
Russia  5, 101, 112–13, 118n29, 121–33, 135, 
136, 162, 168, 181, 259, 272, 273, 276, 277, 279, 










Reshitelny  128–29, 131, 132
Riurik  122, 126




Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)  5, 118n29, 
121–33, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 
282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288, 289–90
S
Saeki Bunrō  218
Saeki Memo  218–19, 221
Saetta (Italian)  176
sailor  10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 32, 36, 42, 43, 44, 
46, 49, 50, 52, 54n20, 85, 98, 121, 130, 131, 133, 
142, 155, 157, 161, 168, 172, 234, 245 
See also seamen
sail power  4, 30, 34, 75, 79, 80, 84, 89, 91, 96, 
97, 100, 103, 142, 145, 261, 282 
See also dual-propulsion ship
Saint Christopher  13
Saint Croix  18
Saint-Domingue  12, 13, 14, 17, 18
Saint Eustatius  13, 14, 15, 18, 26n94
Saint-Jean-de-Luz  16
Saint-Malo  16, 17, 44, 46, 48, 53n16, 55n50
Salem  34
Sampson, William T.  157
Samuel B. Roberts (USN)  248
San Domingo  80 
See also Hispaniola
San Francisco  132
San Jacinto (Union)  80
Santiago de Cuba  157
Sassam oil platform  248
satellites  261, 278
Saudi Arabia  241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 
248, 250
Savannah (CSS CR)  75
Sa Zhenping  129
SC.42 convoy  190 
See also convoys
SC.122 convoy  201 
See also convoys
Scandinavia  139, 160, 162
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Scapa Flow  138, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162
Scarborough raid (1914)  173
Scheer, Reinhard  139, 145, 146, 148, 161
schooner  17, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38n33, 39n38, 
39n45, 65, 75
Scotland  67, 135, 138, 162
Scott, Percy  152
sea-air cooperation  189
Seabourn Spirit (cruise ship)  256, 264
sea control  89, 105, 133, 172, 226, 228–29 
See also control of sea-lanes
Sea Island Terminal  247
Sea King (British ship)  86 
See also Shenandoah (CSS)
Sealion (USN)  227
seamen  4, 20, 30, 31, 35, 36, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 
51, 54n19, 54n20, 55n37, 64, 77, 79, 142 
See also sailor 
sea power  1, 2, 3, 14, 27, 28, 30, 32, 41, 68, 75, 
157, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 283, 287, 288, 289
Seawise Giant (oil tanker)  248
Second Army (Japan)  111, 115
Second Empire (France)  93
Secretary of the Navy  4, 57, 58, 60, 64, 65, 68, 
69n5, 73, 76, 152, 154, 159, 160, 161
Sedan  92
Semmes, Raphael  76–86
Seoul  110, 115
sequential strategy  ix, 29 
See also strategy
Service Afloat and Ashore during the Mexican 
War (Semmes)  76 
Sevastopol  124
Seven Years’ War (1756–63)  3, 9–22, 43, 53n16, 
90, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 279, 281, 283, 
284, 286, 287, 288, 289
Seville  184n33
Shanghai  82, 109, 130, 131, 132, 133
Shanghai murder case  131–32
Shanhaiguan  109–10
Shannon (HMS)  63
shareholders  42, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 55n34
Shatt al-Arab waterway  240
Shenandoah (CSS)  74, 86
Shen Kno II (Taiwanese trawler)  255, 263
shipbuilder  4, 76, 154, 195, 197, 202, 233, 274
ship of the line  57
ship-on-ship battle  4, 57
shipowner  3–4, 29, 35, 36, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 
51, 52, 98
Shipping Administrative Association (SAA)  
214, 215 
shipyards  17, 106
Sicilian Channel  176
side-wheeler  81
Sierra Leone  193
Sims, William S.  6, 152–63
Sinclair, Arthur F.  79, 84–85
Singapore  82, 211, 218, 265
Sino-French War (1884–85)  107, 109
Sino-Japanese War, First (1894–95)  5, 105–17, 
122, 124, 125, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 
279, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287
Sino-Japanese War, Second (1937–45)  210, 211, 
216
Sirri oil platform  243, 244, 248
6th Battle Squadron  159, 160, 161
SJ radar  232 
See also radar
Slade, Edmond J. W.  124
sloop  4, 17, 30, 59, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 75, 77, 78, 
81, 82, 83
small arms  14, 46, 78 
See also guns
Smith, John  60–61
Smolensk (Russian)  127–28
Socotra  255, 268n11
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Sóller  174
Somalia  2, 7, 253–67, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 
276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 283, 285, 286, 287
Somali Coast Guard  255
Somali High Seas Fishing Company (SHIFCO)  
262
Somaliland  254, 260, 261, 269n44
Somali marines  253, 263
Somali National Movement (SNM)  254, 260, 
269n44
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)  
255, 263, 266, 269n44
SomCan security company  258, 262, 263
Somerville, James F.  170
Sŏnghwan  112
sonic boom gun  256 
See also guns
South Africa  82, 128, 193
South America  61, 77, 137
South American Station  67
Southampton  78, 85
South Carolina  30, 44, 60, 73
Southeast Asia  7–8, 209–23, 234
Southern Resources Area  7, 209, 210, 211, 215, 
218
Southern Resources Shipment System  7, 209, 
210–12, 216–18, 222
South Korea  253, 257
Soviet Union  165, 166, 168, 169, 174, 175, 177, 
180, 181, 182, 183n11, 210, 240, 245, 247, 248 
See also Russia
Spain  3, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14–15, 18, 20, 21, 39n50, 
43, 53n16, 77, 79, 90, 92, 94, 96, 157, 165–82, 
183n10, 183n11, 183n13, 184n24, 184n26, 
184n36, 186n52, 186n53, 186n57, 186n60, 250, 
257, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 
281, 282, 285, 286, 287, 288
Spanish Armada  39n50
Spanish Civil War (1936–39)  See Civil War 
(Spanish)
Spanish Nationalists  6, 165–82, 183n13, 
184n24, 186n60, 272, 275, 276, 277, 278, 
279, 280, 281, 283, 285, 286, 287
Spanish Republic  6, 165–82, 184n24, 
184n29, 186n60, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 
279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288
Spanish ships
B-5  170
C-3  170–71, 174, 176, 183n19
Canarias  171–72, 177
Jaime I  173
Miguel de Cervantes  170, 171
Special Imports and Early Imports Programs  
210
Spee, Maximilian von  137
Stalin, Joseph  167, 168, 169, 179, 180, 181, 182, 
186n52, 186n53
Stark (USN)  245, 252n4, 252n15
Stark, Harold R.  163, 228, 229–30
Stark, Oskar Victorovich  122
steam power  74, 76, 79, 81, 82, 91, 93, 96, 
97–98, 100, 103, 157
steel  91, 226
steel hulls  98
Stenzel, Alfred  100–101, 104n31
St. Lawrence, Gulf of  61
St. Lawrence River  58, 61
Stoddert, Benjamin  58
St. Petersburg  125, 127, 128, 131 
See also Leningrad
strategic resources  180, 184n33, 209–23
strategist  ix, 93, 108, 155
strategy  ix, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 27, 28, 29, 
30–32, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42, 47, 49, 50, 57, 58, 59, 
60, 61–65, 66, 68–69, 73, 76, 89, 90, 95, 97, 99, 
100, 101, 103, 105, 109, 110, 111–13, 116–17, 
122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 135–36, 146, 151, 153, 
154, 157, 160, 162, 173, 175, 179, 180, 182, 
188–91, 193–94, 196, 197, 200, 202, 209, 210, 
211, 222–23, 226–27, 228, 229, 230, 235, 247,
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strategy (continued)
253, 264–67, 271, 272, 273, 274, 279, 280, 281, 
282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290 
submarine  ix, 2, 5, 6–7, 73, 135–48, 149n10, 
151, 152, 154, 158, 160, 161, 162, 166, 167, 168, 
169–71, 173–76, 178, 181, 184n29, 185n40, 
185n45, 186n60, 187–203, 209, 213, 220, 221, 
222, 225–36, 238n29, 238n41, 273, 275, 277, 
278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 286 
See also U-boats
Suez Canal  123, 127–28, 144, 179, 254
sugar  10, 17, 18, 33, 211, 221, 236n2
Sugiyama Hajime  210, 213
Suleiman subclan  263
Sultan (Somali clan head)  259
Sumatra  82, 216
Sumter (CSS)  76–77, 79, 83, 86
Sunda Strait  82
Sungari (Liberian-flagged oil tanker)  247
Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces 
(OKW)  191
Surcouf, Robert  48, 55n50
surface raiders  5, 6, 137, 156, 160–61 
See also commerce raiding: commerce raiders
Sussex (French steamer)  146
Syria  241
T
Taar group  262
tactical goals  1, 7, 12, 20, 27, 29, 30, 32, 43, 58, 
62, 99, 132, 146, 155, 160, 187–88, 189, 200, 201, 
227, 232, 250
Taft, William Howard  153
Taiping Rebellion  107–108, 116
Taiwan  112, 211–12, 219, 255, 257
Takahira Kogorō  129
Tallahassee (CSS)  74
Tanaka Documents  214–15, 220
Tanker War (1980–88)  2, 7, 239–51, 252n9, 
272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279–80, 281, 
282–83, 284–85, 286, 287, 289–90
tanks  165, 168
Tarragona  171
Taussig, Joseph K.  155
telegraph  83, 94, 106, 107, 108, 123, 154
telephones  123, 152
Terashima, Lieutenant  128–29
Terceira Island  78
Terdman, Moshe  259–60 
Terrible (British CR)  17 
territorial sea  242
Territorial Sea Convention (1958)  246
Terror (France, 1795)  45
Terror (USSR, 1937)  179, 182, 186n52 
Texaco Caribbean (oil tanker)  245
Texas  80
Thailand  210, 213, 217, 218
3rd Light Cruiser Squadron  161
thirty-two-pounder gun  75, 79, 81, 83
Thurot, François  25n71
Tianjin  109–10
Tirpitz, Alfred von  135, 136, 139, 140, 141–42, 
143, 145, 146
Tōgō Heihachirō  110–11, 118n29, 123, 126
Tōjō Hideki  211, 212
Tokyo  124, 125, 128, 129, 131, 209, 210, 222, 
226, 234, 282
Tokyo Bay  122, 126 
Toronto Economic Summit  249
torpedo  7, 91, 102, 136, 138, 141, 142, 145, 146, 
170–71, 173, 176, 187, 191, 192, 200, 209, 221, 
222, 230–33, 238n26, 239, 271–72, 289
torpedoes, bubble-less ejection  187
torpedoes, noncontact pistols  187
torpedoes, trackless  187
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torpedo boat  ix, 4, 94, 97, 98, 99–100, 102–103, 
114, 115, 122, 123, 126, 147, 171, 203
Torpedo Flotilla (USN)  155
Torricelli (Italian to Spanish)  170, 174
Toulon  20, 99
transatlantic convoys  22, 161, 162 
See also convoys
transatlantic route  5, 12–13, 22, 29, 151, 156, 
161, 162
Treaty of Paris (1856)  127
Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895)  112
Tredegar Iron Works  74
Tribunals of Commerce  45
Triple Entente  151 
See also Entente
Triton (CSS CR)  75
Troop, John  54n30
troopships  5, 28, 105, 109, 110–13, 114, 115, 
116–17, 122, 124, 138, 141, 147, 155, 162, 169, 
180, 184n33, 201, 207n45, 272, 273, 274, 279, 
281, 282, 284, 286
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